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C i t a t i o n of S t a t u t e s . 
In quoting British statute law, the title and the section are 
given, and the citation is appended in a footnote. The titles of 
foreign statutes are preceded by the name of the country to which 
they belong, and in the cae of American ( U.S.A.) Law, by the 
name of the state. 
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A b b r e v i a t i o n s a n d R e f e r e n c e s . 
A full bibliography is appended at the end of this study. 
A list of the abbreviated titles of the works and periodicals 
quoted throughout the whole study is given here. When, however, 
they are quoted for the first time, or in a list of special liter- 
ature, the titles are given in full. 
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P r e f a c e * 
This study is concerned with the problem of a l t e r a t i o n of 
capital in public companies limited by shares. It is exclusively a study 
of comparative law, and the confinement of the subject to p u b l i c 
c o m p a n i e s limited by shares has been imposed only in order to 
facilitate the comparison. There is practically no difference between 
public and private companies in Scots and English Law in respect of the 
alteration of capital, but the difference is growing enormously in other 
systems of law, where private companies are usually regulated by separate 
legislative acts, and very often bear a quite different "trade.name" of 
their own. Thus, for example, the German institutions of G.m.b.H. and 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, the Brazilian sociedade por quotas de 
responsabilidade limitada, the Italian Società anonima per quote, and 
their counterparts in other countries are excluded from this study 1. 
The term "limited companyQ is used throughout to denote a public 
company limited by shares, the other types of limited companies not being 
included in this study. When using the term "private corporation ", the 
whole group of capitalistically organised "commercial associations" is 
meant ; but when the latter term is used, I intend to include partnership 
and similar types of association in my discussion. 
1, Cf. W.Hallstein, "Die Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung in den Auslandsrechten 
verglichen mit dem deutschen Recht ", in : "Zeitschrift far ausländisches und inter- 
nationales Privatrecht ", vol.12, Berlin 1939, pp. 348 ff, and p. 354 ; and Ph. de 
Sola Canizares and H.Aztiria, Tratado de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, 
vol. I, Buenos Aires 1950, pp. 3 -7. 
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In principle, I shall also confine myself to 
the youngest branch of 
company law, i.e. to those companies which were incorporated 
by registrat- 
ion under the Companies Acts, and which accordingly came into 
being after 
1844. Nor is it my intention to attend to the special problems of 
p u b l i c c o r p o rat i o n s, i.e. state -owned corporations, 
and statutory, chartered and cost -book companies 1, although 
they are 
theoretically forms of company that should be included in the framework 
of a study of public companies. But since these problems tend to become 
a special branch of company law, they are generally omitted here 
2 
Further, I intend to deal not only with alteration of capital, but 
some the problems of a l t e r a t i o n in capital, 
i.e. alteration which does not involve an alteration of the total amount 
of the capital. On the other hand, problems of alteration of capital in 
connection with a change in the legal form of the company, say, from 
"unlimited" to "limited ", or from "limited by guarantee" to "limited by 
shares ", - the problems of a final repayment of capital in the case of a 
winding -up of a company, and any type of change of capital in connection 
with amalgamation or reconstruction, are excluded from this work. 
1. L.C.B. Gower, The principles of Modern Company Law, London 1954, pp.6 ff. 
2. M.S.Culp, "Creation of Government Corporations by the National Government" , in : 
"Michigan Law Review ", vol.33 (1935), PP.473 -511; O.P.Field, "Government corporat- 
ions: A proposal ", in : "Harvard Law Review ", vol.48 (1935), pp.775-796 ; S.Reed, 
T.W.Palmer and L.B.Wehle, "Government- Controlled Business Corporations: a symposium; 
in : "Tulane Law Review ", vol. 10 (1935), PP.79 -101 ; and L.B.Wehle, Government 
controlled business corporations in America and Europe, Washington 19350 
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Similarly debentures, since they are not part of the capital, are also 
excluded ; but the survey of the so- called p r e - e m p t i v 
e rights 
(using this term of American doctrine throughout the work) is extended 
to those pre -emptive rights which are owned by debenture -holders, 
This study is undertaken from the point of view of 
c o m p a r a t i v e l a w not only to widen the observation 
of trends, and not only to investigate possible impacts of one legal 
system upon another, - but also to present factual material illustrative 
of this particular problem of company law 1 . Although it might seem at 
first glance that the "segment" of company law chosen for this study is 
a very narrow one, is impracticable to make a 
universal survey even here, and the law of only a dozen countries, 
eleven of them European, has been selected for detailed analysis. Thus 
the chapter comprising individual surveys of the relevant law of different 
countries is sub -divided accordingly, and the law of other countries is 
mentioned only as the need arises. I shall also leave aside completely 
Soviet Law, and the sovietised law of the countries behind the Iron 
Curtain, regardless of whether their status has been recognized de jure 
by this country, although the Soviet Law on joint stock companies re- 
1. Any study of comparative law is apt to draw on sources which are more in the 
nature of "text- books" and "jurists' articles" than "case- books" and 
judicial decisions. 
mains on the statute books of the Soviet Union 1. I shall,however, in 
a few cases mention the pre- soviet law of Baltic countries and other 
countries that are now under Soviet influence. 
The first individual survey is on Scots and English Law, thus 
serving as an initial point in the chapter comprising such surveys 
of various legal systems. It is rather difficult to find a good 
solution for the order of study of the other ten systems of law. 
Neither a grouping of Common Law countries together, and of those 
of the European continent apart, subdividing them perhaps according 
to their history into Germanic and Romanic countries, nor a treatment 
1. The practice of issuing governmental licences for organisation of such joint 
stock companies was discontinued a long time ago (since about 1927). 
Cf. V.Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law, Ann Arbor (Mich.) 1949, vol.2, p.187. 
To mention only one example : the joint stock company Sovtorgflot existed as 
such a company from 1926 to 1931, when it was reshaped as a "federal association ". 
Similarly, the joint stock company Sovfracht was reshaped as a "federal asso- 
ciation" in 1930. Cf. A.D.Keilin, Sovetskoye Morskoye Pravo, Moscow 1954,PP.32 
and 43. Even these joint stock companies of the late twenties had never been 
formed in the Soviet Union but as state enterprises, all shares being held by 
the state or its state autonomous corporations. Cf. P.Arminjon, Baron B.Nolde 
and M.Jiolff, Traité de droit comparé, vol.III, Paris 1952, p.310, and A.Krimmer, 
Sociétés des capitaux en Russie imperials et en Russie sovietique, Paris 1934. 
This is the reason why Soviet Law is not included in this study. Besides, even 
if it were not a mere dead letter of the statute book, to compare it with Western 
Law would be impossible owing to the different economic backgrounds, and their 
incompatability, due in part to the reduced amount of legal ability of the Soviet 
citizen. Cf. M.Cakste, "Das persönliche Eigentum des Sowjetbürgers", in : "Ost- 
europarecht", vol.1, Stuttgart 1955, pp.27 ff. 
For similar reasons apparently F.de Sola Canizares omitted the Soviet countries 
in his recent study on "The Rights of Shareholders ", in : "International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly ", vol. 2, London 1953, pp.564 ff. 
It is , perhaps, still too early to express an opinion whether the recent 
"thawing" in Soviet countries may mean an increase of legal ability in their 
citizens, and whether that may lead to a genuine revival of company law. 
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in 
of all these countries in a purely chronological, or any geographical 
order, would be satisfactory. The impacts of one legal system upon another, 
and the various degrees and styles of their interdependencies appear to be 
so complex that it seems to be almost impossible to find an ideal order in 
which the danger of anticipation of some comparisons would be least. I 
would submit therefore, without any pretence to a solution that would 
satisfy everybody, the following order of treatment of these ten countries: 









I tried to indicate by this grouping of these countries their 
respective affinities one to the other 1, and this placing of the material 
would minimise the possibility of anticipation of legal sources which would 
be dealt with only in one of the subsequent surveys. Italian Law, though 
traditionally akin to French Law, is treated later, since in this case the 
1. The number indicate the order of treatment. 
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impact of modern German and Swiss Law is obvious. The Laws of Sweden and 
Liechtenstein, though Germanic in many respects, could not be placed on the 
list before American Law, since both of them were written one eye firmly 
fixed upon American Law. They belong also to different jurisprudential 
generations, the latter being senior to the former 1. Spanish Law, as 
the cadet of the family, has to bring up the rear. 
The term "charter" is used in the sense of the dovument of constitution 
of a company, and covers both the case where there are two such documents, 
i.e. the Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association in 
Britain, and their equivalents, e.g. "Articles" or "Certificate of 
Incorporation" and "By -Law" 3 in America, as well as the single instrument 
where the division into memorandum and aricles is unknown, e.g. in France, 
Germany and Switzerland 
4. 
1. Cf. infra p. 254. 
2. The term "deed of settlement ", used prior to 1856, bifurcated into "memorandum" and 
"articles" only in the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 (19 and 20 Vict.,cap.47). 
Cf. C.A.Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company, Manchester 1950, p.158, and 
W.Hallstein, Die Aktienrechte der Gegenwart, Berlin 1931, p.117. 
In the Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts of 1845 the term "special act" was used 
to denote : " ... any Act which shall be hereafter passed incorporating or 
constituting a Joint Stock Company ". Cf. J.Charlesworth, The Principles of 
Cpmpany Law, London 1932, p.262, and G.W.Wilton, Company Law and Practice in 
Scotland, Edinburgh 1912, p.614. 
The terms "memorandum" and "articles" were practically unknown in 1845. 
3. Cf. infra pp. 214 -215, and p.223, note 7. 
4. H.W.Goldschmidt, English Law from the foreign standpoint, London 1937, p.170. 
I. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
"The meaning of corporation, like the meaning of property and liberty, 
has been changing during decades and centuries" And undoubtedly there 
is some ambiguity 2 about its meaning, for its nature has always been 
hybrid. At one time it appears to be an association of human beings, at 
another time a persona , i.e. a legal mask concealing human beings. 
Again, we find it as a separate body not to be identified with its members, 
and at another time a mere dummy concealing the content, the base, the 
common interest and the acts of its members. This elastic ability to 
change shape, this privilege of being a "convenience ", as Roscoe Pound 
3 
is supposed tb have said, may well have been considered to be its leading 
characteristic some thirty years ago : but since then the "centre of 
gravity" has moved over in remarkable fashion from private law to public 
law. The ability to change shape has decreased. Instead of companies 
possessing the privilege of being a "convenience ", we may trace signs 
of its becoming a public burden to be a public company 4. Membership as 
a relation between shareholders and the legal entity tends to diminish, 
1. John R.Commons, Legal foundations of Capitalism, New York 1924, p.291. 
2. Georges Ripert, Aspects juridiques du capitalisme moderne, Paris 1946, p.93. 
3. Commons, p.292. 
4. Historians assert sometimes that it may happen quite often that former privileges 
turn to be burdens. Cf. Arnold J.Toynbee, A study of history, vol.IX, London 1954, 
pp. 554, note 2. 
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and to touch a much. smaller field of operation, 
leaving the "loin's stare" 
of management and influence to the inner circle of 
the leading officers. 
The institution of corporations is, legally and sociologically, under- 
going a never -ceasing transformation. This transformation becomes apparent 
in all branches and forms of the institution, but, naturally, it becomes 
more apparent where several changes occur together. Such changes cannot be 
studied in complete isolation from one another, but it is beyond the scope 
of this study to present a picture of all the developments in the whole 
institution of public companies. 
Historically, the hybrid nature 1 of limited companies stems from the 
mixture of two different elements : elements originating in the Roman Law 
instututions of corporatio and societas , and the lements originating in 
Germanic sources. This mixture has become the main type of capitalistic 
enterprise 2, with a system of contracts in the background. 
1. There is, in fact, hardly any institution that could claim to be absolutely mono - 
genous; and claims of monogenosity indicate generally an extreme selfcentredness, as 
much as a stress of the hybridity sometimes indicates lack of initial basis. 
2. The continental jurisprudence knew for about a hundred years the subdivision of 
trading or commercial associations, or corporate enterprises, into "capitalistic" 
and personal associations. Public and private companies were usually attributed to 
the "capitalistic" associations, partnership to the personal ones. All types of 
commercial associations (F.: "socibtts commerciales ") and all single merchants 
(F.:"commer9ants individus ", G.: "Einzelkaufleute ") bear together the legal Quality 
of traders or merchants. This legal concept was known in this country in the times 
of Law Merchant, W.Bowstead ( "The Commercial Laws of the World ", vo1.24, part I ) 
translated the term "Handelsgesellschaften" by "trading associations ". Cf. op.cit., 
p. 78, p. 82, note 1, and p.107. 
Cf. Arminjon - Nolde -Wolff, vol.II, pp. 175, 228, 414 -415, 540 -541; Ph.de Sola Caniza- 
res and H.Aztiria, Tratado de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, vol.1, p.20; 
R.Fischer, "Die Personenvereinigungen ", in : "Handbuch des gesamten Handelsrechts", 
(ed. by V.Ehrenberg), vol.III, part I, Leipzig 1916, pp.1 -11; P.Gieseke, "Das Wesen 
der Kapitalgesellschaft ", in : "Deutsche Landesreferate zum III Internationalen 
Kongress für Rechtsvergleichung ", Tübingen 1950, pp.622 ff.; H.Würdinger, Kommentar 
zum Handelsgesetzbuch, 2nd ed., vol.Il, Berlin 1953, Pp133 ff. 
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Though it might seem at first that the conception of a limited 
company as a legal entity, or as the French say, a personnalitè morale, 
would facilitate modification of the charter and an alteration of the 
capital 1, this has not proved to be the case. One of the most fragile 
features of this hybrid was just the inconsistency between the separate 
legal personality and anonimity 2 of the company on the one hand, and the 
inability to alter and amend the charter on the other hand. The impossibili- 
ty of foreseeing the development of economic conditions and the actual 
needs of the company, and th4 inflexibility of the constitution of the 
legal body revealed almost at once its weak point. The created legal shell 
of the limited company, so very much acclaimed urbi et orbe as an unsur- 
passed achievement of legal architecture, proved almost at once to be 
lagging behind life and the requirements of economic reality 3. 
The elements of partnership were initially so strong in the basic 
1. R.Cuènet, De la rèduction du capital social dans les soci6tès anonymes, Droits 
suisse, français et allemand, Montreux 1925, p.32. 
2. Anonimity, the quality of remaining unknown, is as regards commercial associations 
the quality of hiding the human beings behind the screen of the legal entities and 
their officers. 
Cf. P.Gieseke, "Das wesen der Kapitalgesellschaft ", p.635. 
3. Jnsserand, "Comment les textes de loi changent de valeur au grè des 
phbnomenes economiques ", in : "Etudes de droit civil d la memoire de Henri 
Capitant ", Paris (s.a., 1939), pp.369 ff. 
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1 
structure of limited companies that the rigour and strength of the 
civil law's demands concerning the binding force of contracts dominated 
the life and physiology of the legal entity embodied as a limited company. 
Only with time did the requirements of practical life teach the jurists to 
seek in the quality of a separate unit the answer to the quest for a more 
elastic form. The stress was changing from the personal to the corporative ? 
from the contract to the charter. So long as the contract between the 
shareholders, and between the shareholders and their company, and between 
the shareholders and the state 3 dominated the whole situation, so long as 
these contracts were not yet wholly covered by the charter, the principles 
of civil law were in the foreground. Since the stress has now moved towards 
the public and formal, different principles of interpretation emerge. 
Where the duality of civil and commercial law exists, the latter is taking 
the lead and overshadows the background of civil law. 
One of the reasons why this element of company law, i.e. alteration 
of capital, was chosen as the subject of a more detailed study, was its 
1. Cf. N.Lindley, A treatise on the Law of Partnership, including its application to 
Joint -Stock and other Companies, two vol., London 1860; and Sir Nathaniel Lindley, 
W.B.Lindley and N.C.Gull, A treatise on the Law of Companies considered as a branch 
of the Law of Partnership, 5th ed., London 18890 
The first mention of the possibility of a reduction of capital (cf.infra p.66, 
note 3, p. 71, and pp. 87 ff.) was at that time interpreted as "an assimilation 
to the principles of private partnership ". Cf. "Law limes ", vol.64 (1877),p.41. 
2. P.Pic and J.Kreiaer, Des societes commerciales, vol.I, Paris 1940, p.1940 
3. This "trefoil" of contractual relations dominated American doctrine on private 
corporations for a very long time. L.C,B.Gower ( "Some Contrasts between British 
and American Corporation Law ", in : BLR, vol.69, pp.1371 and 1380) is, however, 
of the opinion that, except concerning the pre -emptive rights, English legislature 
and courts have relied on partnership principles to a much greater extent than 
have the American. 
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proximity to the most essential element of this type of private corpor- 
ations. Since they are the most "capitalistic" 
1 
of all corporations, 
the problem of the amount, forms and flexibility of this capital is 
really important, especially in view of the fact that this capital is 
more easily attacked by the creditors than its reserves 2. Its inter- 
dependency with the problem of structural transformation of "capitalism" 3 
itself, its relationship with the problem of membership, and, last but not 
least, the fact that this is one of the most intricate and widely spread 
problems of contemporary company law, suggested that it was ripe for a 
more detailed study 4. If "capitalism" appears to be a singularly 
malleable institution 5, so are per excellence all legal institutions 
based on or derived from capitalism. If capitalism has changed, and may 
change further (since no live thing or phenomenon is able to escape from 
change), all such changes have to be considered as natural, and on the 
whole as "healthy ". Any achievement bears in itself the nucleus of its 
destruction. The values of commercial life are transitory. On the contrary 
1. Cf. supra p.15, note 2. 
2. A.Siegwart, "Die Aktiengesellschaft ", in "Das Obligationenrecht" (published by 
Bürgi, Egger, Gutzwiller and others), Zurich 1945, P.380. 
3. Among the vast literature on this subject I would like to mention only : G.Pirou, 
La crise du capitalisme, 2nd ed., Paris 1956(cf. especially pp.163 ff.), and the 
collective study : "The Future of Democratic Capitalism" (published by Pennsylvania 
University), Philadelphia 1950. 
4. J.Escarra, E.Escarra and J.Rault, Traité théorique et pratique de droit cgmmercial, 
Les societes commerciales, vol.I, Paris 1950, p.40. 
5. A.A.Berle, Jr, "Corporations and the Modern State ", in : "The Future of Democratic 
Capitalism ", Philadelphia 1950, p.55. 
-19- 
- law lags behind life, and this lagging behind is inseparable from 
and immanent in the institution "law" itself, just as the diversity 
and temporality of its phenomena are an essential part of any life. 
It is typical of all private corporations, and only of them, 
that there exists some duality, and even, perhaps, some ambiguity 
between the notions "capital" and "assets" 1, unknown to the other 
commercial associations.. We may have the impression that this duality 
of these notions "capital" and "assets" should disappear where the 
difference between corporations and partnerships as units of business 
life and forms of corporate enterprise does not exist 
29 
or, although 
existing initially, as soon as this difference diminishes. Some 
German authors thought that this could be achieved, perhaps, by 
stressing the structure of the limited company as a legal entity, 
or a body -of- its -own, and by trying to forget that the membership 
or "shareholdership" is still its basis, thus putting all types of 
business enterprise on the same footing. But that is apparently 
not so. 
The difference originates not in the quality of being a legal entity, 
not in the oddness of a limited company in comparison with the4 so- called 
1. K.Rauch, Kapitalerhöhung aus Gesellschaftsmitteln, vol.I, Graz 1947, pp. 1 ff.; 
and W.Schmid, Das feste Grundkapital der Aktiengesellschaft, Aarau 1948, p.141. 
2. E.g. in French, Italian and Scots Law. 
Cf. infra p. 67 and note 1. 
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personal associations 1 like partnership, but in the legal regulations 
prohibiting the public companies from acting on the same footing as 
individual traders or single merchants , or personal associations, 
especially in countries where the principles of ultra vires are dominant. 
Apparently, the state is strongly disinclined to treat them on the same 
footing 3, and therefore applies the principles of jus cogens to them 
much more strictly than to partnerships his T again applies in a greater 
extent to public companies than to private ones 5. Thereafter, the 
difference may be found to lie in the winding -up formalities, in the 
restrictions concerning the amount of dividends payable to the shareholders, 
in the restrictions concerning the creation of undisclosed or secret 
reserves, and, last but not least, in the restrictions on alteration 
of capital, the sum considered by some systems of law as having the 
quality of a fund for indemnifying the creditors, 
1. Cf. supra p. 15, note 2. 
2. I.e. merchants trading without partners and without formation of a company. 
3. An opposite point of view was expressed by G.W.Wilton (Company Law, Principal 
distinctions between the Laws of England and Scotland, London 1923, p.22),who 
reproaches apparently the state in saying : " It does not seem right that companies 
should be allowed to trade in England in a way not open to the individual trader ". 
4. An American controversy about this question appears in C.Magruder's article: "A note 
on partnership liability of stockholders in defective corporations ", in :HLR, 
vol.40 (1927), pp.735 -751. Another famous American contribution to this question 
was an article by rY.N.Hohfeld ( "Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for 
corporate debts ", in : "Columbia Law Review ", vol.9, New York 1909, pp.285 -320, 
reprinted in W.N.Hohfeld's legal essays : Fundamental Legal Conceptions, New. Haven 
1923, pp. 197 -200, and notes 9 -14). 
5. W.Scherrer, "Die Kapitalerhöhung bei der Aktiengesellschaft ", in : "Festgabe der 
Basler Juristenfakultát zum schweizerischen Juristentag", Basle 1942, p.60 (also 
published as a separate book in the series "Basler Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft"). 
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But, perhaps, the real reason for a different attitude to and for a 
differ- 
ent interpretation of the notion "capital" for limited companies 
lies not 
so much in the fact of "membership" as a basis (since partnership and 
other 
personal associations have also their "membership "), but rather in the more 
intense interest of the state in this category of units of enterprise, 
the 
"upper" class of the state's economy. 
It is generally assumed that p u b l i c companies are one of the forms 
of p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s. A more close investigation, 
however, reveals that they bear this epithet "public" with justification, 
for they are, in fact, more subject to the impact of the p u b l i c ele- 
ment than any other form of corporate enterprise 1. In so far as law is 
concerned, they are enterprises run for private profit, and thus are the 
typical representatives of the so- called "monopoly capitalism" 2, and there 
seems to be no legal obligation on this or that company to act in any other 
way besides that which would seem advantageous to its private interests.Ye- 
vertheless, one may assert that more than any other type of company, they 
not only follow in practice the national and public economic interests, and 
serve as a medium of national policy, but they exist under a certain strain 
that they "ought not operate for the sole purpose of making profit for 
their shareholders" 3. 
1. Lord Greene said in In re Smith and Fawcett Limited (116,L.T.Rep.,279) that private 
companies (though being separate entities in law as much as the public companies) 
are much more analogous to partnerships, especially from the point of view of busi- 
ness and personal relationship. Cf.also : "The Law Times ",vol.216 (1953), p.640. 
2. Berle, pp. 45 and 36. 
3. L.C.B.Gower, "Corporate Control : The battle for the Berkeley ", in : HLR, vol.68 
(1955); p.1190, note 51, and p.1191 # and L.C.B.Gower, "Some Contrasts between 
British and American Corporation Law ", in : HLR, vol.69 (1956), p.1375. The trend to- 
wards state intervention in matters of business was noted by Dicey. Cf.Cooke, p.179. 
-22- 
There are signs that lead one to the conclusion that the community of 
members or shareholders is no longer an essential element of a public com- 
pany, or, at least, does not feature to the same extent as previously, and 
the accent on membership, so well known in partnership, is not nearly s0 
pronounced as heretofore. 
The ideas of "authorized capital ", and of "voteless preference shares, 
and, although in the opinion of only some authors, of "no- par -value shares "1 
have fundamentally disrupted the close contact that had initially existed 
between member and share in the capital. This process of disruption conti- 
nued when the idea started to gain ground that the contributions of the 
shareholders were not the only way of assembling the capital of a limited 
company. An increase of capital out of surplus is one of the other ways.One 
has to remember also that the court has nowadays acquired the right to amend 
the charter even against the wish of the shareholders. The possibility of 
"no- man -companies "3 is the next step in this line of development 4. The idea 
1. E.g. J.C.Bonbright, W.W.Cook and other American authors. 
Cf. also infra pp, 32 and 284 -285. 
2. Cf. infra pp.109 -110. 
3 This possibility was still energetically denied in the late twenties by the American 
jurist E.M.Dodd, Jr.( "Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporat- 
ions", in HLR, vol.40, pp.523 -525). 
This development is now apparent, and not only in all public corporations created as 
a result of a nationalization to exploit the nationalized sector of the national 
economy, but also, though, may be, to a lesser extent, in cases where one speaks 
about a "self- perpetuating control or management ". Cf. E.M.Dodd and R.J.Baker, Cases 
and Materials on Corporations, 2nd ed., Brooklyn 1951, p. 909. 
Professor L.C.B.Gower ( "Corporate Control : The battle for the Berkeley ", in : HLR, 
vol.68, p.1192 and note 60, and "Company Directors and Take -over Bids ", in "The 
Listener ", vol.55, p.21) mentions the appointment of the 
trustees of a Staff 
Pension Fund by the board of directors as an effective act of re- insurance. 
4. Cf. infra p. 26. 
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that membership could be destroyed by a reduction of capital 1 without 
consent, even, perhaps, without consultation with the member, somehow 
contradicted our basic conception of the mutual relations between members 
and the body that was built up by them. The terms "member" and "shareholder," 
once synonymous, are tending now to acquire different meanings 2. 
The voting rights of a shareholder are generally considered to be one 
of his rights that are basically rooted in his status as a member of the 
company, but recent development shows more and more that a disruption has 
taken place. One needs only mention here the voteless preference shares 3. 
"Membership" and "shareholdership" have with time grown so far apart in 
meaning 4 that it is sometimes difficult to imagine that these conceptions 
were not so very long ago generally regarded as almost identical, these 
1. Schmid, p.109 and note 15. 
"1as rivate Becht der 
2. R.Múller- Erzbach ( Mitglpiedschaft als Prufstein eines kausalen Rechtsdenken4 Weimar 
1948, p.90) asserts that it is simply the fixation of the "membership" to a sum of 
money that marks the first divergence between "membership" and "shareholdership ". 
Siegwart (p.159) laid that a minimum of voting rights was an essential of "member- 
ship", but he thought that since the appearance of voteless preference shares one 
should try to find a new notion to replace the old obsolete idea of "membership ". 
3. A.B,Levy, Private Corporations and their Control, London 1950, pp.255, 300, 562, 577 
and 649 -651 ; and R.Teichmann and W.Koehler, 4ktiengesetz, Heidelberg 1950, 
PP249 ff. 
4. This development at first appears, although very vaguely, to have been noticed by 
some Swiss jurists (cf.e.g.R.Cuenet, pp.33 and 44), So did the Scots jurist 
A,C.Bennett also in one of his remarks ( in : "Scots Law Times", News, Edinburgh 
1936, p.70). It.was later the subject of a special study by R.Múller- Erzbach (op. 
cit.). Cf. infra p. 155, note 1. 
It should also be noted that in French jurisprudence and legal nomenclature the 
position has almost been reached where "member" ( "associe ") is rather used in the 
case of partnership and similar personal association, but "sharreholder "( "actionnairë) 
in the case of public and private companies and similar corporations. 
Cf. Escarra-Rault, vol.I, pp.571 -572 ; vol.11, p.56 and pp,473 -474. 
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terms being used quite interchangeably. They are noe, however, receiving 
quite different meanings, the first one denoting a personal relationship, 
the second an obligation. "Membership" is tending to degennerate into a 
titular position with almost no content at all 1 ; "shareholdership" is 
tending to expand and to cover areas which not so very long ago were con- 
sidered to be purely referable to membership. 
Membership has become an unmeasurable conception, and in cases of an 
exchange of shares, or an increase of capital, or a renunciation of 
pre -emptive rights, one is more and mote ceasing to speak about "partial 
or total extinction of membership ", about "diminishing of membership ", 
about "replacement of an old membership by a new one ". These terms belong 
to the past. If "membership" is now a mere principle, the next step in 
this direction my be that in the structure of public companies this 
notion may become optional. 
Reference to the members of a projected alteration of capital that 
leads to an alteration in the amount of shares through increase or 
reduction of capital, may still exist in the form of a general meeting 
1. E.Maller ( Kapitalherabsetzung bei der Aktiengesellschaft, Berne 1938, p. 19) 
expands the idea that the notion "membership" becomes brittle in the course 
of time, especially when the amount of rights formerly attached to "membership" 
and described as droits acquis is gradually diminishing. 
Scherrer (p. 48, b ) gives another good example of such a degeneration into a 
position of a "mere " -membership (G. : " ..blosse Mitgliedschaft"), 
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where the members are asked to act as the supreme sovereign organ of 
the company. But this does not necessarily happen, since one may 
visualize the possibility of such a decision w i t h o u t the obligatory 
activisation of the general- meeting -apparatus : not only in the case 
of an increase of capital within the limits of an authorized capital, 
not only in the form of a collecting of the written assent of a certain 
number of shareholders instead of summoning of a general meeting 1, but 
also in the cases of a revaluation of capital in connection with a 
currency reform, or the transfer, to another state , of territory 
with all the companies domiciled there. 
There is a fairly large amount of psychology in the relationship 
between shareholders and the company to which they belong. In earlier 
stages of development they condidered themselves as co- proprietors 2 of 
the enterprise, and one still finds this attitude in family businesses, 
where the legal entity is only a method of disguise, merely an easily 
seen -through mask.'This applies generally to private companies 3 and their 
I. Cf. infra pp. 226 and 278. 
2.T he expression "the shareholders are the owners" can still be found in popular 
usage. Cf. e.g. Dodd -Baker, p.904 ; and L.C.B.Gower, "Company Directors and 
Take -over Bids ", in : " The Listener ", vol.LV, London 1956, p.20. 
3. It is curious to note that the fact that it is impossible to issue share warrants 
in p r i v a t e c o m p a n i e s markedly diminishes their anonymity. This 
is, once more, a sign of a growing gulf between these two types of private cor- 
porations. 
Cf. F.W.Bürgi, "Die Aktiengesellschaft ", in : "Das Obligationenrecht" (published 
by Bürgi, Egger, Gutzwiller and others), Zurich 1947, P. 49 ; and Charlesworth, 
p. 112. 
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counterparts on the European continent 
1. 
In the case of p u b l i c 
companies we are far away from this attitude, since the psychology of 
2 
co- proprietorship has been superceded by that of investorship . There 
are also found even more extreme examples of this development, where 
bodies legally shaped as public companies do not possess an understructure 
of membership, "shareholdership" or similar institution in the traditional 
style, as e.g. nowadays in companies owned either by the Government, or by 
municipalities, or by other public bodies, or with all shares belonging in 
trust to the same legal entity, or all shares belonging to a single person. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to consider over the relationship 
between law, jurisprudence, philosophy and sociology. I would like to 
refer in this connection to the studies of Prof.G.Gurvitch 3, Prof.Roscoe 
Pound 4and Prof. N.S.Timasheff 5, and merely mention the lesser known 
1. This applies even more to a certain few foreign companies where we find a legal 
entity with the institution of membership shaped on the lines of a limited company, 
but with a legally recognised co- proprietorship in some of the property or real 
estate exploited by the company, as e.g. in the cases of Chilean "mining companies ", 
the German " Gewerkschaft" and the Latvian "shipping associations ". 
Cf. G.M.Hamburger, "Aktiengesellschaft ", in : " Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch 
für das Zivil -und Handelsrecht" (ed.by F.Schlegelberger), vol.II, Berlin 1929, 
pp. 446, 454, 484. 
2. Even theorists of accounting are starting to assert that ownership of capital is 
somehow being reduced to a secondary role in limited companies. 
Cf.F.Sewell Bray, Four Essays in Accounting Theory, London 1953, pp. 44 f. 
My attention to the works of this scholar was drawn by Professor A.G.Murray, of 
Edinburgh University, to whom I express my gratitude. 
3. G.Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, London 1947. Cf. intra p. 29, note 3. 
4. R.Pound, "Sociology of Law" in : " Twentieth Century Sociology" (ed. by G.Gurvitch 
and q.E.Moore) , New York 1945. 
5. N.S.Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law, Cambridge (Mass.) 1939. 
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1 
theories of the American Chief Justice B.N.Cardozo (1870 -1938) and 
the 
2 
Russian Professor W.I.Sinaiski (1876 -1949). 
The amounts of pragmatism and theorizing may be compounded differently 
in different countries. One generally speaks about the "happy pragmatism" 
of the Anglo- Saxons, and it is usually assumed that the British attitude 
is of a strictly practical character 3, as that may be tested e.g. by the 
British attitude to problems of Constitutional Law, and even to the notion 
of "constitutionality" 4. The general psychology of a particular people 
1, B.N.Cardozo, Growth of the Law, New Haven 1927 ; Nature of Judicial Process, New 
Haven 1928 ; The paradoxes of legal science, New York 1928 ; Law and Literature, 
3rd ed., New York 1934 ; Selected writings, New York 1947. 
See a witty remark on his theories by the American jurist E.M.Dodd, Jr., "Dogma and 
Practice in the Law of Associations ", in : HLR, vo1.42, pp.977 -1014. 
2. Sinaiski tended to accentuate the juridical approach, centring his study around the 
artificial figure of the "civil- law -community ", or, the "society" of people living 
under the same civil law. Thus, the Scots and the English "civil- law -communities" 
would have been two entirely different units in his research into the inter- 
relationship between civil law and sociology. In comparison with the genetic 
sociology of Gurvitch (cf. pp.49 and 227), who, analysing by means of "dynamic 
macrosociology ", studied the tendencies and factors of changes, developments and 
decays of the law of particular types of society, the theories of Sinaiski, though 
also "macrosociological" in some respects, were rather static, studying the 
sociological behaviour of individuals as seen through the prism of patterns 
and symbols of the civil law of that country. 
His main works were : Rome et son droit théocratique et laique considérés au point 
de vue de la mythologie, de l'historiographme et de l'histoire, Riga 1928 ; Abhand- 
lungen zur Theorie und Geschichte des Zivilrechts, Riga 1930 ; Théorie de la 
chronologie ancienne civile et naturelle, Riga 1931 ; Identité des lois et base 
chronologique de l'histoire romaine, Riga 1932. 
3. There are, however, signs that an appreciation of ideological aspects and an 
avareness of ideas acquired exclusively, or almost exclusively, by a theoretical 
approach are increasing. 
Cf. e.g. E.Shonfield, "The end of the laissez- faire ", in : "The Listener ", vol.LV, 
London 1956, pp. 163 ff. ; and Peregrine Worsthorne, "Democracy v.Liberty ", in : 
"Encounter ", vol. VI (1), London 1956, pp. 8 ff. The latter even points out that 
a one -sided practical approach might be a "dangerous indulgence ". 
4. It is worth while noting that the Scottish reaction is nowadays slightly less 
practical, since, as seen in the case Mac Cormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953, S.C., 
396, a discussion on the "constitutionality" of Acts of Parliament is still 
conceivable. Cf, infra p. 50, note 2. 
-28- 
may influence not only the amount of pragmatism in their general attitude 
and behaviour, but also the style of their civil law. On the other hand, 
civil law may influence the psychology of that people too. According to 
Gurvitch and other sociologists of law, it is impossible to deny that 
collective spiritual values (e.g. law) and ideas have their own functional 
relations with the social structure and the historical background of a 
society 
1 
. The Swedish scholars Hi gerstrrñm and Lundstedt moved in an 
opposite direction. Stressing the metaphysical and imaginative side of 
jurisprudence, they denied the possibility "scientific" or scholarly 
approach to "ideas" that we may have on legal matters 2, and implicitly 
denied the possibility of an "ideological" approach to all. The relations 
between ideas and the social structure of a society are the subject 
of a study of the "noetic mind" 3. We may say that the "noetic arsenal" 
has a reverberating impact on law, and vice versa : we often live and 
continue to live under the influence of old legal - and political - 
slogans, and drag old legal constructions with us impervious to changing 
conditions and realities 4. Authors so different as Mac Ivor, P.Sorokin 
and E.Jordan, setting out from quite different standpoints, show a great 
1. Gurvitch, p. 37. 
2. A.V.Lundstedt, Superstition and rationality in action for peace, London 1925, p. 8 ; 
A.V.Lundstedt, Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft, two vol., 
Berlin 1932. 
3. Gurvitch, pp. 33 and 37. 
4. The reproach of a jurisprudential fetshism and superstitious dragging behind the 
realities of life is repeatedly, though not always convincingly, one of the main 
themes of Lundstedt. A very short but accurate appreciation of his teachings was 
given recently by a Norwegian scholar F.Castberg, "Philosophy of Law in the 
Scandinavian Countries ", in : " American Journal of Comparative Law ", 
Baltimore 1955, pp.393 -394. 
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interest in the relations between social reality and spiritual 
conceptions 
Another aspect is to find a correlation between the processes of concent- 
ration of capital and the speed of its turnover on the one hand and the 
structural changes in company law on the other hand 
1. 
The period one is able to observe in connection with this study is 
comparatively short, and, though trends are discernible, it may, perhaps, 
be still too early to come to any definite conclusions about the meaning 
of these trends and their connection with general trends observed in 
sociology. 
It is not the task of this study to go into details about the con- 
nection between fluctuations in the purely noetic fashions of describing 
juridical persons as sometimes "realistic" and sometimes "nominalistic" 
structures 
29 
and fluctuations between "realism" and "nominalism" in 
general, and the "ideational" and "sensate" mentalities as sociological 
phenomena 3, but it might be of some interest to note in this place that 
the uprooting of public companies from their membership base indirectly 
1. Múller- Erzbach, p.318. 
2. F,Hallis, Corporate Personality, London 1930, pp.137 ff. 
3. P.A.Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, vol.II, New York 1937, p.305. 
Professor Pitirim Sorokin, now professor at Harvard, G.Gurvitch and W.Sinaiski must 
in many respects be regarded as pupils of the famous Polish jurist L.Petrazycki. 
Cf. Baron A.Meyendorff, "Leo Petrazycki ", in "Modern Theories of Law" (published by 
W.I.Jennings), London (Oxford University Press) 1933, p.28. 
It is quite possible that an early work by L.Petrazycki( "Aktienwesen and Spekulation ", 
1906) has influenced these his pupils to attach more attention to company law 
problems than could normally be expected from philosophers and sociologists of law. 
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serves the "realistic" approach, since all public companies become "real" 
units in the assembly at the top of the state economy. The existing and 
growing ease with which the practical problem of how to alter the capital 
of a public company is solved is in a way a revolt against the former 
"individualistic singularism" 1, where individual interests, sympathies 
and moods of single persons were taken into consideration. The p u b l i c 
company has become in many ways a reality, at first being dressed as a 
reality by virtue of its collective nature, but, lately, being shaped as a 
reality in its own right. The cancellation of the rights of the individual2 
- so very cherished and acclaimed a hundred years ago as the rights of 
"men and citizens" (and of shareholders as well :) - is a general trend 
observable in many domains, and is, of course, noticeable in company 
law too 3. This trend towards "realism" is a favourite theme in the 
works of Pitirim Sorokin. His theories are still important for this 
1. Sorokin, vol.I1 , p.334. 
2. F.W.Maitland gave in his "Collected Papers" (vol.III, Cambridge 1919, p.317 and 
pp.390 ff.) an excellent picture of the English distrust of the early "realistic" 
theories by Gierke, stressing that even the idea that men could presume to act as a 
corporation seemed strange for a very long time to the typical Englishman. 
Cf. : C.T.Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations, Cambridge 1905, 
pp.180 ff. ; F.Hallis, op.cit., p. XL ; and A.Nekam, The Personality Conception of 
the Legal Entity, Cambridge (Mass.) 1938, p.97 and passim. 
Sir Frederick Pollock, Bt., tried to prove (cf. his article in "Festschrift Otto 
Gierke", Weimar 1911, later reprinted in his : "Essays in the Law ", London 1922, 
pp.151 ff.) that the fiction theory of corporations, then prevalent in English 
jurisprudence, was n o t based upon Common Law. 
Cf. also H.A.Smith, "The persona ficta", in "The Juridical Review ", vol.26, 
Edinburgh 1914, pp.60 -62 ; and E.M.Dodd, "Dogma and Practice in the Law of 
Associations ", in : HLR, vol. 42 (1929), pp.978 -9860 
3. This trend was, among others, noticed also by some Swiss jurists. 
Cf. e.g. E.Bossard, Die Reserven der Aktiengesellschaft im neuen Obligationenrecht, 
Berne 1940, p.58. 
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study so far as they admit that even "seemingly special problems enter 
as 
organic components into an integrated culture and live and change as such 
culture changes" 
1. 
Thus it seems of some value to reveal trends in one 
particular though seemingly special problem, and to find out whether they 
fit into the general trends noticed by more universally minded sociologists. 
It may at first sound paradoxical to say that the conception of a 
company as an entity detached from any human membership strengthens and 
does not weaken the company as a "reality" 2, but when we remember that 
this phenomenon lessens the ambiguity 
3 usually atributed to limited 
companies, we may see that it is not at all so absurd, With a weakened 
membership base 4, it becomes detached from the "human" beings acting as 
members, and therefore its claim to be a juridical persona has more 
justification. 
The replacement of the so- called collective responsibility by a 
"responsibility of a total sum of shares contributed by members and 
managed by a special manager" 5 is in its way also an approach to a more 
1. Sorokin, vol.I1, p.336. 
2. The transformation of the owner -manager- entrepreneur class into the class of salaried 
managers might have created at first an "impersonal" attitude towards the business, 
partly owing to the size of the enterprise and owing to the remoteness and the 
bureaucratic character of the officialdom present in the relationship between manager 
and legal entity, but in the long run the corporation becomes a "reality2, i.e. in 
the fraternity of the higher business. The "impersonality" -touch of the manager is 
the by- product of the comparatively quick growth of public companies as a distinct 
type of corporation. Cf. Toynbee, vol. IX, p.572 and note 2. 
3. Cf. supra p.14. 
4. Müller- Erzbach, pp.318 -319. 
5. Sorokin, vol.II, p.316 (3). 
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"realistic" conception of companies, though we are 
still considered to 
1 
be very far from the domination of the "realistic" conceptions 
of law . 
The replacement of the permit or sanction 2 by a mere registration of 
the company 
3 was often considered as one of the first signs of a 
"turning away" from the nominalistic trends of the nineteenth century 4. 
On the other hand, the opinion was expressed by some authors that two 
institutions of company law, namely, non -par -value shares 5 and the 
conversion of shares into stock 6, somehow represent a trend in the 
opposite direction, since they mean a "stock- ownership" in proportionate 
parts 7, and a lessening of the strength of the juridical personality, 
1. Sorokin, vol.TI, p.330. 
2.. Cf. infra p.44. 
3. Sorokin, vol.II, pp. 315 and 333 ; vol.IV (New York 1941), p.117. 
4. It is interesting to note that the Scots theory on Joint Stock Companies, which 
was held before the extension of Companies Acts to Scotland in and after 1856, was 
familiar with the possibility that a mere voluntary union of members may constitute 
a new persona (cf. J.H.Burton, Manual of the Law of Scotland, The Law of Private 
Rights and Obligations, Edinburgh 1847, p.188). Remarkably enough, a very "realistic" 
conception indeed. In England, however, where under the impact of conceptions of 
Germanic Law the creation of a persona was a prerogative of the state, the aid of 
a Crown charter was necessary to enable "such companies to continue their 
existence" (cf, G.J.Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, Edinburgh 1833, p.105). 
Cfo infra pp. 62 ff. 
5. Cf. infra p. 80, note 4, p. 14o and pp. 228 -229. 
6. Cfo infra p. 122. . 
7. N.S.Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate Enterprise, New York 1940, p.98. 
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II. T h e e c o n o m i c b a c k g r o u n d . 
The analysis of the economic inducements to alter the capital of a 
limited company reveals a great variety of reasons for doing so. We are 
able to classify these reasons from many points of view. Those which are 
influential in the course of a "normal management" of a company's business 
may differ from those evolved by unforeseen, chaotic or evolutionary 
events in the economic life of a nation. They may derive from the policy 
of the company concerned, or they may be a part of a state's policy. The 
latter may be in accordance with the wish of the shareholders, but it may 
also be, and is, in fact, very often, carried out against the interests of 
the majority, or a large majority, of the company, 
Period with a stable currency and a more or less constant policy of 
foreign trade generally allow prediction of economic trends, and, for a 
particular company, of its specific possibilities and limitations. This 
leads to a long -range capital policy, where further alterations may either 
be avoided or judiciously planned. however,periods of economic uncertainty, 
currency reforms, convertibility restrictions, and strict exchange 
regulations are favourable to a "mass psychosis" 1 of alterations of 
capital. Another element that should be considered is the official policy 
of particular states which may be either liberal and avoid interference 
with the growing number of cases of alteration, or tend to guide and 
1. Cf. C.M.Schmitthoff, "Distribution of revalued capital assets of a company ", in : 
"Solicitor ", vol. 18 (1951), p.135. 
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supervise the companies in these cases. States with a strong policy 
of 
control usually regulate all alterations of the charters, including, of 
course, alterations of capital too. This is done for two different reasons 
- firstly to protect the interests of the shareholders, and secondly to 
seek co- ordination with the general financial policy of the state. A rigid 
clinging to those structural elements which derive from "partnership ", and 
a perpetuation of the principle of inadmissibility of alterations of the 
charter are sometimes nothing else than a mild form of supervision of the 
investment market. The legislative essays of the period after the first 
World War dealing with these problems show that in almost all cases 
legislation was lagging behind the requirements of the economic situation, 
indeed, all too often it lagged far too far behind, and when they did 
arrive, legislative remedies generally apeared to be half- measures, or, at 
the best , palliatives that never touched the core of the problem. Greater 
initial elasticity of the legal apparatus has in many cases proved to be of 
more assistance in times of uncertainty than "the servile readiness" of the 
legislature to help when the need arose 
On the other hand, the planned economy and the interest of the state 
should be independent from the moods of the investors, especially of those 
of the small or medium type. This leads to the creation of a new type of 
corporation, whose office -bearers appear to be more reliable from the point 
of view of the state's interests. This new corporation seems to possess the 
characteristics of an extreme "anaemic humanity ". It is rather a homunculus 
which in the dawn of the new age has put itself between the state and the 
general public. This became especially apparent in the totalitarian 
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attempts to create a new class -hierarchy, and to place an anonymous 
Wirtschaft at its top 1, but one cannot altogether deny that a similar 
threat may occur even in countries built and conducted on the most 
democratic lines 2, especially when the trend is towards diminishing or 
even eliminating the principles of laissez faire. The planning state 3 
needs above all things a chorus of reliable followers, and the type of 
company. called " p u b t i c c o m p a n y " , appears to be the most 
suitable form for this purpose 4. 
1. F.A.Mann ( "The new German Company Law and its background ", in : "Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law ", 3rd series, vol.19, London 1937, 
pp.223 -228) noted the impact of Wirtschaftsrecht ( "economic law ") and of 
Unternehmenslehre ( "doctrine of the enterprise "), and, last but not least, of the 
ideas of Walther Rathenau on the totalitarian and public -law fashions in company 
law. As a matter of fact, Walter Rathenau's influence on Lord Keynes was in its turn 
quite considerable. Cf. E.Bossard, Die Reserven der Aktiengesellschaft im neuen 
Obligationenrecht, Berne 1940, p.74 and passim ; P.Gieseke, "Das wesen der Kapital- 
gesellschaft", in : "Deutsche Landesreferate zum III Internationalen Kongress far 
Rechtsvergleichung ", Tñbingen 1950, p.627 ; and Rauch, vol.Il, Graz 1950, p.3. 
On the methodological difference between the point of view of a "state's economy" 
and the point of view of an "economy of the enterprise" see the special study by 
F.Schönpflug, Das Methodenproblem in der Einzelwirtschaftslehre, Stuttgart 1933,p.15 
2. An English author called them recently : "... those organized entities which 
substantially contribute to the wants and add to the wealth of enlightened nations" 
(cf. F.Sewell Bray, Four Essays in Accounting Theory, London 1953, p.47). Even some 
Swiss jurists recognized that the main raison d'etre of limited companies was to 
become an element of the state's economy. Cf. E.Múller, Kapitalherabsetzung bei der 
Aktiengesellschaft, Berne 1938, p.73 ; and B.Zingg, Der Gläubigerschutz bei der 
Herabsetzung des Aktienkapitals, Aarau 1940, p.135. 
3. On the advantages and disadvantages of the planning state attitude see the special 
studies by : Gaetan Pirou, La crise du capitalisme, 2nd ed., Paris 1936, pp.55 -87 ; 
and Jules Hoch, Confrontations, 7th ed., Paris 1952, pp.420 ff. 
4. The giant non -governmental business corporations are the personification of the idea 
of subordination of motives directed towards profit making to the altruistic motives 
of serving the public interests. Cf. Toynbee, vol.IX, pp. 572 and 576. 
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Thus, in speaking about certain trends in company law we have always 
to remember that the modern requirements of the planning state foreshadow 
trends in an unexpected way and degree. This type of company somehow 
becomes "uprooted ", the initial identity of the shareholders with the 
company being overshadowed by the relations between the state and the 
company as an entity and as a member of the honourable guild of plan - 
fulfillers. The legal and economic theory that an enterprise can go "out of 
business" as its suits the owner, exists only on paper 1, and indeed, the 
interdependency of this "cream of companies" and the needs of community is 
growing continuously. Though it is impossible to say that this trend 
concerns public companies only, one can assert that these public companies 
are overwhelmingly t h e typical unit of the planned and conducted 
state's economy 
2 This is also one of the reasons why in countries with a 
planned economy, or in countries with a deeprooted economic totalitarianism, 
the difference between public companies and other types of private 
corporations is tending to increase. And, in particular, the alteration 
of capital is one of the most noticeable points where a radical departure 
from the contractual basis of the company becomes apparent. 
1. Berle, p.45 ; L.C.B.Gower, "Corporate Control : The battle for the Berkeley ", in : 
HLR, vol.68 (1955),pp.1189 -1191 and note 51 ; L.C.B.Gower, "Some Contrasts between 
British and American Corporation Law ", in HLR, vol.69 (1956), p,1375. 
2. It is submitted that p u b l i c c o m p a n i e s are on the way of becoming 
a type of their own. Their interdependency with the public interests may soon change 
the present legal position, namely, that they are merely the remainder after the 
deduction of private companies. 
the American term "close corporation" for "private company" has not up to now been 
known in Britain, but it is now beginning "to creep into use ". Cf.L.C.B.Gower, op. 
cit., vol.69, p.1376, note 25. 
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Considering the high proportion of national wealth which is now 
invested in corporate securities, alterations which change their value 
are extremely significant to our economy,and should be studied thoroughly 
1 
These alterations may reflect an expansion or a diminution of business, but 
they may equally well be due merely to an accountancy reshifting not 
necessarily involving an alteration in the amount of business. There is 
nowadays a special branch of economics which deals with the study of cyclic 
fluctuations in trade 2, and there is, of course, a connection between 
the inducement to invest during an "upswing" or "downswing" 3, and the 
general advisablity of altering capital in limited companies. A business 
expansion (from the economic point of view) may mean either a rise in the 
total sales of one period, or an increase in production facilities, or a 
larger output, but it does not always mean at the same time an increase 
of the total value of the capital items 4, and, even in minor cases, it 
does not mean an increase of the formal capital figure. For this study 
only the latter problem matters, but attention will also be paid to a 
range of questions connected with alteration of the formal capital where 
no apparent or recent processes of business expansion are or seem to be 
in the background, as e.g. in the case of an increase of capital from 
the reserves of the company. 
1. A.Becht, "Corporate Charter Amendments, issues of prior stock and alteration of 
dividend rates ", in : Ci,R, vol.50 (1950), p.900 ;s.nd F.Gilson, Les modifications 
aux statuts des sociètês anonymes, Brussels 1919, p.3 and passim. 
2. These fluctuations are more or less the same throughout the capitalistic world. 
Cf. A.H.Feller, "The Movement for corporate reform : a world -wide phenomenon ", 
in : "American Bar Association Journal ", vol. 20 (1934), A. 347e 
3, Buchanan, pp. 280 ff. 
4. Ibid., p. 295 in fine. 
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It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to investigate the 
economic problems of the growing or shrinking of an enterprise and the 
economic advantages and disadvantages, and gains or losses, essentially 
bound up with the question 1; nor is it intended to consider questions 
concerning "technological" change and alteration in the scale of 
production 2, or the financial problems inherent in acquiring additional 
productive resources or capital assets it I is only to those changes 
which involve the restatement of capital 
4 and a modification of 
shareholders' rights in that connection which will be dealt with. 
Apart from the impact of quite extraordinary economic circumstances, 
like currency reforms, legislative measures 5, nationalisation and the 
like, the normal connection between the economic background and alteration 
of capital can be expressed in the following way : - The inducement to in- 
crease can arise not only from business profits 6,but from business losses 
1. Buchanan, p.303. 
2. Ibid., p. 311. 
3. Ibid., pp. 313 -318. 
4. This term, used by Buchanan, covers practically all the types of alteration of 
capital ,discussed in this study. 
5. Scherrer, p. 49 (5). 
6. E.Folliet, Le bilan dans les sociétés anonymes au point de vue juridique et 
comptable, Lausanne 1920, p.99 ; F.Gilson, op.cit., p. 212 ; Rauch, vol.I, 
pp.8 -9 and pp. 15 ff.; H.Staub, A.Pinner, F.Bondi and H.Koenige, Kommentar zum 
Handelsgesetzbuch, 12 /1th ed., vol.Il, Berlin 1926, pp.479, 509 and 510. 
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as well 1. The inducement to reduce the capital is generally that of 
losses 2, when the capital is usually reduced to the amount of actual 
assets 3, but there may be fluctuations of business, or a partial 
unemployment of capital, that may lead to a reduction even without 
any prior losses 4. Financially, it is even, perhaps, an obligation 
on the side of the company. The most curious cases are perhaps those 
of a reduction in order to increase the capital afterwards, or to ease 
the preconditions of a later increase, or, even, a reduction- cum -increase. 
Thus, from an economic point of view, a reduction may have become 
necessary to avert an excess or superfluity of capital ; or, where 
there is an inflation of property values, to eliminate depreciation 
and fixed charges ; or to pay back that part of the capital which has 
become a burden on or impairment of business efficiency ; or, finally, 
to eliminate a deficit and improve the capital position 5, 
1. F.Gilson, Les modifications aux statuts des socièt&s anonymes, Brussels 1919, 
p.219 ; and Scherrer, pp. 42 and 48 (b). 
2. Charlesworth, p. 95 ; and F.Gilson, op.cit., p.231. 
3. Â.K.Kuhn, A comparative study of the Law of Corporations, with particular 
reference to the protection of creditors and shareholders, New York 1912, 
p. 161, note 1. 
4. L.C.B.Gower, "Companies' Reduction of Capital ", in : "Modern Law Review ", vo1.14, 
London 1951, PP. 330 ff. ; E.Múller, Kapitalherabsetzung bei der Aktiengesellschaft, 
Berne 1938, pp, 1 and 21 ; Schmid, p.142 ; P.F.Simonson, The Law relating to the 
Reduction of the Share Capital, 3rd ed., London 1932, p.III ; and B.Zingg, Der 
Gläubigerschutz bei der Herabsetzung des Aktienkapitals, Aarau 1940, p.9. 
5. E.C.Lasseigne, "Recapitalization and Reorganization under Louisiana Corporation 
Law ", in : TLR, vol. 24 (1950), pp. 325 ff. 
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III. L e g a l a s p e c t s . 
The conceptions "company" and "joint stock company, limited" are 
commonly regarded as virtually synonymous, but there was no necessary 
connection between them prior to the middle of the nineteenth century 
1. 
Only then did these conceptions coalesce. Before 1856, almost every 
company formed was on the principle of unlimited liability 2, but from 
that date scarcely any company was constituted but with limited liabi- 
lity 3. the principle that limited liability is an incident of a char- 
tered was known in Scotland, but not in England, for a long time 
before that 4. This was partly due to the distinction drawn by Scots Law 
between the members of a firm and the firm itself 5, this distinction 
being nearer to the "realistic" theory concerning legal entities 6. This 
distinction was quite unknown in English Law, where incorporation was 
needed to create the separation 7, thus approaching to the "nominalistic" 
conception on these matters. Scots Law, influenced by the familiar in- 
stitutions of Roman Law, was thus more favourable to the structure of 
1. Cooke, p. 18. 
2. Cf. infra p. 64. 
3. Cooke, p. 175. 
4. Levy, p. 79. 
5. Cooke, p. 121. 
6. Cf. supra pp. 29 -32. 
7. W.Horrwitz, "Historical development of Company Law ", in "Law Quarterly Review ", 
vol.62, London 1946, PP. 375 ff. 
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legal entities as bodies of their own. In addition, 
the lack of the 
necessity of formal incorporation brought them nearer to 
the point 
of view now known as the "realistic" one 1. 
This acceptance of the principle of limited liability discontinued 
the former practice of making calls for further payments to the company 
2 
Limited liability was considered incimpatible with any obligation on the 
side of the shareholders to pay such calls, and this has led to the fixity 
of the capital 3. It is really difficult to imagine how this latter con- 
clusion was regarded as inevitable. One could, as we see now, maintain the 
principle of limited liabilityland have, to some extent, a flexibility 
of the capital as well. But at that time principles of partnership were 
still so preponderant 
4 that it seemed quite inconceivable that the mighty 
superstructure of the legal entity might replace the partnership relations 
between the shareholders and the limited company with something quite 
different. It was only much later that the idea occured that the foundat- 
ion of a limited company might split the legal background of the "share- 
1. On the history of limited companies as legal entities see : 
K.Bösselmann, Die Entwickelung des deutschen Aktienwesens im 19. Jahrhundert, 
Berlin 1939 ; H.Schumacher, Die Entwickelung der inneren Organisation der 
Aktiengesellschaft im deutschen Recht bis zum ADHGB, Stuttgart 1937 ; and 
W.Schmidt - Rimpler, critical notes on these both books by H.Schumacher and 
K.Bösselmann, in : "Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung far Rechtsgeschichte, 
Germanistische Abteilung ", vol.62, Weimar 1942, PP.545 ff. 
2. Levy, Po 786. 
3. Cuenet, p.14 ; R.Fischer, "Die Aktiengesellschaft ", in : "Handbuch des gesamten 
Handelsrechts" (ed.by V.Ehrenberg), vol.Ill, part 1, Leipzig 1916, pp. 55 ff.; 
E.Folliet, Le bilan dans les sociAtbs anonymes, Lausanne 1920, p.98 ; Schmid, 
PP. 4 ff. and p. 142 ; W.Schmidt Rimpler, op.cit., P. 554 ; J.de Steiger, 
Le droit des socièt &s anonymes en Suisse, Lausanne 1950, p.303. 
4. Cf. supra pp. 16 -17. 
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holdership" into two : 1) the relationship that was still dominated by 
the principles of partnership, and 2) the relationship that was dominated 
by the new institution. It was sometimes considered that the full strength 
of the relationship, derived from the partnership institution, lay dormant 
while a limited company was faultless and in existence, and that by winding - 
up, or in finding grave defects of its structure, it arose again as a 
phoenix from the ashes It was only at a much later stage of development 
that this awakening was construed, not as a rejuvenation of principles that 
may have existed prior to the foundation of the limited company, but as a 
normal conseque nce of the new institution, the limited company. 
In the early heyday of the limited company, the principle of the fixity 
of capital, or of the inadmissibility of any alteration of the contract, 
had only one exception - where there was unanimity of all the partaking 
shareholders. This principle, deeply rooted in the institution of 
partnership, even now still exerts an enormous influence on the 
theory and practice of company law 
2 
This unalterability of contract, charter and capital seemed to be so 
axiomatic a hundred years ago that many systems of law did not even consider 
how alterations of the charter or capital could be achieved. In other 
1. E.M.Dodd, Jr., "Partnership liability of stockholders in defective corporations ", 
in : HLR, vol.40 (1927), pp.521 ff.; and Pic -Kreher, vol.I, p.229. 
2. This necessity of unanimity was applied in Britain prior to 1873. 
Cf. Sir Francis Gore -Browne, `i'.E.Haydon and H.W.Jordan, Handbook on the Formation, 
Management and Winding -up of Joint Stock Companies, 41st ed., London 1952, p.521. 
-43- 
countries, one meets the opinion that the normative regulations existing 
in statute laws are only and exclusively ius dispositivum, i.e. 
applicable to the case if the shareholders consider them applicable. 
The result of such an approach to this problem was that in some 
countries, especially in those of Common Law, or where statute law left 
a gap, authority to alter the charter should be granted in the original 
charter 1, and that, if that was not done, no statutory regulation 
authorizing the alteration of charter or capital could apply. Gradually, 
legislation started to follow to an ever greater extent the practical 
requirements of a permanently changing economic life, began to regulate 
in more detailed form the ways and means of achieving an alteration of 
capital, and did that by parting from the principle of ius dispositivum. 
The result was that modern company law was usually regarded as being the 
domain proper of ius cogens regulations 2. This generally meant a breach 
of the "rights" and positions of individual shareholders . Their special 
rights were no longer unassailable strongholds. A theory started to 
emerge that the very foundation of a limited company involved an uncon- 
ditional and eternal surrender of some of the rights otherwise attached 
to the position of a partner, e.g. the right to oppose an alteration of 
capital. Thus, a shareholder could no longer oppose such an alteration 
if it was achieved according to the regulations of statute law and the 
1. Levy, p.790. 
2. Scherrer, p.60. 
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charter. In countries with a rigid pclicy of control over 
limited 
companies, no company could be created without the authority of the 
executive power of the state , or a formal permit or a "concession" 
1 
, 
no amount of capital could be mentioned in the charter without 
receiving the approval of a government authority, nor could any 
alteration of capital be made 2 without first ascertaining that it 
was in accordance with the general financial policy of the state 3. 
1. Among these countries one still should mention Denmark and Holland, and a number 
of Ibero- American states, as e.g. Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay 
Cf. F. de Sola Canizares, "The Rights of Shareholders ", in : "International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly ", vol.2, part 4, London 1953, p.567, note 16. 
A mild form of a "concession " -control exist besides in Britain, France and U.S.A. 
Cf. infra p. 71, note 7. 
2. The Borrowing (Control and Guarantees) Act of 1946 (9 and 10 Geo VI, Ch.58) and the 
Control of Borrowing Order of 1947 provide for that the consent of the Treasury is 
required for an increase of caoital for more than b 50,000 in any year. 
Cf. L.C.B.Gower, "Some Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law", 
in:HLR, vo.69 (1956), pp.1382 -1383. 
3. The number of problems left to the arbitrary discretion of the state's 
authority was, of course, much higher in these countries than in states where 
there was less interference into the companies' life . This is the reason why 
the statute books of the countries with a rigid policy of control and supervision 
are generally without the minute regulations concerning the alteration of capital, 
as they are known in countries with a free investment market and without 
restrictions on company life. 
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. One need mention only the Swiss 
traditions of legislative drafting (cf.infra pp.190 and 201), where laconic 
style and an extreme liberalism can be found happily together.One wonders whether 
that is due to a deeply rooted democracy of a specifically Swiss pattern, or due 
to the interpretative authority of Swiss judges. Otherwise, though it sounds 
paradoxical, the amount of minute regulations is growing where the whole gamut 
of problems is left to the private initiative of shareholders and office holders 
of the company, but diminishes as soon as this private initiative is impaired by 
a strong policy of concessions. To mention only one familiar example to the 
reader : no confirmation of a reduction was required in the case of a publicly 
owned company within the meaning of the Iron and Steal Act of 1949. 
Cf. S.W.Magnus and M.Estrin, Companies Act 1948, 2nd ed., London 1951, p. 71. 
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There were, of course, other gars left open through which escape 
might be made from the fixity and unalterability of the capital. 
Sometimes an amount of capital was inserted in the charter far in excess 
of the initial actual requirements of the company, but with authorization 
to the company to issue shares later as need arose. Thus the institution 
of "authorized capital" has been created. Recently a new raison d'étre of 
this variety of increase of capital became apparent, namely the acquiring 
of greater adaptability in attracting the investment market. Another 
variety of similar nature - the conditional increase - was introduced 
(e.g. in Germany) for the same purpose shortly before the second World 
War 1, but has not yet developed as an independent institution of company 
law. 
It is rater difficult yet to say whether the attitude is antidemocratic 
in the totalitarian area in Western Europe, or backward in the united 
States, where the predominance of the principles of Common Law is still 
so strong that any deviation from the basic partnership structure is 
considered as " a decline and fall of the fixed rights of the shareholders "2. 
These fixed rights are now being replaced by a new construction where the 
shareholders are fading away behind the screen of modern legal entity, 
while this entity is coming to light and recognition not as a fiction 
but as a reality 3, 
1. C.Ritter and J.Ritter, Aktiengesetz, 2nd ed. 
Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 387 ff. 
2. A.A.Berle and G.C.Means, The Modern Corporat 
.New York 1933, pp. 148 and 209. 
3. Cf. supra pp. 29 -32. 
, Berlin 1939, Pp.498 -508 ; 
ion and Private Property, 
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One thing, perhaps, can be said that the shareholders are 
the last 
people to be asked whether they would like, or agree to, a suggested 
alter- 
ation of capital. Their role has diminished from the status of partners 
1 
to that of casual voters in a meeting of the legal entity. Another trend 
of development has proceeded on parallel lines : the age -old idea of a li- 
mited company as a tiny democracy in a nutshell is obsolescent, since the 
democratic elements have in practice changed their appearance everywhere 
and turned out to be merely plutocratic ones 2. Thus, the public company 
limited by shares is also changing its character from a typical democratic 
creation of company law to a plutocratic body, and shareholders are 
investors 3. 
The aim of this study is to compare the mechanism of alteration of capi- 
tal, to indicate where changes apparent in the general structure of public 
companies throw light on this particular problem, and to examine what 
attempts are being made (be they healthy and hopeful, or desperate and 
faltering) to reform this domain of company law. 
However, this structural development inside the institution, changing 
the emphasis from the peripheral (membership, partnership, shareholder - 
ship 4 ) to the central (personality of the legal entity) has tremend- 
1. A.Nekam, The personality conception of the legal entity, Cambridge (Mass.) 1938, 
p. 106, note 29. 
2. P.Gieseke, "Das Wesen der Kapitalgesellschaft ", in : "Deutsche Landesreferate zum 
III Internationalen Kongress fill. Rechtsvergleichung ", Tübingen 1950, p.629 ; 
and Ripert, p. 98. 
3. This change of the psychological attitude (from members to investors) is, perhaps, 
due to the appearance of a special "improved class of entrepreneurs" which started 
to dominate the scene. Since the paid up capital did not always reach the nominal 
capital the possibility to make business out of the unpaid portions of shares 
became apparent. Cf. G.Todd, "Some aspects of Joint stock companies 1844- 1900 ", 
in : " The Economic History Review ", vol.IV, London 1932 -1934, p.68. 
4. Müller -Erzbach, pp. 90 and 318. 
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ously strengthened the whole institution, ana made it more suitable as a 
unit of a planning state's economy. As long as the contractual relation- 
ship was the dominant factor, the merger of values, forces and person- 
alities in the new body was shallow and limited 1, and one could apply 
the epithet "limited" not only to the amount of resonsibility, which was 
its primary meaning, but also to the degree of effacement of the person- 
alities "be4ind the screen ". In course of time the public company has 
become more and more a new unit, with a "reality" entirely derived from 
the primary "reality" of the personalities initially in the background 2. 
The ways and means of raising capital for a public company, and of in- 
creasing and reducing it, have completely changed the atmosphere of the 
whole institution. The legal personality of the company seemed to be 
incompatible with the personal touch that lay in the notion 
ship" , and, on the other hand, the dwindling down of this notion of 
"membership" to a mere negociable title 4 led to the gradual replacement 
of "members" ( "associes ") by "shareholders" in all the texts of companies 
acts 5. In some cases one has no longer an impression of "real collective 
1. Sorokin, vol.II, p.316. 2. Cf. supra pp, 29 ff. 
3. Cuenet, p. 33. 4. Pic -Kreher, vol.II, p.21. 
5. Swiss Law is to some extent an exception to this rule. Theory of Swiss Law 
postulated that in a 1 1 limited companies there is no membership without 
participation in the capital. Also in recent publications of Swiss jurists 
the emphasis on membership is still noticeable. Though Swiss company law 
provides for a type of companies which corresponds to the British private 
companies and the German G.m.b.H. (cf. supra p. 8 ) , their p u b l i c 
companies (G. : " Aktiengesellschaften ") are in their character much nearer 
to the British private companies than any public companies of any other 
legal system (cf. infra p. 190 ). the idea of a public company as a self - 
governing body with a "waning" membership conception is almost unknown in 
Swiss jurisprudence. 
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responsibility of members ", and the epithet "limited" has come to indicate 
the detachment of the legal entity from its membership. 
It seems sometimes that this epithet merely emphasizes that this new 
legal entity should in no ways be identified with any member of that compa- 
ny, and that the boundary between the membership and the legal entity is so 
strong that there are legally no direct relations between any member of a 
limited company and anyone dealing with that company. The word "limited" 
expresses the maximum of separation between company and members. Once more, 
a symbol of the new "realism ". Whether we like it or not, the reduction of 
the responsibility of the shareholders to mere liability for "a sum of 
money ", and, of course, the idea of serving the national economy have 
strengthened the new "realism" of public companies. We may even, perhaps, 
predict that the "plutocratic" element, still generally preponderant, 
will gradually lessen. 
The process of lessening of the passivity of the courts goes hand in 
hand with a lessening of the speculative moment 1, and a surprisingly 
quickly growing impact of "public law" elements in the domains of company 
law 
2. 
L. Petrazycki propagated the necessity of a "general policy of law "3 
in order to cope with all the probable effects of a contemplated law 
reform, and in order to plan the whole business of legislating for a longer 
period of time in advance. 
1. A.Meyendorff ( "Leo Petrazycki ", in : "Modern Theories of Law ",London 1933, p.31) 
asserted that in the opinion of Petrazycki "modern principles of civil litigation, 
namely the passivity of the courts ", and those of company law, encouraged tricks and 
"speculation with other people's funds ". 
2. L.C.B.Gower ( "Companies' Reduction of Capital ", in : MLR, vol.14, London 1951) 
noticed recently that the Scottish Court, contrary to the English, have a much more 
"healthy" attitude considering public policy generally, and commercial morality also 
3. G. : "Rechtspolitik ". 
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The degree of development is even more apparent when we ascertain the 
background from which it started a hundred years ago. Partnership, all 
types of "personal commercial associations" 1, and even private companies, 
and their counterparts abroad, have changed to a much lesser extent. The 
place they still have in the structure of private enterprise in a given 
country, and especially, the place held and merited by the private 
companies, indicate that their life and vigour is still very high, and one 
may hope that the private initiative of the broad masses of the trading 
population can thereby be maintained for many generations on the traditional 
lines, though one has to be aware of the sociological process which is 
called. the "progressive exodus out of private enterprise into public 
service" 2, and its impact on the growing malaise of managerialism 3. 
However, one has still to agree that those who are in private business are 
in some way "a measuring rod which can be applied to the publicly -owned in- 
dustries", and that "the values of the relatively free society can still 
exercise an influence on the publicly owned sector" 4. It is our duty to be 
aware of the structural and functional changes at the "top" of the pyramid 
of company forms and types 5. 
1. Cf. supra p. 15, note 2. 
2. Toynbee, vol.IX, pp,572 and 574. 
3. Another approach to this question was recently tabled by C.Curran, "The Passing of 
the Tribunes ", in : "Encounter ", vol. VI (6), London 1956, p.21. 
4. These both gmotations are from an anonymous article recently published in the 
weekly : "Time and Tide" (vol.36, London 1955, p.522). 
5. Information about these changes may even, perhaps, enable us to prevent deteriorat- 
ions and transformations that may become harmful to the whole community.In some cases 
a well -timed use of these structural and functional changes may help us to avoid 
disruptive forces which could endanger the evolutionary development of the whole 
social system. The attention given to public and national corporations, and apprec- 
iation of their increasing value in the framework of a national economy, is an 
indication of a healthy waredness of these problems. 
-50- 
One can observe a great variety of technicalities in 
connection with 
the mechanism of alteration of capital, and a great variety of pre- 
conditions or prerequisites can also be found. Very often the amount 
of 
capital has to be stated in the charter 1 . Thus, any alteration of the 
capital involves setting into motion the apparatus of the alteration or 
amendment of the charter. This was not always easy, nor was it always 
possible, even by direct legislation, since the theory of unanimity of all 
shareholders sometimes considered even legislation, if unauthorized by the 
charter, as unconstitutional 2 It was accordingly something of an 
1. In countries of two instruments instead of one (cf. supra p. 13, note 2) the 
amount of capital has to be mentioned in the Memorandum of Association (C.A.1948), 
or Articles of Incorporation of American Law. Some of the states of U.S.A. use 
the. term "Certificate of Incorporation" instead of "Articles" (cf.e.g. Stock 
Corporation Law of New York, 1952, § 35). 
2. Berle - Means, p. 208. 
This is a typical American standpoint. The lack of a possibility under English Law 
of vetoing any Act of Parliament as being unconstitutional came recently into the 
limelight again in connection with the case of Mac Cormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953, 
S.C.,396. It was observed by the Lord President that the unlimited sovereignty of 
Parliament was a distinctly English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish 
Constitutional Law (ibid., p.411). The assertion that a Scottish Court has even, 
perhaps, a limited power of declaring an Act of Parliament to be in desuetude, or 
even unconstitutional, as it is the case in the Supreme Courts of the United States, 
Australia, or the Union of South Africa, has up till now possessed a merely 
theoretical or hypothetical value. Among the authors who recently commented on this 
problem in connection with this case one should mention Professor T.B.Smith (cf. : 
The British Commonwealth, The development of its laws and constitutions, vol.I, 
part 2 : Scotland, The Channel Islands, London 1955, pp. 622 ff. and pp. 647 ff.), 
who stressed that the Scottish Courts have not yet rejected the possibility of 
declaring an Act of Parliament relating to a private right to be ultra vires. Thus, 
one is inclined to consider whether in theory a Scottish shareholder could seek to 
have established by an actio popularis the "unconstitutionality" of a specific 
decision in general meeting, or a provision of the charter, or a provision of the 
Companies Act. The practical and political value of the power of the courts to check 
whether an Act is ultra vires was recently noted in an English periodical (cf. "Time 
and Tide ", vol.36, London 1955, pp. 522 -523). 
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achievement that statute law and charter practice 
started to regulate the 
process of charter amendment in a more or less detailed way. One 
can 
imagine the existence of different clauses regulating the question of 
w h e n such alteration could be add eved : some legislations allow it 
only for already registered companies, some make it possible even prior to 
registration. Again, some legislations require a space of time within 
which no alterations of the charter or alterations of the capital can be 
initiated, while others facilitate alterations :,within a given period of 
time. A very usual prerequisite of an increase of capital was the require- 
ment that the nominal capital should have been already paid -in, fully, or, 
at least, to a great extent. Further, in many legislations a "concession" 1 
by the state authority is needed not only for the creation of the company, 
but also for any essential alteration, and very often indeed for a 
reduction of capital. The problem was discussed once, about twenty five 
years ago, whether the rigour of the state supervision in this connection 
was becoming stronger or weaker with time : and the conclusion was reached 
that the rigour of state control was weakening, except, perhaps, in the 
case of supervision of a reduction of capital. There are some indications 
now that a reverse movement has started and "concession " -formalities have 
been introduced where previously they were unknown* 
1. The courts are usually empowered to act as the state authority in matters concerning 
reduction, while the Ministry of Finance, or the Board of Trade , or the Treasury 
(cf. infra p. 71, note 7, and p. 83), or semi- official bodies like the Securities 
and Ëchange Commission in the United States (cf. infra p.220) do it in the case 
of an increase of capital* 
-52- 
The next set of problems concerns the competence 
of altering the 
capital. The generally accepted solution was to endow 
the general meeting 
with this function. Sometimes it was reserved for an extraordinary 
general 
meeting. Only very seldom were the directors or the board 
of management 
empowered to do it. In some rare cases an additional opinion of tne 
advisory council was sought, but, as far as reduction of capital is 
concerned, a report was very often required from the company's own auditors 
1 
or the court had to be asked to decide whether the suggested reduction was 
weligrounded or advisable. In some other cases this was tne appropriate 
moment to ask for an additional "concession ". 
The resolution by a general meeting had to be very often a "qualified" 
one, i.e. a certain quorum or majority, or both of them, were required 
20 
Sometimes special regulations are to be found about the agenda of the 
general meeting where the question of alteration is to be raised. An ad- 
ditional sanction by the court was generally required only for a reduction 
of capital though this is not altogether unusual for an increase too 3. The 
procedure for increase of capital differed generally from that for 
1. Sometimes it was required not from the company's own auditors, but from a neutral 
corporate body of auditors, who were designated auditors for one special task as 
an impartial body. Cf. Steiger, p.304. 
2. A gradual decrease of these "qualified" requisites is observable. Initially they 
existed in order to certiorate the older shareholders that the alteration of 
capital was not to interfere with the amount of their "membership" (cf.Müller- 
Erzbach, p. 90) ; now, however, the interest to possess such guarantees is quite 
an infinitesimal one. As an indicator of this lack of interest, the introduction 
of voteless preferential shares may, perhaps, serve. Cf. Teichmann- Kowhler, 
pp. 249 ff. 
3. A.C.Connell and A.T.Purse, Companies and Company Law, London 1949, p. 87 ; 
and Levy, p.405. 
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reduction. A special procedure was sometimes adopted 
for the case where 
an increase of capital could be effected within 
the framework of the 
authorized, but not yet issued, capital. A formal reso lution 
of the 
general meeting was then, as a rule, not necessary. 
the fulfilment and execution of the formal resolution to alter the 
capital was in the hands of the directors. Some more detailed instructions 
about time and other conditions could be attached to the resolution, or 
left completely to the discretion of the directors. Reference to the 
procedure outlined in a prospectus (generally in the case of an increase 
of capital) was made either in the statute law, or in the text of the 
formal resolution in general meeting. Similarly, additional regulations 
could be made in both of these ways concerning the question of whether 
the subscribing of the full amount of the projected increase was 
obligatory. In some legislations the regulations on formation of a 
company are analogically applied to the problems of increase too 1. The 
degree of agolication of this rule varies also from country to gountry. 
This applies also to an increase for purchase of property or payment for 
services 2, and sometimes to problems of simultaneous promotion or 
successive formation 3 as well. 
Alteration of capital can be executed either through an alteration 
(increase or reduction) of the nominal amount of the previously issued 
1. Rauch -(vol. I, Graz 1947, pp.106 ff.) has given a very detailed analysis of this 
special question. 
2. This type of increase is sometimes called the "qualified increase ", sometimes - 
"the increase for property or services ", or " ..for considerations other than cash ". 
Cf. Levy, p. 789. 
3. For the adoption of these termini technici of the continental jurisprudence see 




or by altering the number of shares (issuing new shares in the 
case of increase, - or by cancellation or redemption of shares in the case 
of a reduction of capital). The second type is generally considered as the 
"normal" concerning an increase of capital, but the first one appears more 
often in connection with a reduction 
2 
The no- par -value shares may play a 
particular role in this connection, since there may be involved a change of 
the quota represented by them, or a change of the represented value without 
any change of the quota, or, in very exceptional cases, a change of both 3. 
The problem of the price of the newly issued shares may appear to be 
very complex. One has to be aware of the difference between an issue- , or 
par- , or nominal value of the share, and the p r i c e actually paid for 
it. There are some legislations that recognite the principle that the new 
shares should have exactly the same nominal or par- value as the previous 
ones. The latest development, however, is in a more liberal direction, i.e. 
there is no obligation to give the new shares the same par- value as that of 
the existing shares 4 . One speaks about an issue of shares "below par" if 
either they are issued at a dhcount, or,though nominally for the par- value, 
1. In connection with a reduction or readjustment of capital it often happens that one 
has to keep within the framework of the legal (statute law , or charter) requirement 
concerning the minimum amount of one share, or the minimum amount of capital. 
2. W.Scherrer (p.55, note 19) gives a comparative survey of the admissibility of an 
increase of capital by alteration of the nominal amount of the shares, 
3. Cf. infra p. 80, note 4, and pp. 224 -229. 
4, Levy, p. 787. 
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against a commission 1 or brokerage 2 paid by the company. On the other 
hand, an issue "above par" is the case where the shareholder has to pay a 
premium above the sum of the par -value 3. As regards mode of payment new 
shares could be issued against cash, paid at once, or, may be, in instal- 
ments, or for property or services. There should also be mentioned the 
issuings of new shares in lieu of dividends, or by way of division of 
existing surpluses 4, usually called the "bonus " - or "gratis " -shares 
5. 
It is again another problem, whether the newly issued shares rank 
pari passu with the preciously issued shares, or are in some respect 
preference shares. In most cases, the main preference is that of giving 
1. Gore -Browne, pp. 191 and 521 -523 ; Levy, p. 405. 
2. Gore -Browne, pp. 191 and 521. 
3. L.C.B.Gower, The principles of modern company law, London 1954, p.107. 
4. Lit. : H.Buechler, Erhöhung des Grundkapitals mit Ausgabe von Gratisaktien nach 
schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, Berne 1926 ; P.Joffroy, Des reserves et leur 
incorporation au capital social, Toulouse 1944 ; H.Lecomte and H.Bosvieux, De 
l'incorporation de la plus -value de reevaluation au capital social, Paris 1947 ; 
K,Rauch, Kapitalerhöhung aus Gesellschaftsmitteln, two vol.,Graz 1947/50 ; H.W. 
Schmid, Die Erhöhung des Grundkapitals bei der Aktiengesellschaft, nach deutschem 
und schweizerischen Recht, Basle 1938 (typewritten thesis) ; J.Senarclens, Les 
reserves des societes anonymes, Geneva 1943. 
5. Lit. : H.Buechler, Erhöhung des Grundkapitals mit Ausgabe von Gratisaktien ..., 
Berne 1926, pp. 6 ff., pp. 13 ff., p.25, note, and passim ;S.Grinbergs, "Gratisakcija" 
in : "Latvian Encyclopaedia ", vol.VI, Riga 1931, pp. 10536 -10537 ; Ch.Lyon -Caen and 
L.Renault, Précis de droit commercial, Paris 1884, vol.', p.209 ; R,Müller- Erzbach, 
Deutsches Handelsrecht, Tübingen 1928, p. 299 ; K.Rauch, Kapitalerhähung aus Gesell- 
schaftsmitteln, vol.I, pp. 23, 30 and 134 , vol.I1, pp. 35, 37, 105 and 141 -142; 
C.P.Sanger, The capitalisation of profits by Joint -Stock Companies ", in : "The Juri- 
dical Review ", vol.15, Edinburgh 1903, pp. 1 ff.; W.Scherrer, "Die Kapitalerhöhung 
bei der Aktiengesellschaft ", in : " Festgabe der Basler Juristenfakultät zum 
schweizerischen Juristentag ", Basle 1942, pp- 43 -45 and passim ; A.Vavasseur, 
Traite des societes civiles et commerciales, Paris 1897, vol.I, p.362. 
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a right to a greater or a better secured dividend. Nowadays a new type of 
preference share has appeared, invested with "better" rights as regards di- 
vidends, but without, or reduced, voting rights 1. American theory deals 
with sixteen different types of shares, classified according to the presence 
or absence of preference and limitation, concerning both the dividend 
payments and the capital distribution 2. It is thought that the number 
of possible varieties is much higher than that. 
The issue of new shares is linked with the problem of pre -emptive rights. 
These are the rights of the present shareholders, and in some relatively 
few cases of former shareholders or founder members 3, to possess some pre- 
ference in buying the new shares of a company. Historically these rights 
originate in the conception of the shareholders' ownership of the capital 
and represent such ownership enlarged in the same proportion 4 beyond the 
framework of the existing capital. It is still not quite clear whether one 
should call these rights "fixed rights" based merely on common law, though 
this standpoint still prevails.If the trend of the pre -emptive rights is 
1. Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 249 -251. 
2. A.H.Frey, " Shareholders' Pre -emptive Rights ", in : "Yale Law Journal ", vol.38, 
New Haven 1929, p. 563. 
3. Pre -emptive rights may be attached to shares which had n o t been taken by 
shareholders who were entitled to subscribe proportionally to their respective 
holdings and were asked to do so. Thus, according to some systems of law, the 
company is obliged to offer such shares to the other shareholders (cf. infra 
p. 282, note 5). Besides, pre -emptive rights may be attributed to persons who 
are not shareholders at the present moment. These pre -emptive rights are called 
by some authors the pre -emptive rights of "other shareholders and other persons ". 
Cf. Hamburger, p. 137. 
4. Dodd -Baker, p. 904. 
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in accordance with the "decline of fixed rights", mentioned above, it is 
1 
interesting to note concerning Great Britain that though since 1929 there 
has been no strict obligation to offer new shares to present members in 
proportion to their existing shares 
2 
, and though since 1948 there have 
been no such clauses in "Table A ", and, further, although this omission of 
these clauses was actually hailed as the elimination of this "trap for the 
unwary" 3, there is nevertheless no doubt that pre -emptive rights may still 
be mentioned in the articles of a public company. However, the very fact 
that the emphasis on these rights in Scots and English Company Law hes 
evidently lessened, illustrates the "decline of fixed rights" in this 
particular respect.. Somehow one has the impression that the structural 
changes in company law towards a lessening of the stress on the shareholders 
as owners, and the increasing of the stress on the legal entity as a new 
"reality" go hand in hand with the decline of these "fixed rights" also 
It is beyond the scope of this study, however, to indicate the number of 
public companies created after 1929 which have not recognized these rights 
in their articles 4, and of those created after 1948 which have 
intentionally retained them. 
1. C.Á.1929 (19 and 20 G V, cap.23), "Fable A ", Art. 35 -36. 
2. Charlesworth, pp.91 -92. 
3. Gore -Browne, p. 878. 
4. F.L.Reed and C.Wright, Alteration of Share Capital, London 1934, p.100, asserted 
that most companies contained provisions as to the issue of shares on these terms. 
This was prior to 1948. 
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These rights are still very widely recognized in France, the United 
States and in many other countries 1. The rules concerning them were 
attacked from many sides, and problems arose about their revocability by 
the company (through an exclusion in the charter, or through a resolution 
in general meeting at a later date), about their waiving or limiting in 
advance by the shareholders themselves, and about their inoperativeness 
In some special cases (e.g.if "stock" was issued against property in the 
United States).Letters of renunciation were the usual instrument by which 
a shareholder could waive his rights. 
Any alteration of capital may mean an alteration of the interests and 
property rights of shareholders. From contractual standpoint, based on the 
idea that the rights of shareholders were rights in personam , there is 
always some breach of contract, or interference with property, when 
shareholders' rights or interests are altered without their consent 
2 
Though it can be said that there has been a "decline and fall" of the 
fixed rights in this respect also, these problems have still to be 
considered, as they play an important role in modern company law. 
Sociologically, it is quite in the general line of development that the 
rights of shareholders should become as brittle, as any right of citizens, 
1. F.de Sola Canizares, 'The Rights of Shareholders ", in : ICLQ, vol.2 (1953), Part 4, 
p.572 (9) and note 61 ; and Buchanan, pp. 78 ff. 
2. A.C.Becht, "Corporate Chaíeyr Amendments : Issues of prior stock and the alteration 
of dividend rates ", in : CLR, vol.50 (1950), p.901. 
generally under the influence of "reproaches of singularism" 1. Even the 
tendency to explain these rights not as contractual, but as deriving from 
the charter and to be considered merely as an item in the framework of 
limited companies, could be interpreted by Sorokin as an indirect indicat- 
ion of a centripetal force operating inside the institution. 
One has to consider not only the impact of an alteration of capital 
on the rights of the existing shareholders, but also on the conferring of 
rights on new shareholders. Here should be mentioned the problem of the 
moment when these rights - mainly the voting and dividend rights - begin 
to operate. All these modifications may influence tie relative positions 
of different groups of shareholders. Special provision to protect the 
interests of these groups has been made in some countries. This too is in 
a way an indication of a weakening of the position of a single shareholder 
and the strengthening of the position of the group. Again a replacement of 
Common Law by statutory company law. 
Lastly,the procedural problems arising in this connection should now 
be outlined. There are always certain formalities to be observed in respect 
of the publication of the resolutions, the prospectus, the subscription, 
and the formal statement of the accomplishment of an alteration of capital 
There are some regulations about the technical distribution and allocation 
of the new shares, and sometimes about the time limit whithin which 
alteration should be completed. In some cases these time limits are 
peremptory. 
1. Sorokin , vol. II, p.335, 
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Recently some varieties of alteration have been developed in some 
systems of laws, especially concerning meetings of different classes of 
shareholders where there is multiformity of shares. Shortened and tempo- 
rary forms of increase - procedure have also been sometimes introduced. 
Alterations of capital comprise not only the increase and reduction 
of capital, but also the readjustment of capital, and the reorganization 
of capital. Both of them are sometimes called a l t e r a t i o n s 
i n c a p i t a l 1, since alteration of the authorized capital, or 
of the number of shares, or of the nominal amount of the shares is n o t 
involved in every case 2. Though both of them may sometimes mean partly 
an increase, and partly a reduction, their characteristics lie in quite 
different directions. Readjustment of capital refers to the cases where 
a change of the denomination of the capital has taken place. This process 
is sometimes called "renamimg of capital" 3, sometimes "re- nomination of 
capital ". Typical cases are the alterations of capital following upon the 
various currency reforms in Germany after the first and after the second 
World Wars, and the cases of companies that have changed their "national- 
ity" in the course of territorial adjustments, annexations and incorpor- 
ations 4. 
1. Cf. supra p. 9. 
2. O,Griffiths and E.Miles Taylor, The principles of company law, 5th ed., London 
1949, P. 139. 
3. E.g. in the pre -soviet law of Latvia. 
4. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the intricate problems of the 
legal status of companies that belong to a territory the annexation or incorporation 
of which has not been legally recognized by some other countries. Nor is any other 
problem of International Company Law discussed in this work. 
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Reorganization of capital, on the other hand, means an alteration 
in rights attaching to various classes of shares without alteration of 
the total amount of capital. Here are to be mentioned alterations in 
preferences, alterations of the division of the capital into shares, 
and alterations in the relative positions of groups of holders of 
"stock" : again, the conversion of shares into "stock" is one of the 
main problems here 1. But it is beyond the scope of this study to 
investigate those cases of reorganization which consist only in a 
variation of shareholders' rights. 
1. Some authors use the expressions "readjustment" and "reorganization" in a quite 
different sense, as e.g.Buchanan (p.370), who includes in "corporate readjustment" 
all the cases of " . restatement of proprietors' capital, the modification of share- 
holders' contractual rights, and exchanges of shares ... which are initiated vo- 
luntarily by the proprietors ", and uses the phrase "corporate reorganization" to de- 
note all "changes .. in the financial plan, the valuation of assets" when they "are 
not a matter of choice with the proprietors but are f o r c e d upon them because 
of legal procedure established for dealing with cases of actual or immanent 
nonpayment of debts ". 
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IV. Individual Surveys of 
D i f f e r e n t C o u n t r i e s . 
1 
1. G r e a t B r i t a i n . 
( Scots.and English Law ) . 
The historical background of Scots and English Company Law differs 
in many respects. The achievement of separate personality in English Law, 
9 
which was so widely acclaimed in connection with the Salomon case in 1897 ; 
does not rank so highly in Scots Law, where the principle of a separate 
persona was recognized long before 1856, and w1 re a different conception 
of partnership existed 3. It was argued as far back as 1728 that a 
1. The order in which different countries are dealt with in this chapter 
is explained in the Preface of this study. Cf. supra pp. 11-13. 
2. (1897), A.C.22 ; 66 L.J.Ch.. 
Cf. : C.T.Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations, Cambridge 1905, 
pp. 7 ff. ; Cooke, pp. 176 ff.; Gore -Browne, p. 4 (in fine); F.Hallis, Corporate 
Personality, London 1930, pp. XLIII ff.; Lord Miacmillan, An Outline of the Law of 
the Joint Stock Companies, Edinburgh 1907, pp. 27 ff.; M.Barlow, "The new Companies 
Act 1900 ", in : "Trusts, pools, and corporations ", (ed.by W.Z.Ripley), Boston 1905; 
H.A.Smith, The Law of Associations, Oxford 1914, pp. 53 -55 ; and Lord Chorley and 
0.C.Giles, Chorley and Tucker's Leading cases on Mercantile Law, 3rd ed., London 
1948, PP. 144 -147. 
A temporary set -back for this point of view occured during the First World War in 
connection with the consideration of some legal entities as statutory enemies. 
Cf. i.a. : J.E.Hogg, "The personal character of a corporation ", in :LQR, vo1.53, 
London 1917, pp. 76 ff. 
3. R.Brown, "The Genesis of Company Law in England and Scotland ", in : "The Juridical 
Review ", 1901, B, pp. 187 -188. 
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"corporation was the equivalent of a person in a court of law" It was 
urged in one case in 1757 that although " the contract of the British Linen 
Company has no clause expressly providing for a limited liability ... yet 
it was never dreamed that the private estates of the subscribers were 
bound for the company's debts" 2, and although clauses restricting 
liability were quite frequently included in articles of association of 
that time 3, the principle of limited liability 4 was then generally 
unknown in Scotland 5. The general attitude at that time was that limited 
1. Cf. inter alia : A.B.Du Bois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act 
1720 -1800, New York 1938, p.137 (10); Levy, p.79 ; J.A.Lillie, M'Neil and Lillie's 
Mercantile Law of Scotland, 4th ed., p. 312 * and T.B.Simpson, " Company Law, with 
particular reference to the Companies Bill ", in : "The Accountants' Magazine ", 
vol.32, Edinburgh 1928, p. 147. 
2. A.B.Du Bois, op.cit., p.149 (56). 3. Ibid., p. 259 (74). 
4. Only "with the acceptance of the principle of limited liability not only 
a 
against 
creditors but also as between the ... company and the shareholders" (Levy, p.786) 
did it cease to be possible for the company to make calls against the wish of the 
shareholders. Limited liability has always been considered in Britain as based on 
shares with a fixed nominal value or on guarantees for a fixed sum. 
Cf. Minutes of evidence taken before the Committee on Shares of no par value, 
London (HMSO) 1954, p. 172, Cf infra p. 80, note 4, p. 229, note 1, and p.284, 
note 9. 
5. It is, however, laid down in Stevenson and Company v.Macnair (14th December,1757 ; 
5.Br.Sup. 340 , and Lord Karnes' Select Dec., 135 ) that partners in ordinary jeint 
stock companies (i.e. even without an Act of Parliament) are not liable beyond 
their shares of subscribed stock. It may happen that this Scottish case of 1757 
had an impact on the writings of Adam Smith in 1776, who said then that each 
partner should be "bound only for his share ". Cf.. J.R.Christie, "Joint Stock 
Enterprise in Scotland before the Companies Acts ", in : " The Juridical Review ", 
ve1.21, Edinburgh 1909 -1910, pp. 131 and 145. 
See also : J.H.Burton, Manual of the Law of Scotland, The Law of Private Rights 
and Obligations, Edinburgh 1847, p. 189; A.B.Du Bois, op.cit., pp. 224 -225, and 
p. 259 (75 -79) ; J.R.Christie, op.cit., pp. 138 -140 and p. 143 ; R.Henderson, 
Notes on the Law of Scotland in regard to Joint Stock Companies, Edinburgh 1846, 
p.1 ; Levy, p. 79 ; and J.C.Lorimer, Outline of the Law of Joint Stock 
Companies, Edinburgh 1884, p. 3. 
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liability was a purely English invention, and indeed there was a very wide 
opposition to it in Scotland 
1. 
Though English Law had no objection to "limited liability" in itself, 
the Limited Liability Act of 1855 is said to have introduced this principle 
into English Law 2, but this Act did not apply to Scotland 3. Furthermore, 
the Mercantile Law Commission, set up to investigate the difference between 
Scots and English Law, reported against the expediency of extending it to 
Scotland. Only a year later, however, the new Companies Act was extended to 
Scotland but the final introduction of limited liability was supported 
in Scotland only by a bare majority. Of the thirteen sets of answers that 
came then from Scotland, seven were in favour of a limitation of liability, 
and six against 5. Indeed the principle of limited liability came into being 
in Scotland very gradually, and became effective only about 1866 6 : two of 
the Scots banks, in fact, continued as unlimited companies until 1882 7. 
But although the economec activities of other Scots 
1. B.C.Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England 1800- 1867,Cambridge 
(Mass.) 1936, pp.69 -70 and note 48, and pp.117 ff. See also the arguments in an 
anonymous article in "The Edinburgh Review ", vol.95, PP-446 ff.: not a single word 
is mentioned there about the point of view of Scots Law in the question of limited 
liability. 
2. C.T.Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations, Cambridge 1905,pp.109ffx; 
J.R.Christie, op.cit., p.135; Cooke, p.152; B.C.Hunt, op.cit., p.89 and H.A.Shannon, 
"The coming of general limited liability ", in : "Economic History" (published by 
"The Royal Economic Society "), vol.Il, London 1933, p.282. 
3. J.R.Christie, op.cit., p. 146. 
4. Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, 19 and 20 Viet., cap. 47. 
5. R.Brown, "The Genesis of Company Law in England and Scotland ",p. 186. 
6. G.Todd, "Some aspects of Joint Stock Companies 1844- 1900 ", in : "Economic History 
Review ", vol. IV, 1932, p. 69 and note 3. 
7. A.W.Kerr, History of Banking in Scotland, Glasgow 1884, pp.230 -232 ; J.L.Anderson, 
The Story of the Commercial Bank of Scotland Limited, Edinburgh 1910, pp. 77 ff. 
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joint stock companies were comparatively small the backgound of 
Roman Law was very favourable to a sound and healthy development of 
the basic trinciples of company law 
2 
The last purely Scottish Companies Act of the nineteenth century was 
the "Companies Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845" 3 which is still 
of interest in many respect, though it only covered a very small part of 
the whole field of company law 4. It is worth while to note that this Act 
has never been wholly repealed 5, and some of its provisions were 
incorporated in tne Companies Act of 1948 6. Section 59 of this Act of 
1845 7 made it lawful to raise capital by creating new shares, "unless 
1. "This species of partnership .. only to have become judicially known since the 
year 1825" ( R.Henderson, Notes on the Law of Scotland in regard to Joint Stock 
Companies, Edinburgh 1846, p.2). On the Scots companies of the late forties of 
the eighteenth century, see : A.B.Du Bois, The English Business Company after 
the Bubble Act 1720 -1800, New York 1938, p. 72. 
2. Cf. infra pp. 295 -296. 
3. 8 and 9 Vict., cap.17. The text of this Act is appended to G.W.Wilton, Company 
Law and Practice in Scotland, Edinburgh 1912, pp. 613 ff.; and Wordsworth's Law 
of Railway, Banking, Mining and other Joint Companies, 5th ed., London 1845. 
Cf. also : `T.D.Rawlins and The Fon.' .M.Macnaghten, Law and practice in relation 
to Companies under the Companies Clauses Acts 1845 to 1889, and under the 
Companies Acts 1862 to 1900, London 1901. 
4. It was in some respects a very early "PableA" for statutory companies in Scotland, 
or a standard type of the text of what one (if speaking about companies registered 
under the Companies Acts) would call articles of association of "companies ... of 
a public nature ". Cf. L.Levi, Manual of the Mercantile Law, London 1854, p.186 ; 
Charlesworth, pp. 262 ff.; and R.Henderson, op.cit., p.7. 
5. Cf. Chronological Table of the Statutes covering the Legislation to 
December 31, 1954, London (HMSO) 1955. 
6. 11 and 12 Geo VI, cap. 38, S. 287 (6). 
7. 8 and 9 Viet., cap. 17, S. 59. Cf. also G.W.Wilton, op.cit., p.649. 
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it be otherwise provided by Special Act" This procedure was called 
"Augmentation of Capital ", and in connection with this augmentation of 
capital, pre -emptive rights were given statutoty force in Scots Law 
2 
Reduction of capital, however, remained at that time completely outside 
the statute book 3. 
Contrary to the more advanced Scots Law, English Law up to 1844 
prohibited joint stock enterprthse for ordinary trading and manufacturing 
purposes 4, but even in 1844 the English Companies Act 5 still continued 
1. In Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts of the second half of the nineteenth century 
this presumption was reversed, i.e. these Acts did n o t give power to increase 
capital, unless this power was mentioned in the special act. 
Cf. Charlesworth, D. 264 ; and W.F.Hamilton, A Manual of Company Law, 2nd ed., 
London 1901, p. 51. 
This is a specific example of the ius dispositivum- fashion of that time. 
2. 8 and 9 Vict., cap.17, S. 61 : " ... and such new shares shall be offered to the 
then shareholders in the proportion aforesaid ; and such offer shall be made by 
letter under the hand of the secretary ... ". The parallel English Act (8 and 9 
Vict., cap. 16 ) contains the same provision (S.58). The text of the English 
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845 is given in : W.D.Rawlins and 
The Hon. M.M.Macnaghten, op.cit., pp.1 -106 ; and R.J.Sutcliffe, Statutory 
Companies and the Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts, London 1924$ pp. 11 -122. 
See also:A.Crew, Company Law, London 1938, po. 305 -346. 
3. Though a reduction of capital was a relatively infrequent occurence in the 
eighteenth century there were still some cases known. Cf. A.B.Du Bois, op. 
cit., pp. 357 ff. ans pp. 146 (48) and 34.1 (164). Reduction was mentioned 
for the first time in the statute book in 1867 (30 and 31 Vict., cap.131). 
Cf. R.R.Formoy, The historical foundations of modern. company law, London 1923,p.135; 
kevy , pp. 86 and 804 ; H.B.Buckley, The Law and Practice under the Companies Acts 
1862 to 1893, 7th ed., London 1897, p.580 ; G.F.Emery, A treatise on Uompany 
Lawiander the Acts 1862 -1900, London 1901, pp. 24 -35. 
Similarly, reduction remained outside the statute book in some of the American 
states, e.g. in Louisiana. Cf. S.D.Thompson, Commentaries on the law of Private 
Corporations, vol.II, San Francisco 1895, p. 1571. 
4. J.George, A view of the existing law affecting unincorporated Joint Stock 
Companies, London 1825 ; H.A.Shannon, " The coming of general limited 
liability ", in : " Economic History ", vol.Il, London 1933, p. 267. 
5. C.A.1844 (7 and 8 Viet., cap. 110). 
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to consider joint stock companies merely as a variety of partnership 1, 
though without any direct appliaction of the principles of Common Law 
per analogiam. Scots Law of that period applied the general principles of 
Roman Law to Company Law problems as well, and had recourse to statute law 
only in those few cases where there was statute law to apply. 
The idea that a firm could and must be separated from the persons 
conducting the business was common property on the European Continent and 
in Scotland from the second half of the sixteenth century 2, while it was 
then quite unknown in England. The Scot, of course, has always been more 
cosmopolitan as a type 3. The infiltration of Englsih commercial law into 
Scotland started after 1707, however, and became especially marked in the 
field of company law 4. At the same time analogies from Continental systems 
of law began to lose their attraction, and quotations were used ever less 
frequently 5, but, none the less, certain peculiarities of Scots Law pre- 
vented domination by English policy 6, and it is doubtful whether the 
1. One has, besides, to bear in mind the divergence of Scots and English Law on 
partnership. Cf. R.Brown, " The Genesis of Company Law in England and Scotland ", in 
"The Juridical Review ", vol.13, Edinburgh 1901, pp.189 and 196 ; Charlesworth, p.3; 
Cooke, pp.132, 137 and passim ; W.Horrwitz, "Historical development of Company Law ", 
in : LQR, vol.62 (1946), pp.378 and 385 ; H.A.Shannon, op.cit, pp.270 ff. ; H.Smith, 
"The persona ficta ", in : "The Juridical Review ", vol. 26 (1914), P.59. 
2. Cooke, p. 185. 
3. Lord Macmillan, "Scots Law as a Subject of Comparative Study ", in : " Memoires de 
l'Academie Internationale de droit compare ", vol.Il, part IV, Paris 1935, p.15. 
4. J.R.Christie, "Joint Stock Enterprise in Scotland before the Companies Acts ", in : 
"The Juridical Review ", vol. 21, Edinburgh 1909 -1910, pp.128 ff. 
5. A.B.Du Bois, The English Busiiness Company after the Bubble Act 1720 -1800, New York 
1938, p.226. 
6. Ibid., p. 87. 
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Bubble Act could have been fully applied in Scotland 1. The principle of 
incorporation was in England still considered as a privilege and not as a 
right 
2, 
while the Scots point of view was much nearer to the later 
development 3. Even unincorporated companies.in Scotland made some attempts 
to be considered as personae in courts of law 4. 
It has been asserted that it was not an adaptation of a new legal 
institution (new at least to English Law) that was decisive, but mainly the 
revolution in the conception of the nature of property in capital That 
does not mean that Scottish economic circumstances were different and more 
favourable in this respect, but that, rather, Scots Law proved again to be 
more adaptable from the point of view of legal architecture 
6 
Thus, the 
ideas incorporated in the statute law of 1844 7 were less novelties for 
1. R.Brown, op.cit., p. 190 ; and J.R.Christie, op.cit., p.137. 
2. Cooke, p. 143. 
3. R.Brown, op.cit., p. 187 ; and W.R.Seott, The constitution and finance of English, 
Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720, vol. I, Cambridge 1912, p.300. 
On the American point of view see : E.H.Warren, Corporate Adaantages without 
Incorporation New York 1929; and the review of this book by C.G.Little4,in : HLR, 
vol. 42 (1929), pp. 967 ff.; and EM.Dodd, Jr., "Dogma and Practice in the Law of 
Associations ", in : HLR, vol.42 (1929). PP. 977-1014. 
4. A.B.Du Bois, op. cit., p.420 (176) ; and J.R.Christie, op.cit., p. 130. 
5. R.H.Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, London 1952, p. 72 in fine. 
6. The success of the Scottish business circles aginst the crisis of 1825 was partly 
explained even then by the very fortunate "joint- stock -company " -system in Scotland. 
Cf. B.C.Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England 1800 -1867, 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1936, pp. 48 -50 and notes 106 and 108 ; and R.Brown, op.cit., 
p.191. 
7. It was asserted by R.Brown ( op.cit., p.195) that this Act of 1844 possesses the hist- 
orical fame of being the first IA legislation where a definition of a "joint stock 
company "has been introduced. It was, however, only in 1862, that the term "company" 
was approached n o t from the side of a partnership, but from that of a ... joint 
ownership (sic;). Cf. R.Brown, op.cit., pp. 197 -198. 
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Scotland than for England, though the econommc background might have 
seemed to have advanced more towards a modern conception of capitalism 
in England than in Scotland. -What generally was referred to as an 
extension of the Companies Acts to Scotland was in many ways the reverse, 
i.e. principles quite ancient and within the framework of Scots Law have 
been introduced into statutes applying to England as well as Scotland. If 
the policy concerning company law that started in 1856 and meant the 
adoption of the principle Laissez faired was a rather sudden and complete 
change from that which existed previously, the Companies Acts of the 
sixties marked, in fact, not only a remarkable lessening of the laissez 
faire, but also a return to legal traditions that were familiar in Scotland 
prior to 1856 
2, Up to the end of the last century the point of view was 
prevalent that for the statutory enactments concerning company law "we are 
mainly indebted to the skill and experience of mercantile lawyers in the 
sister country" 3. 
To assert that since 1856, or, at least, since 1862 4, Scots and 
English Company Law have become so similar that they have "moved on 
1. W.Horrwitz, "Historical development of Company Law ", in :LQR, vol.62 (1946), 
pp. 381 and 383. 
2. R.Brown, "The Genesis of Company Law in England and Scotland" , in : "The Juridical 
Review ", vol.13 (B), Edinburgh 1901, p.192, calls them unconscious revivals. 
3. Cf. the address of Lord Watson at the Annual Public Meeting of the Glasgow 
Juridical Society in 1883, published in : "The Juridical Review ", vol.13, 1901, p.3. 
This point of view was heavily attacked by R.Brown (op.cit., p. 185). 
4. 25 and 26 Vict., cap. 89. 
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identical lines" 1 would be an oversimplification of the situation 2. The 
existence of identical Companies Acts doe3 not necessarily mean an identical 
attitude towards their interpretation, especially in view of the fact that 
the common law principles of Scotland differ from those in England An 
identical approach to the filling up of gaps and loop -holes is therefore 
not always possible. It would be safer to say that the general plan and 
the structure of modern company law set up in the Acts of 1844, though 
altered and amended in many points, has remained the same in the two 
countries up to the present time 4, although it would be, perhaps, more 
correct to say this if we start with the Companies Act of 1862 5. 
1. Levy, p. 78. 
2. A special study on the still existing differences is given by G.'d.Wilton : 
Company Law, Principal distinctions between the laws of England and Scotland, 
London 1923. His remarks on "uncaIL d" capital (op.cit., p.26) may still be of 
some interest. Cf. infra p. 106, note 1. 
3. L.C.B.Gower, "Some contrasts between British and American Corporation Law ", in : 
HLR, vol.69 (1956), p.1369, note. 
4. Cooke, p. 138. 
5. In order to explain the textual history of the statute law concernevi, a table of 
the texts of those sections of the Companies Acts which deal with the problem of 
alteration of capital is given as Annex I to this study. 
Cf. infra pp. A 1 -A 18. 
The starting point of this table id the Companies Act of 1862. The numeration on 
the top of each section or article refers to the Companies Act of 1948. The numbers 
on the outer margin refer to previous Companies Acts. 
There are different comparative editions covering the whole text of Companies Acts. 
Cf. e.g. : Prof.W.Annan, An arrangement of the Companies (Consolidation) Act,1908, 
as amended by the Companies Act, 1928, with General Index, Edinburgh 1928 ; 
J.G.Hassel, Comparative tables of the sections of the Companies Acts 1929, 1947 and 
1948, London 1948. 
Further, shortened forms of a table of comparison are sometimes appended to editions 
of the texts of the Companies Acts, e.g. : M.Finer and H.A.C.Sturgess, The Companies 
Act,1948, London 1948, part 3, pp.3 -50 ; D.G.Hemmant, The Companies Act,1929, 9th ed 
London 1930, pp. XXIX- XXXVIII ; C.W.Turner, Index to the Companies Act,1948, with 
comparative tables, 10th ed., London 1948, pp.466 -480. 
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The only place where the term "Alteration of capital" is used as a head- 
ing to cover all the types of alteration discussed in this study is in the 
Table A 1, "Reduction of capital ", as one of the main varieties of capital 
alteration, entered the scene at a later stage 2 than "increase of capital ", 
and, perhaps, it was partly on account of this later appearance, and not en, 
tirely due to the influence of the creditors' interests, that it acquired 
and has since retained a special place of its own in the system of the Com- 
panies Acts, in which there is usually a subdivision entitled "Reduction of 
Share Capital" 3, but none devoted to increase of capital 4. However, both 
of them, increase and reduction, involve an alteration of the memorandum 5 
and of the articles of association 6. 
The regulations concerning increase of capital - and they are very few 
in number are to be found in the subdivision "Miscellaneous Provisions 
as to Share Capital" 8. In this miscellany provisions on increase of capital 
1. First Schedule of the Companies Act of 1948. Cf. Annex I, infra pp. A 17 -18. 
2. Cf. C.A.1867 (30 and 31 Vict.,cap.131), Ss.9 -20, and the General Order of the High 
Court of Chancery issued by the Lord High Chancellor in March 1868 (rules 2 -20). The 
text of this Order is appended to Shelford's Law of Joint Stock Companies, London 
1870, pp.467 ff. See also :Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Supple- 
mentary Volume, Part 1 (Supplement to vol.1 -9, Gíeneral Editor : J.F.Gordon Thomson) 
Edinburgh 1949, p. 186 (93). Cf. supra p. 66, note 3. 
3. C.A.1948, Ss.66 -71. 4. Cf. infra pp. 202 and 275. 
5, C.A.1948, S.69 (5)(6). 8. C.A.1948, Ss.59-650 
6. Fletcher Moulton's Companion to the Companies Act,1929, London 1929, p.26. 
7. The provisions about the consent of the treasury, which is required for all increases 
for more than L 50,000 a year, are to be found outside the Companies Act in the Bor- 
rowing (Control and Ruarantees) Act, 1946 (9 and 10 Geo VI, cap.58) and in the Control 
of Borrowing Order of 21st May, 1947. Cf. F.C.Howard, Exchange and Borrowing Control, 
London 1948, These regulations replaced those "Defence (Finance) Regulations" of the 
3rd September,1939, which were introduced shortly after the beginning of the war. The 
limit of L 50,000 a year was fixed by the Order of 21st May,1947. Up to the 21st 
April, 1949, any issue of shares (even below this figure of 50.0007 was not allowed 
without the consent of the Treasury where the issue included the capitalization of 
profits or reserves. Another exemption concerned some of the issues by private compa- 
nies. A special Capital Issues Committee was set forth to deal with these permits. 
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occupy an extremely[ small place, and do not contain many limitations on 
the increase of capital, and their laconic style produees, of course, an 
abundance of gaps which have to be filled from other sources. These 
provisions are not applicable to an increase of capital effected within 
the limits of the authorized capital. Such an increase is normally 
effected simply by a resolution of the board of directors, and there 
are no special formalities that have to be observed 1. 
The first pre- requisite mentioned in this subdivision of the Act of 
1948 is - authorization by the articles 
2. 
Table A contains this author- 
ization 3. In cases of public companies, amendments to the usual Table A 
may be so numerous as to lead to the framing of complete sets of articles 
excluding Table A 4. Thus, besides the official Table A 5, there were and 
still are in operation semi- official types of articles of association of 
a public company, usually referred to as "forms" 6. If a company has its 
1. Increase of capital treated in this study is in most cases an increase beyond the 
limits of the authorized capital. Cf. supra pp. 25 and 45, and infra pp.277 -278. 
2. The Companies Act of 1844 required the deed of settlement (cf. supra p.13, note 2) 
to provide for increase of capital. No further Act included a similar provision. 
Later Companies Acts referred both to the original articles and to later amendments 
achieved by special resolution passed by a majority of not less than three fourths. 
Cf. R.R.Formoy, The historical foundations of modern company law, London 1923, p.78; 
and J.C.Lorimer, Outline of the Law of Joint Stock Companies, Edinburgh 1884, 
pp. 16 and 49. Since 1907 special resolutions were considered superfluous. 
Cf. infra pp. A 2 and 5. 
3. Cf. infra Annex I, p. A 3 , footnote 2, and p. A 17. 
4. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950, p.29 ; and 
Green's Encyclopaerlia, op.cit., p. 168. 
5. Cf. infra Annex I, pp. A 17 -18. 
6. One should mention in this connection the form reproduced under the title "Form 59" 
in : V.Nicolas, The Law and Practice relating to the formation of companies, 
London 1908, pp. 215 -252 ; or to "Form No. 2" in : G.W,Wilton, Company Forms 
in Scotland, Edinburgh 1920, pp. 48 -169 ; or to "Form 277" in : Palmer's 
Company Prededents, 16th ed., vol.I, pp. 472 -672. 
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own articles, either drawn on the lines of one of 
the standard forms or 
completely individualistic, and they do not contain power 
to increase the 
capital either by a reference to 'Table A, or express regulation, 
such power 
can be obtained by amending the articles 1 in the normal way. If, 
however, 
the original shares do not all have the same rights, and the provisions 
defining such rights are contained in the memorandum, then the shareholders' 
rights so defined cannot be altered even with the consent of all the 
shareholders, unless the memorandum contains a power to alter such rights. 
If the memorandum does not contain such a power 2, the sanction of the 
court is necessary 3; and this can be obtained in the course of an 
application under S.206 of the Companies Act of 1948 4. 
The second pre -requisite for an increase of capital is an ordinary re- 
solution 5 passed in general meeting, provided, of course, that the articles 
authorize an increase 6. The articles may, of course, limit this authority 
by e.g. requiring a quorum, or a qualified majority, or both combined. 
1. Both actions, i.e. the amendment of the articles and the increase of capital, can be 
accomplished uno flatu provided that the resolution is passed by the majority 
necessary to qualify as a "special" one. Cf.Gore- Browne, pp. 520 -521; Levy, p.787; 
Palmer's Company Law, i)t i ed., Londr-)2.1 1949, p. 70. 
This does not apply to reduction of capital. Cf. infra pp. 90 -91. 
2. E.g. specified preferential rights might be "irrevocably" attached to a particular 
class of shares. In such cases a subsequent increase must not contravene these 
provisions. In practice it happens very seldom indeed. Cf.O.Griffiths and E.M.Taylor, 
The principles of Company Law, 5th ed., London 1950, p. 131. 
3. A.C.Connell and A.'T.Purse, Companies and Company Law, 6th ed., London 1949, p.86; 
and O.Griffiths and E.M.Taylor, op.cit., pp. 7 and 140. 
4. Cf. infra p. 86. 
5. In the C.A.of 1908 and prior to that, a special resolution passed with a qualified 
majority was required. Cf. infra, Annex I, p.A 4, footnote 1, and p.A 17, foot - 
note 1. Since, however, C.A.1948, S.61 (2) ,does not mention an ordinary resolution 
as a pre -requisite, any resolution would suffice. Cf. Palmer, p.69. 




Nothing is mentioned in the Act about the manner in which the capital 
is to be increased, but the problem arises whether in connection with 
the 
phrase : "...by new shares of such amount as it thinks expedient" 1 the 
other variety of increase which is practised in other legal systems, i.e. 
an increase of the nominal amount of the previously issued shares, is 
admissible under Scots and English Law 2.' The next section, relating 
to an increase 3 does not use this restrictive phrase. Thus, and in view 
of the exclusive character of the preamble of S.61 (1) 4, it could be 
asserted that this variety of capital increase seems to be unknown in 
Britain 5.However, it is worth while investigating how far the filling of 
this gap is theoretically admissible, whether by explicit enactment 6, or 
1. C.A.1948, S.61 (1)(a). 
2. L.C.B.Gower ( The proinciples of modern company law, London 1954, p.107) apparently 
denies this possibility and recognizes the issuing of new shares as the only way. 
3. C.Á.1948, S.63 (1). 
4. Cf. infra p. 92, note 2. 
5. The English Companies Act of 1844 (7 and 8 Vict.,cap.110),Schedule (A),Art.33, 
suggested two modes of "augmentation" of capital, i.e.by the conversion of loans 
into capital, or by the issue of new shares, adding cautiously "or otherwise ". 
Authors were puzzled at that time what other mode that could mean. Cf.G.Taylor, 
A practical treatise on the Act for the Registration, Regulation and Incorporation 
of Joint Stock Companies, London 1847, pp.160-162. 
It is submitted that in keeping these two words in the statute book the possibility 
of an increase of capital by increasing the nominal value of the shares would have 
been recognized as admissible. However, the only case known in Great Britain of 
increase of capital without an issue of new shares is the increase carried out by 
The Commercial Bank of Scotland in 1882. It was based upon S.5 of the C.A.1879 which 
stipulated that an "...unlimited company may ... increase the nominal amount of its 
capital by increasing the nóminal amount of each of its shares ". The present 
formulation of this rule is to be found in C.A.1948, S,64. Cf.R.R.Formoy, The 
historical foundations of Modern Company Law, London 1923, p.137 ; C.E.H.Chadwyck 
Healey, P.F.Wheeler and C.E.E.Jenkins, A treatise on the law and practice relating 
to Joint Stock Companies, 2nd ed., London 1886, p. 734. 
6. Neither of the above mentioned Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts (8 and 9 Vict., 
cap. 16 and 17) give an explicit answer, since the articles in question restrict the 
augmentation to that effected by creating ne.Ai shares. Cf. G.W.Wilton, Company Law an 
Practice in Scotland, Edinburgh 1912, p.649. 
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.by interpretation. The possibility stil remains that this gap may be 
filled simply by a clause in the articles 1, and one would hope that such 
a clause regulating more explicitly the increase of capital and providing 
for doing so by increasing the nominal amount of the previously issued 
shares would not be interpreted as being contra legem. The other possible 
way would be by suitable interpretation of the phrase " ... consolidate 
and divide" of S.61 (1)(b). Though this was primarily meant to cover one 
of the forms of reorganisation of capital 2, it could, it is submitted, 
bear a secondary interpretation as "consolidation through increase ". Such 
an increase- cum -consolidation of a 1 1 the share capital in order to 
divide it up into shares of l a r g e r amount than its existing shares 
could be achieved uno flatu . If this interpretation could be accepted 3, 
one would simply have another example of parallel terms : since "diminution" 
of the share capital 4 is recognized side by side with "reduction" 5, two 
forms of "augmentation" could theoretically be admitted also : namely, the 
"increase by new shares" 6 and the "increase- cum -consolidation" 7 without 
any issue of new shares. 
1. The text of Art.44 of Table A (C.A.1948) does not solve this problem in a definite 
way, since it is ambiguous. The phrase " ... increase ... by such sum to be divided 
into shares of such amount" does not touch the question whether these shares,are new 
shares, or merely the previously issued ones. 
2. Cf. supra p. 61, and Gore -Browne, p.538. 
3. G.W.Wilton, Alteration of the memorandum of association, Edinburgh 1927, p.53, is 
opposed to this interpretation. 
4. C.A.1948, S.61 (1)(e) and (3). 
5. C,A.1948, Ss.66 ff. 
6. C.A,1948, S.61 (1)(a) and S.63 (1). 
7. C.A,1948, 3.61 (1)(b) and S. 62 (1)(a). 
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The third pre- requisite is that notice must be given by the company 
to the registrar 1 within fifteen days after the passing of the above 
mentioned resolution. The registrar is obliged to record the increase. 
Such a notice must include all particulars about the classes of shares 
affected and all the conditions of the new issue. A copy of the resolution 
authorizing the increase has to be appended to this notice. Nothing else 
is explicitly said 2.Thus, one can presume that there is nothing to prevent 
an increase of capital although the authorized share capital has not yet 
been fully issued 3, and that there is no connection between the amount 
of subscribed capital (in the framework of the previous amount) and the 
admissibility of raising additional capital. Two aspects, quite different 
from each other, have to be pointed out in this connection. There may still 
be some unissued portion of the previously authorized share capital which 
could be utilized for an increase of capital, without having to observe all 
the necessary formalities 4; or, the capital may not yet have been fully 
paid up by the shareholders 5. Similarly, it can be said that the fact that 
1. C.A. 1948, S. 63 (1). 
2. Table A is bare of any additional requirements. They may, of course, occur in the 
individual articles of association. 
3. S.W.Magnus and M.Estrin, The Companies Act,1948, 2nd ed., London 1951, p.67. 
A different opinion is expressed by John iviontgomerie, Steven's Elements tf 
Mercantile Law, 11th ed., London 1950, p. 219. 
4. Cf. supra pp. 71 -72. 
5. Levy (p. 787) overlooks the existence of these two aspects. He says : "the capital 
may be increased even though the original a u t h o r i z e d capital is not 
fully p a i d - u p ". One should extend this in two directions, and add that the 
capital may be increased even : 1) though the authorized share capital may not yet 
have been all issumd (Levy, p. 788), or 2) though the capital is not fully paid up. 
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there has been a previous increase (either through issue of shares within 
the framework of the authorized capital), or by a previous resolution in 
general meeting) does not exclude the possibility of further increase 
1. 
The opinion has been expressed, and is still regarded as sound, that 
there is no obligation on the company to offer these new sbares to the 
existing shareholders, unless the articles so provide. This opinion, as 
mentioned above 2, is based upon the fact that the clauses 
3 dealing with 
this question 4 were omitted from the Companies Act of 1948 5, thus 
confining this obligation either to companies established under former 
Companies Acts, when a previous Table A was part of the company's 
constitution 6, or to companies with articles of association explicitly 
imposing an obligation to offer new shares to existing shareholders. This 
was done following the general business practice that pre -emptive rights 
should inconvenience 7 the company only in those cases where these rights 
were explicitly conferred 
8. 
It is interesting to note that this right of 
1. Levy, pp. 787 -788, 
2. Cf. supra p. 57. 
3. A.Glynne -Jones ( The Companies Acts 1862 to 1900, London 1902) and P.F.Simonson 
(Revised Table A, London 1907) called the units of the Table A "clauses ", 
A.C.Bennett (in his remarks in "Scots Law Times ") used two expressions : "clauses" 
and "regulations ", other authors adopted various names for them. 
4. C.11.1929, Table A, Art. 35 -36. Cf. infra, p. A 17, footnote 2, and p. A 18, foot- 
note 1. As a matter of fact, both these regulations are still in force in Northern 
Ireland. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 18, footnote 1. 
5. Minutes of evidence taken before the Committee on Shares of no par value, 
London (HMSO) 1954, p. 14. 
6. On the applicability of a previous Table A see the rema rk by A.C.B(ennett) : 
"Company Law, Perplexities of the Statute ", in : SLT (1936), p.70. 
7. Gore -Browne, p. 878. Cf. supra p. 57. 
8. The same trend is observable in some of the American statutes too, although the 
Common Law is in favour of a widely recognized pre -emption. Cf. e.g. the statutes 
of California, Michigan and Pennsylvania. 
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the shareholders to have new shares offered to them, though previously 
known in Scots and English Law 1, and recognized in statute law 2, never 
had a proper name until quite recently, when the American coining of "pre- 
emptive rights" was introduced 3 into British juridical literature 4.Though 
this institution was relegated to the First Schedule in 1862 5, and though 
6 
in 1908 the rather futile limitation "subject to any direction to the 
contrary" was introduced 7, it is curious to note that there are two,almost 
disused, United Kingdom statutes 
8 
where this institution of pre -emptive 
rights is still preserved - the already mentioned Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Acts of 1845. 
1. A.B.Du Bois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act 1720 -1800, 
New York 1938, p. 395 (69), and p. 396 (72). 
2. Cf. supra p. 66, note 2. 
3. A.B.Du Bois asserts (op.cit., pp. 278 -279 (203 and 213), p. 340 (163) and p. 356) 
that the term "pre -emption" was known in Scotland and England at the end of the 
eighteenth century. The fact is worth noting that this same expression appears 
in very early American sources as well. 
4. Levy, pp. 787 and 795 -797. 
It is worth while noting in this connection that there is a difference in 
attitude between American Law and British statute law. While American Law uses the 
expression "pre -emeptive rights" (cf. e.g. the statutes of California of 1951, 
marginal note to § 1106 ; Michigan - 1951, S.31 ; New York - 1952, §35 (3)(4), 
Pennsylvania - 1951, 5.611 ; and Wisconsin - 1953, S.180.21 ), all the British 
sources speak only about an obligation on the part of the company. 
5. W.D.Rawlins and The Ron. M.M.Macnaghten, Law and Practice in relation to companies 
under the Companies Clauses Acts 1845 to 1889, and under the Companies Acts 1862 to 
1900, London 1901, p.488 and footnotes. 
Levy (p.795) erroneously called it parable A ", a name appropriated much later. 
6. Since the whole "Table A" is a standard form of articles of association with the 
provision that if and in so far as a company should not have drawn up articles of 
its own they are to be applied, it would be really useless to insert in "TableA" 
any "subject to "- clauses. Cf. Levy, p. 346. 
7. Levy (p. 795) erroneously asserted that this limitation came into being in 1929. 
8. 8 and 9 Vict., cap. 16 (S.58), and cap.17 (S.61). Cf. supra pp. 65 -66. 
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It is interesting to consider whether these Acts of 1845 may be 
relied on in a way subsidiary to contemporary regulations, involving an 
obligation on the Hart of the company to offer new shares to old share- 
holders. The removing of Art. 35 and 36 out of the old "TableA" 1 
( a veritable collection of " ius dispositivum" ) could thus yield a 
quite unexpected result. There is still ground for argument as to whether 
these Acts of 1845 were ius cogens at all. Were they initially meant to be 
ius cogens ? 2 What are they now ? It is also questionable whether the 
meaning of the phrase "... undertakings of a public nature in Scotland" 
has not acquired a new modified content to fit in not only with the modern 
notion of the nationalized sector of the national economy, but also with 
the modern notion of public companies 3. Since it is only very seldom that 
provisions of individualistic "articles of its own" exclude or limit these 
pre -emptive rights 4, an application of these above mentioned two Acts of 
1845 could still, perhaps, be considered for the case where the individ- 
ualistic articles of a public company are silent on this question. 
The laconic style of the Companies Act of 1948 in these questions is 
evident in other problems too. Nothing is said in statute law about the 
contents of the resolution that should be passed in general meeting on an 
increase of capital. Nothing is said about the limits of discretion of the 
1. C.Á.1929, Table A, Art. 35 -36. Cf. Annex I , infra p.A 17, footnote 2, and 
p. A 18, footnote 1. 
2. Cf. e.g. the preamble of 8 and 9 Vict., cap. 17 : " ... save so far as they shall 
be varied or excepted by any such Act ..." 
3. Cf. supra p. 36, and notes i and 3. 
4. Levy, p. 795. 
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directors in this respect 1, nor is anything said about whether the 
regulations on formation of a company are applicable here Per analogiam, 
and if so how far ; or whether regulations on successive formation and 
simultaneous promotion are applicable 2. All these questions are left 
completely to the articles of association, and since they are generally 
silent on them 3, the general meeting is, in practice, usually left to 
determine them, besides determining the scope and contents of the 
resolution in all other relevant matters. Similarly, nothing is said in the 
Companies Act of 1948 as to whether the subscription of the full amount of 
the projected increase is a precondition of the validity of the increase ; 
nor is anything said about whether the principles governing the authorized 
capital are automatically applicable to the difference between the 
projected and the subscribed capital. 
In addition, the company has a free hand concerning the par value 4 of 
1. O,Griffiths and E.M.Taylor, The Principles of Company Law, London 1949, P.131. 
2. Cf. supra p. 53 and note 3. 
3. So also is Table A. 
4. Unlike American Law, shares of no par value are unknown in Scots and English Law. 
The question does not at the present moment arise of how an increase of capital may 
affect no -par- value -shares. A recommendation to permit de lege ferenda the issue of 
ordinary shares of no par value was recently expressed by a special committee ap- 
pointed by the President of the Board of Trade.Apparently following an American point 
of view (cf.supra p.22)that no- par -value -shares are an item of an "over -capitalized" 
upper layer of the corporate pyramid, it was sugc^ested that the application of this 
new institution be limited to public companies only. That would mean, of course, an 
additional difference between public and private companies. This question was raised 
in Parliament on May 4th,1956, and it seems now quite probable that future legislat- 
ion will be favourable to no- par -value -shares. The latest summary of American theory 
on this question was given by C.L.Israels ( "Problems of par and no par snares : a 
reappraisal ", in :CLh, vol.4'(,pp.12f9- 1)OU), who came to the amazing conclusion that 
(p.1300) since "the basic conception of the nature and scope of liability are draw- 
ing together" it is no longer so important which type of share be issued. 
Cf. L.C.B.Gower, the principles of Modern Company Law, London 1954, pp.119 ff.; 
Board of trade, Report of the Committee on Shares of no par value, London (HMSO) 
1954, and Minutes of evidence taken before this Committee, p. 119. 
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the new share : it may be the same, but it may equally be either greater 
or less. there are, however, some regulations concerning the below -par 
increase 1, a feature unknown in Britain before 1928 2. 
It is possible for a company to issue new shares at a discount, provided 
a resolution is passed to this effect in general meeting 3. The resolution 
must specify the maximum rate of discount, and it must be sanctioned by the 
court 4. There are also two clauses which impose time limits on this type 
of issue 5 : firstly, it can be made only after the first year of business 
has elapsed,and,secondly, the issue must be completed within the very short 
space of one month after it is sanctioned by the court 6. Another limitation 
concerns the type of the shares : only shares "of a class already issued" 7 
can be issued at a discount. Thus, preference shares cannot be issued at a 
discount when there were no preference shares prior to that increase, or no 
shares with exactly the same preference. Particulars about the discount 
men 
allowed and written off have to be motioned in all subsequent balance 
1. Cf. supra pp. 54 -55. 
2. Cf. Company Law Amendment Committee 1925 -26, London (HMSO) 1926 (Cmd.2657), 
pp. 9 ff. and notes 45 -46. 
3. C.A.1928, S. 37 ; C.A.1929, S. 47 ; C.A.1948, S. 57. 
The position prior to 1928 was unfavourable to an issue at a discount. 
Cf. Chorley and Tucker's Leading cases on Mercantile Law, 3rd ed., London 1948, 
pp. 161 -163 ; and Rauch, vol.I, Graz 1947, p. 56. 
See also the report in : " The Scottish Law Review ", Glasgow 1929, pp. 334 ff. 
4. The price for a reissued share might be less than that paid for it before a 
forfeiture, if it was paid up to any extent by the former shareholder. 
Cf. Gore- Browne, p. 537. 
5. C.A.1948, S. 57 (c)(d). 
6. Phis term can be extended, of course, with the sanction of the court, 
7. Gore -Browne, pp. 197 and 521. 
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sheets of the company 
1. 
Another type of below -par- increase is represented 
by a commission 2 payable by the company (up to 10?4, 
if autnorizea by the 
articles), and provided that certain strict formalities 
are observed 3. 
Similarly, it is lawful for a company to pay 
brokerage 4. 
On the other hand, one speaks about an above- 
par -increase if the new 
shares are issued at a premium 5, whether for cash or otherwise 
6. 
The 
Companies Act is silent about the terms of payment, but there is no 
reason 
why any of the possible methods of payment should be excluded. The new 
shares can be paid eitner in full on application, or by instalments 
(usually at certain initially fixed intervals, or as and when the money is 
required by the company),either in cash, or for property and services, or 
in lieu of dividends, or by way of division of edisting surpluses 7. 
1. There is a certain amount of lack of system in the fact that this S.57 precedes the 
sedes mater.iae concerning the increase of capital. Though it is applicable exclusi- 
vely to the cases of increase, it was placed together with the only section on the 
issue of redeemable preference shares into a special subdivision sandwiched between 
"Commissions and Discounts" and the above mentioned "Miscellaneous Provisions ". If 
ever a separate subdivision on "Increase of Capital" should come into being, the 
true place of this section would be at the end of it. 
2. "The Scottish Law Review ", vol.45, Glasgow 1929, p.336. 
3. C.Á.1948, S.53 (1)(c -d) and Fourth Schedule, 
Cf. Levy, p. 387 ; Gore -Browne, pp.191 and 521. It is a comparatively rare occurence 
when the shareholder receives additional shares in lieu of commission.Cf.Gore- Browne 
p.522. It is doubtful whether these could be called bonus -shares. 
4. CÁ°1948, 8.53 (3). Cf. Gore -Browne, pp. 191 and 521. 
5. Gore- Browne, p. 522 ; L.C.t3.Gower, The principles of Modern Company Law ..., p.107. 
6. In both cases a sum equal to the aggregate amount or value of the premiums has to 
be transferred to a special share premium account. Cf. C.Á.1948, S.56. 
Cf. Gore -Browne, pp. 522 -523. 
7. Though an increase of paid -up capital without any payment to the company is a 
theoretical variety of increase, the Court in Scotland refused in one particular 
case to sanction a rearrangement of the capital which was partly an increase 
without cash. See : Walker Steam TraWl Fishing Co., 1908 S.C.123. 
Cf. Gore -Browne, p. 533 ; L.C.B.Gower, op.cit., p.108. 
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In this connection the question of the so- called "bonus " -or "gratis" - 
shares should be mentioned 1, for in the framework of this study, this 
question only requires mention in connection with that of increase of 
capital. Though in principle an issue of bonus -shares is ultra vires in 
Britain 2, the amount of exceptions has grown tremendously with time, and 
the impression sometimes prevails that the practice of issuing them in 
connection with an increase of capital is a quite normal one, though in 
certain cases the consent of the Treasury is req ;wired to such an issue 3. 
It is submitted that an issue of bonus shares to new subscribers or old 
shareholders is equivalent to issuing shares at a discount 4, and, since 
such an issuing is inadmissible except in the few cases where it is author- 
ized by the Companies Act 5, there is not much scope for an application 
of this institution. It is, perhaps, rather a mistake to treat bonus 
1. It is a very unsettled question whether there is any terminological difference 
between them. Some authors on the Continent used the term "gratis shares" to denote 
new shares issued partly or fully without payment in cash (either in lieu of dividens, 
or out of surpluses), while "bonus " -, founders' or formation -shares were considered 
to be those issued at the very beginning of a company gratis in consideration of 
services rendered. In Britain a reverse terminology has been adopted, though not 
meticulously observed : bonus shares are those which are sometimes issued in 
connection with an increase, but gratis -shares (very rarely can this term be found 
here ;) are those which are issued to founders and promoters during the formation of 
a company. Levy (p.404) and M'Neil (Mercantile Law of Scotland, Edinburgh 1949, P.339, 
use the term "bonus- shares" apparently for both purposes. It may be that the 
British term "bonus- shares" originated from the title of bond -holders to a bonus 
out of profits (Gore -Browne, p. 522) and the bonus -shares were initially only those 
which were given in lieu of a bonus in cash. Cf. supra p. 55, notes 4 and 5. 
2. W.Horrwitz, "Historical development of Company Law ", in : LQR, vol.62 (1946), 
Pp. 384 -385 ; Levy , p.404. 
3. S.W.lviagnus and M.Estrin, Companies Act, 1948, 2nd ed., London 1951, p. 67, 
4. Gore -Browne, p. 521, in fine. 
5. Levy, p. 362. Cf. supra pp. 80 -82. 
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shares as being one of the cases of "below " -par- issuings 1, since, seen 
from the accountant's point of view, the question whether an increase is a 
"below" -par, or an "above" -par- increase is answered entirely by a comparison 
of the "par" value of the increased capital with the "sale" value of it. 
It is completely immaterial whether this "sale" -value is due to a cash 
payment, or in consideration of property or services, or to a capitalization 
of profits, or to a capitalization out of a capital redemption fund 2 or a 
share premium account but it has to be a "valuable consideration" 4. 
In all these cases this "sale " -value can be either "below ", or "above ", or 
even equal to the "par " -value. Since, however, the issuing of bonus shares 
comprises those an increase of capital which are neither wholly 
for cash, nor wholly for property or services, nor a mixture of both, - 
but may represent a case where the value of the share was partly covered by 
a cash payment and partly by a transfer from a fund or account 5 of the 
same company in question, it may happen that the "sale" -value of an increase 
with bonus shares is "above" the "par " -value of it. It has to be agreed that 
usually it is below,but it caíh be above too.Thus,the conclusion may be 
reached that bonus shares issued by increasing the capital of a 
company are accepted in practice, generally in the case of a 
1. This point of view is held also by Levy (p.404), although it could be pointed out 
that he speaks there (pp.404 -405) only about founders' shares. Cf.also Levy, p.163. 
2. Cf. infra p.111. 
3. Gore- Browne, p.521. 
4. Gore -Browne (p.522) points out that it is unlawful to issue bonus shares to bond- 
holders (cf.supra p.83,note 1) when there is no profit, or the consideration is 
illusory. 
5. `thus, an increase by bonus shares is wholly or partly an increase out of the 
company's own means (G.: " ... aus Gesellschaftsmitteln "). 
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revaluation of capital assets 1, or a capitalization of profits 2, 
provided only that the consideration on which this operation is based 
is not an illusory one. The, theory still prevails that there is some 
kind of contract that protects the shareholders of bonus shares 
Another problem arises out of the increase of capital, namely, the 
rights of the shareholders of the new shares. One says that the new shares 
"rank pari passu "when it is meant that there is no difference between the 
old and the new shareholders as regards their respective rights, The Compa- 
nies Act is silent on this point, and, provided that there is nothing in 
the memorandum to restrict or limit the company's choice 4, it is at the 
company's discretion how to rank the new shares in this respect. Preference 
shares may have been issued at the formation, or at a previous increase. 
The new shares may rank pari passu with one of the existing group of shares 
but they may also, partly or wholly, form a new group of their own 5. If 
1. C.M.Schmitthoff, "Distribution of revalued capital assets of a company ", in : "The 
Solicitor ", vol.18, London 1951, pp. 135 ff. 
2. The varieties known as : bonus shares out of capital redemption fund, or bonus 
shares out of share premium account (Gore -Browne, p.522), or bonus shares in lieu 
of dividends, come in the end under the same cover. 
Cf. the reports : " Capitalisation of profits and similar questions ", in : SLR, 
vol.35 )1919), pp.227 -230 ; vol.42 (1926), pp. 94 ff.; and in : "The Law Times ", 
vol.147 (1919), pp.60 -61. 
3. Gore -Browne, pp.521 -522. 4. Palmer, p. 706 
5. A quite recent development shows that a new group of shares created increasing the 
capital may mean not only a difference concerning voting rights, or preferential 
dividends, or a preferential treatment at a winding -up, but also concerning the 
"shareholdership" itself, e.g. by allocation of the whole issue to the trustees 
of the Staff Pension Fund, as it was done recently in the case of the Assam Company. 
Cf. L.C.B.Gower, "Corporate Control : The battle for the Berkeley ", in : HLR, 
vol.68 (1955), p.1192, note 60 ; and L.C.B.Gower, "Company Directors and Take -over 
Bids ", in : "The Listener ", vol.Lv , London 1956, p.210 
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the rights attached to any class of shares previously created (either 
at formation, or at a previous increase of capital) are defined by the 
memorandum of association, these rights cannot be modified in any way, 
unless the memorandum indicates the way and manner of modification. An 
exception to this rule is given by the Companies Act, S.206 1, which 
provides a possibility of an arrangement, sanctioned by the court, 
which may mean a relief 2. 
Preference rights usually concern dividends ; they may, however, 
concern surplus assets divided at a winding -up, or voting rights as well. 
The preference in the matter of dividends is merely a priority, and never 
a vested right of the shareholders irrespective of the amount of profits 
earned 3. The resolution concerning the increase of capital usually also 
gives particulars about the time when the new rights of the shareholders 
become effective. The usual way nowadays is to mention in the articles of 
association (either in an original article, or one added by special 
resolution) that the company is authorized to issue preference shares. 
This authorization may also be contained in the memorandum of association, 
but it is less often that this happens, since an alteration of the 
memorandum is more difficult. In principle the memorandum can be altered 
only with the assent of the court, unless the same memorandum provides 
procedure for alteration. 
1. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 14. 
2. H.Farrar, Company Law, 2nd ed., St.Albans 1930, p. 143. 
3. Levy, p. 561. 
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A special type of preference shares is the redeemable preference 
share 1. A special clause in the articles of association has to state 
whether such shares are redeemable at the option of the company, or 
compulsorily. A special new issue of shares can later be created for the 
specific purpose of enabling the redemption of these shares to be made out 
of the proceeds of such an issue, but the more normal way is to do it out 
of profits which would otherwise be available for dividends. the company 
is generally authorized to use the special capital redemption fund to pay 
the par value of these shares, and to issue new shares in place of the 
redeemed ones to existing shareholders as bonus shares 
2. 
Much greater attention is attributed in the 1948 Act to the subject of 
r e d u c t i o n of c a p i t a l . Formerly the basic approach was 
that the company was not entitled to diminish the fund liable to the 
creditors 3 and that there was an obligation to preserve the integrity of 
the capital as the creditors' guarantee fund by insisting that the company 
should not use its assets for any other purpose but those mentioned in the 
memorandum 4. The Companies Act of 1862 did not even contemplate the 
possibility that a company might be overcapitalized, and that there might 
be a wish to return a part of the capital to its shareholders by reduction 
1. C.x.1948, 8.58; C.A.1929, 8.46. 
2. Levy, p. 566. 
3. Palmer, p. 73 ; H.Thring, The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, London 1856, p.55. 




Thus, under the cover of the ultra vires doctrine 2 any 
repayment to the shareholders was considered as invalid, since the idea 
of a creditors' guarantee fund would become illusory by the very 
possibility of a reduction by repayment. 
As mentioned above 3, there is a complete sub -division entitled 
"Reduction of Share Capital" 4 in which, besides presenting the regulat- 
ions, the importance of this type of alteration of capital is emphasized 5. 
But although the greater part of the relevant material is indeed presented 
in this subdiuidion, there is no unified system in it. There are, at least, 
three items that are not included in it : - two of them - (1)the condit- 
1. W.Strachan, " The return of a company's capital to its shareholders ", 
in : LQR, vol.26, London 1910, pp. 231 -232. 
2. Cf., however, 'W.Horrwitz, "Historical development of company law ", in : LQR, 
vol. 62 , London 1946, pp. 375 -386. 
3. Cf. supra p. 71. 
4. C.A,1948, Ss66 -71. Cf. infra Annex I, pp. A 6 -13. 
See also the commentaries on this sub- division in : Buckley on the Companies Act, 
12th ed., London 1949, pp. 152 -165. 
5. The greater interest shown in Great Britain in reduction of capital can be seen 
not only from the more detailed and elaborate treatment in statute law, but also 
from the amount of books, articles and other publications specially devoted to 
this question. While one can find only one special legal stzdy covering all types 
of alteration of capital, and none treating especially the problem of increase 
of capital, - the book by P.F.Simonson (The Law relating to the Reduction of 
Capital) has run to as many as three editions (1st ed., London 1911, 2nd ed., 
London 1924, 3rd ed., London 1932). The legal study mentioned above, that covers 
all the types of alteration Y of capital, is that by G.W.Wilton, Q.C. (Alteration 
of the Memorandum of Association, Edinburgh 1927). Another work, namely by 
P.L.Reed and C.Wright (Alteration of Share Capital, London 1934), is rather a 
secretarial vade mecum than a legalistic study. Both of them, however, devote 
the major part of their space to questions about reduction of capital. Phe same 
trend can be observed in Switzerland too, where authors were complaining about 
the lack of interest in problems of increase of capital, except, perhaps , the 
special questions of bonus shares and pre -emptive rights. 
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ional cancellation of the uncalled capital 1, and (2) the diminution of 
capital by cancellation of untaken shares 2 , can be found among the 
miscellaneous provisions of the previous sub -division 3, but the third 
one - which is a reduction of capital represented by those shares of the 
company which were purchased by the company itself by the order of the 
court 4 - is placed at the end of part IV of the Act In dealing with 
"cancellation" the legislature appears to have introduced two shades of 
meaning for the same notion6: since instead of "reduction" that section 
speaks rather about a "diminution" of capital. This distinction first 
appeared in 1877 and 1879 7, and the only reason for it appears to have 
been that in this particular case the usual confirmation by the court was 
not required.8Put the introduction of this new term "diminution" into the 
text of this section 9 seemed to be unsafe for interpretative reasons. 
therefore a special clause was appended,saying that "a cancellation of 
shares - shall not be deemed to be a reduction" 10. Such a method is not 
unknown in other systems of law too. 
1. Some authors call it : creation of a reserve liability. Cf. Buckley, op.cit., 
PP. 146 -147. 
2. Cf. infra p. 91, note 4. 
30 C.A.1948, S. 60 and S. 61 (1)(e). 
The heading of this sub -division is : "Miscellaneous Provisions as to Share Capital ". 
4. Gore -Browne, p.610. 5. C.Á.1948, S.210 (2). Cf.infra pp.108 ff. 
6. Cf. supra p. 75. 
7. C.A.1877, S. 5 ; and C.A.1879, S. 5. Cf. infra Annex I, pp. A 2 -3. 
8. R.R.Formoy, The historical foundations of modern company law, p.137 ; Wilton, p.59. 
90 " ... and diminish the amount of its share capital by the amount of the shares 
so cancelled ... ". 
lo. C.A.1948, S. 61 (3) ; C.Á.1877, S. 5. 
Cf. H.Farrar, Company Law, St.Albans 1930 ; O.Griffiths and E.M.'Paylor, The 
Principles of Company Law, London 1949, pp. 132 -133. 
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Although reduction of capital, as introduced into the Companies Act 
of 1867 1, has always had one characteristic distinguishing it from increase 
of capital, namely, the requirement of confirmation by the court, this 
difference waslater lessened when no provision was made for confirmation 
by the court for two new types of reduction , created in 1877 and 1879, 
respectively 
2 
12 he other characteristic disinguishing reduction from increase was 
the requirement of a special resolution 3, but this was introduced only in 
the 1929 Act, in which it was provided that a simple resolution in general 
meeting was sufficient 4 for both increase of capital 5 and cancellation of 
untaken shares 6 The prerequisite common to both, the increase and the 
reduction of capital, was, of course, authorization by the articles 7. An 
authorization by the memorandum was considered as insufficient 8. Thus, 
where no authorization was provided in the articles, it had to be obtained 
1. C.ó.1867, S.9. 
2. C.A.1877, S.5 ; C.A.1879, 5.5. Cf. supra p. 89. 
3. This requirement is automatically linked with a three quarters majority of those 
present and entitled to vote. This is a majority, not a quorum, requirement. 
Cf. Levy, pl 804. 






no difference up aptil- then, since in all cases a special resolution was 
Cf. supra p. 73, note 5. 
S.61 (1)(a). 
S. 61('(e). 
7. Older Companies Acts referred both to the originally framed articles, and to later 
amendments. This phrase was omitted in 1907. 
8. Simonson , p. 16 ; Wilton, pp. 73 ff. 
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by another special reso'ution altering the articles to this effect. 
Both resolutions could be passed at the same meeting 1, though not 
uno flatu 2. Table A contains this authorization 3. 
the Companies Acts stressed from trie beginning that a company may 
reduce its share capital "in any way" 4 itpleases, and to this end it vay 
even do things that otherwise are forbidden, including a purchase of the 
shares of the company itself, or a rearrangement of the rights of share- 
holders, or an unequal subdivision of shares 5. One has to note in this 
connection that while concerning the increase of capital the stress is put 
on the words "by new shares" 6,nothing of that kind is mentioned in connect- 
ion with a reduction. Thus, any reduction can be either a diminution of the 
nominal amount of the shares, or a cancellation of whole shares, or partly 
by one and partly by the other way. The stress in the text of the Companies 
Act lies rather in the relationship between reduction, liability, and 
items of the balance sheet than in the technical and formal question of 
how to achieve it. the list of the most usual ways is given in section 66 
of the Act 7, and two other Hypes of reduction are proviaea for in Art.46 
1. Prior to 1929 that had to be done in two separate meetings. 
Cf. A,C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950, p.120 ; 
Gore -Browne, p.520 and p. 526, note 34 ; Simonson, p. IV (3). 
2. M'Neil and Lillie's Mercantile Law of Scotland, Edinburgh 1949, p.125. 
3. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 18. 
4. It is questionable whether the expression "in any way" could possibly include the 
diminution by cancellation of unissued shares mentioned in S.61 (1)(e) and (3) of 
the Companies Act of 1948. See the comments on a recent Scottish case, Ormiston Coal 
Co., 1949 S.C.516, in : SLT, Edinburgh 1950, pp.13 -14, where the articles of 
association provided the authorization for a reduction, but not for a cancellation 
of unissued shares. 
5. Gore -Browne, p.524 ; Levy, pp.619 -620 and p. 806 ; Wilton, pp. 70 ff. 
6. Cf. supra p. 74. 7. C.A.1948, S.66 (1)(a -c). 
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of Table A 1, but this enumeration is not exhaustive of possible ways 
and types 2. The main types mentioned in S.66 of the Act are the following: 
a) reduction by extinguishing or reducing the liability of the 
shareholders in respect of not yet paid -up capital 3, 
b) reduction by cancellation of paid -up capital which is lost or 
unrepresented by available assets, 
c) reduction by repayment of paid -up capital which is in excess of 
the wants of the company 4. 
There is, however, some lack of system in formulating these types 5. While 
types "b" and "c" differ only in the economic background to the reduction 
of capital 6 and in the possibility of a partial repayment of the capital 
to the shareholders, but not concerning the portion covered by the 
reduction 7, type "a" was designed for the "not yet paid -up "- portion only, 
irrespective of the reason for the reduction. While types "a" and "c" are 
resorted to by prosperous companies, type "b" is by unsuccessful compa- 
nies 8. 
Expressing these types in symbols we can draw up the following 
schema . 
1. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 18. 
2. From this point of view the formula of the preamble of S.61 (1) indicates much more 
the exmlusive character of that enumeration than that in the formula of S.66 (1). 
Cf. Simonson , p. 17. 
3. Cf. infra p.106, note 7 . 
4. Cf. Levy, p. 805. 
5. C.A.1877, S.3, had a much more logical wording. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 6, note 7. 
6. Cf. ,supra p. 39. 
7. In both cases "b" and "e ", the reduction could only concern either trie paid -up 
capital, of partly the paid -up and partly the not yet paid -up areas. 
8. Simonson, p. 17. 
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L E G E N D 
erent meanings of "capital ": Different "styles" of reduction : 
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As mentioned above 1, these eleven types of reduction are far from 
being the only possible ones 2. 
Except for the cancellation of untaken shares 3, in all other cases, 
whether mentioned in the above schema or not, a special resolution is 
required 4, and, except for the first three types mentioned above 5, con- 
firmation by the court is required 6, Though Table A is silent in this 
respect, it would be unwise to presume that no confirmation by the court 
is required for the two types of reduction which are mentioned in Art.46 of 
Table A 7, or for any type of reduction not included in the above schema. 8 
Concerning the two new types mentioned in Art.46 of fable A 7 one could, of 
course, assert that they are,properly speaking,not types of reduction of 
capital at all 9, being in set terms, a rdduction of the c a p i t a l 
r e d e m p t i o n r e s e r v e fund in the one case, and in the 
other case, a reduction of the s h a r e p r e m i u m a c c o u n 
t1. 
1. Cf. supra p. 92, note 2. 
2. Gore -Browne (p.524, note 19) quotes a rather unusual type of reduction, where the 
amount returned, or a part of it, is considered as a payment off of capital "upon 
the footing that the amount ... may be again called up ". Such a reduction is partly 
a reduction with repayment (Types IX -XI), and partly a retaining of an authorized' 
capital above the level of the reduced paid -up capital. 
Another possible combination is that where the repayment (Types IX -XI), or a part 
of it, is considered as conditionally reduced (Types I, or II). 
Cf. also Wilton, p. 79 and note 5. 
3. Type III, Cf. supra p. 93. 
4. Art. 46 of "Table A" also embodies the requirement of a special resolution. 
5. Types I -III. Cf. supra p. 93. 
7. Cf. infra Annex I, p. A 18. 
9. Cf. infra pp. 110 ff. 
10. On the difference between "share capital" and "share premium account" 
see also : L.C.B.Gower, The principles of modern company law, London 
1954, p. 107. 
6. Cf. supra p. 90. 
8. Gore- Browne, p. 524. 
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thus, in both these cases, since they are not specifically mentioned in 
S.66 (1), the preamble to the subject of Reduction of Capital, one could 
infer that the articles of association may provide for a procedure not 
involving confirmation by the court 
1 
In all the other cases it is doubt- 
ful whether articles eliminating this requirement could be considered as 
valid, even if they referred to a type not mentioned in S.66 2, since this 
list is not exhaustive, and the preamble covers any type of reduction that 
should come within the framework of this subdivision 3. 
Initially it was supposed, of course, that the requirement of confirm- 
ation by the court was established primarily for the benefit of the existing 
creditors 4 whose position might be affected by the reduction of the 
capital. Only much later was it realized that not only the creditors but 
the shareholders as well might be interested in the reduction 5. The prin- 
ciple that the court will, of course, refuse its confirmation when an 
1. Though Rule 5 of the Order L III B (cf. Annex II, infra p. A 19) treats both these 
cases separately from the usual types of "reduction of capital ", Rule 10 foresees 
the possibility of applying by summons for directions as to the proceedings to be 
taken, and (2)(b) empowers the Judge to "order an inquiry as to the debts, claims 
or liabilities ", i.e. to apply fully or partly the regulations of S.67 (2) of the 
Act, in these both cases too. These Rules of the Supreme Court are, of course, 
applicable in England only. Both sections in question, i.e. S.56 (1) and S.58 (1)(d), 
though containing clauses which are subject to "the provisions of this Act relating 
to the reduction of share capital" know exceptions (cf. Gore -Browne, p.199 and 
note 373, and the final part of p. 522), and these could consist in a procedure 
without any confirmation by the court. 
2. Levy, p. 807. 
3. C.11.1948, Ss 66 -71. 
4. Levy, p. 801, in fine. 
5. Gore -Browne, p. 524 ; O.Griffiths and E.M.Taylor, The Principles of Company Law, 
London 1949, pp. 134 and 137 ; Levy, p. 807 ; and G.Todd, "Some aspects of Joint 
Stock Companies 1844- 1900 ", in : "The Economic History Review ", vol. IV, London 
1932 -34, p. 67 and note 4. 
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injustice may be done either to the creditors, or to a minority of the 
shareholders 1, has now become an axiom. There is no provision in the 
Companies Act that the reduction shouldbspread equally or rateably over 
all the shares 2. One can even assume that the circumstances of voting in 
general meeting and the majorities of votes cast in class meetings have 
lost a great deal of their persuasive force upon the courts. 
The extent of the court's freedom of action has been especially 
increased since 1929 when sub -section 3 of Section 56 was introduced 3. 
Until then the court had freedom to decide whether to apply the procedure 
laid down in "subs.two" 4 only in those cases where the reduction did not 
involve either a diminution of liability 5, or repayment of any paid -up 
capital to the shareholders 6, but in the above specified cases, i.e. 
diminution of liability or repayment of any paid -up capital 7, the court 
w a s obliged to apply the procedure of 8.49 (1) of C.A.1908 8 very 
strictly. Only in 1929, with the adding of the third sub -section 9 and a 
1. Gore -Browne, p. 525. 2. Simonson, p. 17. 
3. C.A.1948, S. 67 (3). Cf. infra Annex, p. A 8. 
4. C.A.1929, S. 56 (2)(a- c)(i -ii) ; C.A.1948, S. 67 (2)(a- c)(i -ii). 
5. Type V. Cf. suprap, 93. 
6. Types IX -XI. Cf. supra p. 93. 
This point of view emanated at first from the words " ... unless the court 
otherwise direct" of S. 4 (1)(1) of the C.A.1877 (cf. infra Annex I, p. A 7, 
footnote 6), and, later, from : " ... and in any other case if the court 
directs" of S.49 (1) of the C.A.1008, or S. 56 (2) of the C.A.1929, or S.67 (2) 
of C.A.1948 (cf. infra p. A 7 ) . 
Cf. O.Griffiths and E.M.raylor, op.cit., p.135 ; and Wilton, p.95. 
7. Types V and IX -XI. Cf.supra p. 93. 
8. C. ,&.1877, S.4 (1)(1) , went even so far as to say that " ... the creditors of 
the company shall not ... be entitled to object or required to consent to the 
reduction ". 
Cf. Annex I, infra p.A 7, footnote 6. 
9. C,Á.1929, S.56 (3). Cf. infra Annex I, p. A 8. 
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reference clause in the previous subsection 1, was the court free "having 
regard to any special circumstances" 2 to direct "that subsection (2) ... 
shall not apply as regards any class or any classes of creditors" 3. 
Linked with this increasing extant of the court's freedom of action 4 
is the question of the formal requirements of the petition of the company 
for confirmation of its resolution for reduction of capital. A similarly 
minor point that should be mentioned in this connection is that the word 
"petition" was omitted from the appropriate section of the Act 5, and it 
might be supposed that the procedure could be by summons in future 
6 
1. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 7, footnote 5. 
2. Evidence that a company is solvent is not sufficient to satisfy the court, and 
does not necessarily constitute a "special circumstance ", though the court has 
in many cases dispensed with an inquiry when it was satisfied that cash in hand 
plus the value of any trust investments exceeded the company's liabilities and 
the amount of capital proposed to be returned. Cf. Gore -Browne, p. 529 and note 53. 
3. The result thus achieved is somewhat clumsy from the point of view of system. 
If the only cases where the application of the special procedure laid down in 
S.67 (2)(a -c) of the Companies Act of 1948 was formerly obligatory can now be 
evaded with regard to " ... special circumstances ", and this latter fact depends 
entirely on the attitude adopted by the court, then the same result, it is submitted, 
could be achieved, perhaps, by simplifying the preamble of S.67 (2) of the Companies 
Act and shortening it to a mere formula : "In any case if the court so directs : -". 
4. Levy, p. 805. 
5. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 7, and footnote 4. 
This textual change was noted by : M.Finer and H.A.C.Sturgess, The Companies Act, 
1948, London 1948, part L, p.186 ; Gore -Browne, p.528 and note 50 ; and M.Wheeler 
and G.Tribe, Changes in Company Law, London 1947, P.44. 
6. The Rules of the Supreme Court, however, still provide that procedure must be by 
petition in these cases. Similar provision is made in the Rules of the Court of 
Session in Scotland. 
Cf. infra p. 98 and notes 1 -2, and Annex II, infra pp. A 19 -23. 
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In addition to the requirements of the Companies Act, special rules 
have been issued governing procedure for the reduction of capital, 
especially concerning the application of this section 67 (2) of the 
Companies Act of 1948. These special rules are contained in "Order L III B" 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court for England 1, and in the Rules of the 
Court of Session for Scotland 2, 
Formerly it was essential to show in such a petition whether or not the 
amount of capital that is to be written off had been lost or was unrepre- 
sented by available assets 3, but now, undoubtedly influenced, at least in 
1. Cf. "The Annual Practice ", vol.69 (published by R,F.Burnand, B.G,Burnett -Hall and 
D,Boland), London 1952, pp.989 -1027. 
The full text of this order and all its appendices is given besides in : S.W.Magnus 
and M.Estrin, The Companies Act,1948, 2nd ed., London 1951, pp.512 -522 ;4nd in 
Palmer, pp.74.5 -752. An extract from these rules is appended to this study as Annex 
II (cf. infra pp. A 19 -23). 
The text of the former rules (The Rules of the Supreme Court 1929, Order L III B of 
31st July,l929) is, appended to Simonson, pp. 61 ff. 
2. Cf. The Rules of the Court of Session,1948 , London (HMSO) 1948, and Act of Sederunt 
(Procedure under Companies Act,1948),1948, No.2293 (S.185). 
Rule 208 (p.14) provides that " ... all petitions initiated in the Court of Session 
and falling within any of the classes following : 
(XI) Petitions under the Companies Acts other than Petitions in a voluntary 
winding up ... 
shall be presented to the Inner House ... ". 
The rules mentioned under section 3 ( "Companies "), i.e. Rules 220 -236 (pp.82 -90) 
relate exclusively to winding -up procedure, and are not analoguous to the English 
rules mentioned in Annex II of this study. 
It is submitted that,perhaps, owing to the inapplicabilitg of this "Order L III B" 
in Scotland, Scottish courts have been capable to lead a more healthy policy in all 
these questions. Cf. supra p. 48, note 2. 
3. Gore -Browne, p. 524. 
It was considered then that so long as a company had its own reserve fund, it could 
not allege a loss of capital. Cf. "Reduction of Capital ", in : "The Solicitors' 
Journal ", vol. 48, London 1904, pp. 570 -571. 
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part, by the much wider interpretation put upon the objects of the 
Companies Acts 1, the court may even confirm a reduction when there is no 
loss of capital at all. The court may also go much further, and confirm a 
reduction which is not in accordance with the rights attached to the 
shares 2 or sanction a purchase of shares by the company itself 3, or 
confirm a reduction where no class meetings of the various classes of 
shareholders have been held, thoughlsually such meetings are the normal 
pre -requisites to a petition to the court 4. 
This special procedure that can be applied in any case 5 consists of : 
1) drawing up of a list of creditors 6 entitled to object to the reduction, 
2) securing payment of either the full amount of the creditor's debt or 
claim, or of an amount fixed by the court 7, 3) the addition of the words 
"and reduced" to the company's name 8, and 4) placing an obligation on 
1. Gore -Browne, p. 533. 
2. If the rights attached to the shares are embodied either in the memorandum of 
association, or in the articles of association, but there is no provision for 
modification of these rights, S.206 of the Companies Act may be applied. Cf. infra 
P. 
122, and Annex I, pp. A 14 -15. See also Gore -Browne, pp.525 and 784 ff., and 
William Dixon Ltd., 1948 S.C. 514. 
3. Simonson, pp.17 -18. 
4. Gore -Browne, p.532. 
5. Cf. supra pp. 96 -97, and infra Annex II, pp. A 19 -23. 
6. C.A.1948, S.67 (2)(b). Cf. Gore -Browne, p. 531 ; P.F.Simonson, A treatise on the law 
relating to debentures and debenture stock, London 1913, pp.314 -316. 
7. C.A.1948, s.67 (2)(c)(ii). 
8. This practice has seldom been in favour and has been steadily discontinued. Cases 
when the court decides to make such an order are extremely rare nowadays. Cf.infra 
Annex I, p. A 9, footnote 4. See also : Gore -Browne, p. 531 ; Simonson, Preface, 
p. IV (2) ; and A.Stiebel, Company Law and Precedents, Ind ed., vol.I, London 1920, 
pp. 773 ff. Wilton (pp.90 ff, and pp.103 ff.) gives a good review of the position 
of the "and reduced " -requirement prior to 1929. 
Company Law Amendment Committee 1925 -26, London (HMSO) 1926 (Cmd.2657), p.11. 
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all shareholders, and, if the company is wound up, possibly even on 
creditors 1 also, to contribute towards the payment of a debt or a claim 
of a creditor, who, though having been entitled to object to the reduction2 
was through his ignorance of the proceedings not entered on the list of 
creditors In this last case , where the company is wound up, the court 
has the peculiar right of making and enforcing calls on the contributories 
as if they were ordinary contributories in a winding up, thus acting, as it 
were, instead of the liquidator. This obligation of the shareholders to 
contribute after the winding up of a company 4 is in a way a relic of the 
partnership und.erstructure. 
1. The expression "list of persons so liable to contribute" (C.A.1948, S.70 (1)(b)) 
avoids the mention of members or shareholders, and thereby stresses, though,perhaps, 
indirectly, that at the moment in question (i.e. after the winding-up) there are no 
longer any shareholders. On the other hand, the court may even include the other 
creditors in the list of contributors, and may do that on the ground that such 
creditors would have got less had the ignorant creditor presented his claim in time. 
This possibility would be excluded if S.70 (1)(a) is applicable, i.e.if the company 
is n o t wound up. Cf. infra Annex I, p. A 12. 
2. C.A,1948, 3.67 (2)(a), contains the general formula that : "... every creditor who 
at the date fixed by the court is entitled to any debt or claim which if that date 
were the commencement of the winding up ... would be admissible in proof against the 
company, shall be entitled to object to the reduction ". Other references to winding 
up procedure can be found in S. 67 (2)(c)(ii) and at the end of S.70 (1).Similarly, 
rule 11 of the "Order L III B" contains a series of references to winding up pro- 
cedure. Cf. infra Annex II, p. A 21, rule 11 (a) and (b). 
This link of analogy between reduction and winding up, not unusual in other systems 
of law too, has nothing in common with another question, namely, whether a company 
in voluntary liquidation is entitled to reduce its capital. This question is 
nowadays answered in the affirmative, since liquidation is only a stage preparatory 
for dissolution, but that does not necessarily mean that there may not be a return 
to life. Cf. Simonson, pp. 20 -21. 
3. C.A.1948, S.70 (1)( proviso )(a -b). Cf. Gore -Browne, p. 531. 
4. C.A.1948, S.70 (1)( proviso )(b). 
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Thus, the court has the alternative either to decide not to apply 
S.67 (2) as regards creditors 1, or 2 to keep strictly to this procedure 
and to be satisfied, on the hearing of the petition, that every creditor 
entitled to object either has consented to the reduction 3, or that his 
debt or claim has been either discharged or secured in a manner directed 
by or acceptable to the court 4. 
Nonetheless, it is the usual practice in England to have evidence at 
hand when the petition is heard, and an affidavit 5 is usually lodged ex- 
plainink the reasons for the intended reduction 6, and giving particulars 
1. C.Á.1948, S.67 (3). The presence of "special circumstances" has to be stated, though 
the court is apparently free to decide how these words should be interpreted. 
2. The court has no other power to dispense with the settling of this list of creditors. 
The choice is between these two possibilities. Cf. Gore -Browne, p. 530. 
3. Gore -Browne, p. 529, in fine. Cf. also rule 11 (f) and (i)(end of the first sen- 
tence) of the "Order L III B ". Cf.Annex II, infra pp.A 22 -23. 
4. It was suggested once that, similarly to some legal systems on the Continent, the 
confirmation by the court should in certain cases be granted only after the expiry 
of a specified period (hereafter in this study called "induciae ") following the 
formal resolution in general meeting on a reduction of capital. 
Cf. C.L.Nordon, "The contemplated changes in Company Law ", in: "the Law Times ", 
vo1.164, London 1927/1928, p.246. 
5. Particulars about the contents of such an affidavit are given in rule 11 (a) and 
(b) of the "Order L III B ". Cf. Annex II, infra A 21. 
Usually such an affidavit also contains detailed information about the memorandum 
and the articles of association, the minutes containing the resolution for the 
reduction of capital, and also the last audited balance sheet. Cf. Gore- Browne,p.532. 
6. The court may, of course, direct publication of the reasons for reduction. This 
possibility was mentioned in S.55 of C.A.1908. In Scotland it was never required, 
and in England extremely seldom. Cf. H.Burn -Murdoch, Notes on English Law as 
differing from Scots Law, Edinburgh 1924, p. 52 ; and Wilton, pp. 96 -97. 
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about the financial position of the company, sometimes with an appended 
valuation of the assets by an independent valuer 1, usually stating that 
the assets retained by the company are adequate 2. In Scotland, if no 
objection to the proposed reduction is made by any creditor or shareholder, 
the Court remits the proceedings to a man of business as reporter to 
consider the regularity of the procedure, and the facts stated in the 
petition, and, where creditors are concerned, to adjust the list of credi- 
tors in order that it may be settled formally by the court as the 
statutory list 3. 
A projected reduction can be either sanctioned or disallowed by the 
court. Though any scheme considered as fair for the shareholders and 
creditors may be sanctioned by the court, and though the present trend is 
towards increasing the court's freedom of action and discretion, there are, 
however, some general principles which the court usually observes. 
Thus, for example, reduction should not be used fora "writing down of 
the capital" in order to extinguish the remaining liability in cases where 
shares were issued at a discount 4. Again, where capital is represented by 
goodwill, it is usually not considered as being "unrepresented by available 
assets ".Similarly, assets representing a reserve fund or a credit on profit 
and loss account will be treated as available assets. The apportionment of 
loss between the paid -up capital and the reserve fund is carried through on 
the principle that only that portion which is attributed to the paid -up 
1. Gore -Browne, p. 532. 
2. L.C.B.Gower, "Companies' Reduction of Capital ", in : MLR, vol.14 (1951), p.331. 
3. Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Supplement to Vol.1 -9, pp.193 -194. 
My attention to this regulation was drawn by David Maxwell, Esq., Q.C., lecturer 
in Mercantile Law at Edinburgh University, to whom I express my gratitude. 
Gore -Browne, p.533. 
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capital will be considered as lost capital 
l 
. Special attention is given 
to the situations arising in cases of multiformity of shares 2, and to the 
cases where reduction is linked with a repayment 3. The fact itself that 
there is a class, or are classes, of preference shares does not in the 
least mean that a reduction of the share capital should not affect them. 
And even though shareholders of preference shares have no voting rights 
(if such a class were created either at the beginning of the company, or at 
a subsequent alteration of the memorandum or articles),and could therefore 
not express their opinion in connection with a proposed reduction - this 
does not mean that a proposed reduction could not concern them 4. There are 
of course, cases where these preference rights indicate more or less 
precisely the way in which a reduction should affect different groups of 
shareholders, and what would be the role played by the holders of 
preference shares in the reduction procedure. 
However, articles of association are generally silent about the 
principles to be applied in reducing the capital in the case of a multifor- 
mity of shares. The company has therefore a free hand in choosing the 
method, and it is entirely at the discretion of the court to confirm it, 
or not. Since pref erenc es attached to one particular class of shares either 
concern dividends, or the distribution of capital at a winding -up, the 
principles applicable to a reduction refer usually to the principles in 
1. O.Griffiths and E.M.Taylor, The Principles of Company Law, London 1949, p.138. 
2. Preference shares are not necessarily treated in the case of a reduction in the same 
way as the ordinary shares.It is quite usual to give them a lower rate of interest 
upon the capital they originally brought into the business. 
Cf. Gore -Browne, p.526 ; and Palmer, pp.76 -77. 
3. Types IX -XI. Cf supra p. 93. 
4. Palmer, p. 77. 
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connection with a winding -up 1. Therefore one of the widely accepted 
principles is that where preferences relate to priorities in capital, 
the holders of these preference shares should have preference at a 
reduction with repayment I. This point of view expresses indirectly 
the idea that such a reduction with repayment is in its way a partial 
winding up without the application of the rather cumbersome procedure 
of a formal winding up 3. In the reverse case, where preference share- 
holders have no preference rights as to the capital in the case of a 
winding up, a reduction -cum -repayment may affect the ordinary shares 
only 4. 
The minority right of the shareholders of a particular group of shares 
to apply to the court to have an already validly voted variation 5 of 
shareholders' rights cancelled was introduced in 1929 6. This right, 
however, is subject to two limitations : -- firstly, it is only available 
1. Cf. supra p. 100, note 2. 
See also the case of Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. v. Scottish Insurance 
Corporation, 1949 S.C. (H.L.) 90. It is curious to note that this is one of two 
cases that were recently cited and followed in Delaware. Cf. L.C.B.Gower, "Some 
Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law ", in : HLR, vol.69, 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1956, p.1401, note 163. 
2. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950, p.122 ; and 
Gore- Bwowne, pp. 526 -527. 
3. Another type of reduction, i.e. one which is regulated in the newly created S.210, 
is also considered as an a d d i t i o n a l , not alternative, "remedy to winding 
up ". Cf. Gore -Browne, p.609 ; and L.C.B.Gower, op.cit., p.1386, note 81. 
See also the William Dixon Ltd. case, 1948 S.C., pp.513-514. 
4. 0.Griffiths and E.M.Taylor, The Principles of Company Law, London 1949, p.138. 
5. Variations in this section includes abrogation. Cf. Gore -Browne, p.431. 
6. CÁ1929, S. 61; C,Á.1948, S. 72. Cf. infra pp. A 13 -14. 
Cf. Gore- Browne, pp. 26 -27, 451 and 867. 
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if the memorandum 1 
2 
or the articles of association authorize it , - 
secondly, it is in the court's discretion to grant or refuse the 
application. Thus, this minority right, given to holders of not less than 
15% of the issued shares of the class concerned, is merely a right to 
have the matter investigated. It does not give an absolute right to have 
a variation of the rights of shareholders averted. It seems that a much 
more effective way to achieve a variation of these rights in connection 
with a reduction of share capital may be found in S.206 of the Companies 
Act 3, since it is applicable independently of provision therefore in the 
memorandum or articles, and may be initiated even by a single shareholder, 
or a single creditor 46 
The above mentioned eleven types of reduction 5 do not form a 
particularly coherent system, since even the conception of "capital" is 
1. It is usually considered undesirable to set out these rights and the procedure 
for their amendment and variation in the m e m o r a n d u m , though Art. 4 of 
Table A (1948) authorizes their variation. The point of view has been expressed 
that such a clause in the articles is valid ".. where memorandum and articles ... 
are issued contemporaneously ", but there is an opposite opinion that the memorandum 
itself has to authorize such alterations. Even the consent of all the shareholders 
concerned was sometimes considered as unsatisfactory, and the alteration thus 
achieved as invalid. 
2. Cf. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, op.cit., pp.126 ff.; Gore -Browne, p.867. 
See also : "Company Law and Practice, Modifications of class rights ", in : 
"The Solicitors' Journal ", vol.91, London 1947, pp.202 ff.; pp.213 ff. 
3. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, op.cit., p.127 ; Buckley on the Companies Acts, 
12th ed., London 1949, pp.423 -424 ; and Gore -Browne, pp.528 and 784 -792. 
4e Cf. infra pp. 122ff. 
5. Cf. supra pp. 92 -93. 
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not always the same 1. In the first five types 2 the amount of issued 
shares and paid up capital is not affected at all, and the whole procedure 
of reduction concerns in one or other way that part of the authorized 
capital which is beyond the paid -up "area" 3, Type III is the only one 
4 
(out of these five) where the untaken capital is involved A. In the other 
four cases 5 the procedure of reduction concerns the taken though not yet 
paid -up area. These four types differ in the way in which the liability of 
the shareholders is affected ; it may be conditionally 6, or irrevocably 7, 
amounting to the whole area of the not yet paid -up capital 8, or merely to 
a fraction of this area 9. There are, of course, some other possible types 
1. The conception of "capital" in Scots Law differs in one point from that in English 
Law, though very slightly : a "hypothecation" of the uncalled capital is possible 
under Scots Law only when it is provided for in the articles, but under English Law 
this possibility is presumed in every case.Cf. H.Burn- Murdoch, Notes on English Law 
as differing from Scots Law, Edinburgh 1924, pp.50-51 ; P.F.Simonson, The Companies 
Act 1900 with commentaries and forms, 2nd ed., London 1901, p.69 and note ; 
G.W.Wilton, Principal distinctions between the laws of England and Scotland, 
London 1923, pp.26-28. 
2. Types I -V. Cf. supra p.93. 
3. The schematic designs on p.93 indicate the presence of three different "areas" of 
capital : the paid -up, the taken though not yet paid -up, and the untaken. That does 
not necessarily mean that the presence of all three "areas" is essential in any 
particular case. Type III is the only one that is unthinkable without the untaken 
"area ". Types VI and IX are quite possible even when the whole authorized capital is 
taken and paid -up. The word "area" is used here and later in this sense. 
4.The schematic design of this type on p.93 indicates the cancellation of the whole 
area of untaken shares. A cancellation of a part of this area is, of course, possible 
as well. 
5. Types I -II and IV -V. 6. Types I and II. 
7. Types IV and V. These four types (I,II,IV,V) are extremely rare in practice, since 
uncalled or not yet paid -up capital seldom exists longer than for a few months. 
Therefore S.66 (1)(a) is by some authors considered as obsolescent. Cf. Minutes of 
evidence taken before the Committee on Shares of no par value,1954,pp.172 and 175. 
8. Oypes I and IV. 
9. Types II and V. 
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where the reauced area would simultaneously cover partly 1 or wholly the 
untaken area, and partly or wholly the not yet paid -up area of capital 
2 
In the case of the last six types 3, a reduction of the paid -up capital 
is invmlved. That means that in all these cases the area of reduction 
partly covers the paid -up area 4. These six types differ among themselves 5 
in the extent to which they cover the not yet paid -up area of the capital 
6 
and whether the reduction involves a repayment 7. Further, as part of a 
scheme of reduction an extinction of dividend arrears can be mentioned. 
This is , of course, in a way a variation of the rights attached to that 
class of shareholders whose dividend arrears are threatened by this ex- 
tinction, though it is more of the nature of an arrangement between the 
company and its shareholders in the sense of 3.206 of the Companies Act 
8, 
1. Types of such a "mixed" character may in quite exceptional cases cover the whole 
not -yet -paid -up area and partly the untaken and paid -up area. 
2. E.g. type I- cum -III, type II -cum -III, type IV -cum -III, type V -cum -III, etc. 
In the first two of these "mixed" types mentioned here, a functional difference 
will still , however, be observable s - the reduction by cancellation of untaken 
shares is rather an irrevocable one. In the case of such a "mixed" reduction 
it has always to be borne in mind that one has to proceed according to the rules 
set up for each part of the reduction. 
The law does not recognize any principle that facilities granted for one part 
(e.g. "no special resolution required" or "no confirmation by the court required ") 
may be extended to the other part too. 
Cf. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950, p.119. 
3. Types VI -XI. Cf. supra p. 93. 
4. If the reduced area would cover the whole paid -up capital, it would be, quite 
naturally, a case of a winding -up. 
5. Cf. supra pp. 39 and 92. 
6. types VI and IX are the cases where a reduction is confined to the paid -up area 
only ; types VIII and XI are the cases where the reduction simultaneously covers 
partly the paid -up and partly the not yet paid -up area ; and types VII and X are 
the cases where it covers partly the paid -up and wholly the not yet paid -up area 
of the capital. 
7. Types IX -Xi. 
.8. Wilton, pp.87 -89. 
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In all these eleven cases, we are normally speaking about a reduction 
of the authorized capital 1 though it is quite conceivable that in the 
2 
case of repayment a reduction of the paid -up capital does not necessarily 
mean a simultaneous reduction of the authorized capital to the s a m e 
amount, or the reduction of the authorized capital at all The repaid- 
though -still -authorized area may cover the whole repaid area, or only a 
part of it. If it covers the whole repaid area, that means that there 
has been no reduction of authorized capital at all 4. A part of the 
reduced paid -up capital can also be retained as authorized capital 5. 
Similarly, it is possible that the retaining of this area or a part of it 
as authorized is a "qualified" one, e.g. with a clause " ... except in the 
event and for the purposes of the company being wound up ", in which case 
there would be a mixture of '.types IX -XI with types I -II. 
Some of the types of reduction are not included in the schema on p.93. 
Here there should first be mentioned reduction by purchase of shares by 
the company itself. This newly created type 6 envisages the right of any 
1. Cf. supra p. 106, note 3. 
2. Types IX -XI. 
3. Gore- Browne (p.524, note) mentions two Scottish cases where the "authorized ceiling" 
was not lowered to the s a m e extent as the "paid -up ceiloing ", or not lowered at 
all. Cf. supra p. 94, note 2. 
4. This is possible only in the case of Type IX (cf. supra p. 93), since any 
extinguishing or reduction of liability (Types X -XI) automatically means a 
reduction of the authorized capital too. 
5. This is possible in the cases of the types IX -XI. Cf. supra p.94, note 2. 
6. C.A.1948, S.210, formerly S.9 of the C.A.1947 (10 and 11 Geo VI , cap.47). 
This amendment was accepted on the recommendation of the Cohen Commission. 
Cf.also 
: S.W.Magnus and M.Estrin, Companies Act 1948, 2nd ed., London 1951, p.208; 
M.Share, Company Law and Practice,The changes effected by the Companies Act 1947, 
London 1947,pp.12 -13; M,Wheeler and G.Tribe,Changes in Company Law, London 1947, 
pp.5,10 and 57; the report in "The Law 2imes ",vol216 (1953), pp.639-641. 
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shareholder to apply by petition for an order to investigate the affairs 
of the company. Such an investigation may be initiated by one shareholder 
alone, provided only that he is personally affected by the oppressive man- 
ner tin which the affairs of the company are being conducted 2. If the pe- 
tition containing such a complaint is favourably considered by the court, 
but it also appears that a winding -up may unfairly prejudice that partic- 
ular group of shareholders to which the petitioner belongs, the court is 
empowered to make such order as it thinks fit.It is most essential (as a 
prerequisite of the whole situation considered by the court) that "other- 
wise" the facts should justify an order for a winding -up on just and equi- 
table grounds , and that the only reason for an order was the probability 
of an unfairness towards the petitioner and other members of a group. 
This power of the court is not restricted, and any order may be made 4. 
The court may even make amendments of the memorandum or articles of asso- 
ciation, and these amendments will have the same effect as if they were 
duly made by a valid resolution of the company 5. The court may regulate 
the future conduct of the company's affairs in any way that may bring full 
relief to any oppressed minority of shareholders.It is also possible - and 
1. As to the interpretation of the expression "oppressive" see : Elder v. Elder and 
Watson, 1952 S.C.49 ; and "The Law Times'!, vo1.216, London 1953, pp. 639 ff. 
2. Levy , p. 850. 
3. Buckley on the Companies Acts, 12th ed.,London 1949, PP.423 -424 ; and 
Gore -Browne, pp. 588 and 609. 
4. Two Scottish cases, one of them the above mentioned Elder v.Elder and Watson Ltd., 
are considered of being the only illuminating judgments on the applicability and 
value of 5.210. Cf. L.C.B.Gower, "Corporate Control : The battle for the Berkeley ", 
in : HLR, vol.68, p.1183, note 23, and "Some Contrasts between British and American 
Corporation Law ", in : HLR, vol.69 (1956), p.1387 and note 82. 
5. The effect of such amendments is even greater, since the company is not entitled to 
alter or amend them again without the permission of the court. Cf. Levy, p.850. 
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this especially concerns this study - for the court to order the purchase 
of the shares of any shareholder either by other shareholders, or by the 
company itself 1. And in the latter case that means a reduction of the 
capital amounting to the value represented by the purchased shares. The 
peculiarity of this variety of reduction of capital lies not so much in its 
being a different "type" of reduction 2, as in the otherwise unusual power 
of a body external to the company, i.e.the court, to regulate the affairs 
of a company at its discretion. As a matter of fact, however, this fits 
perfectly into the pattern of the trend mentioned above , -"away from 
partnership towards the upper class of the state's economy 1" 3, and it may 
well be that the next step, in this trend, will be the creation of the 
office of the Public Shareholder 4, the epithet "public" thus receiving 
a new meaning too. 
Two other varieties of reduction, not mentioned in the schema on p.93, 
are : a) the reduction of the capital redemption reserve fund 5, and b) the 
1. Gore -Browne, p.610 ; Simonson, p.18. 
2. Since a purchase of a share is in a way a repayment of paid -up capital, this variety 
would systematically and perfectly fit into types IX, or X, or XI. 
Cf. supra p. 93. 
3. The gradual transfer of control from the courts to the Board of Trade is already 
an indication of this trend. Cf. Levy, pp.778 -785 and p.857. 
A different opinion is, however, expressed, namely, that from another point of 
view there is a reversion to partnership principles, since this S.210 of the 
Companies Act of 1948 gives the title to initiate an investigation of the affairs 
of the company to even a single shareholder. 
Cf. "The Law Times ", vol.216, London 1953, p.641. 
4. Levy, pp.877 -858. 
5. Cf. Annex I, infra p.A 18 and footnote 4. 
This instii;ution was mentioned for the first time in S.46 and Table A of the C.A. 
of 1929, and was apparently set up as a safeguard against a reduction that might 
result from a redemption of shares. Cf. Iiii:.Finer and H.A.C.Sturgess, The Companies 
Act 1948, London 1948, part I, pp.183 -185 ; V.H.Frank, Company Accounts, 2nd ed., 
London 1952, p.11. 
reduction of the share premium account 
1. 
The opinion has been already 
expressed. 2 that they are not, properly speaking, varieties of reduction of 
capital, but are similar proceedings that have no direct effect on the 
amount of capital. 
Concerning the first of these two cases, it should be noted that a 
redemption of preference shares is not considered as being a reduction of 
the amount of authorized capital 3, though provisions about reduction could 
be aprtly applied 4. 'though the amount of authorized capital is not 
affected by it, and though at the end of the day it will not even affect 
the amount of paid -up capital, it is still a manipulation of the capital 
items, and, though, perhaps, only transitorily 5, an alteration of the 
capital account in the balance sheet. In view of that, it is, nevertheless, 
in a way, a reduction of capital. Since a redemption is in itself a variety 
of judiciously planned repayment 6, one may assume that it is a variety of 
Type IX 7 , or a "suspended" reduction with a probability of an immediately 
1. Cf. Annex I, infra p.A 18 and note 5. This institution was mentioned for the first 
time in Table A of the C.A.of 1948. Cf.M.Finer and H.A.C.Sturgess, op.cit., 
pp.182 -183 ; and M.Share, Company Law and Practice ..., London 1947, P.57. 
2. Cf. supra p. 95, note 1. 
3. C.A.1948, 5.58 (3).Similarly, an increase of capital by creation of new shares 
issued to the shareholders (either to all, or to the ordinary shareholders only) 
as bonus shares is not considered as being an increase in the technical sense. 
Cf. H.Farrar, Company Law, St.Albans 1930, pp.146 -147 ; Gore -Browne, pp.199 and 508; 
M.Wheeler and G.Tribe, Changes in Company Law, London 1947, PP.43 -44. 
4. C.A.1948, 5.58 (1)(d). Cf. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, 
Edinburgh 1950, p.123. Cf. infra pp.112 -113. 
5. A good coining is, perhaps, the expression : " ... temporarily capitalized 
accumulated profits ". Cf. "The Law Times ", vol.171 , London 1931, p.148. 
6. Gore -Browne, p. 198. 
7. Cf. supra p. 93. 
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following, or even simultaneous, increase 1, very often in the form of 
fully paid bonus shares issued to the shareholders 2. Since these 
redeemable preference shares are issued on the terms that they are liable 
to be redeemed, the consent of the court is not required 3. 
Similar in some respects to the previous variety of reduction is the 
reduction of the share premium account 
4. However, while the capital 
redemption reserve fund is created during the life -time of a company and 
exists as a separate account in the group of capital accounts, the share 
premium account may be created at the very beginning of a company in order 
to comply with the requirements of S.56 of the Companies Act, or, speaking 
in terms of accountancy, in order to re- stabilize the amount of issued 
share capital by creating a new account in the group of capital accounts 5, 
though, like the capital redemption reserve fund, it may be used for paying 
up unissued shares that are to be issued as fully paid bonus shares. It is 
doubtful whether all the regulations on reduction of capital apply fully to 
the reduction of a share premium account even if one considers that this 
account is a part of the paid up capital of the company 6. Since this 
1. A simultaneous reduction -cum- increase, elaborately provided for in some other 
systems of law, has the attractive advantage of being economical from the point of 
view of formalities and stamp duties, since the forms of Notice and Statement of 
Increase, otherwise required to be lodged with the Registrar, are not necessary in 
this case, neither is any slmp duty payable. Cf. Gore -Browne, pp.199 and 520 ; 
Simonson, p.57 ; Wilton, p.102. See also : "Company Law and Practice, Redeemable 
preference shares ", in : "The Solicitors' Journal ", vol.90, London 1946, pp.170 -171. 
2. W.B.Abbott, Recent changes in Company Law and Accounts, Edinburgh 1929, p.25 ; 
and the report in "The Law Times ", vol.171, London 1931, pp.148 -150. 
3 H.W.Jordan and S.Borrie, Company Law and Practice, London 1901, p.166. 
Cf. supra p. 95, note 1. 
4. V.H.Frank, Company Accounts, London 1952, pp.11 -13 ; Gore -Browne, p.507 ; 
M.'aIheeler and G.Tribe, op.cit., p.44. 
5. Gore- :8rowne,p.461 ; C.M.Schmitthoff, "Distribution of revalued capital assets of a 
company ", in : "The Solicitor ", vol.18 (1951),p.136. 6. Gore- Browne, p.522. 
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account, unlike the capital redemption reserve fund, has never been a part 
of the share capital in any way, it does not fit into any of the types in 
the schema on page 93, and it is doubtful, to an even greater extent than 
in the previous case, whether a reduction of this account is a variety of 
reduction of capital in the sense of this study 1. It accordingly seems 
that objection could be taken to its being grouped along with real 
reductions of capital in Art. 46 of Table A 2. It is in no way an 
"alteration_ of capital" as the heading above Art. 44 indicates 3. If the 
previous case can be called reduction -cum- increase, there is in this case 
only an increase by adding to the capital of the company an amount that 
previously formed a special capital item, or a part of it. 
There is, besides, another group of varieties of alteration of capital, 
that are sometimes considered as types of reduction 4 which should be con- 
sidered in this connection. The question is whether forfeiture of shares, 
surrender of shares, and disclaimer of shares are types of reduction of 
capital, as it is asserted sometimes 5, or varieties of "alteration of 
capital" that should be classed as "reorganization of capital" 6. 
None of these forms are regulated by the Companies Act. There is, 
however, a special heading "forfeiture of shares" in Table A 7. It is 
questionable whether forfeiture of shares is conceivable if Table A does 
1. V.H.Frank, op.cit., p.12, in fine. 
2. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 18. 
3. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 17. 
4. Gore -Browne, pp.534 ff., and p.875 ; Palmer, pp.l30 ff. 
5. +Hilton (p.72) calls them the "indirect reductions ". 
6. Cf. supra p. 61. 
7. C.A.1948, Table A, Art. 33 -39. 
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not apply to a particular company, and if its own artmcles of association 
do not contain any or sufficient authority for the company to make a 
forfeiture valid 1. The opinion has been expressed that it is still 
possible though only with the sanction of the court 2, and, presumably, 
this opinion is based on the initial sentence of S.66 of the Companies Act 
of 1948 3, and, to some extent, on the analogy between the forfeiture and a 
reduction - cum -extinction of liability 4. It is, however, quite as reasonable 
to argue that since this is not a variety of reduction of capital at all, 
the initial words of S.66 : "Subject to confirmation by court" should not be 
applied 5. This latter point of view is still sometimes adopted in systems 
of law where the partnership basis has been retained to a much greater 
extent, or where the rules regarding forfeiture can be deduced from the 
Common Law features of the contract between shareholders and their company. 
This point of view is no longer held in Scots and English Law, though, 
quite theoretically, it might still be canvassed. 
Forfeiture of shares is always linked with penal proceedings for the 
non -payment of calls 6. Forfeiture is, from the shareholders' point of 
view the same process as repayment of paid -up capital 7 from the point of 
1. Cf. R.Ashworth, Limited Liablity Companies, London 1925, pp.275 ff.; W.E.Levie, 
A Handbook of Company Law in Scotland, Edinburgh 1926, pp.113 ff.; Palmer, pp.74 -75; 
A.C.B(ennett), "Company Law, Forfeiture of Shares ", in : SLT, 1938, p.213. 
2. Gore -Browne, p.534. 3. Cf. supra _ pp.94 -95. 
4. Type X (cf.supra p. 93). Types IX and XI are not applicable in this case, since for- 
feiture is impossible either without an extinction of liablity for the not yet paid - 
up area, or with a partial extinction only. 
5. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950, p.121 ; Green's 
Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Supplement to vol l- 9,Edinbmrgh 1949, p.186 ; O.Griffths and E.ìcí.Qaylor, The principles of Company Law, London 1949, P.133. 
6. Charlesworth, p.118 ; Gore -Browne, p.534 ; Levy, p.806. 
7. Gore -Browne, p.869. 
-115- 
view of the company 1. Therefore it is a reduction of capital by the 
amount of the paid -up part of the forfeited shares. It differs from the 
Type X of the schema on page 93 2 only in respect of the reason for the 
action : in one case, it is the result of an excess of capital over the 
wants of a company 3, in the offner, it is the result of a non -payment of 
calls. forfeiture is in its way a narrowly defined special variety of 
reduction, since it is applicable only in the case of non -payment of 
calls, and is not applicable for non -payment of any other debts 4. On the 
other hand, a very strict procedure is]a.id down 5.T his counterbalances the 
privilege usually attached to forfeiture, namely, that it can be imposed 
by the directors alone 6, or, at least, by a simple majority of share- 
holders without any sanction of the court 7. Finally, a forfeiture may be 
a reduction -cum- increase 8, but it need not necessarily be so. Thus, the 
company may use the non- payment of calls as a pretext to reduce the capita] 
by the amount of the forfeited paid -up capital 9, or a part of it. Art 37 
1. In systems of law where the purchase of its own shares by the company is prohibited, 
forfeiture is usually considered as one of the exceptions to this rule. 
2. Cf. supra p.93 and p. 114, note 4. 
3. Cf. supra pp. 39 and 92. 
4. Charlesworth, p.119 ; Gore -Browne, p.534. 
5. Charlesworth, p.118 ; Gore -Browne, p.536. 
6. C.Á.1948, Table A, Art.33. 
7. Gore -Browne, p. 534. 
8. Charlesworth, p.119 ; Gore -Browne, p.537. 
9. C.A.1948, Table A, Art.37. 
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of Table A preserves the post- forfeiture liability of a former share- 
holder, thus counteracting the possibility of a "strike" of the majority 
of shareholders 1. In the absence of such a provision about post -forfeiture 
liability the former shareholder is freed from any liability at once, and 
that concerns past and future calls as well. It is interesting to note that 
the post -forfeiture liability, an institution deeply rooted in Common Law 
and partnership, survives in the field of Company Law only as an accidental 
and no longer as an essential characteristic of the relations between 
shareholders and company. It is curious to note that Art. 33 -39 of Table A 
speak only about "members ", thus inadvertently stressing that these rules, 
if applied, regulate the membership side of the relations between 
shareholders and company. 
The second member of this group of varieties of alteration of capital 
is the surrender of shares. Though it is neither recognized by the Compa- 
nies Act, nor mentioned in Table A 2, it is quite frequently provided for 
in a companies' own articles of association, usually in the form of a 
special right of the directors to accept the surrender in order to avoid 
forfeiture 3. Though surrender has some similarity with the previous 
institution, i.e. the forfeiture of shares, it possesses a series of 
1. Such a "strike" could easily enough hamper the interests of the creditors. 
Cf. Charlesworth, p.120 ; Gore- Browne, pp.535, 537 and 876. 
2. This institution appears, however, in the Companies Clauses Acts governing the 
so- called statutory zompanies. Cf. Charlesworth, p.272 ; Wilton, Company Law and 
Practice, Edinburgh 1912, p.442 ; A.C.B(ennett), "Company Law, Surrender of shares ", 
in : SLT, 1938, pp.213 -214. 
3. C.E.H.Chadwyck Healey, P.F.Wheeler and C.E.E.Jenkins, A treatise on the law and 
practice relating to Joint Stock Companies, 2nd ed., London 1886, pp.94 ff.; 
Charlesworth, p.121 ; Gore -Browne, p.534 ; Palmer, p.75 ; Wilton, pp. 72 and 82. 
-117- 
different features. The element of penal action is absent here. A re- 
payment of the paid -up ampunt of the shares is not essential 1, and an 
exchange for another type of shares is possible 2. The assent of the 
shareholder is essential, and the normal way is for the offer of a 
surrender to come from him. Surrender is limited only to shares that are 
liable to forfeiture 3. Beyond that it should be considered merely as a 
type of an ordinary reduction, and therefore the sanction of the Court 
should be sought 4. 
The third member of the group is disclaimer of shares 5. It very much 
resembles surrender of snares. It is the special case where the trustee 
of a bankrupt shareholder, or the liquidator of a company in a winding -up 
process (where the company is itself a shareholder of another company), 
disclaims shares which are subject to a liability. This proceeding, so far 
as it relates to individual shareholders, is regulated by the Bankruptcy 
Act, 1914, section 54 ; and in so far as it relates to company -shareholders 
6 
it is regulated by the Companies Act, 1948, section 323 . It came into 
1. There may be a case where a surrender is arranged against a returning to the share- 
holder of the capital which he has paid -up, and the wiping out of the uncalled 
liability on the shares. 
2. In this particular case a surrender is nearer to reorganization of capital than to 
reduction. Cf.: "Company Law and Practice, New shares for old ", in : "The Solicitors 
Journal ", vol.90, London 1946, pp. 325 ff. 
3. Charlesworth, pp.121 -122 ; O.Griffiths and E.M.Paylor, The principles of company law 
London 1949, p.133 ; Palmer, P. 75 ; and W.G.H.Cook, Company Case Law, London 1933, 
pp. 79 -87. See also : Bellerby v. Rowland and Diarwood's Steamship Company, 
1902, 2 Ch. 14. 
4. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950, p.121 ; 
Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Supplement to vol.1 -9, Edinburgh 
1949, pp. 186 -189 ; JV.E.Levie, A handbook of Company Law in Scotland, 1926, p.115, 
5. Gore -Browne, pp. 538 and 681 -688. 
6. The Bankruptcy Act, 1914, and section 323 of the Companies Act of 1948 do not 
apply to Scotland. 
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existence for company- shareholders only in the Companies Act of 1929, and 
is still, from the point of view of company law, somewhat underdeveloped. 
It is certainly doubtful whether there is any good reason for grouping 
it with forfeiture and surrender 1. 
Owing to the stability of the currengy system of this country, 
r e a d j u s t m e n t of c a p i t a l 2 as a type of alteration 
of capital is quite unknown in Scots and English Law. 
A comparatively elaborate treatment is, however, given in the Companies 
Acts to different types of the last variety to be mentioned in this study 
-- the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of c a p i t a l 3. Though the 
term "reorganization of capital" is not found in the Companies Act, except 
in 8.206 (6) 4, it is used by some of the commentators 5. The material is 
1. Gore -Browne, p. 534. 
2. Cf. supra p. 60. 
3. Cf. supra p. 61. 
4. C.A.1908, 8.45 (1), used the expression : "..to reorganize its share capital" to 
indicate a special type of consolidation- cum -division. 
Cf. W.E.Levie, op.cit., pp.101 -102 ; J.Loudon, "Reorganization and Reconstruction 
of Limited Companies ", in : "The Accountants' Magazine ", vol.32, Edinburgh 1928, 
pp.231 ff.; A.M'heil, Manual of the Law of Joint Stock Companies in Scotland, 
2nd ed., Edinburgh 1926, pp.128 -129 ; P.F.Simonson, Companies Acts 1900 and 1907, 
London 1908, pp.196 -198 ; A.Stiebel, Company Law and Precedents, 2nd ed., vol.I, 
London 1920, pp.829 ff.; Wilton, pp.60 -69. 
This section was repealed later in 1928 on the recommendation of the Greene CommitteE 
on Company Law, and is partly incorporated now into the present S.206 of the Compa- 
nies Act of 1948. Cf. Company Amendment Committee 1925 -26, London (iso) 1926 
(Cmd.2657), p.14 (32 -33). 
Cf. infra 14.122 ff., and Annex I, p. A 16 and footnote 2. 
5. Cf. e.g. E.W.Chance and P.W.French, Principles of Mercantile Law, 12th ed., 
vol.Il, St.Albans 1947, p.203 ; Gore -Browne, pp.540 -545 ; Palmer, p.80. 
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split up into two parts : 1) the subdivision "Miscellaneous provisions 
as to share capital" 
1 
is partly devoted to different types of reorganiz- 
ation of capital , and 2) the subdivision "Arrangements and recon- 
structions" 
3 
concerns partly reorganization of capital in the sense of 
this study. 
The order in which the different types of reorganization are placed in 
the text of S.61 of the Companies Act serves as an illustration of the 
gradual setting of these regulations into the context, - consolidation-cum- 
division and conversion into stock being the older types 4, and subdivision 
into smaller shares 5 and reconversion into shares 
6 
the more recent. It is 
astonishing to note from the point of view of system that even after the 
amendment to the present S.61 (1) 7 was introduced in 1900, and although 
types of alteration of the amount of shares 8 (either by issuing shares of 
a larger amount, or by issuing shares of smaller amount) were treated in 
Table A side by side 9, the regulations about conversion and re- 
conversion 
10 
remained sandwiched between them. 
1. Cf. Annex I, infra pp. A 2 -5. 
2. C.A.1948, 5.61 (1)(b- d),and S.62 (1)(a -d). Besides, Art.40 -43 and Art.45 of Table A 
deal mainly with these questions. The rather meagre commentaries on these questions 
indicate that they arouse little argument or interest. 
3. C.A.1948, Ss.206 -209. Cf. Annex I, infra pp. A 14 -16. Sections 208 -209 are devoted 
to the questions of amalgamation which are beyond the framework of this study. 
4. C.A.1948, S.61 (1)(b), S.61 (1)(c)(first part), and S.62 (1)(a -b). 
5. C.A.1948, S.61 (1)(d), and S.62 (1)(d).This type was created in 1867. 
6. C.A.1948, S.61 (1)(c)(second part), and S.62 (1)(c). This type was created only mn 
1900. Cf. Annex I, infra p. A 3 and footnote 4, and A. A 4. 
7. Cf. Annex I, infra p.A 3, footnote 4. 
8. C.Á.1948, S.61 (1)(b) and (d). 
9. Table A (1908), Art.44 (a -b); Table A(1929),Art.37 (a -b); Table A(1948),Art.45(a -b). 
10. C.A.1948, S.61 (1)(c). 
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Consolidation- cum -division indicates by its very terms the accomplish- 
ment of two actions, which usually but not necessarily can be done 
uno flatu, and may even be linked together in one single resolution 
1. 
A consolidation takes place where e.g. eight shares of twelve shillings 
and sixpence each have been put together to form one share of five pounds 2 
A post -consolidation division takes place when this consolidated share of 
five pounds is subdivided again into new shares, provided only that the 
final nominal amount of the new shares will be larger than their initial 
amount. It is doubtful whether a consolidation- without -division is valid 3. 
One could easily enough admit its possibility if the words "and divide" 
were to be omitted from S.61(1)(b), and if the words "of smaller amount" 
in á.61(1)(d) 4 were to be replaced by "of different amount ", since then 
the first case would cover only the plain case of consolidation upward 5, 
1. Gore -Browne, p.539 ; Company Law and Practice in Scotland, 1912,p.88. 
2. The fact that C.A.1908,S.41(1)(b), which is identical with the present S.61(1)(b), 
spoke of "all or any of its share capital" (contrary to the text of Art.44 of the 
Table A of 1908) led G.V.Wilton (op.cit.,p.88) to the conclusion that there were two 
types of consolidation, one of them partial, the other covering the whole capital. 
3. Wilton (Alteration .., p.53) admits this possibility, apparently interpreting the 
words "and divide" only in the sense that finally "the division must be into shares 
of larger amount than the existing shares ". If so, the expression used by this autor 
in the next paragraph on p.53,namely, "consolidation or division" is a little puzzling. 
4. While S.61 (1)(d) speaks about subdivision "into shares of smaller amount ", 
3.62 (1)(d) speaks simply about subdivision of "its shares or any of them ". 
5. This would, however, leave the case of a conversion -cum- reallocation aside. 
Simonson (pp.41 ff.) mentions such a case, where neither the amount of authorized ca- 
pital, nor the nominal amount, nor even the amount of paid -up capital has been al- 
tered, but where only the uncalled area has been put anew at the discretion of the 
directors for replacing the extinguished liability of the shareholders with the 
power to place these newly created wholly unpaid shares on the market. Such a 
practice, unknown in the statute book, fits into the provision of S.206 rather 
than those of S.61. 
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but the second case would cover any subdivision, irrespective of whether 
it is done after or without a previous consolidation. 
The next type of reorganization is the subdivision into shares of 
smaller amount 1. This covers the case when e.g. a share of six pounds is 
subdivided into shares of one pound. The text of this section could lead one 
to the illogical conclusion that this does not cover the case of a consoli- 
dation- cum -division into shares of s m a l l e r amount than the original 
ones. Thus, it could seem that it would be impossible to subdivide uno flat.. 
e.g. ten shares of six pounds each into twelve shares of five pounds each, 
since the previous amount cannot be divided into the latter one 
2 
Both these types are similar in this respect that the authorization by 
the articles 5 and an ordinary resolution of the company exercised in gene- 
ral meeting 4 are the necessary pre- conditions.The sanction 
not required 5. They differ,however, in the regulation that 
the proportion between the paid -up and the unpaid areas has 
the same 6. 
of the court is 
in subdividing 
to be kept 
1. 'Wilton, pp.55 -56. 
2. Gore -Browne (p.540) and Wilton (p.55) indicate that the practice is to allow 
such a consolidation- cum -division into smaller shares to avoid fractional holdings. 
3. This authorization is given by Art.45 of Table A (1948). 
4. C.A.1948, S.61 (2) and _rt.45 of Table A. 
5. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950, p. 118 ; 
Palmer, p. 69. 
6. This does not apply to the case of consolidation -cum- division into shares of larger 
amount. An unequal subdividing is possible and valid if the rules on reduction of 
capital (s.66) are observed, and a reduction or extinction of liability contemplated. 
Cf. supra p. 96. 
Cf. Buckley on the Companies Acts, 12th ed., London 1949, p.149 ; W.F.Hamilton, 
A Manual of Company Law, 2nd ed., London 1901, p.56 ; and Gore -Browne, p.540. 
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the last case in this group is the conversion of shares into stock, 
and re- conversion of stock into shares, an institution confined to Anglo- 
American countries. In order to facilitate the flexibility and transfer- 
ability of a "bundle" of shares, it is permissible to convert all or any 
of the paid -up shares into stock, and reconvert them later into shares 1. 
An original issue of stock without issuing of shares at all is not 
permissible though sometimes done in practice 2. An issue of stock either 
against not fully paid shares, or bonus stock, is illegal. 
The provisions of the subdivision "Arrangements and Reconstruction" 3 
were primarily meant only for arrangements with creditors. Later they were 
extended to arrangements Only the of and 
the definition of "arrangement" in the present S.206 (6) brought them into 
line with the reorganization questions dealt with in S.61 5. 
This section 206 of the Companies Act of 1948, as far as it concerns 
a reorganization of capital within the framework of this study, provides 
1. P.F.Simonson, The Companies Act 1900 with commentaries and forms, 2nd ed., London 
1901, pp. 95 -96 ; Wilton, pp.57 -58. 
2. Gore -Browne, p.539, and the case quoted under note 121. 
3. C.A.1908, Ss. 120 ff.; C.A.1929, Ss. 153 ff.; C.A.1948, Ss. 206 ff. 
4. Wilton (pp.111 ff.) gives a survey of different meanings of "arrangement ". 
Cf. also : P.F.Simonson, The Law relating to the Reconstruction and Amalgamation 
of Joint Stock Companies, 3rd ed., London 1919. 
5. There have been some talks and arguments about the connection between S 
S.206. One has, nonetheless, to remember that not always where S.206 is 
is there sufficient ground to say that there is a "variation of rights" 
sense of S.72. Cf. "Company Law and Practice, Modification of rights ", 






that where an arrangement is proposed 1 between a company and its share- 
holders 2 the court may on the summary application 3 of the company or of 
any shareholder order a meeting of shareholders 4 or of a class of share- 
holders. If a majority representing three quarters of the shareholders or 
a class of them 5 agrees to the proposed arrangement and the court sanctions 
it 6, this arrangement is binding on all the shareholders and the company 
itself too. 
In defining the word "arrangement ", S.206 (6) provides that it includes 
"a reorganization of the share capital of the company by the consolidation 
of shares of different classes or by the division of shares into shares of 
different classes or by both these methods ". This definition has received 
a wide interpretation, though partly based on decisions given when S.45 (1) 
1. Contrary to the practice of the English courts, the Scottish court held in one case 
in 1910 that the application of a company for an order of the court directing the 
holding of meetings for consideration of a scheme prepared by its directors was 
prematurely presented because the scheme had not been submitted to the shareholders 
in general meeting. his point of view was overruled in anouher case in 1918f 
Cf. áiilton, p.116. 
Since then it is considered that though a prior resolution of the company is not 
absolutely necessary, it is nonetheless very desirable, since its absence might well 
form a ground for the court to refuse to confirm the proposed arrangement. 
Cf.Gore- Browne, p.789. 
2. The text of 5.206 (1) and (2) uses the term "member" exclusively, in all probability 
to extend its applicability to companies limited by guarantee or unlimited companies 
which may exist without a share capital and whose members therefore could not tech- 
nically be considered as shareholders. Cf. S.'vY.MagZus and M.Estrin, Companies 
Act 1948, 2nd ed., London 1951, p.31. 
3. S.W.h-iagnus and M.Estrin, op.cit., p.201. 
4. The court may order that no meeting be held where the remaining assets are ample to 
cover the claims of the shareholders affected. Cf. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, 
The Companies Act 1948, Edinburgh 1950,p.127 ; and William Dixon Ltd., 1948 S.C.515. 
5. Holders of the same class of shares with different amounts paid may be considered as 
belonging to different classes for the purpose of this section. 
Cf. A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, op.cit., p.127. 
6. Gore -Browne, pp.790 -791. 
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of the Companies Act of 1908 was in force 
1. 
It is generally considered that 
if a part of such a reorganization of capital is a reduction,the sections 
applicable to reduction must come into operation 2. 5.206 (6) differs 
virtually from the previously mentioned Ss.61 (1)(b)(d) and 62 (1)(a)(d). 
The difference textually lies in the inclusion in the former of the words 
"of different classes ", and the omission therefrom of the requirement of 
either larger or smaller shares 3. Between this 5.206 (6) and the old S.45 
(1908) 1 the difference lies in the possibility of a consolidation-cum - 
division 4. 
It is doubtful whether the provisions of 5.206 (6) will prove to be a 
workable variety of reorganization of capital, since the extremely cumber- 
some procedure of 5.206 (1)and (2) with the summary application to the court, 
the quorum requirements in a class meeting, and, finally, the sanctioning 
of the arrangement by the court, while acceptable in the relations between 
company and creditors, seem to be a burden too heavy to prove a success. 
The elasticity of the provisions of S.61 give a sufficiently wide scope 
of action. Even the risk of convening two consecutive meetings (in order 
to circumvent the requirements of S.61 of the subdivision into shares of 
either larger or smaller amount 5) would not , perhaps, seem too great if 
1. Cf. Annex I, infra p.A 16, footnote 2. 
2 . A.C.Bennett and R.A.Bennett, op.cit., p.128 ; Simonson, p.22. 
3. Cf. supra p. 120, note 4. 
4. C.Á.1948, 3.206 (6) : " ... or by both these methods ". 
Cf. also : W.B.Abbott, Recent changes in company law and accounts, Edinburgh 1929, 
p.26. 
5. Cf. supra p. 121. 
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one has to compare it with the disadvantages of the procedure of 
section 206. On the other hand, if one would even accept the inter- 
pretation that any consolidation of shares of different classes brings 
the provisions of S.206 into operation, the applicability of S.72 on 
"variation of shareholders' rights" might in many cases offer the 
solution of a reor,;anization scheme of a still more elastic character 
than in the case of the cumbersome section 206. 
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2. F r a n c e . 
r'rench Company Law 1 goes back to the Napoleonic Code de Commerce of 
1807 2. It would seem therefore that one should attribute to it the laurel 
of seniority among modern company acts. However, the history of company 
law throughout the last 150 years shows that though the impact and 
influence of French Law in general was very considerable 3 it has had 
comparatively little impact upon the companies acts of other countries, 
1. Lit.: Ch.Lyon-Caen and. L.Renault, Précis de droit commercial, two vol.,Paris 1884 ; 
Ch.Lyon -Caen and L.Renault, 'traité de droit commercial, 5th ed., eight vol., Paris 
1921 ff.; A.Vavasseur, Traité des sociétés civiles et commerciales, 5th ed., Paris 
1897 ; F.Arthuys, Traité des sociétés commerciales, two vol., Paris 1917 ;P.Pellerin, 
French Company Law, London 1920 ; ILRousseau, Sociétés commerciales, two vol, Paris 
1921 ; i.Copper- Royer, Traité théorique et pratique des sociétés anonymes, 3rd ed., 
five vol., Paris 19'e5 fr., 4th ed., Paris 1931 ff.; J.Ntreichenberger, Sociétés 
anonymes de France et d'Angleterre, Paris 1933 ; Ch.Houpin and H.Bosvieux, Traité 
general, théorique et pratique des sociétés civiles et commerciales, 7th ed.,Paris 
1935 ff.;P,.Carry, "La nouvelle legislation sur la société anonyme ", in : "Bulletin 
de la Societé de Legislation Comparée ", vol.67, Paris 1938, pp.177 ff.; P.Pic and 
J.Kreher, Des sociétés commerciales, 3rd ed., vol.I, Paris 1940, vol.II, Paris 1948; 
A.Moreau, La société anonyme, four vol., Paris 1946/1948 ; J.Escarra, E.Escarra and 
J.Rault, Traité théorique et pratique de droit commercial, Les sociétés commerciales, 
vol.I, Paris 1950, vol.II, Paris 1951 ; L.hatardon,'l'raité pratique des sociétés 
commerciales, 10th ed., Paris 1950. 
2. Among trie older sources of French Company Law the articles of the F r e n c h 
Hudson Bay Company of tiffe eighteenth century should, of course, be mentioned. 
Cf. Ch.Lyon -Caen and L.Renault, Précis de droit commercial, vol.I, Paris 1884, 
p.202. 
3. On the portability of the Napoleonic Codes and their dissemination throughout the 
world, see Toynbee, vol.VII, pp.268 -277. On the general impact of French Law see: 
P.Armìnjon, Baron B.Nolde and M.í "lolff, Tráité de droit comparé, vol.I, Paris 1950, 
Pp.136-216. On the impact of the Napoleonic Code Civil see also : A.de Saint -Joseph, 
Concordance entre les codes civils etrangers et le code Napoleon, 2nd ed., four vol., 
Paris 1856. 
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except, perhaps, its nearest neighbours - Belgium and Luxembourg, and 
older Italian law. Its seniority was hardly an asset, and has in no way 
led to the foundation of a French group in company law. Just the contrary 
happened, since French company law, although influenced by foreign legis- 
lation at a later date still preserved in many ways a rather antiquated 
character. In two respects, however, its provisions were more consistent 
than the early company law of this country , namely the character of the 
company as a legal entity 1, and the absence of any personal liability on 
the part of the shareholders. On the other hand, the creation of companies 
was considered, to a much greater extent than in this country, to be a 
matter requiring the government's authority, and this theory remained the 
dominating idea for a much longer time than in Scots and English Law 
2 
Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century France belonged 
completely to the group of states adhering to the system of "concessions" 3 
Only after the conclusion of a Franco- British convention of 30th April, 
1862, was France forced to liberalize its attitude in these matters, and, 
acting partly under the impact of the United Kingdom Companies Act of 1862 4, 
to modify the previous system of the Code de Commerce by a new law of 
23rd May,1863. Even then the French legislature did not altogether abandon 
1. Ch.Lyon -Caen and L.Renault, vol.' (1884),p.245 ; Pic -Kreher, vol.I, p.194. 
2. This idea was apparently the cause of the 
At least, it was so asserted. Only in the 
the fiction theory recorded, through more 
conception of the company. Cf.Pic- Kreher, 
3° Cf. supra P. 44. 
4. C.A.1862, i.e. 25 and 26 Vict., cap.89. 
fiction theory in French jurisprudence. 
late thirties was a slight trend away from 
stress being laid on the personality 
vol.I, pp.194 -195 and pp.201 -202. 
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state supervision of the larger companies, and only after another law of 
1 2 
24th July,1867, was this supervision almost completely abolished . On 
the other hand, this new law of 1867 departed somewhat from the liberal 
attitude adopted in 1863, and imposed a number of provisions and regulations 
upon the shareholders and creditors which embodied the principles of ius 
cogens to a much greater extent than would have seemed consistent with 
the liberal spirit of that, time, This law of 1867 did not provide for the 
question of whether the extraordinary general meeting was empowered to 
amend the charter 3. To a certain extent therefore the principle of 
unanimity for any amendment of the charter or any alteration of the capital 
was still applicable 4. It was at the end of the nineteenth century that 
French jurists became aware of the fact that the main problem was whether 
1. Art. 47 of this law of 24th July,l867, repealed the former law of 1863. 
Cf. A.Vavasseur, Trail des socittts civiles et commerciales, vol.Il, Paris 1897, 
p.3. 
This same law of 1867 provided for another, now almost obsolete, type of company, - 
the sociètts en commandite par actions (very often, and with a misleading effect, 
called simply -: socittès par actions ) which, as explained above (cf.supra p.8 ) 
do n o t come within the framework of this study. Unfortunately enough, there 
also existed the rather confusing practice of calling both types together the 
"sociètts par actions" , Cf. Pic - Kreher, vol.II, p.21. 
Literature on this French institution of company law was vast. Cf.e.g. A.Vavasseur, 
op,cit.,vol.I, pp.197 -598 ; M,Caitucoli, Les augmentations de capital dans les 
sociètbs fzangais par actions, Toulouse 1923 ; J.Charpentier, Etude juridique sur 
le bilan dans les soci&tts par actions, Paris 1906 ; G.Dardanne, Les augmentations 
de capital des soci6t &s françaises par actions, Poitiers 1924 ; A.Percerou, Lois 
actuelles et projets recents en matiéres de socittts par actions, Paris 1932. 
2. Hamburger, p. 89 ; Ch.Lyon -Caen and L.Renault, vol.I (1884), p.247. 
3. Ripert, p.92. 
4. Pic- ICreher, vol.Il, pp.157 -158. 
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the contrat sociale of a limited company is the fundamental or only a 
secondary element of the artificially created legal entity ; and that the 
solution of the question of whether the unanimity of all shareholders about 
any increase of capital is required depends on the standpoint accepted in 
the first problem 1, From the point of view of the philosophy of law of 
that time it seemed simply inconceivable to speak about the fixation of a 
capital, though it might have ranged as a secondary element in the process 
of the creation of a limited company, as an unessential element 2. Only the 
appearance of the institution of an "authorized capital" brought the 
feeling of the importance and essentiality of the numeral of the capital 
to a downfall. Only after 1903 could a slight relaxing of a rigid clinging 
to the principles of contractual relations as the dominant element of 
company law be observed 3. The general rule was that any augmentation of 
the shareholders' "engagement" was illegal without their consent 4. Only if 
the charter of a company provided for the procedure for altering the capital 
was it considered as conceivable that unanimity of all the shareholders 
would not be required. 
The next steps in the development of French Company Law were the laws 
of 30th January,1907, and of 22nd November,1913, the laws of 1917 and 1926, 
5 
the law of 1st May,1930 ;, the laws of 1935 and 1937, the law of 14th Au- 
1. P.Appleton, Etude sur le droit des assemblees generales extraorainaires de modifier 
les statuts, Paris 1902, p.137. 
2. Ibid., p.138. 
3. Pic- ïireher, vol.Il, p.157. 
4. L *Batardon, 'Traite pratique des societes comuLerciales, Paris 1950, p.356 ; 
Rauch, vol.I, p.59, note 2. 
5. B.lepner, ":Uas französische Aktienrecht und seine Reformprobleme ",in:"'Leitschrift für 
das gesamte handelsrecht ", vol.97 (1932),pp.279 ft.; vol.98 (1933), pp. 1 ff. 
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gust,1941, the law of 4th l Jiarch,1943, the law of 2)rd December,1946, and 
the law of 4th August,1949 1. 
Only after 1930 was it permissible and within the authority of the 
general meeting to increase 2 it reduce the capital, to create priority 
shares, or to amend the relationship between the shareholders of different 
groups 3. The authorization of the board of directors to effect an increase 
of capital, or, in a way, to continue the issue of capital "in instalments" 
is a part of the present system, though it would be wrong to assert that 
this was merely a variation on the Anglo-American theme of "authorized 
capital" 4. Special regulations concerning quorum and majority can, of 
course, be provided. 2he state of the investment market applies 
also to all increases of capital only if the amount of increase is over 
1. "Lit.: C.Denoyer, "recent modifications of French Company Law ", in : JCL, 3rd series, 
vol.XIL, London 1937, pp.32 ff.; J.Escarra, "Some points of comparison between the 
Companies Act,1948, and the French Law of Companies ", in : "Cambridge Law Journal ", 
vol.11, London 1951, pp.15 -30 ; H.Kerwer, "Die abschliessende Neuregelung des 
französischen Aktienrechts", in : ZHR, vol.105, Stuttgart 1936, pp.60 ff.; V.Solus, 
La reforme du droit des sociétés par les decrets de 1935 et 1937, Paris 1938. 
Cf, also : Escarra- Rault, vol.I, p.25 ; and Pic -Kreher, vol.I, p.278. 
2. Lit.: Ch.Corcelle, L'administration des sociétés, Les augmentations de capital dans 
les sociétés anonymes, Paris 1935 ; Janton, Etude financisre et juridique sur 
l'augmentation dans les sociétés anonymes, Paris 1931 ; J.Landeroin, Les augmenta- 
tions de capital dans les sociétés anonymes, Paris 1947 ; P.Maria, Des modifications 
du capital social, Paris 1913 ; J.Regis, Les augmentations de capital contre espèce 
des sociétés anonymes, Paris 1947 ; H.Viaux, Des augmentations de capital, Paris 
1944 ; A.Wahl, Etude sur l'augmentation du capital dans les sociétés anonymes, 
Paris 1894. 
3. Ripert, n. 92. 
4. B.Hepner, op.cit., vol.97 (_1932), pp.322 ff.; and vol.98 (1933), pp.5 ff.; 
Rauch, vol.I, p.57 and note 3. 
-131- 
25 m.fr. (about b 25,000 ) . In all these cases a permit, or "concession ", 
issued prior to the increase by the Ministry of Finance, is required 1. 
Besides, all increases above the sum of 10 m.fr. have to be effected through 
the medium of special banks. If the increase is effected by mean of a 
successive formation 2, a special procedure provided for in the law of 
30th January,1907, comes into operation. French jurisprudence is familiar 
in this connection with the question of a possible over -subscription of the 
suggested increase and the method of how "to spill the overflow'. It may 
happen that the charter reserves to future agreement, or to a decision of 
the board of directors, the question of how to reduce the amounts sub- 
scribed down to the figure of the planned increase. no other method is 
adopted, a proportional reduction of these amounts seems to be the 
logical solution 4. 
The analogy between increase and formation has been followed by French 
jurisprudence since about 1867, but recently French jurists have started to 
reiterate that this point of view was faulty 5. Unlike Scots and English 
Law, a nominal minimum amount of a share was set up at 10,000 fr. 6, but 
1. L.Batardon, Trait6 pratique des soci6t6s commerciales, Paris 1950, p.352. 
2. Cf. supra p. 53 and note 3. 
though it is considered as unusual that a formation of a limited company should be 
dealt with in the form of a "successive formation" ( "en faisant appel au public "7, it 
is a quite ordinary procedure in case of an increase of capital. 
Cf. Escarra -Rault, vol.I, p.11 ; Pic - Kreher, vol.II, p.231. 
3. Escarra -Rault, vol.II, p.116. 
4. Escarra Rault, vol.II, p.117 ; Pic - Kreher, vol.Il, p.244. 
5. Escarra- Rault, vo1.II, p.11 ; B.Hepner, "Das französische Aktienrecht und seine 
Reformprobleme", in : ZHR, vo1.98 (1933), p.7. 
6. Art. 28 of the decret of 4th August,1949. 
On the previous minimal rates see : P.Pellerin, French Company Law, London 1920, 
P.25, note. 
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this provision did not apply to new shares issued after 1st September,1949, 
provided that these new shares were assimilated either to all the older 
shares, or, in case of multiformity of shares, to one or more classes of 
them An increase by capitalization or dividing -up of the reserves of the 
company, eventually leading to the issue of bonus shares 2, was considered 
as possible 3. The formalities concerning the subscription of new shares 
and the publications in connection with it were provided for in the law 
4 of 1907 . Contrary to Scots and English Law, and, to some extent, contra 
to American Law too, French Company Law follows the principle of "souscrip- 
tion in_tegrale" 5, i.e. declaring an incomplete subscription to be invalid6. 
According to the law of 1943, at least one quarter of the increased amount 
should be paid at the time of subscription, and the remainder, in one or 
more instalments, within the period of five years after the increase comes 
into force. Contrary to the provisions concerning the formation of companies, 
an increase by compensation is admissible 7. Similarly, a qualified increase 
1. L.Batardon, op.cit., p. 353. 
2. L.Batardon, op.cit., pp.362 ff.; P.Joffroy, Des reserves et leur incorporation au 
capital social, Toulouse 1944 ; H.Lecomte and P.Bosvieux, De l'incorporation de la 
plus -value de ré-evaluation au capital social, Paris 1947 ; Rauch, vol.I,pp.58 -62. 
3. B.Hepner, op.cit., in : ZHR, vol.98 (1933),p.12 ; P.Pellerin, op.cit., p.68 ; 
Rauch,vol.I, pp.58 ff. 
4. Cf. also Art.59 of the law of 1867. 
5. B.Hepner, on.cit., in : ZHR, vol.98, p.5 ; H.Kerwer, "Die abschliessende Neurege- 
lung des französischen Aktienrechts", in : ZAR, vol.105 (1936), p.61 ; Pic -Kreher, 
vol.'', p.233. 
6. The suggestion was made only quite recently that the de -facto amount subscribed in 
response to a proposed increase should be accepted as the final amount of the in- 
crease. However, it was still at first rejected by the court in the famous case of 
"le Gaulois ". Cf. Pic- Kr &er, vol.I, p.234. 
7. L.Batardon 
, op.cit., p.353 ; Escarra-Rault, vol.', p.12. 
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be 
is possible 1. The new shares 2 can either actions nominatives ( "name -shares') 
or share warrants On the other hand, an increase of capital by increase 
of the nominal amount of the shares is usually not allowed, and this is 
based on the principle that no augmentation of the engagements of the 
shareholders should be permitted 4. 
According to the laws of 1943, an increase of capital is considered 
invalid if the previous capital has not been fully paid up 5. Pre -emptive 
rights were established only in 1935 
6 
. Even if contrary provisions are 
mentioned in the charter, these rights belong to the shareholders proport- 
ionally to the amounts they hold. This is rather an unusual provision. On 
the other hand, the general meeting is entitled 7, in certain specified 
circumstances, to abolish these rights 8, or to alter them. Unlike Scots 
and English Law and the majority of the legal systems of the Continent, the 
observance of these rules regarding pre -emptive rights is comparatively 
rigid, since the penalty of the whole increase of capital being declared 
invalid may be inflicted if these rules are not observed 9. 
1. A special "commissary" has to be appointed in this case.his obligation is to supervi% 
a qualified increase. Cf.L.Batardon, Traite pratique des societes commerciales, 
Paris 1950, pp.356 and 362. 
2. Lit.on "share" in French Company Law : W.Boehm, Über Aktionärschutz nach deutschem, 
englischen und französischen Recht, Munich 1910; R.L.Liévre, La protection des 
actionnaires dans les sociétés anonymes, Etude de droit americain comparé au droit 
franpis, Allenpn 1939 ; J.Perror, La création d'actions nouvelles lors d'une 
augmentation de capital, Paris 1948 ; Schn.eidr, Die Aktie nach englischem, amerika- 
nischen und französischem Recht, Marburg 1930. 
3. According to the law of 1903, the new shares can also be preference shares. 
4. Cf. supra p. 129. 5. Escarra- itault, vol.Il, p.260. 
6. C.Denoyer, "Recent modifications of French Company Law ", in : JCL, vol.19 (1937), 
p. 37; Escarra -Rault,vol.I, p.11, and vol.Il, p.260 ; B.Hepner, "Das französische 
Aktienrecht und seine Reformprobleme", in :ZHR,vol.98 (1933), p.8. 
7. This resolution has to be passed in an extraordinary general meeting. 
Cf.L.Batardon, op.cit., pp.230 -232. 
8. L.Batardon, op.cit., p.355. 9. iscarra-Rault, vol.Il, p.260. 
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The resolution on increase usually has to be passed in two successive 
general meetings. The first of these has to be an extraordinary meeting 1. 
The purpose of the second one is mainly to verify the subscriptions, to 
declare the increase as completed, and to amend the charter accordingly. 
The value of the new share may be either on a par with that of existing 
shares, or different from it. The new shares can be issued at a premium 2. 
Reduction of capital 3 was provided for only in rudimentary form in the 
law of 1867, and it acquired the normal amount of detailed treatment 
(comparable with that in other systems of law) only after 1913. Contrary 
to the provisions on increase of capital, an extraordinary general meeting 
was not obligatory here. In principle, the resolution on reduction is 
considered as an amendment of the charter 4, except where the charter 
provides otherwise. Reduction is within the authority of the general 
meeting 5, but the question whether reduction is within the authority of 
the general meeting w h e n the charter is silent on this question 
1. The provisions of Art. 31 of the law of 1867 concerning quorum and majority are 
applicable to both general meetings summoned for this purpose. 
2. L.Batardon, op.cit., pp. 358 ff. 
3. Lit. : G.Cantenot, De la réduction du capital social dans les sociétés anonymes, 
Paris 1935 ; L.Cellerier, Etudes sur les sociétés anonymes en France et dans les 
pays voisins, Paris 1905 ; R.Cuénet, De la réduction du capital social dans les 
sociétés anonymes, Droits suisse, frangais et allemand, Montreux 1925, pp.69 ff 
and pp. 89 ff.; L.Genty, De la réduction du capital dans les sociétés anonymes, 
Paris 1908 ; P.Pic and J.Kreher, Sociétés commerciales, vol.I, Paris 1940, 
PP. 305 ff.; E.Sée, De la réduction du capital, Paris 1899 ; A.Spach, Etude de 
capital social dans les sociétés par actions, Nancy 1913. 
4. P.Appleton, Du droit pour les assemblés extraordinaires dans les sociétés par 
actions de modifier les statuts sociaux, Paris 1902. 
5. L.Batardon 
, op.cit., p. 381. 
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cannot be clearly answered in the affirmative 1. 
French jurists accounted for five different economic backgrounds to 
reduction. It may be due either to an over-capitalization of the enter- 
prise 
2; 
or to losses sustained by the company and leading to an "amorti- 
zation" of a part of the capital 3 ; or to a depreciation of some of the 
assets ; or to a verifying of initially over -valued assets ; or, lastly, 
in connection with a proposed simultaneous or immediately following 
increase 4. In the first of these cases the problem of the maintainance 
of the interests of the creditors is a very important one 5. Any such 
reduction would become invalid if their interests were not kept intact. 
The creditors are entitled to oppose such a reduction, but this applies 
only to those who were creditors prior to the reduction 6. It sounds, 
however, a little antiquated when it is realized that this right of the 
creditors to "rely" on the previous amount of the capital continues for 
five years after the publication of the reduction. 
1. Some authors, like e.g. A.lahl ( "Commentaire de la loi du 22 novembre 1913 "), 
consider the right of the general meeting to reduce the capital as existent even 
when the charter does not explicitly so provide. E.Lecouturier ( "Manuel pratique 
des assemblès d'actionnaires ") comes to an opposite conclusion, asserting that no 
general assembly has any right to alter the equality existing among the shareholders 
without the explicit consent of them all. He , apparently, bases this idea on the 
much -stressed princiule of the contractual relationship between the shareholders. 
2. L.Batardon , Traité pratique des soci @t @s commerciales, Paris 1950,pp.383T401. 
3. Ibid., pp.336 -351, and pp.401 -406. 
4. Ibid., pp.406 -411. It is really doubtful whether it would be possible to award 
the logicians' palm to this classification of the economic background into five 
groups. 
5. However, it is hardly necessary when the reduction is due to losses sustained by 
the company. There is no obligation even then to inform the creditors about the 
losses and the reduction. Cf. L.Batardon, op.cit., pp.401 ff. 
6, L.Batardon 
, op.cit., pp. 382 -383. 
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Reduction by diminishing the nominal value of the shares is considered 
as admissible In practice this is applicable in those cases where the 
whole capital is not paid up. A most intricate situation may arise when the 
paid. p amount is not evenly spread over all the shareholdings 2. Contrary 
to older principles, when the stress was still on the contractual side of 
the relationship between the shareholders, a link between a reduction of 
the capital and an alteration of the rights of the shareholders is now, and 
has been since 1913, quite conceivable 3, 
Unlike Scots and English Law, French Company Law has ample scope to 
build up provisions concerning r e a d j u s t m e n t of capital 4. The 
lowering of the value of the French currency after 1914 has led many times 
to an alteration of the capital and of the nominal amount of the shares 
due to economic and financial events beyond the control of the companies 
themselves. These alterations were sometimes officially prescribed by the 
state authority, or their acceptance by the companies was made almost 
compulsory, but, contrary to what happened in Germany 5, there was until now 
always a parity, or, at least, a comparability of the old value with the 
new one. Instability of the currency caused the appearance of a novelty in 
1. L.Batardon , op.cit., p.386 and pp.394 ff. 
2. L.Batardon, op.cit.,pp.387 -393, and. p.411 ; Cuenet, p.58. 
3. L.Batardon, op.cit., pp.412 -413. 
4. Cf. supra pp.60 and 118. 
5. Cf. infra p. 184. 
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i 
accountancy : a special "rejuvenation fund" - was invented in order to 
readjust the value of the different assets. This method, however, did not 
prove to be satisfactory, since the new accounts were usually quite 
illusory and deceptive. This was the reason why the transfer of this fund 
to the capital account in order to increase the capital by utilization 
of these reserves was considered as the best possible solution 
2 
Thus, 
the sliding trend of the value of French currency had its parallel in a 
series of intermittent readjustments of the capital figures in the balance 
sheets of the companies. These increases were usually purely nominal and 
hardly indicated the true value of the capital assets. 
1. F.: " fonds de renouvellement" 
2. L.Batardon, Traité pratique des sociétés commerciales, Paris 1950, p.679. 
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3 . B e l g i u m . 
The Napoleonic Codes form the background to Belgian Law 1, but 
additional legislation, not only concerning company law, developed 
Belgian Law along somewhat different lines from those taken by French 
Law 
2 
Nevertheless, the derivation from French Law is quite apparent 
even now in all structural and stylistic* questions, though the rules of 
interpretation applied by the Belgian Court of Cassation are sometimes 
different from those applied by the French Court of Cassation. In spite 
of this similarity to French Company Law, and in spite of the acceptance 
of Roman Law principles on the structure of legal entities, Belgian 
Company Law 3 stresses more than French Law the contractual and the 
common law basis of a limited company, and mentions its balance sheet 
1. At the time of their promulgation the territory that is now Belgium was part of 
the Napoleonic Empire, and the Codes remained in force after the creation of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, and after the separation of Belgium in 1830. 
Cf. Arminjon- Nolde -Wolff, vol.I, p.137, and gol.II, p.187. 
2. Arminjon- Nolde -Wolff, vol.I, p.138 ; Hamburger, p.95. 
3. Lit.: M.Feye, Traité de droit fiscal des sociétés et associations, vol.I, Brussels 
1934 ; Ch.Foucart, Le droit des sociétés commerciales, Thuilles (s.a.,after 1947); 
L.Frédericq, Principes de droit commercial belge, Les sociétés commerciales, two vol.; 
Ghent 1928/30 ; L. Frédericq, Traité de droit commercial belge, vol.V , Ghent 1950 ; 
R.E.Kirkpatrick, Practical treatise on Belgian Law, London 1930 ; L.Passelecq, Traité 
des sociités commerciales, Brussels 1934 ; C.Resteau, Les sociétés anonymes devant 
les lois belges, five vol., Brussels 1913 -1914; P.Wauvermans, Manuel pratique des 
sociétés anonymes, 7th ed., Brussels 1937. 
From a comparative point of view, see L.Bienaimé and P.Baudoin- Bugnet, Le Code des 
socites anonymes en Europe, Brussels 1938. 
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side by side with its .charter as one of the basic elements of its 
constitution 1. The next steps in the development of Belgian Company 
Law were the laws of the 18th May,1873, 2and the laws of 1881, 1886, 1901, 
1913, 199 and 1926 3, and the 9rret6 Royal of 30th November 1935 4. 
Questions about alteration of capital 5 are still dealt with on the 
basis of the analogy with the formation of the company 6. The same majority 
of three quarters in an extraordinary general meeting 7 is required here 
also 8. Though it is unusual, it is still possible for the charter to 
forbid alteration of the charter, and with it, alteration of the capital 
too. In that particular case, it is only by a unanimous decision of all the 
shareholders that the capital may be altered 9. The present provisions on 
1. F.Gilson, Les modifications aux statuts des soci6t &s anonymes, Brussels 1919, 
pp.77 and 81. 
2. The first project leading to this law was of 1865 (usually called "projet Pirmez "). 
3. Hamburger, p.95 ; F.Norden, "Belgien ", in : " Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch f. 
Zivil- und Handelsrecht", vol.I, part 1, Berlin 1927, p.11. 
4. Published in the official Moniteur of 5th December,1935. 
Belgian Law provides that law which was in force at the moment of the company's 
foundation is applicable to companies established prior to 1935. There are still 
a few companies left which were established prior to 1873. 
Cf. F.Gilson, op.cit., p.2. 
5. Lit.: P.Coppens, L'abus de majority dans les socis anonymes, Louvain 1947 ; 
F.Gilson, Les modifications aux statuts des sociètès anonymes, Brussels 1919. 
Further special literature is mentioned in the bibliography of L.Frtdericq, 
vol.V, Ghent 1950. 
6, Ch.Foucart, op.cit., p.96; F.Gilson, op.cit., p.52 and pp.205 ff.; R.E.Kirkpatrick, 
op.cit., p.264. 
7. F.Gilson, op.cit., pp.202 -203. This provision is quite analogous with that of French 
Company Law. There is not the possibility, even by provision in the charter, of 
delegating this function to the ordinary general meeting . Cf. also Gilson,p.39. 
8. In case of a multiformity of shares, this majority has to be reached in each class of 
shares, but there may be cases where a unanimous decision in one of the particular 
classes is required. Cf.F.Gilson, op.cit.,pp.204,216,235 ; Hamburger, p.95. 
9. F.Gilson, op.cit., pp.3 and 43. 
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increase of capital are generally the same as they were in 1913 1. An 
unusual pre -requisite for an increase is the provision that a minimum 
amount of seven members 2 should be on the roll of members at the time of 
increase 3. The other provisions are less unusual, viz.' a complete sub- 
scription 4, and the paying -up, or an "effective" qualified increase 5, of 
at least one fifth of the value 6. Compared with Scots and English Law, 
Belgian Law keeps more strictly to all these requirements 7. The charter 
may specify the amount of the rights attached to the new shares, and the 
phases of their introduction 8. Unlike Scots, English and French Law, 
Belgian Company Law is familiar with the institution of "no-par-value"- 
shares 9, and all the implications of an alteration of capital where shares 
1. L.Fredericq, Traite de droit commercial belge, vol.V, Ghent 1950, p.727 ; 
F.Gilson, Les modifications aux statuts des societes anonymes, Brussels 1919, 
pp.202 ff.. 
2. F.: "associe ". Unlike French Law and jurisprudence, Belgian legal terminology uses 
still more often "associè" than "actionnaire ", though it is doubtful whether this 
points to some structural difference. Cf. F.Gilson, op.cit., pp.234 ff. 
3. L.Frédericq,op.cit.,vol.V,p.728 ; F.Gilson, op.cit.,p.52 ; R.E.Kirkpatrick, 
op.cit., p.263. 
4. F.Gilson, op.cit., pp.39 ff., and p.207. 
Contrary to the latest development in French Company Law (cf.supra p.132, note 6), 
Belgian Law still adheres very closely to the old principle of "souscription 
integrale". Unlike the French practice, the occurence of an increase by public 
subscription (i.e. similar to a "successive formation ") is very seldom found 
in Belgium. Cf.F.Gilson,op.cit.,p.217 ; R.E.Kirkpatrick, Practical treatise on 
Belgian Law, London 1930, p.265. 
5. A curious provision of Belgian Company Law is the imposition,on those shares which 
represent a qualified increase, of a veto on or a restriction of their negotiability 
and transferability up to the tenth day after the publication of the second annual 
balance sheet following the increase. Cf.F.Gilson, op.cit., p.2100 
6. F.Gilson, op.cit., pp. 151, 206 and 208. 
7. R.E.Kirkpatrick, op.cit., p.263. 
8. F.Gilson, op.cit., p.223. 
9. Though considered as permissible since about 1873, it was recognized by statute law 
only in 1913. Cf. R.E.Kirkpatrick, op.cit., p.266. 
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are issued without a par -value 1. An issue of new shares above "par "is, 
however, considered as illegal. 
2 
Pre -emptive rights are usually- provided for in the charters of Belgian 
limited companies 3. Their alienability is also provided for 4. On the one 
hand, the shareholders are not entitled to ask for the maintenance of the 
former amount of capital 5, but on the other hand, there is no question of 
any obligation on the shareholders to buy new shares, or to allow an increasE 
of the amount of fully paid shares, in order to have not fully paid shares 
instead, at least not without the consent of all the shareholders 6.As in 
German Law, these pre -emptive rights appertain in the case of usufruct 7 
to the "bare proprietor" 
8. 
Belgium was one of the first European countries where an increase out of 
surpluses and by incorporation of reserves was made possible 9. An unusual 
variety of such increase by capitalization is where creditors agree to a 
reorganization of the liabilities of the company by accepting shares in 
satisfaction of their claims. This is a qualified increase combined with an 
increase by capitalization of the debts and obligations of the company 
100 
1. Cf. Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Shares of no par value, London (HMSO) 
1954 (Cmd.9112), p.4. 
2. L.Frèdericq, op.cit, pp.728 -729 ; F.Gilson, op.cit., p.212. 
3. F.Gilson, op.cit.,pp.215 ff. 4. L.Frèdericq, op.cit., pp.740 ff. 
5. F.Gilson, op.cit., p. 79. 6. F.Gilson, op.cit., p. 204. 
7. Cf. infra p.155. 
8. F.:" nu proprietaire ". Cf. L.Frèdericq, op.cit., p.741. 
9. L.Fr6dericq, op.cit.,pp.743 ff.; F.Gilson, op.cit.,pp.46 and 217 ; Rauch, vol.I, 
pp.62 ff., and vol.Il, pp.107 -110. 
10. Such an action requires, however, the sanction of all the c r e d i t o r s. 
Cf. L.Frkdericq, op.cit., p.748 ; F.Gilson, op.cit., PP. 219 ff, 
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An increase by capitalization can be made either by issuing of new bonus 
shares, or by increasing the niminal amount of the shares without anything 
actually been paid on account of such an increase. There can be no question 
of such a capitalization being possible in the case of the so- called 
"reserves extraordinaires ou facultatives". according to some writers that 
applies also to the so- called legal reserves 1. For a very considerable 
time, French and Belgian jurists devoted much space and energy to dealing 
with these very questions 2, usually arguing that they are merely matters 
of accountancy 3. Some. however, asserted that a qualified majority was 
still needed in all these cases. 
Belgian Law is also familiar with readjustment of capital 4 as a 
special type of alteration of capital in connection either with a re- 
valuation of the currency 5, or with an acquisition of alien territory 
6 
Belgian Company Law provides for the following types of reduction of 
capital 7 : 1) the "formal" reduction, generally based on a readjustment 
of capital in order to rectify a negative balance sheet due to losses of 
the company 8, and 2) the "effective" reduction, generally based on the 
1. L.Fr6dericq, Trait& de droit commercial belge, vol.V, Ghent 1950, p.743 ; F.Gilson, 
Les modifications aux statuts des socibt &s anonymes, Brussels 1919, pp. 46 -47. 
2. P.Coart- Frèsart, Revue pratique des socittbs, Brussels 1927 ; L.Frèdericq, op.cit, 
pP.745 ff.; E.and F.Genin, Commentar op het wetboek der registratie-hypoteek- 
engriffie- rechten, Brussels 1940, PP.495 ff.; Ch.Houpin, 'Trait& góneral,theorique 
et pratique des socibt6s civiles et commerciales, Paris 1895, 6th ed.(together 
with H.Bosvieux):Paris 1927, vol.Il, pp.9 ff., 7th ed.: Paris 1935/37 ; Rauch, 
vol.I, pp.58 -63. 
3. Coart- Fr6sart : "yperequation" , L.Frèdericq : "simple jeu d'ècritures" 
4. Cf. supra D. 60. 5. L.Fr4dericq, op.cit, pp.747 ff. 
6. E.g. the territory of Eupen -Malmedy after 1919. Cf. infra p183, note 2. 
7. L.Fr &dericq, op.cit., pp.749 ff.; F.Gilson, op.cit., pp. 230 ff. 
8 P.Gilson, op.cit., pp.232 ff. Cf. infra pp. 203 -204. 
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wish to bring an unemployment of capital to an end 1, and usually linked 
with a repayment of fully paid shares, or an extinction of the liability 
concerning the not yet paid -up part, or with a repayment - cum -extinction. 
For all the types of reduction the principle of a prior datisfaction of 
the creditors is equally applicable, but the idea is still prevalent that 
a reduction of capital is only conceivable where there are no creditors 2. 
This satisfaction can, however, be replaced in practice by a creditors' 
agreement. In one particular case, of course, it may happen that a reduction 
of capital will somehow be beyond the control of the creditors, viz.in the 
case of a reduction owing to the losses of the compan y . As in German Law, 
an induciae of six months 4 exists for all those cases where a repayment 
takes place. No dividend payments, or repayments to the shareholders are 
feasible within this time 5. 
Again, Belgian Company Law is familiar with reduction - cum -increase, 
especially in the case of a reduction in the sense of a readjustment 
6 
Both decisions can be made in the same extraordinary general meeting. For 
all the types of reduction, an amendment of the charter is quite essential, 
and the extraordinary general meeting is the only place where that can be 
done. As is the case in German Law, only some minor functions concerning 
the implementing of such a decision can be delegated to the board. 7 
A reduction of capital by diminution of the nominal amount of the 
1. L.Fr&dericg, 
2. L.Frèdericg, 
3. F.Gilson, op. 
4. Ibid., p.238. 
5. Cf. infra p. 
op.cit., p.749. 
op.cit., p.750 ; F.Gilson, op.cit., pp.78 -80, and p.236. 
cit., pp. 82 ff., and p.237. 
Cf. infra pp. 175 and 206. 
158, and p. 175 and note 3. 
6. F.Gilson, op.cit., p. 232. 7. Ibid., pp. 39 and 233. 
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shares is provided for in Belgian Company Law 
1. 
This may concern the 
not yet paid -up part of the shares, in which case one speak about a 
diminution or extinction of liability 2 On the other hand, a reduction 
of capital may be effected by way of a reduction of the number of shares, 
either by exchanging new shares for old, or by the buying of shares by 
the company itself in order to cancel them. 
1. F.Gilson, Les modifications aux statuts des societes anonymes, Brussels 1919, 
PP.244 ff. 
2. Ibid., p.247. 
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4. L u x e m b o u r g . 
The historical background of the Company Law of Luxembourg is very 
similar to that of France and telgium 1. This tiny monarchy has its own 
peculiar story of bilinguality. Though the Luxembourg vernacular has since 
1839 been predominantly Germanic, and although it was from 1815 till 1918 
economically linked with Germany, either through membership in the German 
Confederation (1815- 1866), or, since 1842, through a customs' union, its 
legal language remained the French 2 of the Napoleonic Codes 3 °And though 
united in a personal union with the Crown of the Netherlands from 1815 
till 1890, it always maintained French, and, especially, Belgian, legal 
and juridical traditions 4, partly, perhaps, as a result of the occupation 
of almost the whole territory by Belgium during the years 1830 -1839 5. The 
impact of the Belgian Companies Act of 1873 and the amendments thereto is 
evident in the Luxembourg Law on Commercial Associations of 1915 
6 
which 
remains the sedes materiae concerning limited companies 7. 
1. Arminjon- Nolde- Wolff, vol.I, pp.60 and 139. 
2. It is worth while noting that French remained the legal language of a vast area of 
Western Germany up to 1900. Cf.Toynbee, vol.VII, pp.274 -275. 
3. A.Neyens, "Luxemburg ", in: "Rechtsvergleichendes Randwörterbuch f.Zivil- und Handels- 
recht" (ed.by F.Schlegelberger),vol.I, part 1, Berlin 1927, p.128. 
4. Rauch, vol.I, p.63. 
5. A.1eyens, op.cit., p.128. 
5. Loi du 10 aoút 1915 sur le regime des sociètès commerciales. Quoted from : Textes 
legtslatifs concernant les sociètès de participation financiéres (Holding Companies), 
Luxembourg 1939, pp.38 ff. 
7. Smaller modifications of the Luxembourg Company Law took place in 1922, 1927, 1930 
and 1933. An earlier law of 23rd December,1913, is still applicable in some special 
questions. 
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On the whole, the provisions concerning alteration of capital are the 
same as in Belgian Law. An unusual peculiarity is that the requirement of at 
least one -fifth being paid -up 1 is linked with another requirement, namely 
that the value of the paid -up part cannot be below 50 francs 2. This 
peculiarity means that if the nominal value of each share is below 250 fr., 
the requirement of at least one -fifth is replaced by that of a fixed sum of 
50 francs. Three similarities with Belgian Law should in particular be 
noted : the number of members of the company has to be at least seven 3 at 
the time of increase, "no- par -value" shares are admitted 4, and it is 
illegal to increase the nominal amount of fully paid shares, in order to 
have not fully paid shares instead, unless the consent of all the share- 
holders is given 5. The charter may, of course, provide otherwise.Compared 
with Belgian Law, there is slightly less rigidity concerning the "souscrip- 
tion integrale" 6. An unusual provision concerning the voting system nt the 
extraordinary general meeting is found in Luxembourg Law. The rule is that 
1. Cf. supra p. 140. 
2. Cf. Art. 26 and 31 of the Law of 10th August, 1915. 
3. Cf. Art. 32 (1). 
4. Cf. Art. 37 and 41 (2). Cf. also supra p.140. 
5. Cf. Art. 67 (2). Cf. also supra p. 141. 
6. More or less on the lines of the recent development in French Law (cf.suprap.140, 
note 4). 
Cf. Art. 48 (3). 
See also : Holding Companies under Luxembourg Law (published by : Banque Commerciale) 
Luxembourg 1930, p.14. 
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all limitations concerning the accumulation of votes 1 become inoperative 
as soon as modifications or amendments of the charter or alteration of the 
capital are on the agenda, unless, of course, the charter itself provides 
otherwise 2. An even more unusual provision concerns the rules on quorum 
and majority : any increase or reduction of capital requires a majority of 
two thirds 3 both in a "first" general meeting, whre a quorum of at least 
half of the whole capital is required 4, and in a "second" general meeting 
also 5. Btt in this latter case the counting of votes has to be done in two 
ways : a simple majority of all shareholders present or represented 6 is 
first required, and then, simultaneously, a majority of two thirds, the 
absent or non -represented shareholders being considered this time as being 
present and as having voted with the strength of one third 7 in favour of 
1. The formula "each share gives one vote" is the classic example of a possible 
unlimited accumulation of votes in the hands of one wealthy shareholder. The formula 
"each share gives one vote, but no one can have more than ... votes" is, on the other 
hand, an example of limiting the amount of votes. This rule of Luxembourg Law means 
that all limitations of such a nature are automatically out of order as soon as an 
alteration of capital is on the agenda, since then all shareholders are voting with 
the maximum strength of their holdings. This provision of the Luxembourg Companies 
Act might have been drafted under some influence of bmerigan Law, since e.g. s 51 of 
the Stock Corporation Law of New York (1952) has a similar wording. 
2. Cf. Art. 67 (3). 3. Cf. Art.67 (8). 
4. Cf. Art. 67 (5) and 69. 5. Cf. Art.67 (5)(6)(8). 
6. Luxembourg Law is inconsistent in its use of the terms "member" and "shareholder ". 
It uses sometimes "member" (e.g.Art.32, part 1), and in many cases "shareholder" 
(e.g. Art.48 and Art.67, part 6). 
Cf. supra p. 140, note 2, and infra p. 212, note 3. 
7. F.: " ... mais au maximum pour un tier de la totalite des voix ".This ambiguous 
sentence could, of course, be interpreted as meaning that no more than one third of 
a l l v o t e s c a s t either in favour or against the proposals of the board 
may come from these "presumptive voters ". There is a slight mathematical inconsist- 
ency in this interpretation. 
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the proposals of the board In case of multiformity of shares, these 
rules on quorum and majority are equally applicable to all class meetings ? 
In case of reduction of capital, the proposed method has to be mentioned in 
the appropriate notice 3. 
As in Belgian Law, Luxembourg Law provides for the possibility of an 
increase of capital out of surpluses, by capitalization of the reserves, and 
by augmentation of the nominal value of the invecta et illata of the company 
in case of a prior qualified formation or a qualified increase 4. This 
provision became a financial "best- seller" in connection with a decision 
of the Belgian Court of Cassation at the end of 1931 , to the effect that 
the proportional tax was not applicable to all kinds of "internal" 
increases 6. The Luxembourg tax offices started to apply this principle in 
the Grand Duchy too and charged only a droit fixe 7. It was in connection 
with this decision, and the promulgation of a special law regarding holding 
companies 8 that Luxembourg Company Law came into the limelight. These 
holding companies differed from the ususal limited companies only in one 
point, namely, concerning the object of their trade. while the usual limited 
1. Cf. Art. 67 (6)(8). 2. Cf. Art. 68. 
3. Cf. Art. 69 (2). 
. This possibility was provided for for the first time in the above -mentioned law of 1913 
5. Rauch, vol.I, p.64e 
6. This expression is of Italian origin (It.: "aumenti interni"). Cf. infra p. 210. 
7. B.Delvaux and E.neiffers, Les sociétés Holding au Grand Duché de Louxembourg, 4th ed 
Paris 1953, pp.220 ff. 
8. Loi du 31 juillet 1929 sur le regime fiscal des sociètès de participation (Holding 
companies). Quoted from : Textes legislatifs concernant les socibtès de participation 
financiéres (Holding Companies), Luxembourg 1939, pp. 3 ff. 
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company is concerned either in commerce or in industry, the "pure" type 
of holding company deals exclusively with aggregation of capital 1 or 
"emboitement" , and a mixed type of holding company deals partly with 
aggregation of capital, and partly with commerce and /or industry. From the 
point of view of structute, holding companies are usually limited companies 
but they could also be formed as something else, e.g. as a partnership. 
It was the deliberate financial policy of a number of smaller states 
to attract the domiciliation of alien companies by promising special favour: 
in the taxation of capital. Besides Luxembourg 2, some of the Swiss cantons 
(especially Glaris and Grisons), Liechtenstein 3, 'rangier 4, Curaçao, 
Panama 5, some of the American states (especially Delaware 6 and New 
Jersey), and, up till 1945, Monaco also, have all become famous as countries 
which had introduced special "liberal" legislation" favouring the formation 
of holding companies and this concentrating foreign capital in their 
countries 7. The relative easiness of increasing capital out of reserves 
and by re- valuation of reserves by the issue of bonus shares or otherwise 
is, of course, one of the main elements which facilitates the formation of 
1. Textes legislatifs concernant des socibt6s de participation ..,1939, p.5. 
2. Cf. the English pamphlet : "Holding Companies under Luxembourg Law ", published by 
the Banque Commerciale of Luxembourg in 1930. 
3. Cf. infra pp. 245 ff. 
4. Under the auspices of the Compagnie Belge de Banque et de Gestion at Tangier. 
5. Under the auspices of the Intrenational Corporation Company, Inc.,New York. 
6. R.C.Larcom, The Delaware Corporation, Baltimore 1937. 
Cf. infra p.219and note 4. 
7. B.Delvaux and E.Reiffers, op.cit., pp.295 -302 ; P.R.Rosset, Les Holding Companies 
et leur imposition en droit comparè , Paris 19310 
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nominal skeleton companies which can expand later and be adapted as 
holding companies 1, 
1. Textes legislatifs concernant les sociétés de participation financii5res 
(Holding companies), Luxembourg 1939, p.5. 
B.Delvaux and E.Reiffers, Les sociétés Holding au Grand -Duché de Luxembourg, 
4th ed., Paris 1953, pp.116 and 222. 
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5. G e r m a n y . 
The historical background of German Company Law has much in common with 
English Law, especially during the time when there were as yet no Companies 
Acts, and comparisons were possible "on the charter level" 1. As in England 
and Italy, German Company Law was in many respects at first, in the later 
Middle Ages and thereafter, derived from the charters of corporate bodies 
of the merchant marine 2, and it was only much later that the amount of 
privilege ( "octroi ") started to overshadow the formation and the management 
of this type of corporation. 
The first statute laws of various German states were partly influenced 
by the French Code de Commerce 3. Further statutory development of Company 
Law in Germany was as follows: the older Code of 1861 (the so- called ADHG13)4, 
1. K.Cosack, Lehrbuch des Handelsrechts, 6th ed., Stuttgart 1903, p.557. 
2. Cf. R.Fischer, "Die Aktiengesellschaft ", in : "Handbuch des gesamten Handelsrechts" 
(ed.by V.Ehrenberg), vol.Ill, cart 1, p.13 ; M.Gutzwiller, "Rechtsvergleichung in 
kontinentaler Sicht ", in : "Rècueil de travaux suisses prèsentès au IV -iéme Congres 
International du Droit Compar@ ", Geneva 1954, p.5 ; P.Rehme, "Geschichte des Handels 
rechts ", in : "Handbuch des gesamten Handelsrechts" (ed.by V.Ehrenberg) ,vol.I, 
Leipzig 1913, pp.219 ff. 
3. E.g. the Prussian Law on Railway Companies of 1138, the draft of a Commercial Dode 
of Wurttemberg of 1839, the draft of a Commercial Code of Nassau of 1842, the Compa- 
nies Act of Prussia of 1843. gor the history of German Company Law see : H.Schumacher 
Die Entwickelung der inneren Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft im deutschen Recht 
bis zum ADHGB, Stuttgart 1937. 
4. This Code remained in force in Austria up to 1938. 
Among various annotated translations of this Code (including all the Acts issued 
after 1861) these French editions may be mentioned : one, published in 1881 by 
P.Gide, Ch.Lyon -Caen and J.Dietz, and another, published in 1896,by P.Carpentier. 
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an Act of 1870 (usually quoted as "Aktiennovelle "), an Act of 1884 1, and 
the new Commercial Code of 1897 (the so- called HGB ) 2. Though German 
Company Law recognized limited companies as legal entities 3, they were 
still in 1897 considered in many respects as a kind of informal associat- 
ion 4, 
1. This Act of 1884, which remained almost unchanged in its general outline through the 
recodification of the HGB up to 1G37, was mainly based upon the idea of a "normative" 
system mildly supervised by the registrar. Cf.R.Rosendorff, "The new German Company 
Law and the English Companies Act,1929 ", in : JCL, 3rd series, vol.14, London 1932, 
P.94- 
This Act of 1884 introduced pre -emptive rights into German Company Law. 
Cf. A.Dueringer and M.Hachenburg, Das Handelsgesetzbuch, 3rd ed., vol.Ill, part 1, 
Mannheim 1934, pp. 5 ff.; Rauch, vol.Il, p.73, note 1. 
2 . This HGB, which came into force on 1st January,1900, remained the main source of 
Company Law up to 1937. Other parts of this Code are still valid. An English 
translation of this HGB appeared under the editorship of W.Bowstead in the British 
edition of the work "The Commercial Laws of the World", London (Sweet and Maxwell) 
(s.a.), vol.24, part 1. Among various other translations thre should be mentioned 
a translation by B.A.Platt, The Commercial Code for the German Empire,London 1900, 
and that by A.F.Schuster, The German Commercial Code (HGB), with an introduction by 
E.J.Schuster, London 1911. There are,besides, excellent french translations of this 
HGB. One of them appeared in 1901 under the title : Legislation commerciale de 
l'Allemagne, Code de Commerce mis en vigeur en 1900, Paris (A.Chevalier- Marcocq) 
1901, and another was done by P.Viatte, Code de Commerce Allemand, Paris 1901. 
3. Thöl, Bernburg and Meurer were supposed to be the only exceptions among German 
authors who were opposed to this idea. Cf. K.Cosack, op.cit., p.556, note 1 ; 
C,Ritter and J.Ritter, Aktiengesetz, Berlin 1939, p.3 (2a) ; W.Schmidt- Rimpler's 
critical notes on the books by H.Schumacher and K.Bösselmann, in : " Zeitschrift der 
Savigny Stiftung far Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung' vol.62,Weimar 1942, 
pp. 549 ff. 
4. G.: "Verein ". The expression "Aktienverein "still occured now and then in the years 
prior to 1900, but gave way to the more precise "Aktiengesellschaft ". Still, 
HGB § 6 (2) qualified companies limited by shares as "Verein ". 
Cf. A.Renaud, Das Recht der Aktiengesellschaften, Leipzig 1863, p.459 ; K.Cosack, 
op.cit., p.619 and passim ; Ritter, p.3. 
There is some similarity in the rather archaic forms of the terms "articles of 
association" and "memorandum of association" in Scots and English Law, which are 
also merely reminiscences of pre -corporative influences in modern company law. 
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The regulations of the HGB concerning alteration of capital were as fol- 
lows. An increase of capital was considered possible only when the former 
capital was fully, or almost fully, paid -up 1, Though the HGB did not 
provide for any type of increase other than increase by issue of new shares 
an increase of capital by increasing the nominal value of the previously 
issued shares was recognized in theory and met with in practice 5. Pre- 
emptive rights 4 were also recognized. Provisions concerning them were 
rather elaborate , and the juridical literature devoted to these questions 
was extensive 6. Pre -emptive rights became inoperative, however, in the 
case where the increase of capital was effected by increasing the nominal 
2 
1. HGE § 278 (1). Cf. K.Cosack, Lehrbuch des Handelsrechts, Stuttgart 1903, p.619 ; 
Staub, pp.481 ff.; Ritter, p.481. 
2. G.: " ...durch Ausgabe neuer Aktien" was rendered by B.A.Platt, op.cit.,p.112, as 
"by issuing new shares ", but by Bowstead and Schuster in their translations as 
"fresh shares ", or "fresh issue of shares ". 
3. Staub, p. 479 (lc). 
4. HGB § 282 did not know a special terminus technicus for pre -emptive rights. Neither 
was there any special word coined in the German juridical literature of the nine- 
teenth century. Though the text of § 282 spoke about "the right to ask that he be 
allotted an amount of new shares" (B.A.Platt, op.cit., pp.114 -115), which is a perfect 
rendering of the German phrase :" ... neuen Aktien zugeteilt werden .. ", the juri- 
dical literature coined and adopted the term for it : " Aktien.bezugsrec_:t ", i.e. the 
right to demand allocation of shares. Bowsceed, op.cit., p.153, translated it in one 
of the footnotes as " .. the right of the shareholders to claim preferential 
allottment ", or, simply : " preferential treatment ". 
5. HGB §§ 282 ff. 
6. Lit.: Guldenstein, Das Aktienbezugsrecht, Munich 1914 ; Karo, Die rechtliche Natur 
des Aktienbezugsrechts und seine Gestaltung bei Bestehen eines Pfandrechtes, Er- 
langen 1916 ; H.Herold, "Die Ausübung des Aktienbezugsrechts bei einer Verpfá,ndung 
und Sicherungsübereignung der Aktien ", in : "Gruchots Beitrüge zur Erlguterung des 
deutschen Rechts ", vol.65, Berlin 1921, pp.385 ff.; Stern, Der Grundsatz der gleich- 
massigen Behandlung der Gesellschafter und der Ausschluss des Bezugsrechts, 
Soest 1925, 
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value of th:_: shares 
1. 
The revocability of these rights in advance by the 
charter was not permissible 2. Similarly, it was considered invalid to 
promise pre -emptive rights in the charter prior to the resolution on 
increase of capital 3. However, it was considered possible to cancel or 
alter them through a resolution in general meeting when dealing with the 
proposed increase. By way of such an alteration of pre -emptive rights, 
provided it was possible according to the Companies Act and the charter, 
pre -emptive rights could be created with different "strengths" for different 
groups of shareholders, and, in certain circumstances, for non -shareholders 
also 4.. A waiving or limiting of these pre -emptive rights occured very 
often in connection with a qualified increase 5. 
As with Scots and English Law, German Company Law puts less stress on 
the rights of the shareholder to a certain amount of new shares, than or 
the obligation of the corporation to allocate a certain amount of new shares 
to a shareholder if asked by him 6, Though these rights are attached to the 
"shareholders" and the expression "member" does not occur in the sections 
in question 7, they are still considered by German .jurists as forming part 
1. Staub, pp. 479 and 493. 
2, K.Cosack, op.cit., pp.619 -620 ; R.Mueller- Erzbach, Das private 
schaft als Prüfstein eines kausalen Rechtsdenkens, Weimar 1948, 
3. This was the result of the reform of 1884. Cf. R.Fischer, "Die 
in : " Handbuch des gesamten Handelsrechts" (ed.by V.Ehrenberg) 
Leipzig 1916, p.323. 
4. Cf. supra p. 56, note 3. 
5. Staub, p.494. 
6. Cf. supra p. 78, note 4. 
See also HGB § 282 (1), and Ritter, p.489. 
7. Staub, p. 497 ; Ritter, p.489. 
Recht der Mitglied - 
p.91 ; Staub ,A.494- 
Aktiengesellschaft ", 
, vol.III, part 1, 
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of the rights that are attached to "membership" 
1 
It is, however, 
doubtful whether we can recognize as valid their point of view concerning 
the automatic transfer of these pre -emptive rights to non -shareholders in 
the cases of usufruct 2, or cessio lePitimationis of the shares 3, since, 
strictly speaking, no person other than a shareholder should be considered 
as entitled to claim an allocation 4 of the new shares, unless specially 
mentioned in the resolution.Such a resolution had to mention the proportion 
of the "pre -emption" 5 and the period of grace 6 within which these claims 
on allocation had to be made by the shareholder. The HGB mentioned a 
minimum of two weeks 7. 
1. G.: " Recht aus dem Mit:liedschaftsverhältnis ". Cf.K.Geiler, "Die wirtschaftliche 
Methode im Gesellschaftsrecht", in : G , vol.68, Berlin 1927, p.612 ; H.Herold, 
"Die Ausúbung des Aktienbezugsrechts bei einer Verpfändung and Sicherungsübereignung 
der Aktien ", in : G , vol.65, pp.386 and 388 ; Ritter, p.489. 
R.Mueller- Erzbach (op.cit., p.318) expressed the view in his rather philosophical 
study on this subject that the gradual lessening of the amount of obligations on 
the part of the shareholders derived from their status as m e m b e r s of the 
company - leads to a depersonification or withering away of the membership itself. 
The incapacity of the company to impose new "membership " -obligations upon its 
shareholders is, in his opinion, indicative of this process also. According to 
R.Mueller- Erzbach (op.cit.,p.319), all the privileges attached to different classes 
or groups of shares, including pre -emptive rights, are nothing else than the last 
remainder of the rights of the company to "rely" on its shareholders as its members. 
One should come to the conclusion ( though R.Idueller- Erzbach has not said so 
explicitly : ) that a waning of these pre -emptive rights ( as observed in Scots and 
English Law, but not yet in the Law of Northern Ireland ; cf. supra p.57 and pp. 
77 -79 ) goes hand -in -hand with a growing rift between " m e m b e r s h i p " , as 
the natural relationship between co- partners of a social body, and " s h a r e- 
h o 1 der s h i p ", as the formalized and rather anaemic residuum of the 
relationship between co- partners of a super -personified body of a p u b l i c 
company. 
2. G.: " Niessbrauch". Cf. Ritter, p.489; Staub, pp.497 ff. 
3. G.: " Legitir_lationszessionar ". 4. G.: " Zuteilungsanspruch ". 
5. Cf. supra p. 78, note 3. 
6. W.Bowstead, Commercial Laws of the World, vol.24, part 1, p.153. 
7. HGB 282 (2). 
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An increase of capital was looked upon as an alteration of the 
charter 
1. 
Accordingly, a majority representing at least three quarters 
of the capital, present 2 at the time of voting, was required, unless the 
charter provided otherwise 3. However, a simple majority was sufficient to 
reject a motion for increase 4. Provisions regarding company formation were 
usually applied per analogiam 5, especially concerning the modus of 
subscription 6 of the new shares 7, the amount to be paid -up, and the time 
within which that should be done. (1n issue of new shares "belo. par" 
8 
was not allowed 9. 
Reduction of capital was provided for in four rather short sections 10. 
There were two main types envisaged, namely, reduction with a partial 
1. Older ( "ADHGB ") German literature : H.Keyssner, Die Aktiengesellschaft und die 
Commandit gesellschaft auf Aktien, Berlin 1873 ; Nissen, "Die Erhöhung des Grund- 
kapitals einer Aktiengesellschaft ", in : ZHR, vol.19, Erlangen 1873, pp.373 ff. 
The "HGB" German literature is summarized by R.Fischer, "Die Aktiengesellschaft ", 
in : "Handbuch des gesamten Handelsrechts" (ed.by V.Ehrenberg), vol.Ill, part 1, 
Leipzig 1916, pp.319 ff. 
2. A.Dueringer and M.Hachenburg, Das Handelsgesetzbuch, 3rd ed., vol.Ill, part 1,p.503. 
3. HGB § 275 (1). 
4. Staub, p. 471. 
5. K.Cosack, Lehrbuch des Handelsrechts, Stuttgart 1903, p.620 ; Rauch, vol.I, 
pp.106 -116. 
6. The German term "Zeichnungsschein" was rendered as "subscription certificates" by 
T.Bowstead, op.cit., p.153, or as "subscription tickets" (B.A.Platt, The Commercial 
Code for the German Empire, p.114), or simply -"application" (A.F.Schuster, The 
German Commercial Code .., London 1911, p.131). 
7. HGB S 281. 
8. The term "below par" was not yet used by the translators of the HGB.Cf.B.A.Platt, 
op.cit., p.65; A.F.Schuster, op.cit., p.74 ; W.Bowstead. op.cit., p.125. 
9. HGB § 184. Lit.: K.Cosack, op.cit.,pp.621 and 624 ; A.Dueringer and M.Hachenburg, 
op.cit.,p.307 
; Heinrici, "Zur Frage der Kapitalbeschaffung bei Aktiengesellschaf - 
ten", in : G , vol.67, Berlin 1925, pp.353 ff.; Staub, p.46. 
10. HGB § 288 -291. Lit.: R.Fischer, op.cit., pp.328 ff.; Neuburger, Die Herabsetzung des Grundkapitals bei Aktiengesellschaften, Berlin 1911 ; E.See, Die Herabsetzung des 
Grundkapitals nach deutschem und französischen Recht, Heidelberg 1906. 
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repayment of the capital to the shareholders 1, and reduction without 
such repayment, the latter being often called the accountant's reduction 
2 
A majority representing at least three quarters of the capital was 
required, and the charter could provide additional requirements 3 for 
quorum and majority. In case of a multiformity of shares, sectional voting 
of the different groups was provided for. 
The resolution had to contain the reason for and the mode of reduction4. 
Both ways were feasible, i.e. a reduction of the nominal amount of shares, 
or the reduction of the number of shares 5. Reduction by consolidation 6, 
and by redemption 7 of shares were also within the scope of German company 
law. Gradual reduction 8 was allowed, differing from the usual type of 
reduction in the framing of the resolution, namely, whether there was to 
1. HAR § 288 : " ... zur teilweisen Rückzahlung des Grundkapitals an die Aktionäre ". 
2. G.: " rechnungsmässige Kapitalherabsetzung ". Cf. also : B.Mosimann, Die Kapital- 
herabsetzung des Grundkapitals bei der Aktiengesellschaft und ihr Einfluss auf die 
wohlerworbenen Rechte des Aktionärs, Zurich 1938, p.21. 
3. HGB § 288 : " ... andere Erfordernisse" was translated as "other requirements" by 
W.Bowstead (Commercial Laws of the World, vol.24, part 1, p.153), or as "more 
stringent conditions" (A.F.Schuster, op.cit., p.134), or as "further provisions" 
(B.A.Platt, op.cit.,, p.117). 
4. KGB § 288 (2).Cf.K.Cosack, op.cit., p.624. 
5. Staub, p.510. 
6. A.Canto, Die Herabsetzung des Grundkapitals der Aktiengesellschaft mittels Zusammen- 
legung von Aktien und die Rechte des Einzelaktionärs, Cologne (s.a.), pp.6 ff. and 
p.24 ; Cuenet, p.76. 
7. G.: " Einziehung von Aktien, Amortisation ". I am very much indebted to the ter- 
minological index appended to the publication by the Foreign Office : "Manual of 
German Law ", vol.I, London (HMSO) 1950, Pp.277 ff., but at the same time it cannot 
be said that the index is complete. 
8. Staub, p. 514. 
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be a reduction by a certain amount, or down to a certain amount. In the 
latter case, the company was authorized gradually to reduce the capital 
down to the amount specified in the resolution. rhe following provisions 
contrary to Scots and English Law should be noted : - German statute law 
provided for a minimum below which no reduction was allowed 1 ; there was 
a special requirementp that the projected reduction had to be contained 
in the agenda of the general meeting 2; and it was provided that only 
after an induciae of one year 3 were repayments to shareholders, or 
payment of dividends from the reduced capital to be allowed 4. Such then 
in brief, were the provisions of the HGB. 
The new German Companies Act of 1937 5, _ough at that time obediently 
hailed as a result of Nationalsocialism and Third Reich wisdom 6, was mainly 
1. Kuhn, p.69. 
2. HGB § 274 (2). Staub, pp.468 and 513. 
3. This induciae was called in German " Sperrjahr". 
HGB § 289 (4) : " .. ein Jahr verstric#hen ist .." was rendered as "until after a 
year has passed" (W.Bowstead, op.cit., p.154), or as "after the expiration of a 
year" (B,A.Platt, The Commercial Code for the German Empire, p.118). 
4. RGB § 289 (4). Cf, K.Cosack, Lehrbuch des Han delsrechts, Stuttgart 1903, p.625 ; 
Staub, p. 518. 
5. G.: " Aktiengiesetz 1937 ", usually abbreviated as AG. 
A French translation of the German Companies Act of 1937 ( "AG ") can be found in 
the works by P.Boudoin- Bugnet, Les socittts par actions en Allemagne, Paris 1939, 
and by M.Doucet, Code de commerce allemand et autrichien, Paris 1949, pp.195 -281. 
This German Companies Act of 1937 was commented on by M.Wolff, "Commercial Law ", 
in : "Manual of German Law" (ed.by Foreign Office), London (HMSO) 1950, and in 
English periodicals, i.a.by : F.A.Mann, The new German Company Law and its back- 
ground", in : JCL, vol.19, part 4, London 1937, pp.220 -238, and H.G.Tasse, "The new 
German Company Law ", in : "The Bell Yard ", vol.20, London 1937, pp.19 ff. Good 
French comments on this law were given by E.Mezger, Le nouveau regime des socittts 
anonymes en Allemagne, Paris 1939. 
6. Ritter, p. 2 ; F.A.Mann, op.cit., p.227. 
-159- 
the result of many unsatisfactory partial reforms 1 of the HGB regulations 
regarding public companies 2, but the Companies Act of 1937 ( "AG ") was in 
many respects outdated even before it came into force. An innovation was 
the splitting up of the sixth chapter 3 into three subdivisions 4 with 
respective headings, where "increase of capital" was dealt with in the 
first "subparagraph" 5 of the second subdivision, i.e. the one devoted to 
"Supply of Capital" 6. Textually this "subparagraph" covers ten sections 
which are in their contents much more elaborate than those corresponding 
to them in the HGB. 
The new AG § 149 corresponds more or less to the previous HGB § 278. 
An increase of capital is still considered as a form of alteration or 
amendment of the charter 7, and all the general rules on alteration of 
1. The best known statute containing a partial reform of the company law of the HGB 
was that of the 16th September, 1931. This "Notverordnung" was usually referred 
to as "Aktienrechtsnovella It received commentary by ;'i0Schmidt and H.and A.Pinner 
in : Staub's Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Nachtrag zur 12.und 13.Auflage, 
Berlin 1932 ; and in English periodicals by R.Rosendorff, "The new German Company 
Law and the English Companies Act ", in : JCL, vol.14, London 1932, pp. 94 ff., and 
vol.15, London 1933, pp.112 -116, and pp.242 -254. This author stressed the impact of 
Anglo- American Law on some of the institutions of company law, 
2. The counterpart of the British private companies (cf. supra p.8), the so- called 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung , or,abbreviatedly, G.m.b.H., were never 
provided for by the same statutory act. Cf. F.A.Mann, op.cit., p.228. 
3. "Alteration of the charter, Supply of capital, Reduction of capital ". 
4. G.: "Abschnitt", 
5. G.: "Unterabschnitt ". 
6. G.: "Kapitalbeschaffung ".Lit.: Heinrici, "Zur Frage der Kapitalbeschaffung bei 
Aktiengesellschaften ", in : G , vol.67, Berlin 1925, pp.353 ff.; Quassowski, 
"Formen der Kapitalbeschaffung ", in : "Festgabe für Schlegelberger ", Berlin 1936, 
11.377 ff.; A.slieland, "Kritisches zum Kapitel der Grundkapitalveränderungen nach 
dem neuen Aktienrecht ", in : "Zeitschrift für schweizerisches Recht ", vol.57, 
Basle 1938, pp3 ff, 
7. G. : "Satzur_hsánderungen ". 
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the charter 1 apply here too, unless special rules on increase 2 and 
corresponding rules in the charter provide for something different 3. Any 
alteration of the charter is invalid if it is contrary to the provisions of 
charter at the time of alteration 4, e.g. no item of the charter defined as 
being unalterable can be altered, even where there is a unanimous 
decision in favour of doing so. 
This section only mentions the increase of capital by issue of new 
shares 5, although it has been held in theory that here, and elsewhere, 
"new shares" means "new portions of membership" 6 and not necessarily only 
"new share documents" 7, and that an increase of capital by increasing the 
amount of the shares is admissible. AG § 149 (1) recapitulates the general 
rule of AG § 146 about the requirement of a three -quarters majority 8. As 
1. AG §§ 145 -148. 
There is no legal quorum requirement in the German Companies Act of 1937 ( "AG "), but 
special regulations are often to be found in the individual charters of companies. 
There is,besides, a decree requiring a quorum of one -third of the capital. This 
decree was introduced in the British Zone of Western Germany on 17th December,1946. 
Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, íesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesell- 
schaften auf Aktien, Berlin 1937, p.494 ; and Teichmann- Koehler, p.228, and 
pp. 366 ff. 
2. AG §§ 149 -158. 
3. The shareholders do n o t possess an inalienable right to demand the maintenance 
of the same amount of capital that existed when they became shareholders. 
Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, p.374. 
4. Teichmann_Koehler, p.366 (1). 
5. G. : " ... durch Ausgabe neuer Aktien". Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., 
pp. 495 ff.; Rauch, vol.I, p.16. 
6. G. : " Mitliedschaft ". 
7. Ritter, p. 479 ; T eichmann- Koehler, pp.373 ff. 
8, R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., p.496 ; Teichmann-Koehler, pp..368 ff. 
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mentioned above 1, a special quorum is not required. This can, of course, 
be altered by the charter 2, and additional requirements can be included in 
the charter, as e.g. about a special quorum. Class meetings and adequate 
notice in the agenda are provided for in the case of a multiformity of 
shares 3. A below- par -issue of new shares is still prohibited, but, in the 
case of an above -par -issue, the minimum price of the shares has to be stated 
in the resolution 4. Certain commentators have held that this function of 
the general meeting can be delegated to the board 5. 
AG § 149 (1) differs in some reoects from HGB § 278 (1)(first and third 
sentence). Contrary to the former regulation, it is not the fact itself 
that the former capital is fully, or almost fully, paid -up that is decisive 
for a further increase, but the possibility, or, perhaps, the probability, 
of the payment of the still uncalled or unpaid capital 
6 
A resolution in 
general meeting made prior to the time when the whole previous capital is 
fully paid -up is, however, valid. Conditional resolutions regarding 
increase are permitted 7. 
1. Cf. supra p. 160, note 1. 2. Compare with HGB § 275 (1). 
3. AG g 146 (2) and 149 (2). Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, pp.373 -375. 
4. AG § 149 (3). 
5. Ritter, p.480 ; Teichmann- Koehler, p.314. 
6. Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 375 -376. 
Contrary to Scots and. English Law, the prolonged existence of an un- called or unpaid 
capital is considered in German jurisprudence as being contrary to the basic principles 
of common law as regards companies, since, as has been asserted by Brodmann and 
others, a special type of shares linked with an obligation to make additional 
payments ( "Aktien mit Nachschusspflicht ") is thereby created. Cf. Ritter, p.480. 
In my opinion this point of view is erroneous, since there are in reality no 
additional payments provided for which would be beyond the figure the shareholders 
have initially subscribed fore 
7. Ritter, p.481. 
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AG 150, which concerns qualified increase, corresponds more or less 
to HGB § 279, though it differs textually from it 1. It provides that all 
the conditions of an issue of new shares for a consideration other than 
cash must be specified in the resolution. Contrary to the regulations of 
the HGB, previous and adequate notice of such a resolution must be given 
the agenda. The regulations concerning filing of the resolution on increase 
with the registrar 2 remained on the whole the same, though it is noticeable 
that fewer formalities 3 are required in this connection. Such a notificatbn 
has to state the amount of the not yet paid -up shares 4,and the reason why 
their payment has not yet been made 5. It is considered as not quite 
satisfactory for the company simply to declare in such a notification that 
the whole capital is called up 6, since that would not show the amount of 
the not yet paid -up portion of the capital. The registrar is entitled to 
refuse registration when it is apparent that the value of the increase for 
purchase of property, or for payment of services 7 is below the face value 
of the corresponding shares. 
8 
1. Teichmann-Koehler, pp. 377 -378. 
2. G. : " Handelsregister ". 
3. Previously (cf. Staub, p.490) the signatures of all the members of the board were 
required ; now, however, only such a number of signatures is required as is 
specified by the charter. 
Cf. AG § 70, and Ritter, pp.484 -485. 
4. G. : rückständige Einlagen ". 
5. AG § 151 (2). Cf. R.v.Godin and H.dilhelmi, Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und 
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien, Berlin 1937, p.502. 
6. Ritter, p.485. 
7. Cf. supra p. 53 and note 2. 
B. AG § 151 (3). 
i 
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The principles of successive formation 1 are strictly applied to 
increase of capital. The subscription itself is considered as a contract 
between the company and the subscriber 2. This contractual character is 
essential even for the relationship between the company and the share- 
holder who is entitled to acquire the new shares on the basis of 
pre -emption. 
Pre -emptive rights 3 are still considered as a part of the rights of 
the shareholder intrinsic to his status as a member. Contrary to American 
conceptions 4, the stress lies more on the obligation on the part of the 
company to allocate a certain amount of shares to existing shareholders, 
if they demand it. Since this obligation is linked with a time -limit of at 
least two weeks 5, even existinh shareholders have to go through the 
procedure of a formal subscription. Therefore, pre -emptive rights are 
under German Law in some way a privilege in that the subscription 
6 
is at 
first available to the existing shareholders 7, and only thereafter to the 
1. G. : " Stufengrúndung Successivgir_dung ". Cf. 2eichmann- Koehler, pp.379 -380. 
Cf. supra p. 53 and note 3. 
2. Ritter, p.486. 
3. G. : " Aktienbezugsrecht ". On the legal nature of pre -emptive rights in German 
company law see : 
R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., pp.508 ff.; R.Mueller- Erzbach, pp.92 ff.; Rauch, 
vol.'', pp.70 ff.; Teichmann- Koehler, pp.380 ff. Older literature is mentioned 
1prá p.153, note 6. 
It is curious to note that, contrary to American Law, the German term Bezugsrecht 
denotes rather only an individual right to demand the allocation of certain shares, 
and not a right to p u r c h a s e them, as it seems it should when we remember 
the primary meaning of "emptio ". Cf. supra p. 155, note 1. 
4. Cf. infra p.233 
, note 2. 5. AG § 143 (1) . 
6, G. : " Zeichnun_gsschein ". Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, p.382. 
7. It is worth while noting that this pre -emptive right becomes,as from the moment of 
the registration of the completed increase, an alienable right. Cf. AG§ 158, and 
Teichmann_Koehler, pp.381 and 387. 
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general public. Thus, the offer of an existing shareholder differs from 
the usual offer of any member of the general public in its priority in 
time. In this sense, it cannot be rejected, and these pre -emptive rights 
have almost peremptory force It is curious to note that in the case 
where the company, contrary to its obligations, allocates the shares to a 
newcomer and not to the existing shareholder to whom they should be 
allocated, such an allocation is, according to German Law, still valid, 
and the shareholder has merely the right of compensation for the damage 
caused through "non 
2 
-performance" and does not have the right to demand 
A 
a new set of similar shares '. 
The company may 4 exclude pre -emptive rights altogether but only in 
the resolution on the projected increase, and not prior to it 5. This 
exclusion can even be conditional, or indirect 6. The decision to exclude 
these pre -emptive rights requires the usual majority of three quarters 7 
1. Ritter, op.cit., p.490. 
2. G. : " Nichterfúllungsschaffen ". 
3. Ritter, p.490. 
4. However, the general practice is to exclude these rights, or, at least, to delegate 
them to a neutral trustee (usually to a bank) that allocates them later to the 
shareholders desiring these shares, or to persons other than shareholders. This 
delegation of pre -emptive rights to a bank is, again, an example of pre -emptive 
rights of non -shareholders. This neutral trustee has all the usual rights of a 
shareholder as long as the final allocation of the shares has not taken place. 
Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, p.383. 
5. AG § 153 (3) : " Das Bezugsrecht kann ... nur im Beschluss über die Erhöhung des 
Grundkapitals ausgeschlossen werden ". This word "only" ( "nur ") should mean that 
an exclusion in advance is illegal. Ritter (p.491) tries to explain it differently. 
6. Ritter, p.492. 
7. Cf. H.Trumpler, Die Bilanz der Aktiengesellschaft nach neuem Aktien- und Steuer- 
recht, Berlin 1937, p.211. 
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but the charter may provide for a greater 1 majority and other requirements 
too, e.g. a special quorum 
2. 
A promise of the company to allocate the new 
shares to a newcomer is invalid if it was made prior to the resolution on 
increase 3 and is valid a f t e r that only with the proviso that there 
might be a possible exercise of pre -emptive rights by some of the share- 
holders. 4 
The resolution in general meeting to increase the capital is merely an 
indication of the company's intention. The fact of a completed increase has 
to be therefore especially notified 5, but it is possible to link together 
both notifications 6, i.e. the notification mentioned in AG § 151 (1), and 
the notification of a completed increase. The formal entry by the registrar 
of completed increase of capital brings the increase into effect 7. All the 
details about the completed increase have to be set forth in the official 
announcement of the entry 
8 
Only after the completion of this entry is it 
permissible to issue new share documents, or interirh certificates 9 for the 
1. Contrary to AG § 149 (1), where the expression "other majority" (G. : " ...andere 
Kapitalmehrheit ") was used, this AG § 153 (3) - and, concerning conditional increase, 
AG § 160 (1) - spoke about a "greater majority" (G.: " . .irössere Kapitalmehrheit). 
This difference was not appreciated by Ritter (p.493, d ). 
2. Deichmann- Koehler, pp. 380 and 385. 
3. AG 154 (2). 
4. AG '§ 154 (1). Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, p.384. 
5. AG § 155. Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und 
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien, Berlin 1937, p.513. 
6. AG § 155 (5), This is identical with the former HGB § 285. Cf.Staub, p.505. 
7. AG § 156. This is a new regulation. Prior to that such an entry possessed merely a 
declaratory function, and did not legally constitute the fact of an increased 
capital. Cf. Ritter, p.497 ; Teichmann-Koehler, p.386. 
80 AG § 157, This is similar to the former HGB § 284 (4). 
9. G. : " Zwischenschein ". 
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new shares in the increased capital 1, but the subscriber becomes a 
m e m b e r of the company prior to that, i.e. at the moment of the 
formal entry by the registrar 2. Neither could the rights 3 attaching 
to the shares of the increased capital be transferred or dealt with 
prior to this entry. 
The next suparagraph 4 is devoted to a new institution within the 
framework of German Company Law - the conditional increase 5. It is, in 
its way, quite alien to the company law principles of Anglo-American Law, 
and it was once suggested that it was a purely German creation 6. Looking 
back, however, one comes to the conclusion that this juridical creation 
has proved to be rather abortive 7. The main purpose of this variety of in- 
crease was to vest in the holders of convertible bonds 8 the right either 
to exchange these bonds against newly created shares 9, or to subscribe 
1. AG § 158. 
3. G. : "Anteilsrechte ". 
5. Cf. supra p. 45. 
See also : Rauch, vol.I, p.18, and 
"The new German Company Law ", in : 
Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 387 -394. 
2. Teichmann-Koehler, p. 387. 
4. AG §§ 159 - 168. 
vol.II, pp. 55 ff.; Ritter, p.498 ; H.G.Tasse, 
"Bell Yard ", vol.20, London 1937, p.22 ; and 
6. H.W.Schmid, Die Erhöhung des Grundkapitals bei der Aktiengesellschaft, (typewritten 
thesis) Basle 1938, p. 84. 
7. A.Wieland ( "Kritisches zum Kapitel der Grundkapitalveránderungen nach dem neuen 
Aktienrecht ", in : ZSR, vol.57, Basle 1938, p.7 ) in 1938 did not recommend the 
introduction of this institution into Swiss Company Law. It did, however, 
influence a Hungarian draft on company law. Cf. Hallstein, p. 187. 
8. G. : "Wandelschuldverschreibung ". 
9. This right of the bondholders was called in German "Umtauschrecht ". 
Cf. : Heinrici, "Zur Frage der Kapitalbeschaffung bei Aktiengesellschaften ", 
in : G , vo1.67, Berlin 1925, p.379. 
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preferentially for new shares 1. From an economic point of view, this was 
only a palliative to the efforts of a company to attract new capital, since 
a new bondholder possessed not only the title of creditor, but the ability 
to become, either in exchange, or addit .Lonally, a shareholder. This 
conditional increase was created 2 merely to enable the company to satisfy 
the appetite of the bondholders for new shares, and it is so called in that 
the increase is conditional on the wish of the bondholders to become share- 
holders. The amount of conditionally increased capital cannot surpass half 
the amount of capital that existed before such an increase 3. The special 
resolution to increase capital in this fashion, i.e. "conditionally ", has to 
contain all details about the rights of the bondholders to exchange their 
bonds, or to demand the allotment of new shares. These rights have to be 
"inalienable" 4, and all later resolutions in general meeting on these metters 
of 
are considered invalid if they are contrary to this principle inalienabi- 
lity 5. Such a conditional increase of capital could be effected either in 
1. G. : " Bezugsrecht". These rights are in many respects (and not only terminologically) 
similar to the pre -emptive rights of shareholders, though it is curious to note that 
i 
the usual pre -emptive rights of the shareholders are legally excluded as soon as these 
rights (in connection with a conditional increase ) cone into operation. It 
was, however, stated by some of the authors that these are the pre -emptive rights 
that could sometimes be attributed to non -shareholders. Bondholders are, of course, 
not exactly shareholders. 
Cf. R.v.Godin and H.'7ilhelmi, Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften and Kommanditgesell- 
schaften auf Aktien, pp.520 ff.; Ritter, p.499 ; 2eichmann- Koehler, p.381. 
Cf. supra D. 56, note 3. 
2. The conditional increase was a result of an interim order of 1934. 
Cf. R.v.Godiri and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., p.518 ; H.2rumpler, Die Bilanz der Aktienge- 
sellschaft nach neuem Aktien- and Steuerrecht, Berlin 1937, p.120. 
3. AG § 159 (3). 
4. G. : " unentziehbar ". Cf. AG S 159 (1). See also : Heinrici, op.cit., p.376 ; 
Ritter, pp. 499_500. 
5. AG 159 (4). Cf. Ritter, p.501 ; Teichmann- Koehler, p.392. 
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favour of bonds issued simultaneously with or Drevio7sly to the date of 
increase, but, equally, it could be done in advance" too, i.e. in favour 
of future bonds, issued at a later 4ate 1. The majority required for the 
relevant resolution in general meeting is exactly the same as for a 
regular resolution on increase. The difference lies only in the provision 
that the charter may require a g r e a t e r majority 
2. 
Shares created 
and share documents issued on the basis of such a conditional increase are 
called "shares on demand" 3. Such a conditional increase can be at the time 
a qualified increase, i.e. for purchase of property, or payment for 
services 4, though it is actually possible only in the case where the bonds 
of a company have a very low price. Contrary to the normal increase, a 
conditional increase of capital is considered as completed and the capital 
as legally increased immediately on the issue of the "shares on demand" 5. 
The third subparagraph 6 is devoted to the authorized capital 7, which 
as an institution was also an innovation to German Company Law at that 
time 8 The term used in the heading of this subparagraph and at the 
1. Ritter, p. 500. 
2. Cf. supra p. 165, note 1. 
See also : Ritter, p.502. 
3. AG §§ 161 ff..:" Bezugsaktien ".Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., pp.527 ff. 
4. AG § 161 (1). Cf.R.v.Godin and H.Jilhelmi, op.cit., pp.526 ff.; Teichmann -Koehler, 
P. 392 (d). 
5. AG §§ 161 (2), 164 and 167. Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., p. 538 ; Ritter, 
P.503 (3) and p.507 ; Teichmann -Koehler, p.390. 
6. AG §§ 169 -173. 
7. G. : " genehmigtes Kapital ". 
8. H.G.Tasse, "The new German Company Law ", in : "Bell Yard ", vol.20, London 1937, 
P.22 ; Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 394 ff. 
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end of AG § 169 (1) - "GenehmiLtes Kapital" - obviously indicates the 
affinity with the "authorized capital" of Anglo- American systems of law , 
thou gh the terms themselves are not identical, and there are more 
differences than common ground if we compare German Law with, say, Scots 
and English Law. When speaking about a case of normal increase of capital, 
German Company Law does not mean that the amount of increase is the maximum 
which can be reached in instalments 2, though there are signs that, mainly 
under the influence of English Law, the aura of sanct_L'y surrounding the 
maximum figure in a resolution on increase is fading away considerably. In 
older law, the whole subscription for an increase was considered invalid if 
the figure aimed at wrki.s not reached within the set time limit. Now, however 
such a resolution may contain a clause providing that in any event the 
capital is to be considered as increased up to whatever figure has in fact 
been achieved by subscription 3. Thus, even in the case of a normal 
increase within the meaning of AG 149 -158, two figures could be mentioned 
together in the resolution : the maximum one, and the one actually achieved. 
1. F.A.Maun, "The new German Company Law and its background ", in : 
London 1937, p.236 ; Ritter, p. 508. 
2. It is curious to note that there was at least one attempt in the 
to introduce this institution of "authorized capital ", as it is 
American Law. While debating on a new Saxon Company Code in 1837 
that the capital item mentioned in the Statuten should be consid 
maximum, and that it could be collected in instalments. Cf. H. 
Entwickelung der inneren Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft im 
bis zum ADHGB, Stuttgart 1937, p.43. 
3. Ritter, p.487. 
JCL, vol.19, 
nineteenth century 
now known in Anglo- 
, it was suggested 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in this case too. An exclusion of pre -emptive rights could be effected by 
1 
2 the board . In case of a multiformity of shares the delegation clause 
has to mention all details about the grouping of the new shares, especially 
in the case when voteless preference shares were issued ,Similarly, an 
increase in this way may be at the same time a qualified one, provided 
only that the clause of delegation provides for it 4. 
Initially there was a great gulf between the basic conception of 
capital in German Law on the one hand, and in the Anglo- American systems of 
law on the other 5. German Law, like the majority of Continental systems of 
law, considered as the capital of the company the maximum amount of the 
shareholders' responsibility as an invariable figure, and as stated in the 
charter and in the balance sheet. There was usually very little difference 
between the amount of the nominal and the paid -up capital. But under the 
permanent influence of Anglo-American systems of law, the rigour of this 
German conception has been grdually weakening. Whereas both Scots and 
English Law largely neglect cases of increase within the framework of 
authorized capital 6, German Company Law still provides in all details for 
1. Rauch, vol.I, p.17, note 3 ; Ritter, p.510. 
2, AG § 169 (1). 
3. AG § 171 (2)(3). Cf. Ritter, pp.373 -375 and p.511 ; H.d.Schmid, Die Erhöhung des 
Grundkapitals bei der Aktiengesellschaft, nach deutschem and schweizerischen Recht, 
(typewritten thesis) Basle 1938, p.70. 
One has to bear in mind that the assent of the holders of the e preferential shares 
would have been essential in the case of a normal increase of capital too. This 
assent has to be sought for at the time of an alteration of the charter, when 
inserting there the clause of delegation. When, however, the delegation clause was 
already in the original charter, or - when the board decided to increase the capital 
within the framework of such an "authorized capital ", no assent of the preferential 
shareholders was needed. 
4. AG § 172 (1) . 
F. Cf. sUpra p. 72. 




the procedure that should be observed in such a case. Principles of 
"authorized capital" became apparent in German Law not only in the form 
of a rather limited delegation to the board, but also,as mentioned above 1, 
in the facility of inserting a clause in the formal resolution on increase 
stating that it is not essential to reach by subscription the figure set 
for this purpose, in which case whatever amount is actually subscribed 
would be considered as binding. 
The third and last subdivision of the sixth chapter of the new German 
Companies Act is devoted to Reduction of Capital 
2 
Here again are three 
"subparagraphs" : on the normal form of reduction 3, on a specially 
"facilitated" form of reduction 4, and on reduction by redemption 5. Any 
reduction is in principle considered as an amendment of the charter 
6 
AG 17j (1), which corresponds to the former HGB § 288, provides that 
a reduction of capital requires the usual three -quarters majority 7. The 
charter may, of course, provide for a greater majority, and for other 
requirements also, e.g. that of a special quorum. The general meeting is 
not entitled to delegate this power. In case of a multiformity of shares 
the same majority has to be obtained in all group meetings of the share- 
1. Cf. supra p. 169. 
2. AG F,< 175-194. Cf. Teichmann -Koehler, pp. 404 ff. 
G. 
: " ordentliche Ka Ditalherabsetzung ". 
4. G. : " vereinfachte Kapitalherabsetzung". Cf. R.Rosendorff, "The new German Company 
Law and the English Companies Act ", in : JCL, vol.15, p.249 ; H.2rumpler, Die Bilanz 
der Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin 1937, p. 208. 
5. G. : " Ka.italherabsetzun_ durch Einziehun: von Aktien ". 
6. Ritter, p. 516 ; Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 402 and 406. 
7. b.'J'rumpler, op.cit., p. 209. 
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holders. The proposed reduction has to be mentioned in the agenda 
1. 
Resolutions on reduction have to contain clamses concerning the background, 
the purpose, and the method of the projected reduction 2. AG § 175 (4) 
mentions explicitly only two ways in which a regular reduction can be 
achieved : either by diminution of the nominal amount of the shares, or by 
consolidation of the shares . Though the Af does not explicitly provide 
for the different types of reduction, as e.g. with and without repayment, 
by cancellation, or by diminishing of the liability concerning unpaid 
shares, they are all, nevertheless, possible under German Law, and are, 
indeed, met with in practice. 
German Company Law provides that diminution of the nominal amount of 
the shares is the normal method of reduction 4. Though this way is not 
expressis verbis mentioned in Scots and English Law, it is nevertheless one 
of the ways in which a reduction can technically be made 5. Consolidation 
of shares is also considered as a species of the diminution of the nominal 
amount 
6 
. Cancellation of whole shares, so comaion in Britain, was treated 
by German jurisprudence as a rather "uncommon" type of reduction, and 
referred to as "reduction by redemption" 
70 
1.AG§ 175 (2). 2. Ritter, p.516 ; Teichmann -Koehler, pp.403 ff. 
3. This latter way is, however, admissible only in the case where a diminution of the 
nominal amount of the shares is not possible owing to provisions about the minimum 
amount of shares. This is an item quite unknown in Scots and English Law. 
Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, p.409. 
4. eichmann- Koehler, D. 403. 5. Cf. supra p. 91. 
6. Ritter, p. 517. 
7. It could, however, be called "uncommon" only in contrast to the "common" or normal 
type of reduction( "ordentliche ")in the sense of AG 
§ 175 -181. In reality, it is 
one of the types most frequently in use. 
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The notification of the resolution for a reduction of capital is 
regulated in the same way as in the case of an increase 
1 
. The capital is 
considered as de jure reduced from the moment of the formal entry by the 
registrar of the resolution for reduction 2, but contrary to the procedure 
on increase 3, the capital is considered as reduced from the moment of 
registration of this f i r s t resolution for reduction, without any 
second resolution 4. Again, contrary to Scots and English Law, which now 
recognizes a far reaching right of the court to decide whether rules for 
the protection of the interests of the creditors are to be applied 5, 
German Company Law still sticks invariably to the old institution of the 
protection of creditors 6, though in one respect there is a remarkable 
simplification of the formalities : special advertisements and obligatory 
letters to the known creditors, calling them to file their claims, have 
been abolished This right of the creditors to demand either satisfaction 
or security 
8 
exists independently of whether it is a reduction with or 
1. AG §§ 151 (1) and 176. 
2. AG § 177. Cf. T eichmami- Koehler, p.411. 
3. AG § 156. 
4. Ritter, p. 518. 
5. Cf. supra pp. 95 -97. 
6. Teichmann- Koehler, p. 404. 
7. H.Trumpler, Die Bilanz der Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin 1937, pp. 209 and 216. 
8. Cf. supra p. 99 (2). 
Under the older German Law of the HGB, the creditors were not formally entitled to 
demand decurity (G.: "Sicherung, Sicherheit, Sicherheitsldstung "). "f. Ritter, p.521. 
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without repayment 1. The resolution for reduction, which is published by 
the registrar, has to mention this right of the creditors 2 and has to 
impose a time limit of six months 3 within which all the claims of the 
creditors should be filed. Payments to the shareholders, if any are 
provided for, can be made only after the lapse of this induciae of six 
months, and after satisfaction or security has been given to all share- 
holders who he v° notified their demands within the prescribed time4. 
As in Scots and English Law, the company is free to decide that a 
reduction by repayment does not necessarily mean a simultaneous diminution 
or extinction of the liability 5. Thus, an authorized capital may be 
retained above the level of capital. the opposite case is also 
possible, i.e. when the reduced amount is entirely composed of not yet 
paid -up shares 6. A mixture of both types is also possible 7. 
1. AG § 178 (3). 2. AG § 178 (1). 
3. It was formerly, under the HGB, a term of one year, known under the technical 
nickname "Sperriahr "(cf. supra p. 158). Now the more appropriate term " Sperrfrist" 
is used. Cf. R.v.Godin and H.1Jilhelmi, Gesetz aber Aktiengesellschaften and 
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien, Berlin 1937, D. 571 ; Teich_..anr, Koehler, p.408 ; 
H.Trumpler, op.cit., pp. 209 and 216. 
Zingg (p.45) notices that these periods of induciae are becoming shorter in 
Companies Acts everywhere and explains this as a means to cut down expenses. 
He thinks that the increasing facilities for avoiding interference by tne court 
serve the same purpose of economy. It is submitted that for these reasons the 
danger of contravening the interests of the creditors might not be too great any 
more. 
4. AG § 178 (2). 5. Cf. supra p. 108. 
6. Since such a manipulation is legally still a reduction of capital, the clause about 
the induciae of six months (AG § 178) has to be applied here also, and the share- 
holders continue to be liable for calls until all creditors who have notified the 
company about their claims have received either satisfaction, or security. 
7. Ritter, p. 522. 
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The next section 1 is devoted to the technical side of a reduction, 
namely the procedure leading up to the financial reduction, and consisting 
in, e.g. the exchenge of share documents 2, the overstamping or docketting 
of these documents, consolidation 3, or any other similar technical act. 
The company is entitled to ask the shareholders to hand in their previous 
share documents in order that they may be rectified 4. The company is 
entitled to threaten the forfeiture 5 of those share documents which are 
not presented or handed in on the company's instructions. However, the 
company is not obliged to forfeit these documents. i'he threat of forfeiture 
has to be mentioned in the announcement of the company 6 calling for the 
handing in of the old share dociments for exchange, docketting etc. It has 
been stated in this connection that the forfeiture of a share document does 
not automatically involve the end or alteration of the relationship 
between the owner of the forfeited shares and the company 7. 
1. AG § 179. 
2. The opinion - somewhat surprising - was expressed by some German jurists that in a 
case of a reduction of capital by diminution of the nominal value of the shares, a 
technical exchange of older share documents against new share documents bearing the 
new nominal value of the shares would be permissible only with the consent of 
a 1 1 the shareholders. Cf. Teichme.nn I.oehler, p. 410. 
3. "Consolidation" as one of the forms of reduction (AG § 175,IV,1) differs somehow 
from the technical procedure of a "joining" of share documents (AG § 179, I ) 
though the German text uses in both cases derivative forms from the same verb 
" zusammenlegen" (i.e. "to put together "). A third meaning was attributed to the same 
word when it was indicating a special contract - "Zusammenlegungsgescháft" 
(Ritter, p.524), i.e. an agreement about a putting together, or a contract between 
the company and the shareholders about the consolidation of the shares. 
Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., pp.574 ff. 
4. G. : " Berichtigun_g ". Cf. also AG § 67, and Ritter, pp.221 -223 and pp.523 -526. 
5. G. : " Kraftloserklárung ". The company possesses this right of forfeiture without 
any special resolution in general meeting. Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, p. 409. 
6. 
AG 
§ 179 (2). Cf, R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., pp.577 ff.; Teichmann- 
Koehler, p. 410. 
7. Ritter, p. 524. 
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When the number of shares handed in by the shareholder for exchange or 
otherwise is not sufficient for him to receive at least one share under the 
new scheme of the di vision of the company's share capital, the normal 
procedure is either to buy the necessary remainder of old shares, or to 
sell the superfluous old shares 
1 
Usually the shareholders ask the company 
to 1,uy or sell these shares on their behalf. In the case where a share- 
holier has failed to authorize the company to act on his behalf, the 
company has the same right to exact forfeiture 
2 
The declaration of 
forfeiture of such share documents is usually followed by the sale of the 
new s.nere documents which Should have been issued instea.d of the forfeited 
ones. The company sells these shares on account of their former owner for 
the official stock market price, but in the event of no official price for 
the particular shares being known, the sale is conducted by means of an 
auction 3. 
The normal procedure for notification of the completion of the 
reduction of the capital corresponds entirely to the procedure observed in 
connection with increase of capital 4. The difference lies, however, in the 
time from which the altered figure of capital comes into force 5. 
The A.G. implies that a reduction- cum -increase is feasible 
6 
This is an 
innovation. Unlike Scots and English Law, German Company Law has since 1923 
required the principle of a minimum capital, i.e. the principle that a 
1. hitter, p. 52_. 2. AG § 179 (1)(second sentence). 
3. öG 17) (3). This regulation corresponds to HGB § 290. 
4. áG§ 180 (1)(2) and 155 (1)(5). 5. Cf. supra p. 174. 
G. 2eichmann- Koehler, pp. 411 -412. 
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public company must have a share capital that cannot be lower than a 
certain sum stated in the Companies Act 
1 
. AG § 181 allows for the 
possibility of reducing the capital below this minimum figure provided that 
the general meeting decides simultaneously that the share capital should be 
increased again so as to reach at least the legal minimum figure 2. Such 
resolutions for reduction and increase 3 are, however, invalid, when they 
have not been filed with the registrar within six months from the time of 
their being made 4 There are, however, some situations where an extension 
of this time limit is made possible. Contrary to the previously mentioned 
rules on procedure 5, all three resolutions, i.e.for increase, (simultaneous- 
ly) for increase, and (again simultaneously) on the completion of the 
reduction - cum -increase, can in this particular case be linked together, and 
expressed in one single notification to the registrar 
6 
The next subparagraph 7 is devoted to a simplified or shortened form of 
1. This institution of a "ciinimum capital" was introduced into German Company Law only 
in 1923. Up till 1937 the minimum amount was 50,000 RM. After that, it was suddenly 
raised to 500,000 RM. After the currency reform of 1948, it was "altered down" 
to 100l000 DM. 
Cf. A.Duerinrer and M.Hachenburg, Das Handelsgesetzbuch, 3rd ed., vol.III, part 1, 
pp. 202 ff. ; F.A.Mann, "The new German Company Law and its background ", in : JCL, 
vol.19, London 1937, pp. 227 -228 ; Teichmann- Koehler, p. 20 (1). 
2. An increase of capital cannot be a qualified one when it is a part of a 
reduction -cum -increase. Cf. '$'eichmann Koehler, p.412. 
3. G. : " Diese Beschlasse .." (i.e. : "these resolutions "). 
4. In the sense of AG 155 or 180 respectively. 
5. AG §§ 155 (5) and 180 (2). Cf. supra p.165. 
6. AG § 180 (2)(in fine). 
Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, Gesetz aber Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesell - 
schaften auf Aktien, Berlin 1937, p. 582. 




Compared with the previous subparagraph, the main difference 
lies in the way of dealing with the projection of the creditors' interests2. 
this type of recduction could not be applied in all the cases where the 
normal type of reduction was possible. It is applicable only in the cases 
of a readjustment of capital owing either to losses sustained by the compa- 
ny, or to a revaluation of the assets 3, or in the case of recompletion of 
the legal reserve capital 4 . But these are not by any means the only 
pre -conditions of the "applicability" of this form of reduction 5, since 
it is o n l y in the case where the legal reserves are already 
exhausted 6, and o n 1 y (and that matters 1) when it is necessary 
to "replenish" these reserves with new capital that this type is of use 7. 
1, It is curious to note that by number of sections, and, to a lesser degree, by the 
length of these legal provisions, this "subparagliraph" surpasses by far the previous 
one where the "not- shortened" form of reduction is dealt with. It is really hardly 
possible to say that this Ls a s i m p l i f i e d form of reduction procedure. 
Cf. Ritter, p.528. 
It is worth while noting, besides, that AG 182 (2) refers to almost all sections 
of the previous "subparagraph ", and then, as well, to the following eight sections 
of this "subparagraph ". The sections about the protection of the creditors (e.g. 
AG § 178 ) are, however, n o t referred to. It may be said, perhaps, that every 
"simplification" demands an initial "ample" explanation of the situation. 
Historically this type of procedure was based on a law of 1931, published shortly 
after the very acute financial crisis of that time.Cf. A.Düringer and M.Hachenburg, 
op.cit., pp.47 -48 R.v.Godin and H,Wilhelmi, op.cit., pp. 586 ff.; Teichmann- Koehler, 
P.413 ; H.Trumpler, Die Bilanz der Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin 1937, pp.209 -210. 
2. Teichmann.- Koehler, P.412. 3. G. : " Wertminderung". 
4. Ritter, pp. 528 -529 ; Teichmann- Koehler, pp.412 -413 ; H.Trumpler op.cit., p.169. 
5. AG b 183 and 186. Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., p.590. 
6. Teichmann- Koehler, p. 415. 7. Ritter, p. 529. 
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This subparagraph is ius strictum, and therefore its contents and the 
sphere of its applicability could not be altered by the charte2 The 
resolution has to explain the reasons for reduction 2. Contrary to the 
ordinary procedure of reduction,repayments to the shareholders are here 
illegal 3. The background of this strict rule is easily explained when we 
remember that the readjustment of sustained losses is, in practice, the 
only case where use can be made of this type of reduction 4. A curious 
regulation provides that in the event of it appearing during the first 
two gears (following such an action) that the achieved reduction of capital, 
when brought about by means of a revaluation of the assets of the company, 
has been too great and will result in a new piling -up of reserves above the 
intended level, then the difference must be transferred b a c k to the 
legal reserve capital 5. Only after the lapse of these two years can the 
company pay the shareholders a dividend of more than 4% 6, but this can be 
done again only after the legal reserve capital has been refilled up to 
10% of the figure of the reduced ( "rump ") capital 7. A higher dividend can, 
1. Ritter, p. 529. 2. AG § 182 (1)(last sentence). 
3. AG § 184. Cf. R.v.Godin and H.; "Jilhelmi, Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Komman- 
ditgesellschaften auf Aktien, Berlin 1937, pp.590 -592 ; Teichmann -Koehler, p.415. 
4. Ritter, pp. 530 -531. 
5. AG § 185. Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., pp.593 ff.; Ritter, p.531 ; 
Teichmann -Koehler, p.416 ;I;L.Trumpler, op.cit., pp. 210 and 220. 
6. AG § 187 (2). This figure of 4% can be changed by a mutual decree of the Ministers 
of Justice and of State Economy. The modern editions of the AG still use the 
pre -1945 expression "Reichsminister' though, at least in Western Germany, the 
corresponding officials now hold differently styled titles of office. 
7. AG 187 (1). Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 416 -417 -. 
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however, be paid if all those creditors have been satisfied or secured 
whose claims existed 1 prior to the publishing of the registrar's 
announcement of the entry of reduction ; but these creditors must have 
filed their claims within six months after the publication of the annual 
report and the balance sheet 2. This provision replaced the procedure of 
creditors' protection, as it was known in AG § 178. This "simplified" form 
of reduction has another unusual feature, namely, it can be applied 
retrospectively to the foregoing business year 3, i.e. the reduced figure 
of capital may be inserted in the balance sheet of the year preceding the 
year of the resolution on reduction. Like the normal procedure , this form' 
can also be Bart of a reduction- cum -increase 5, and the privilege of 
retroacrive force applies to the increase as well 6.A qualified increase 
is, however, not possible in this case 7. The great advantage of this type 
of reduction lies in the ease of diminishing a negative balance at once 8. 
1. G. : " .. , vor der 
worden ti ;aren" . 
2. AG § 187 (1)(second 
Cf. Ritter, p.533 
Bekanntmachung der Eintragung des Beschlusses b e gründe t 
sentence). 
T eichmann- Koehler, p. 416 (2) . 
3. AG § 188. Cf. Ritter, pp.534 -535 ; Teichmann- Koehler, pp.419 -420 ; H.i'rumpler, 
Die Bilanz der Aktiengesellsc aft, Berlin 1937, p.217. 
4. AG §§ 182 -191. 
5. AG § 189 (1). Cf. Teichmann-Koehler, p.420. 
6. R.v. Godin and H.Wilhelmi, op.cit., pp.602 -604 ; Ritter, p. 536. 
7. AG § 189 (1)(second sentence). 
8. H.Trumpler, op.cit., p. 210. 
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The last subparagraph 1 is devoted to reduction by redemption 
2. 
A 
redemption can be either forcible or by purchase of the share by the 
company itself. The possibility of forcible redemption, i.e. of a redemption 
without the permission of the holder of that share, has to be stated in the 
charter, either in its original, or amended form 4, or, using a German 
phrase, "has to be born redeemable ". The procedure of a normal reduction, 
including the provisions of AG § 178 (2) on the protection of creditors, 
has to be applied here also 5, except where fully paid -up shares are put 
rat the company's disposal free of charge 
6 
or in consideration of a profit 
or a "free reserve" 7, provided that they have been shown in the balance 
sheet previously 8, but even then a resolution in general meeting is 
needed 9, though a simple majority is sufficient. 
1. AG `5 192 -194. Cf. R.v.Godin and H.Wilhelmi, Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und 
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien, pp.608 ff.; Teichmann- Koehler, p.421. 
2. The Aktienrechtsnovelle of 1931 (cf. supra p. 159, note 1 ) tried to introduce a 
special term for this type of reduction : "Ermássigung des Grundkapitals" (i.e. 
diminution of capital), in order to denote and stress the difference between a normA.7. 
or regular reduction and this type. This difference lay in two points é : concerning 
the modus of the protection of the interests of the creditors, and concerning the 
internal effect of the reduction. Cf. H.Trumpler, op.cit., p.211. 
May I submit that the idea. of this terminological innovation was a borrowing from 
Scots and English Law. Cf. supra pp. 88 -89. 
3. G. : " Zwanp.seinziehun ". Cf. W.Schmidt and. H.and A.Pinner, in : Staub's Kommentar 
zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Nachtrag zur 12.irnd 13.Auflage, Berlin 1932, pp.22 ff.elder 
Ger /m.literature 
: Hirschland, Einziehung von Aktien, Munich 1908. 
4. Ritter, pp. 538 -540; Teichmann- Koehler, p.422. 
5. Ritter, p. 541. 
6. 'W.Schmidt and H.and A. Pinner, op.cit., pp. 27 ff ; H.Trumpler, op.cit.,pp.211-212. 
7. G. : " freie Rücklage ". 
8. AG § 192 (3). Cf. Ritter, p.542 ; Teichmann- Koehler, pp. 421 and 424. 
9. 
AG § 192 (4). 
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German Company Law has acquired the peculiar fame of being the 
classical example where very minute and extensive provisions exist 
concerning r e a d j u s t m e n t of capital 1 Though Germany is 
perhaps not the first country 2 where special regulations have been needed 
to overcome the difficulties following a currency reform, or for a 
Gleichschaltung 5 of a newly acquired territory, there is no doubt that 
Germany's expansive policy and two economic breakdowns after two lost wars 
gave the most excellent background for an abundance of "readjustment" - 
legislation. 
1. Cf. supra pp. 60 -61. 
2. May I submit that all the countries that came into being by breaking up the 
Danubian Habsburg Monarchy, and by secession from Russia were with all probability 
the first ones where the need for readjustment of figures connected with share 
capital and the share amounts to the new currency introduced in these new states was 
an actual one. Thus, e.g. Estonia had to readjust her share capitals twice : in 1919 
and in 1928, Latvia published her first readjustment decree in 1921, etc. 
Nonetheless, Germany can claim the biggest collection of readjustment decrees either 
in connection with currency reforms, or owing to territorial changes in Central 
Eulq,e. The two main Acts about readjustment of capital were published in 1923 (the 
so- called Verordnung über Goldbilanzen) and in 1948 (the so- called DM- Bilanzgesetz). 
It was asserted by Rauch (vol.II,p.5)that the first of these two acts was drafted 
under a strong influence of French Law concerning the currency reform in the Saar, 
The re- incorporation of the Saar in 1935, the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, 
the incorporation of the Sudetian borderlands in 1938, the re- incorporation of the 
iviemelland in 1939, the absorption of the Republic of Danzig in 1939, the annexation 
of Eupen and Malmedy in 1940, the extension of the German territory eastwards in 
1941, the agglomeration of Alsace in 1941, and of Lorraine in 1942, etc.,etc.,gave 
good reason every time for readjusting the capital of the local limited companies to 
the currency regulations of the absorbing German Reich. 
Lit. : K.Ballerstedt, Kapitalgewinn- and Ausschüttung bei Kapitalgesellschaften,eine 
gesellschaftsrechtliche Betrachtung, Tubingen 1949; W.Beuck and. H.Paret, D -Mark ZTm- 
stellunósbilanz in Recht and Praxis, Hamburg 1948; W.Beuck, Kommentar zum D- Markbi- 
lanzgesetz, 2nd ed., Cologne 1949; K.Geiler, A.Stehlik and H.J.Veith, D- Markbilanz- 
gesetz,Kommentar, Munich 1950; E.Kretz, "Deutsches Aktienrecht, Reichsmarkeróffnungs- 
bilanzen and Umstellungsmassnahmen im Lande Österreich", in : ZHR, vol.106, Stutt- 
gart 1939, pp. 137 ff.; Teichmann- Koehler, pn. 332 -342, p.346 (note 33), pp.401 ff., 
and pp. 593 -625. 
3. I wonder whether the usage of the German word Gleichschaltung has now acquired a 
better standing than the old English term "equalization ", since its continued use by 
and vol.IX, p.554. Toynbee ? Cf. Toynbee, vol.VIII, p.589, 
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The most peculiar situation arose in connection with the last currency 
reform in Germany in 1948, which differed from almost all previous cases of 
similar currency reforms in one very important point, namely, there was 
practically no parity declared between the old RM and the new DM 1.Therefoie 
a readjustment of share capitals and of the nominal values of shares could 
not be undertaken on the simple mathematical basis of one equation, but had 
to be based on a completely independent balance sheet, where all the assets 
were revalued and the remaining capital calculated without any fixed 
relation to the balance sheet of the pre- reform period. In view of the very 
heavy war -time and post -war losses 2 of the companies, special temporary 
accounts were created ' in order to help the companies to overcome the 
difficulties connected with a general readjustment to the new economic 
circumstances. These special currency reform regulations also contained 
various points directly or indirectly connected with alteration of capital. 
Though these provisions of German Company Law have to be considered as 
A 
temporary legislation 4, and although. they are in many ways reminiscent of 
legislative preambles or prefatory rules on application of a new law, two 
1. Though it is beyond the framework of this study to pay tribute to the phenomenon of 
German economic rebirth after 1948, it should nevertheless be mentioned that this 
currency reform might have been one of the financial elements that made this 
recuperation possible. Cf. T.Balogh, Germany : an Experiment in "Planning" by the 
"Free" Price Mechanism, Oxford 1950 ; H.C.Wallich, Mainsprings of the German revival, 
Oxford 1956. 
2' G. : " Kriegs- and Kriegsfolgeschäden ". 
3. The most popular accounts were : the capital depreciation account (G.:"Kapitalent- 
wehrtun:.skonto ") and the lost capital account (G.: "Kapitalverlustkonto ") . 
Cf. K.Geiler, Stehlik and Veith, op.cit., pp.274 and 284, p.314 and passim. 
4. Cf. infra 0.186 , note 4. 
achievements can nonetheless be put to their credit, namely, it was 
stressed that these a aerations of capital were neither a form of increase, 
nor reduction ;nor of a reduction- cum -increase, but were merely an amend- 
ment of the figures of the capital and of the shares, and, secondly, that 
no duty whatsoever was payable in connection with such a manipulation 
2 
This law provided special rules on the valuation of the assets and 
liabilities of the company. If, according to these rules, after the 
deduction of all the liabilities from all the assets of the company, a 
residue of more than DM 50,000 could be stated in the opening balance 
sheet expressed in the new currency, the company would be considered as 
of constituting capital at least at the level of the 
newly created legal minimum of DM 50,000 The main purpose of this 
special law of 21st August,1949, 4 was to find a remedy for those numerous 
cases where the company was unable to find this sum of DM 50,000 as a 
residue of such a calculation. If a company was able to constitute such an 
initial share capital of at least DM 50,000, this act was called the final 
resettlement of capital 5 and such a company had to proceed after that 
1. K.Geiler, Stehlik and Veith, D- Markbilanzgesetz, Kommentar, Munich 1950, p.351. 
2. Rauch, vol.Il, p. 47, note 3 ; Teichmann-Koehler, p.332. 
3. Cf. supra p. 178, note 1. 
The minimum amount of capital of DM 100,000 provided for in 7 of the AG of 1937, 
as amended after the currency reform, does not apply to the old companies, which, 
according to § 44 of this special law, have the privilege of starting under the new 
currency regime with merely half of that amount - DM 50,000. 
Cf. K.Geiler, tehlik and Veith, op.cit., p.260 ; Teichmann- Koehler, p.332 (15). 
4. G. : " Gesetz aber die Eröffnungsbilanzen in Deutscher Mark und Kapitalneufest- 
setzung" (officially published in : "Gesetzblatt der Verwaltung des vereinigten 
Wirtschaftsgebietes ", 1949, Nr. 32, pp. 279 ff.), usually called the DM- Bilanzgesetz. 
5. G: " endgültige Neufestsetzung des Grundkapitals ". 
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strictly in accordance with the provisions of the AG of 1937, none of the 
privileges of this special law having any effect upon them 1. In the 
opposite case, however, the similar act of constituting the new share 
capital of the company was called the preliminary resettlement of capital , 
and the companies had the full amount of all the possibilities and 
privileges provided for by this special law. 
The above mentioned temporary accounts 3 served as counterbalances of 
the fictitious figure of a share capital of DM 50,000, that had to be 
mentioned among the company's liabilities in its balance sheet. If the 
company in a set time 4 managed to equalize these accounts 5, the company's 
preliminary resettlement of capital would turn automatically into a final 
one. In the opposite case, the company would have to look for other means 
of financing itself (in order to fill up its capital to the required 
amount), or, else, to wind up, or convert itself into another type of 
1. 2eichmann- Koehler, p. 332. 
2. G. : " ... vorlá,ufige 1 eufestsetzung des Grundkapitals". 
3. Cf. supra p. 184, note 3. 
4. A time limit of three years was provided for in case of a "regular" capital 
depreciation account, and six years for an "irregular" one.Cf. Teichmann- Koehler, 
p.355. 
Since this special law set 31st December,1951, as the final date before which all 
companies should resettle their capital and bring it into line with the new currency 
it is possible that some of the "irregular" capital depreciation accounts may still 
(1956) be left on the balance sheets of German public companies. This law, as a 
whole, has, however, lost its relevance already, since the adjustment of capital to 
the new currency has been achieved almost completely. 
5. K_.Geiler, Stehlik and Veith, op.cit., n.274 and pp.314 ff. 
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companies, e.g. a G.m.b.H. 
1 
. Another purpose of this special law was to 
avert a too quick distribution of dividends, since, after the currency 
reform, that could easily enough endanger the creditors' interests 
2. 
A capital depreciation account could in no case be higher than a half 
of the figure mentioned in the balance sheet as share capital; this account 
had to be the only reserve account. No distribution of dividends was 
allowed while such an account was still on the balance sheet among the 
assets of the company 39 and to counterbalance this, veto -like irrevocable 
pre -emptive rights 4 were attributed to all the shareholders concerning all 
new shares J. 
Instead of, or parallel to the capital depreciation account the - 
company possessed another means of counterbalancing a fictitious nominal 
figure of share capital, namely, to built up a special lost capital account 
This account could be built up by sums representing the war -time and 
post -war losses of the company, but could in no case be higher (in the new 
currency) than the figure of the previous shar,, capital (in the old curren- 
cy)7. In the case where only a lost capital account was built up, the 
shareholders had only a "normal" type of pre -emptive rights 8, and not the 
irrevocable ones, as would have been the case when a capital depreciation 
account had been opened, either with or without a lost capital account. 
1. K.Geiler, Stehlik and Veith, D- Markbilanzgesetz, Kommentar, Munich 1950, p.305. 
2 Teichmann-Koehler, p.333. 
4. K.Geiler,Stehlik and Veith, p.285. 
6. Ibid. , pp. 277 ff. 
3. K.Geiler, Stehlik and Veith,op.cit.,p.271 
5. Ibid.,pp. 284 V. 
7. Teichmann- Koehler, p.336. 
8. K.Geiler, Stehl4k and Veith, op.cit., p.285. 
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A resettlement of capital, though it was still considered as an 
amendment of the charter, did not require a qualified majority, or any 
voting in class or group meetings, even if the charter provided for that 1. 
However, a minority of 101 of the share capital was considered sufficient 
to achieve a postponement of a decision on such a resettlement of capital. 
í'he usual majority, provided for in the charter, was, however, required_ as 
soon as this bacame not merely an aci; of resettlement of capital in the 
sense of this special law but at the same time an increase of capital by 
issuing new shares or otherwise 2. Similarly, the usual majority and the 
usual voting in class or group meetings was required to alter the rights 
of the shareholders 3. A special procedure for docketting 4 the share 
docum4nts with their new nominal value was provided for 5. This special 
law provided also for special regulations concerning those cases of 
increase or reduction which were decided but not yet filed prior to the 
date of currency reform (21st June,1948), or in the time between the 




2. K.Geiler, Stehlik and Veith, op.cit., p.260. 
A qualified increase was, however, impossible in this particular case. 
Cf. supra, p. 181. 
3. Teichmann- Koehler, p. 358. 
4. Cf. su ra pp. 176 -177. 
5. Teichmann -Koehler, p.342 (26). 
6. K.Geiler Stehlik and Veith, op.cit., p10.440 ff. 
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6. S w i t z e r l a n d . 
It was only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that a 
unification of Swiss Law could be achieved. Up till then the Swiss cantone 
each had their own legal systems. Swiss cantonal law of that time could. be 
divided into three groups of legal systems 1: those influenced by French 
Law 2, those belonging to Bernian. Law 3, and those belonging to the Law of 
Zurich 4. The Swiss Code of Obligation of 1881 
5 
was the first federal 
Swiss Law, and amongst other matters it dealt with the questions of Company 
Law 6. partial reforms of it were achieved in 1917 7 and in 1919 but in 
1937, to some extent under the impact of the German Companies Act, a quite 
new system of company law was adopted. 
1. A.Egger, "Schweiz ",in : "Rechtsver l.Handwörterbuch f.Zivil- und Handelsrecht", (ed. 
by F.SchleLelberger) vol.I, part 1, Berlin 1927, p.227. 
2. These were the cantons of Geneva, Vaud, Neuchatel, Valais, Fribourg and Ticino. The 
first two of these cantons were also famous for their own peculiarities in their 
approach to legal questions. 
3. These were the cantons of Berne, Lucerne, Aargau and Solothurn. The influence of 
Austrian Law was apparent here. 
4. The cantons of Zurich, Schaffhausen, Zug, Grisons, Glaris, Nidwalden, St.Gallen 
and Thurgau. 
5. Lit.: G.Bachmann, "Aktiengesellscgaft (Anonyme Gesellschaft) und Genossenschaften ", 
in : "Das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht "(ed.by ..Schneider and Fick),Zuacich 1915; 
Th.Guhl, Das neue Aktiengesellschafts- und Genossenschaftsrecht der Schweiz, Zurich 
1937 ; J.Haberstich, Handbuch des schweizerischen Obligationenrechts, two vol., 
Zurich 1887 ; H.hafner, Das schweizerische Obligationenrecht, 2nd ed.,Zurich 1905 ; 
A.Schneid:.r and H.Fick, Das schweizerische Obligationenrecht, 2nd ed., Zurich 1883; 
V.Rossel, ianuel du droit civil suisse, vol.III, Lausanne (s.a., after 1911). 
6. 
CO 612 -677. 7. the Federal Law of 25th September,1917. 
8 The Federal Laws of 8th July,1919, and of 26th December,1919. 
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The peculiarity of Swiss Law in general is that it exists in three l 
authentic texts, according to the number of the three official languages 
of the federal state of Switzerland. One of them is German, and it is 
generally recognized that German is in most cases the original language of 
drafts that later become statute law, though, officially, all three texts 
are considered as equal 2. Nevertheless, linguistically, syntactically and 
terminologically this Swiss German 3, as a legal language in Swiss Federal 
Statute Law, differs in many ways both from the legal German of Germany,and 
the legal German of Austria. The simplicity, elasticity and brevity of form 
in Swiss German is an asset which should not be overlooked. The impact of 
German Law on Swiss Law would only have been of technical interest, if the 
linguistic mastery of expression of the Swiss text did not make of the 
Swiss Code an achievement which in its brevity and elasticity 4 towers high 
above the level of its German model. One has to bear in mind that Swiss 
Company Law in particular is an achievement, since the Swiss managed to 
adopt alien ideas without at the same time importing exaggerated machinery 
to supervise the economic life and the investing activities. To a certain 
extent therefore, Swiss limited companies resemble the private companies of 
this country much more than the public ones. 
1. The equality of the fourth Swiss language - Romansh - was recognized only in 1938, 
but it did not affect the constitution. 
2. It still happens now and then that these three texts are not quite identical. 
Cf, infra p. 198, note 2 ; p.199, note 1 ; p.200, note 2 ; and p. 206, note 6. 
The comparative edition by G.Wettstein ( "The Swiss Federal Code of Obligations ... ", 
Zurich 1928) unfortunately enough did not cover Company Law. 
3. The abbreviations SF and SG in footnotes of this chapter indicate the Swiss French 
and the Swiss German terms in legal texts. The latter ones are by no means identical 
with those used in Germany. 
4. AEgger, op.cit., pp. 229 and 231. 
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The Swiss Code of Obligations of 1881 was undoubtedly written under 
some influence of Austrian Law 11 and of some of the German reform acts of 
o 
the seventies `.1he 26th chapter of this Code was devoted to company law 3. 
Only the following points concerning this 1881 Code need now be mentioned : 
An increase of capital 4 was considered as a type of alteration of the 
charter 5, and the only conceivable mode of increase was by increasing the 
number of shares 6. The issuing of a prospectus in connection with an in- 
crease became obligatory only after 1919. Repayments in case of a reduction 
of capital 7 were treated analogously to those in the case of winding up 8, 
1. I.e. under the influence of the ADFGB which remained in force in Austria up to 1938. 
2. Hamburger, p.82. 
3. CO §§. 612 -677. Cf. V.Rossel, Manuel du droit civil suisse, vol.Ill, pp.662 ff.and 
pp.722 ff.; A.Schneider and Fick, Das schweizerische Obligationenrecht, Zurich 1883, 
pp.44 -6 -497. 
4. Lit.: .d.Buechler, Die Erhöhung des Grundkapitals mit Ausgabe von Gratisaktien nach 
schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, Berne 1926 ; E.Folliet, Le bilan dans les socibts 
anonymes au point de vue juridique et comptable, Lausanne 1920 ; H.Sigrist, Die Er- 
höhung des Grundkapitals im schweizerischen Aktienrecht, Zurich 1930 ; H.Strguli, 
"Veränderungen des Grundkapitals der Aktiengesellschaft nach dem schweizerischen 
Obligationenrecht ", in : ZSR , vol.14, Basie 1895, pp.1 -58. 
5. G.Bachmann,"Aktiengesellschaft (Anonyme Gesellschaft) und Genossenschaften ", in : 
"Das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht"(ed.by A.Schneider and Fick),Zurich 1915, 
p.104 ; V.Rossel, op.cit., p.679 ; A.Schneider and Fick, op.cit., p.459. 
6. G.Bachmann, op.cit., p.105 ; Buechler, p. 3 and passim ; E.Folliet, op.cit., 
pro. 98 ff.; Rauch, vol.I, p.69, note 3 ; V.Rossel, op.cit., p. 662 ; Scherrer, 
P. 59 ; H.Strguli, op.cit., pp. 24 -34. 
7. Lit.: R.Cu6net, De la reduction du capital social dans les sociêtés anonymes, 
Montreux 1925 ; T.Guhl, "Die Herabsetzung des Grundkapitals bei der Aktiengesell- 
schaft", in : "Schweizerische Aktiengesellschaft ", vol.6 (1934), pp. 179 ff.; 
H.Strguli, op.cit., pp. 40 ff. 
8. CO 670. Cf. G.Bachmann, op.cit., pp.218 -219 ; Hamburger, p.84 ; E.P.,i"uller. Kani- 
ta.lhere.bsetzung bei der Aktiengesellschaft, Berne 1938 ; V.Rossel, op.cit., pp.662 
and 722 ; A.Schneider and Fick, op.cit., p.490 ; H.Strguli, op.cit., pp. 46 ff. 
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and a decision in general meeting was necessary to this end 1. Similarly to 
Scots and English Law of to -day, this Code of 1881 required no legal mini- 
mums for shares or the share capital 2. The charter could provide for a 
special majority that might be higher than the legal requirements of votes 
for a windin: up. In case of a multiformity of shares special class meetings 
had to be summoned to partisdpate in this decision. :l'he system in which 
reduction of capital was treated in older Swiss law was not quite satis- 
factory. The notions "repayment" and "reduction" were considered as being 
opposite to each other It was possible to reduce the uncalled capital by 
extinguishing or reducing the liability of the shareholders 4. 
The new Swiss Companies Act came into force on 1st July,1937 5. The 
Swiss Code remained, though there were important modifications, in its 
former style 6. The leitmotif of these modifications was the protection of 
the shareholder, and, especially, perhaps, the small shareholder. In the 
middle of the thirties a new element in the form of "protection of enter- 
prise" 7started to rise to the surface, and, although far from being as 
1. Cuenet, p. 14. 
3. E.M.üller, op. cit . , p.5 and note 1. 
4. Cuenet, pp. 57 ff. 
5. Cf. the Federal Latin dLtQa 18th December, 1936. This Act comprise the third part of 
the Code des Obligations ( §§ 552 -926). It is quoted in this study from its French 
text. Cf. C.,J.and A.Rossel, Code Civil Suisse et Code Federal des Obligations, 
6th ed., Lausanne 1943. 
There is a vast literature on the Swiss Company Law of 1937. Cf, e.g. : 
F.W.Bürgi, "Die Aktiengesellschaft", in : "Das Obligationenrecht" (ed.by Búrgi, 
Egger, Gutzwiller and others),part 5b, Zurich 1947/53 ; A.Siewart, "Die Aktienge- 
sellschaft", in : "Das Obligationenrecht" (ed.by Búrgi etc.),part 5a, Zurich 1945 ; 
T.Guhl, Das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht, Zurich 1944 ; J.de Steiger, Le droit 
des societes anonymes en Suisse, Lausanne 1950. 
6. LBossard, Die Reserven der Aktiengesellschaft im neuen Obligationenrecht, 
Berce 1940, 11.59° 
7. G. : '+ Unternehmenschvtz ". 
2. Ibid., p.56. 
_1 C?3_ 
accentuated as in the legislative acts of totalitarian countries, it left 
its traces on all regulations about the protection of shareholders. Further 
developing. the trends so well known in Article First of the Swiss Civil 
Code, this stress on his protectable interests enhanced the status of the 
shareholder into what might be called a "faithful entrepreneur of his 
company ". It may seem at first glance that this was a retrograde step 
towards the rather "personal" relations of a partnership. A more close 
scrutiny, however, reveals that the shareholder is in no way transformed 
into an actual entrepreneur, but that the quality of a "faithful entre- 
preneur" is applied to him auoad the interests he may claim as protectable. 
Thus, only those of his interests would continue to be protectable (in the 
case, let us say, of a prospective alteration of capital) which would be 
his interests if he was considered as a "faithful entrepreneur ". The 
result is a double- headed regulation ; the protection has to serve two 
aims at the same time : to protect the small shareholder from actions of 
the "ruling and governing shareholders" on the one side, and to protect the 
whole community of shareholders by elevating the "enterprise" as the central 
and chief object of protection on the other side. 
One of the most favoured means of this protection of the enterprise 
were the regulations about an obligatory creation of reserves 
1. 
Concerning 
alteration of capital, however, this would work out a rule of inter- 
1. i'his idea was formerly known in German and Italian Law. 
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pretation in cases where a shareholder claimed that a proposed alteration 
would harm his individual rights, his "acquired" rights, or his special 
interests. Thus, in the light of this recent development of Swiss Law, a 
shareholder would be able to insist on the harmfulness of an intended 
alteration of capital when the interests presumably affected by the 
alteration are such interests as a shareholder "qua faithful entrepreneur" 
or partner would have had. The aim of this regulation is to limit any 
selfish victory of private individual interests over those of the enter- 
prise . 
A few very laconically 2 expressed sections of the new Swiss Companies 
Act are devoted to the question of increase by issuing new shares 3 ; the 
following three sections 4 deal with the issue of preference shares. Phese 
regulations on increase are to be found among the sections of the First 
Chapter 5 of the Companies .act, merely as the third and fourth subdivision 
of the 11th, or "L ", division of the First Chapter. 'his eleventh division 
has an unusual heading : "The Protection of Shareholders and of the Share - 
capital" 
6 
Its second subdivision is on "alteration of the charter ", the 
third on "issue of new shares ", and the fourth on "issue of preference 
1. E.Bossard,Die Reserven der Aktiengesellschaft im neuen Obligationenrecht, Berne 
1940, p. 61. 
2. A sketch on the laconic style of the Swiss Companies Act of 1937, as far as it 
concerned the provisions on alteration of capital, was made by A.Wieland ( "Kriti- 
sckës zum Kapitel der Grundkapitalvergnderungen nach dem neuen Aktienrecht ", in : 
ZSR 
, vol.57, Basle 1938, pp.46 ff.). A crtique of the system of the provisions 
of the Swiss Companies Act was made also by Scherrer (p.40 and passim). 
3. CO , 650_653. Cf. Scherrer, p.40. 
4. CO 654 -656. 
5. 
SP 
: " Chapitre Premier ", SG : "Erster. Abschnitt ". 
6 Sp 
: "Protection des actionnaires et du. capital social ", SG : "Schutz der Aktionsre 
und des Grundkapitals" . Cf. Scherrer, p.40 and note 5. 
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shares ". These are the main dedes materiae of the Swiss Companies Act of 
1937 on increase of capital 1. 
An increase of capital by increasing the nominal value of the shares is 
now considered valid, since the provision of the former (18611 section 
614 (2) has now been abolished 2. It is, however, still questionable whethim 
and in what cases a higher majotity or quorum (and, perhaps, even the 
unanimous decision of all the shareholders) is required 3. This leaves the 
way open for an increase by capitalization of the reserves and surpluses, arfi 
by issuing Brats shares 4, things that were almost if not quite incon- 
ceivable under older Swiss Law 5. An alteration of the nominal value of the 
shares can, besides, be effected by an accumulation or consolidation of 
smaller shares into one bigger one, or by splitting up of a bigger share 
into several smaller ones 6, A consolidation becomes imperative when the 
1, Lit.: W.Scherrer, "Die Kapitalerhöhung bei der Aktiengesellschaft ", in : "Festgabe der 
Basler Juristenfakultät zum schweizerischen Juristentag ", Basle 1942 ; H.W.Sch.mid, 
Die Erhöhung des Grundkapitals bei der Aktiengesellschaft, (typewritten thesis) Basle 
1936 ; A.äieland, "Britisches zum Kapitel der Grundkapitalveränderungen nach dem 
neuen Aktienrecht ", in : ZSR , vol.57, Basle 1936, pp. 1 -50. 
2. Rauch, vol.', p. 69 and note 3 ; Scherrer, p.41 ; ESchucany, Kommentar zum schwei- 
zerischen Aktiengesetz, Zurich 1940, p.65 ; A.Siegwart , p.163, pp.180 ff.; pp.384 ff 
3, Scherrer, p. 69. 
4E.Bossard, op.cit., p.174 ; F.'V.Bürgi, pp.115 and 128 ; F.Reyrenn, "L'incorporation 
des reserves au capital social et le probléme de l' imposition des 
actions gratuites 
en Suisse ", in : "Melanges drétudes offerts d Folliet et Hensch ", Geneva 1945 ; 
Scherrer, pp, 44 ff,; pp.49 ff.; 55.59 ff.; P. 68, and pp.72 ff.; 
J.Senarclens, Les 
reserves des societes anonymes, Geneva 1943 ; Siegwart, pp.380 ff.; 
Steiger, pp.292- 
293 ; G.M,Wettstein, Die nicht voll eingezahlte Aktie, Aarau 1946, 
r.46. 
5. Buechler, p.23 ; Rauch, vol.I, pp.70 ff. 
6. It is curious to note that such an accumulation requires 
the sanction of the share- 
holders whose shares are to be consolidated (CO 
§ 623,I1), but not a splitting up. 
Cf. G.M.'1ettstein 
, op.cit., p.14. 
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nominal value of shares slides below the legal minimum 
1. 
The possibility 
of an increase of capital that would be partly an increase by issue of new 
shares, and partly by increasing the nominal value of the shares, is quite 
conceivable in Swiss Company Law 
2 
The analogy between tile formation of a company and an increase of capi- 
tal is still followed in the Act 3, though for at least twenty years pre- 
viously legal opinion had regarded the analogy as inept 4. Thus, similar to 
the procedure for company formation, the provisions on successive formation 
(CO §§ 629 -637) and on simultaneous promotion are equally applicable to 
the increase of capital too 6. As far as increase is concerned, the main 
difference between successive formation and simultaneous promotion lies in 
the possibility, in the case of the latter, of doing in one meeting all 
1. G.M.Wettstein, op.cit., pp.99 ff. Cf. infra p.203, note 2. 
2. Scharrer, p.67. 
3. Cf. U.Geilinger, Die erschwerten Beschlüsse der Generalversammlung der Aktiongre, 
Aarau 1948, p.48 ; Schwrrer, pp.5L and 56 ; Steiger , p.294. 
See also : CO ô 650 (1). 
4. The main motive of Swiss jurists in protesting against the use of this analogy was 
to stress the fact that during the formation of a company the separate legal entity, 
which it afterwards becomes, is not yet in existence, and, therefore, "the company" 
cannot be a party to its own formation. But the fact that a company contemplates an 
increase of capital presupposes that the company as such has been broug_:t into 
existence and therefore possesses in every respect its own juridical personality, 
being thus capable of having its own opinion and of playing its own role in all such 
processes. Cf. Siegwart, p.385. 
5. CO § 638. SF : " Fondation simultanée ". Though unanimity is renuired for a 
simultaneous promotion, this does not apply to an increase of capital by a 
simultaneous promotion. Cf. U.@eilinger, op.cit., p.86, note 15 ; Steiger, p.295. 
Cf. also supra p. 53. 
6, U.Geilin7 er, op.cit., p.86 ; Schucany, p.65 ; Siegwart, p.385. 
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that usually has to be done as regards successive formation in two general 
meetings. Thus, in this single meeting everything can be included ; viz : 
the publication of the prospectus 1, the subscription to the new sharey 2, 
7 
and the payment for these shares The analogy between formation and in- 
crease applies also to the provision that at least 20% of the share has 
to be paid immediately after the subscription 4. 
the resolution in general meeting on increase of capital has to be 
treated, as before, as a resolution on alteration of the charter 5. The 
shareholder has neither the irrevocable right ( "droit acquis") to demand 
the maintenance of the previous amount of capital, nor, conversely, is he 
under any obligation to participate in the increase . Unlike German and 
Italian Law, Swiss Company Law does not contain the provision that an 
increase is only possible after the previous capital has been fully, or 
almost fully, paid up 7. Section 651 specifies the contents of the 
Prospectus. Swiss Company Iaw provides also for a shortened form of 
prospectus 8, which differs from the standard form not so far as its 
1. Scherrer, p.54. 2. A.Brauen, La souscription d'action,Neuchatel 
1928. 
3. This increase by simultaneous promotion has become now in Swiss practice the 
normal way of proceeding. Cf. Schucany, p.66 ; Steiger, p.295. 
4. GM.4Pettstein, Die nicha voll eirngezahlte Akzie, Aarau 1948, pp.46 -47. 
5. The unalterability of the charter is still much stronger in Swiss Law than in 
German Law. Swiss Company Law has no provision entizling the administration to 
"adjust" the charter in minor cases, as is allowed in Germany (AG § 145). 
Cf. Steiger, p.287. 
6, n°Mueller, Kepitalherabsetzung bei der Aktiengesellschaft, Berne 1938, p.11 ; 
Siegwart, p.148 ; Steiger, pp. 294 and 300. 
7. Scherrer, p.65 and note 29 ; Siegwart, p.379 ; Steiger, p.293. 
3. 
SP 
: " bulletin de souscription ", SG : " Yeichnungsscheir_". 
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contents are concerned, but in the technical way in which the conditions of 
subscription are laid out in the document 1. This also applies, of course, 
to the procedure concerning increase of capital : a separate formal 
document, called the "prospectus" is no longer obligatory provided that the 
contents 2 _r.equired for such a document are adequately inserted in a less 
formal document, called "bulletin de souscription"or " Zeichnungsschein" 3. 
Though the term is not used explicitly, Swiss Company Law recognizes the 
institution of "authorized capital" 4. 
Pre -emptive rights are provided for in the Act 5. It is admissible for 
either the charter, or the resolution on increase of capital to contain an 
arrangement that is different from that provided in the Act 6. Thus, pre- 
emptive rights can be abolished too 7, but in the event of the charter 
mentioning pre -emptive rights expressis verbis (in implement of the 
statutory provisions of this CO § 652 ), they could, of course, be abolished 
or amended only in the way provided for an alteration of the charter, and 
n o t without the consent of the shareholders 
8 
If the shareholders liish 
1. Schucany, p. 36 (3) . 
2. Only the French text (neither the German, nor the Italian ) mentions in the last 
sentence of CO § 651 that the names of all the promoters ( "les noms de tous les 
fondateurs ") should be included in the text of such a "bulletin de souscription ". 
Cf. V.,J.and ..Rossel, Code Civil Suisse et Code Federal des Obligations, 
Lausanne 1943, part II, p.215, note 1. 
3.CO §§ 631 and 651. 
4. Lit.: R.von Salis, Das autorisierte Kapital, Zurich 1937 ; Siegwart, pp.385 ff.; 
Steiger, p.296. 
5. CO § 652. Cf.Scherrer, p.54 ; H.W.Schmid, Die Erhöhung des Grundkapitals bei der Ak- 
tiengesellschaft ..., Basle 1938,pp40 ff.; Steiger, p.299. 
6. This different arrangement, could, of course, attribute these pre -emptive rights to 
a cuite separate circle of persons, even perhaps to non. -shareholders. 
Cf. H."1.Schmid, op.cit., p.43 ; Steiger, p.299. 
1. Scherrer, p.55. s 8. Schucanv, p. 69. 
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to use their pre- emrtive rights 1 they have to proceed in the usual war, 
and have to subscribe for the new shares and pay for them . A shareholder 
who has not been asked is entitled either to object to the issuing of the 
new shares, or, in the case where this has already been done and the notice 
has been filed with the registrar, to claim compensation. 
There are no special provisions in Swiss Law about qualified increase 
The resolution in general meeting on the increase of capital, and the 
resolution in general meeting stating that the whole procedure has been 
completed 4 have to be filed with the re.;i_strar 5. The new shares are valid 
only from the moment of the registration of the completed increase. 
It is not necessary that the nominal amount the new shares should. be the 
same as the old ones 6. However, a below -par -issue of the new shares is not 
admissible 7. The general meeting is entitled (in the framework of the 
procedure provided for an alteration of the charter. ) either to issue the 
new shares as preference shares, or to convert the already issued ones into 
1. SG : " jeder .Aktionar ", the Italian text : " ogni azionista". 
However, the French text has it differently : "chaque associé" (i.e. "every member "), 
though otherwise the French text generally uses actionnaire for shareholder. 
2. Schucany, p.68. 3. }1. d.Schmid, oD.ci t. , p.49. 
4. ris mentioned above (cf. supra pp.196 -197), both these resolutions can be put 
together in one, i.e. expressed uno flatu. 
5. CO § 653 (1). 
6. Scherrer, p.53. 




If, however, there aleady is a class of preference 
shares, a new class of preference shares with even higher rights (- compared 
to those attached to the older class of preference shares -) 2 can be creates 
only when a resolution to that effect is passed both in the class meetings 
of those shareholders of preference shares whose rights might be affected 
by such a creation, and, also, in the usual way in the general meeting of 
a 1 1 5 the shareholders, unless the charter provides otherwise 4. 5.655 
provides for the qualified quorum that is necessary in general meeting to 
pass the resolutions either creating new shares as preference shares, or 
converting the existing ones into preference shares. The quorum required in 
this section os of at least two 656 (2) indicates that 
1. Unavoidably, this can concern only a part of the older shares, since otherwise 
(i.e. if a 1 1 the previous shares had been converted into preference shares) there 
would be no difference between shares at all. The existence of preference shares is 
always an indication of a multiformity of shares. 
An alteration of the contents of the shareholders' rights in a 1 1 the shares 
could therefore in no circumstances create a "preference ". 
Another possibility, however, is to convert the older shares into preference shares, 
and also issue new shares which would have the same amount of rights that were 
hitherto attached to the older ones. Cf.Schucany, pp.70 -71 ; Siegwart, p.408'; 
Steiger,pp.297 ff. 
2. SF : " ... it ne peut être 6mis de nouvelles actions qui les primerais ", the German 
text has it, however, differently : " .Vorrechte gegenüber den bereits bestehenden 
Vorzugsrechten .. ". Cf. Schucany, p.71(4). - 
3. SF : " . d'une assembl@ generale de tous les actionnaires" ; SG : " .. sámtliche 
Aktionnäre ". 
It is questionable , however, whether this is a quorum requirement for such a 
general meeting. Sciucany (p.71) refers to a meeting of a 1 1 the shareholders 
also in the case of the creation of a new class of preference shares when no higher 
rights, but only similar or lower rights are contemplated. Therefore, it would seem 
that there is no need to summon the special class meetings of the preference share- 
holders. 
4. co § 
65,1 (2). Cf. T.Guhl, Das schweizerische Obligationenrecht, 3rd ed., p.452 ; 
Steiger, p. 2q7, 
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preferential rights may concern the rights on dividends 1 (either with or 
without the right to draw a dividend for the period prior to the creation 
of these new shares), the right to receive a preferential payment in the 
event of a winding -up 2, and preferential pre -emptive rights in the case 
of a further increase of capital 3. 
The same extreme and welcome economy of expression is found also in 
the sections of the Swiss Companies Act which are devoted to the question 
of reduction of capital 4, since only four very short sections deal with 
it. They are, besides, the most laconic ones in their way. The placing of 
these sections is most curious from the point of view of system. Unlike 
German, Spanish and Swedish Company Law, there is in the Swiss Companies 
Act no chapter, or, at least, no group of sections, covering together the 
1. Cf. also CO § 675. 2. Cf. also CO § 745. 
3. Though not mentioned explicitly in this place, Swiss Company LPw allows for 
preference shares where the Preferential rights consist only in privileges 
concerning vote. Cf. CO § 693, and V.,J.and A.Rossel, Code Civil Suisse et Code 
Federal, des Obligations, Lausanne 1943, part II, p.216, note 3 ; Schucany, p.72 
and pp.124 -125. 
A quite different situation arises when the charter adopts the principle that every 
share, irrespective of its nominal value, has the same amount of voting strength. 
Thus, shares with a smaller nominal value become, comparatively speaking, preference 
shares. Cf. Scherrer, p.77. 
4. Lit. : E.Bossard, Die Reserven der Aktiengesellschaft im neuen Obligationenrecht, 
Berne 1940, pp.172 ff.; B.Mosimann, Die Herabsetzung des Grundkapitals bei der Ak- 
tiengesellschaft und ihr Einfluss auf die wohlerworbenen Rechte des Aktionärs, 
Zurich 1938 ; E.M ller, Kapitalherabsetzung bei der Aktiengesellschaft, Berne 1938; 
M.Staehelin, "Zur Frage der Sicherstellung bei der Herabsetzung des Aktienkapitals ", 
in : ZSR , vol.57, Basle 1938, pp.234 -272 ; &.Wieland, "Zur Kapitalherabsetzung der 
Aktiengesellschaft nach dem revidierten Obligationenrecht ", in : ZSF. ,vol.60, Basle 
1941, pp.1 -38 ; B.Zingg, Der Gläubigerschutz bei der Herabsetzung des Aktienkapitals 
Aarau 1940. 
5. co §§ 732-735. 
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two main types of alteration - increase and reduction - or treating them 
side -by -side 1. Similar to Scots and English Law, there is a special chapter 
o 
on Reduction ` - the fourth of the Swiss Companies Act - , while the 
regulations on increase, as mentioned above 3 are tucked away in the 
middle of the first chapter 
This chapter on reduction contains a comparatively great amount of 
innovations 4. In its general outline, features parallel with Scots and. 
English Law, and with later developments in German Company Law, can be 
observed, especially concerning the protection of creditors This chanter 
applies to all cases of reduction, except that of a reduction- cum- increase6. 
A lowering of the ceiling of the authorized capital 7 w i t h out any 
alteration of the issued capital is considered as being a normal reduction, 
but a diminution of the reserves is, however, usually not so condidered 8 
A reduction of the uncalled capital by extinguishing or reducing the 
liability of the shareholders is considered as possible 9, though some 
doubts are expressed about the validity of extinguishing a liability if it 
1. Scherrer, p.40. 
2. It is, as a matter of fact, one of the shortest, though not the shortest, of the 
eight chapters which form together the 26th "title" (CO 620 -763) of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations. As mentioned above (cf. supra p. 191), this 26th "title" is 
the Swiss Companies Act of 1937. Cf. Scherrer, p.39 and note 1. 
3. Cf. s 
P. 194. 
4. Scherrer, p.39 ; Schucany, p.172 (1). 




732 (1). Cf. E.Mflller, op.cit., pp. 8 ff.; Scherrer, r.48. 
7. Cf. supra p. 106, note 3 ; p. 108 and note 3 ; and p. 175. 
8. Steiger, n.302, note 2. 
9' `1.7: -. Wet tstein , Die nicht voll eingezahlte Aktie, Aarau 1948, p.98 and passim. 
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concerns uncalled capital out of a qualified formation, or out of a 
qualified increase 1. In no case can the capital be reduced below the 
legal minimum 2, This is a provision quite unknown in Scots and English 
Law , and also in older Swiss Law 5. It seems that under the influence of 
Swiss jurisprudence the old point of view which considered every reduction 
as being at least partly perhaps a winding up process was dropped in the 
Swiss Companies Act of 1937 4, but the decision in general meeting on 
reduction is still deemed to be a resolution on alteration of the charter 
unless it is a reduction -cum- increase without any alteration of the sum of 
the share capital '. Technically, a reduction uan be achieved either by 
diminution of the nominal value of the shares 6, or by diminution of the 
number of shares. There are only two types of reduction provided for in the 
Act of 1937 7 : 1) a reduction of capital in order to rectify a negative 
balance sheet due to losses 8, and 2) a reduction due to other causes. 
1. Alfred Wieland, Die verschleierte Apportgrtindung in Theorie und Praxis des 
schweizerischen Aktienrechts, Balse 1949, p.35. 
2. CO §.§ 621 and ?32 (5). Under the Swiss Companies Act of 1937 the minimum capital of 
a limited company is constituted at SFr.50,000, and the minimum amount of a share at 
SFr.l00. Prior to 1937, however, there were no legal minimums required. 
Cf. Siegwart, p.173. 
3. Cf.su ra p.178,note 1; p.185,note 3; and p. 192.. 
4. E.Muller, Kapitalherabsetzung bei der Aktiengesellschaft, Berne 1938, pn.2 and 72. 
5. Such a reduction -cum -increase can be effected only in the form of an issue of new 
shares (cf. CO §§ 650 -656). See Siegwart, p.382. 
6. Siegwart, p. 182. 7. Schucany, p. 173. 
8. CO § 735. SF : "Si pour sup-primer un exc@dent;passif constaté au bilan et resultant 
des pertes "; SG : " zum Zwecke der Beseitigung einer durch Verluste entstandenen 
Unterbilanz ". This type of reduction has in Swiss Law one particular feature,namely, 
the reduction becomes legally effective only with the registration of the reduced 
capital, and not with the de facto "watering" of the capital assets of the company. 
Cf. W.Schmid Das feste Grundkapital der Aktiengesellschaft, Aarau 1948, p.143 
' and note 5a ; G.M.Wettstein, op.cit., p.97 ; A.lieland, "Kritisches zum Kapitel der 
Grundkapitalveránderungen nach dem neuen Aktienrecht ", in: ZSR, vol.57 (1938), p.12. 
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The first of these two types is unthinkable with a repayment, and 
therefore the procedure of satisfying or securing the creditors is not 
needed 1, provided that the amount of reduction is equal to the amount of 
company losses, or surpasses it only in order to facilitate an equal subdi- 
viding of these losses among the shares of the company 2 Though it seems 
that such a reduction is in reality merely areadïusleent of the official 
capital item of the }-élance sheet to the present actual situation, and, 
therefore should be regarded as an obligation on the side of the company 
to readjust the capital accordingly to the proper level 3, a resolution 
in general meeting is still considered as essential. 
The second type of reduction may be with or without repayment 4. The 
first case applies to a reduction In order to bring an unemployment of 
capital to an end 5. Such a reduction may also take the form of extinguishing 
the shareholders' liability 
6 
The latter case covers reduction by re- 
demption of shares acquired by the company itself 7. 
An unusual feature of Swiss Company Law is the participation of a 
neutral body of approved auditors 8 in the procedure prior to the formal 
1. Steiger, pp.302 ff. 
2. Schmid, p.111 ; Schucany, p.177, Zingg, p.44. 
3. Cf. suaá P. 39. 4. Schucany, p.173. 
5. G.,;.Wettstein, Die nicht voll eingezahlte Aktie, Aarau 1948, p. 98. 
6. Cf ssu --pes p. 202. 
7. CO § 659 (1). Cf.A.Nieland, "Die Unvereinbarkeit des Erwerbs eigener Aktien mit dem 
Einlage - Rückzahlungsverbot ", in : ZSR , vol.56, Basle 1937,pp.202 -206. 
8. CO 732 (2). SF : " syndicat de revision ou une saciète fiduciaire", SG : " Revi- 
sionsverband oder ... Treuhandgesellschaft ". It appears that there exists an 
officially recognized list of about 35 9.pproved firms of auditors which a_e 
entitled to undertake such or similar tasks. Cf. '.Mtzl.ler, op.cit., p.9 ; 
Steiger, ppa Kapitel ... ", op.cit., pp.16 ff. 304 -305 ; A.Wieland, "Kritisches zum 
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resolution in general meeting on reduction of capital. This applies also 
to the case of a reduction in order to rectify a negative balance sheet 1. 
Similar in its oddity is the provision that a representative of the body 
of auditors has to be present at the general meeting where the question 
of a reduction of capital is on the agenda 
2. 
A threefold publication in the official gazette is needed 36 Besides, 
publication in a manner provided for in the charter of the company 4 is 
also required by section 733 5. The opportunity has to be given to all 
creditors to demand satisfaction or security 6 within two months following 
the third official publication in the official gazette 7. This publication 
is necessRary even in those cases.where the books of the company do not 
1. Schucany, p.173. 
2. CO § 732 (2). There is some parallelism between this provision and a suggestion 
made some time ago (cf. supra p.110 ) in this country that a nominal share in each 
company should be held by a special trust in order to have a centralized supervision 
of all national investments in this type of companies, 
3. The official title of this periodical is : SF : " Feuille officielle suisse du 
commerce "; SG : " Schweizerisches Handelsamtsblatt ". Cf. E.Müller, Kapitalherab- 
setzung bei der Aktiengesellschaft, 1938, p.9 ; G.M.Wettstein, op.cit., p.98. 
4. Schucany (p.174) asserts that a threefold publication is obligatory in the 
non -official paper too. This is not, however, evident from the text of this section. 
5. E.Bossrad, Die Reserven der Aktiengesellschaft im neuen Obligationenrecht, 
Berne 1940, p. 172. 
6. SF 
" ... sue les créanciers annoncés ont été désinteressés ou garantis" ; SG : "Be 
friedigung oder Sicherstellung". There is, unfortunately enough, no strict rule about 
the method of collecting these securities, as there has been in German Law. 
Cf. F.Marguerat, Les droits des créanciers d'une société anonyme en cours 
d'existence Lausanne 1935 ; Steiger, p.316 ; A.Wieland, "Zur Kapitalherabsetzung 
der Aktiengesellschaft nach dem revidierten Obligationenrecht ", in: ZSR,vol.60,p.12. 
7. Bresumably the creditors are entitled to notify their claims prior to this "third" 
publication as well. Any notification by a creditor (even an indirect one) is satis- 
factory if expressed not later than two months after the third official publication. 
Cf. Schucany, p. 175 (4) 
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indicate the existence of any creditors 1, but it is not necessary when it 
is a reduction by rectifying a negative balance sheet owing to losses 
sustained by com-_,any 2. Only after the expiry of an induciae 
3 
of these 
two months 4, and after the satisfying or securing of the creditors, who 
have notified their claims, can the reduction be executed 5, and filed with 
the registrar 
6 
There are, however, some Questions unresolved about the 
amount of the security due to the creditors. According to the opinion of 
the majority of Swiss authors 7, the creditors are entitled to demand the 
full amount of the intimated claims, but Müller 
e 
thinks that a proportional 
security should be considerdd as sufficient 9. Schucany 10, however,thinks 
that only those creditors are eligible whose claims existed 
11 
at the time 
1. Schucany, p. 174 (2) . 
2. CO § 735. Cf. also : E.Mi?ller, op.cit., p.1O. 
3. Cf. suìra D. 143, and p. 175 and note 3. 
4. This provision is in its character similar to that in the German Companies Act 
of 195 ?. Cf. Schucany, p. 174 ij). 
5. SF : " La réduction du capital social ne peut étre operèe ..." 
SG : " Die herabsetzung ... darf ... durchgeführt ... werden ." 
6. she words "with the registrar" are omitted in the French text of the Act. 
7. Schucany, p.177. 
8. E.Müller, op.cit., p. 30. 
9. I.e. , proportionally of the amount of reduction to the total sum of the capital. 
10. Schucany, p. 175 (2) . 






Though the older Italian Law was mainly based upon the Napoleonic 
Codes 1, modern Italian Company Law shows an increasing impact of German 2 
and Swiss Law. The Commercial Code of Sardinia -Piedmont of 1842 was 
extended to the greater part of Italy in 1865 3, and then replaced by the 
Codice di commercio in 1882. A series of amendments concerning Company 
Law was introduced in 1935 4, but in 1942, quite unexpectedly, a major 
change in the whole legal system took place. Up till then Italy had 
belonged to the countries where private law was separated into two codes, 
the civil and the commercial. A change of the legal system took place, 
possibly under the influence of Swiss Law, where the division into two 
codes was unknown and the very notion of commercial law was rudimentary. 
The whole of company law was now incorporated into the new Codice Civile 
of 16th March,1942 One has to agree that, considered as new ideas set 
1. The first introduction of the Napoleonic Codes in the various parochial states of 
Italy took place between 1804 and 1809. Only Sardinia and Sicily remained untouched. 
The Napoleonic Codes remained in force after 1815 only in Lucca, but, following a 
second wave of reception, Sicily? Sardinia- Piedmont and two other states promulgated 
new commercial codes which were mainly based on provisions of the Napoleonic Codes, 
Cf. Arminjon-Nolde-Wolff, vol.I, pp.141 ff. 
A.de Saint Joseph, Concordance entre les codes civils etrangers et de Code 
Napoleon, four vol., Paris 1856, does not cover commercial and company law. 
2. Levy, p. 221 ; Rauch, vol.I, p. 89. 
3o L.Mossa, "Italien" , in : " Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch far Zivil- und 
Handelsrecht" (ed.by F.Schlegelberger), vol.I, part 1, Berlin 1927, p.104. 
4. Rauch, vol.I, pp. 89 ff., vol.II, pp.190 -191. 
5. Following some ideas of Fascist origin, Company Law was at first (1941) incorporated 
into the Libro del lavoro , and, then, changing the numeration of the sections only, 
into the Codice Civile. Cf. Rauch, vol.I, p.92, note 2. 
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down in the form of a new system, this reform was a distinct achievement, 
and it can also be said that this reform was conducted to stress the 
dominant role of the planning state. The leading class of public companies, 
it should be noted, was to be supervided and conducted in a special way 1. 
The older Italian Company Law 2 was mainly based on French Law. A system 
of "concessions" applied equally to companies with a capital of over 
5 million lire, and to all increases above this level 3, unless the amount 
of increase was less than a quarter of the former capital and the company 
was formed more than two years prior to that. As in Scots and English Law, 
there were no provisions about the minimum amount of capital and shares. On 
the other hand, there remained the quite antiquated provision that the value 
of all shares should be equal 4. A quorum of three quarters, and a majority 
of half of the represented capital was required for any amendment of the 
charter, or increase, or reduction, or reintegration of the capital 5. 
1. Cf. supra pp. 34 -36. See also : Arminjon- Nolde- Wolff, vol.', pp.144 -145 ; 
Rauch, vol.II, p.3b. 
2. Lit.: F.3ing, La Societe anonyme en Italie, Paris 1887 ; A. de Gregorio, Della 
society, e delle associazioni commerciali, Turin 1938 ; L.Mossa, Diritto Commerciale, 
vol.', Milan 1937, ppo171 ff.; V.Salandra, Societd commerciali, Turin 1938 
C.Vivante, Trattato di diritto commerciale, Turin 1893. 
3. Hamburger, p. 97 . This amount of 5 million lire was later (in 1935) reduced to 
one million. Owing to this reduction of the nominal amount requiring a concession, 
there was, of course, a resultant increase in the number of cases where the 
"supervision" of the investment market became necessary. 
4. L.Mossa, op.cit., p. 194. A similar rule was provided in Latvian Law. Though there 
was no provision in Italian Law admitting or rejecting "no -par- value " -shares, it could 
be deduced that since the principle of the fixity of the capital was provided for, 
and since the number of shares had to be mentioned too, there was practically no 
place for such type of shares. 
5. Codice di Commercio, 1882,Art. 158, part 1 (4)(5). Cf. Rauch, vol.I, p.87. 
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An unusual provision was that in the case of an increase the absent 
and dissenting shareholders were entitled to leave the company 1, receiving 
the value of their shares in proportion to the assets of the company as 
shown in the last balance sheet prior to the increase 2. This right was 
abolished in 1935 3. An increase of capital could be effected either by 
issuing new shares, or by increasing the nominal amount of all shares 
equally 4. Italian jurisprudence recognized even then that an increase 
could be effected by a transfer of the reserves or other funds, or by a 
revaluations, and this type of increase had received the special name of 
"internal increase" 6. As in German, Swedish and Swiss Law, it was quite 
usual in Italy too to issue fractional scrip certificates 7 where an issue 
of gratis shares was impossible on the basis of an exchange of an equal 
amount of new shares against old ones 
8 
In the case of a reduction an 
induciae of three months was provided for 9. 
Z. It. : Diritto di recesso. 
2. Art, 158 (2), 
3. Rauch, vol.I, p.87, note 2. Cf. infra pp. 243 -244. 
4 L.Mossa, op.cit., p.214. 
5. It. : "rivalutazione". 
6. Rauch, vol.', pp.86 -87, and p.88, note 4 ; A.T eofilato, "Aumenti interni di capitale 
nelle societá anonime ", in : "Giurisprudenza e dottrina bancaria ", vol.13 (1941), 
Pp. 269 ffe 
7. It. : "buoni frazionari ". 
8° Cf sarA p. 1?7, and infra pp. 258 and 260. 
9 Hamburger, pp. 98-99. 
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The new Codice Civile in its provisions on company law 1 follows a 
clear laconic style which is reminiscent of the text of the Swiss Code. 
Less than a dozen very short sections are devoted to the question of 
alteration of capital, seven of them dealing with increase , and only three 
with reduction. An issue of new shares can be made only when the prevbus 
capital is wholly paid up 2. Subscription to the increased capital, and 
payment of at least three tenths of the nominal amount of the subscribed 
shares is the normal mode of procedure. The French principle of "souscrip- 
tion integrale" 3 is still followed, i.e. the shareholders are not bound 
by their subscriptions when the projected amount has not been reached, but 
the resolution on increase may bear a different provision `. Qualified 
increase is mentioned shortly ; a special clause on "increase of capital by 
means of a transfer of credit" refers simply to the appropriate article 
where a qualified formation by way of a transfer of a credit is dealt with. 
The provisions on pre -emptive rights 
6 
are comparatively more detailed. 
Italian Law provides for the proportional right of the shareholders to 
acquire the new shares. Legally this is rather an obligation on the side 
of the company to offer these shares 7. The shareholders are entitled to 
1 Lit.: A.Brunetti, Trattato del diritto della società, vol.II, Milan 190, pp.514 ff; 
A.Graziani, Diritto delle societá, Naples 1952, pp.210 ff.; G.C.Fri, Commentario 
delle codice civile ( a cura di A.Scialoja e G.Branca), Rome 1951, pp.574 -595 ; 
G.Luther, "Die Neugestaltung des italienischen Privat- und Wirtschaftsrechts ", in : 
"Zeitschrift f.ausl.und Internationales Privatrecht ", vol.13, Berlin 1942, 
pp. 638445., 
4 Art. 2438. 
3. 
It, 
: " ... 6 integralmente sottoscritto ... " 
4. Art, 2439. 
50 It, : mediante conferimento di crediti ..." 
6. Ita 
: "Diritto di opzione ". 7. It. : " devono essere offerte in opzione ". 
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acquire these shares within a period of not less than fifteen days after 
the appropriate publication in the official gazette 1. These pre- emptive 
rights do not apply to cases of a qualified increase 2, and can, besides, 
be excluded or limited by an appropriate resolution, provided only that 
members 3 representing more than half of the total capital have voted in 
favour of the restriction or abolition 4. An increase of capital by transfer 
of reserves or special funds in order to issue gratis shares, or in order 
to increase the nominal amount of the shares already issued is provided 
for 5. As in German Law, provision is made for only a very restricted fora 
of authorized capital 6, set in the form of a delegation of the power to 
increase to the board of directors. This delegation has to be used within 
one year's time and within a previously fixed amount ; and it can be 
expressed either in the original charter, or in any later resolution on the 
amendment of the charter. The rules about the registration of the resolution 
on increase are more or less on similar lines with those in German and 
Swiss Law 7. There is a strict difference in procedure in the reduction 
1. Art. 2441. 
2. This exception has some parallel in American Law. Cf. infra p. 233, note 3, 
and p. 235, note 2. 
3. Italian Law uses both expressions : "shareholders" ( "azionisti ") and "members" 
( "soci ") without paying overmuch attention to a possible difference. On a similar 
inconsistency in Swiss Law see supra p. 199, note 1. 
4. It is stressed in this section that the same majority is also applicable in the 
case where the resolution has been passed in a "second" meeting. 
5. Art, 2442. Gratis shares should not be issued as a new type of priority or 
preference shares. Cf. Rauch, vol.l, p. 92. 
6. Art. 2443. 
7. Art . 2444. 
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of the "exuberant capital" 
1 
and the lost capital 
2 
An induciae of three months is provided only for the first case, 
Theoretically, a resolution on reduction of such exuberant capital could 
be passed only if not one creditor had opposed it, but in practice the 
decision of the Court may overrule any opposition of creditors, provided 
only that the company can give an efficient guarantee 3. Unlike other 
systems of law, Italian Law requires a loss of one third of the capital 
before the company is obliged to convene a general meeting in order to 
check its financial situation, and to reduce 4 the capital accordingly 5. 
Unlike Scots and English Law, the new Italian Law provides for a special 
amount of capital. A below this possible only 
in the case of a simultaneous increase which would at least bring the 
capital back to the level of the minimum 
6. 
It. 
" capitale esuberante ..." 
4 Art. 2446. 
3. It. 
: " idonea garanzia". 
4 It. : " ridurre ..." 
5. It is curious to note that so long as one speaks about a factual loss of capital the 
Italian Law uses the expression "diminution" ( "capitale 6 diminuito"), but as soon 
as the official resolution has been passed "reduction" ( "riduzione" or "ridurre "). 
6. Art. 2447. 
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H. U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a . 
It is as yet quite impossible to speak in terms of a completed 
unification of American `°ompany Law, though there have recently been 
considerable efforts to achieve such unification The draft of the Model 
Business Corporation Act, which was a result of studies undertaken by the 
Corporation Law Committee of the American Bar Association and was adopted 
in 1951, has, perhaps, been the latest of these attempts 
2. 
At present 
every state has its own legislation and its own jurisprudence, as it always 
has had, and therefore the richness of material and the number of varieties 
is enormous. Indeed, it is not even possible to find unification within the 
basic terminology. The term "private corporation" covers all that we 
understand by "limited companies" in Britain 3. The -words "share" and 
"shareholder" are sometimes but not always replaced by "stock" and 
"stockholder ". Instead of "memorandum of association" and "articles 
of association" the American terms "articles ..e" or "certificates of 
1. Cf. H.W.Ballantine, "Problems in drafting a Modern Corporation Law ", in : "American 
Bar Association Journal ", vo1.17 (1931), Pp.579 ff.; E.M.Dodd, "Federal Corporation 
Act, Preliminary Draft prepared by the Corporation Law Committee of the American Bar 
Association ", in : YLJ, vo1.53 (1944), PP.812 -818 ; Levy, pp.205 and 707;F.A.Wright, 
"Current developments in statutory corporation law ", in : "Mlamy Law Quarterly ", 
vol.7 (1952), pp.l -43. 
2. The report by G.S.Hills ( "Model Corporation Law ", in : HLR,vol.48, pp.1334 -1380) is 
not quite up to date on this subject, though correct in the general outline. 
There existed P rior to that a "Tentative Draft ", published by the National 
Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Law in 1928. The corporation 
laws of Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana and Washington were substantially based upon 
this model of a Business Corporation Act, 
30 On the reasons why one should still talk about "company law q instead of "corporation 
lawn) in England, see : L.C.B.Gower, "Some Contrasts between British and American 
Corporation Law ", in : HLR, vol.69 (1956), pp.1371 -1372. 
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incorporation" and "by -law" are respectively used, though the connotation 
of these terms is by no means identical 
1. 
The term "capital" usually refers 
to that portion of the assets which has been received as, or allocated to, 
payment of shares, whereas "capital stock" is used to refer to the book- 
keeping item carried on the liability side for the purpose of determining 
whether there is a surplus or a deficit 2, Nonetheless, it is as yet 
almost impossible to speak about a standard nomenclature in American 
Company Law. 
Unlike the majority of European legal systems, the background of 
American Company Law was common law. This is still so, and in some questions 
to an even greater extent than in Scots and English Law. Even in those few 
states where a general reception of common law principles did not take 
place, as e.g. in Louisiana 3, common law is nonetheless applicable 
concerning company law questions. Modified principles of partnership are 
still central 4 to private corporation law, though the modern development 
of the statute law of various states and the practice adopted by the 
le Cf. infra p. 223 , note 7. 
4 R.S.Stevens, Handbook on the law of Private Corporations, 2nd ed., St.Paul 1949, 
P.431. 
3. Hamburger, p. 120. 
4. "A partnership conducted wholly by agents where the co- partners have power to 
appoint the agents, but are not responsible for their acts ". 
Cf. Dodd -.Baker, p.891 ; E.M.Dodd, "Partnership liability of stockholders in 
defective corporations ", in : HLR, vol.40 (1927), p.521, and a contrary point of 
View by C.Magruder, "A note on partnership liability of stockholders in defective 
corporations 
", in : HLR, vol.40 (1927), pp733 ff.; and K.K.Luce, "Legislative 
amendment of corporation statutes - the Wisconsin problem ", in : "Marquette Law 
Review ", vol.30 (1946), p.24. 
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majority of companies in the form of their "articles" and "by -laws" are 
more or less on lines similar to those in this country. Their practice is 
in many cases even more "modern" and "advanced" than what is found here. 
The gaps are, however, still filled with principles deeply rooted in 
common law. A special doctrine was defined during the time of Chief Justice 
Marshall, namely, that "although the artificial being, the corporation 
aggregate, was not a, citizen ", it was nevertheless entitled to sue in the 
courts of the United States 
1. 
Much later a bill was even introduced 
providing that a corporation should be considered a citizen of a state 2. 
The vast amount of state statute law is the reason why a separate branch 
of Comparative Law is entirely and exclusively devoted to the comparative 
study of the different laws of the United States of America 3. Diversity 
1. R.M.Benjamin, "Corporate Citizenship a Legal Fiction ", in : "Albany Law Journal ", 
vol.69 (1908), p. 264. 
4 J.J.Parker, "The Federal Judiciary ", in : " American Bar Association Journal ", 
vo1,24 (1938), P13.239 -240. 
3. The leading American periodical on Inter- American Comparative Law is : "Tulane Law 
Review" (New Orleans, 1925 ff.). Among the scores of American legal periodicals 
there should also be mentioned : 
' American Bar Association Journal (vol.1 -6, Baltimore 1915 ff., vol.6 ff.,Chicago 
1920 ff.), American Journal of Comparative Law (Baltimore 1952 ff.), American 
Journal of Comparative Legislation (Ann Arbor), American Journal of International 
Law (Washington, D.C.), American Law Review (St.Louis 1866 ff.), Boston Law Review 
Boston 1921 ff.), California Law Review (Berkeley 1912 ff.), Columbia Law Review 
New York 1901 ff.), Comparative Law Series (Washington, D.C., 1938 ff.), Cornell 
Law Quarterly (Ithaca 1915 ff.), George lishington Law Review (Harrisburg 1932 ff.), 
Harvard Law Review (Cambridge, Mass.,1887 ff.), Idaho Law Journal (Moscow, Idaho 
1931 ff.), Louisiana Law Review (Baton Rouge 1939 ff.), Marquette Law Review (Mil- 
waukee 1917 ff.), Michigan Law Review (Ann Arbor 1904 ff.), New York University Law 
Quarterly Review (New York 1924 ff.), Temple Law Quartery (Philadelphia 1927 ff.), 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1851 ff.), Yale Law Journal (Newhaven 1592 ff). 
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in details is infinite, and it would be completely impossible to consider 
the law of all the American states in this study 
1, 
Prior to the War of Independence onla a few charters had been issued. 
Corporations as a type of business organizations were then universally 
unpopular, partly as the result of some antecedents of the American 
Revulution. Only after the assumption by the legislatures of the power to 
grant charters 2 did this uneasiness gradually disappear 3. Prior to the 
introduction of the general corporation acts in the different states 4, a 
charter was granted by an individual legislative act of the state. Therefore 
a legislative act amending the charter had to be passed every time a change 
was desired. The celebtated Dartmouth College case in 1819 established 
that the charter granted to a private corporation ctnstituted a contract 
1.A list of the best known corporation acts of the various states is attached 
hereafter as Annex III. Cf. infra A 24. 
I would like to stress in this connection that I selected the company law of 
seven states for a more detailed study, i.e. California, Indiana, Michigan, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin. I regret being unable to 
quote the new Ohio General Corporation Law of October 1955, which, I think, 
id the latest enactment in American Company Law. 
Cf. F.D.Emerson "The new Ohio General Corporation Law ", in : "University of 
Cincinnati Law Review ", vol.24, Cincinnati 1955, pp.463 -518. 
2. The states of Pennsylvania and Vermont were probably the first ones where this 
principle was explicitly assumed, 
3. Joseph S,Davis, Essays in the earlier history of American Corporations, two vol., 
1917 ; W.R.Compton, "Early History of Stock Ownership by Corporations ", in : 
"George Washington Law Review ", vol.9, Harrisburg, Pa.,1940, pp.125 ff.; E.M.Dodd, 
The first half century of Statutory Regulations of Business Corporations," in : 
"Harvard Law Essays ", Cambridge, Mass.,1934, pp.65 -132 ; E.M.Dodd, "Statutory 
developments in Business Corporation Law 1886 -1936 ", in : HLR, vol.50 (1936), 
pp.27 -59 ; C.S,Lobingier, "Phe natural history of the private artificial person ", 
In : TLR, vol.13 (1938), pp041 ff.; S.Williston, "History of the Law of Business 
Corporations before 1800 ", in : HLR, vol.2 (1888), pp.105 -166. 
4. It is generally accepted that an Act adopted by North Carolina in 1795 was the first 
American general companies act, embodying the principle of "free" formation of cor- 
porations, though it did n o t atply to all types. 
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between the state and the corporation, and that it was within the 
protection of the constitutional mandate that no state should pass any 
law impairing the obligations of these contracts The opinion was 
expressed at that time that any legislation changing such a charter 
"impaired" the obligations existing among the shareholders, and that 
therefore any such act should be regarded as unconstitutional 2.T his very 
strict point of view continued to prevail in some of the states 
3 
up till 
the late thirties 4, but experience has tended to show that this point of 
view was damaging the shareholders' interests. This was the reason why 
powers were gradually introduced in various corporation acts permitting 
amendment of the charter under specified circumstances 5. Thus, an 
alteration of the charter could be achieved by these three different 
10 As recently as 1921, the Louisiana Supreme Court followed the principles involved 
in the Dartmouth College case, and definitely held that Art.447 of the Civil Code 
011870 d o e s n o t give the legislature authority to amend corporate charters. 
of. D.E.Bennett, "Remodeling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisiana Corporations, 
A critical survey ", in : "Louisiana Law Review ", vol.3 (1941), pp.492 ; K.K.Luce, 
"Legislative Amendment of Corporation Statutes - the Wisconsin problem ", in : 
"Marquette Law Review ", vo1.30 (1946), pp 32 -33. 
2. Berle deans, pp. 148 and 209 ; A.C.Becht, "Corporate Charter Amendments : issues of 
prior stock and the alteration of dividend rates ", in : CLR , vol.50 (1950), p.903. 
A charter was initially conceived as a contract between the state and the corporation 
and, once made , the stare could not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 1 y "impair the 
obligation" of such a contract, unless the contract reserved to the state the power 
to change, to amend or to repeal such a charter. On the notion of "constitutionality" 
in Scots and English Law see supra p. 27 and p. 50, note 2. 
30 E.g. Georgia, New Jersey, Utah. 
4. Eo0.Cu,ran, "Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters ", in : 
"Michigan Law Review ", vol.32 (1934), P.747. 
5. Berle -Means , p. 211. 
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methods only : 1. by direct legislation, 1 
2. by vote or decision of the company, if authorized by 
legislation enacted after the formation of the company, or 
3. by vote or decision of the company, if authorized by the 
state's corporation act a n d the charter 
2 
Gradually, the system of charters granted for individual companies was re- 
placed by general corporation acts, at first for certain classes of compa- 
nies, as e.g.in North Carolina in 1795, and in Massachusets in 1799, and 
only later applied for all types of companies. For some forty years both 
systems often existed side by side. Though the Federal Constitution did not 
provide for company law, it was recognized, after the constitutionality of 
two federal companies was contested in the eighteen -twenties,that by virtue 
of the doctrine of implied 1,cwe_s a granting of charters by the Federal 
Congress was valid. Nevertheless, the limits of this power of the Federal 
Congress are still not quite clear 3. 
The legislation of some of the states has shown an exaggerated amount of 
liberality in matters of company law 4. This and the laxity 5 regarding the 
1. This power of the states to interfere with the internal business of companies is at 
present largely dormant, but this latent possibility may one day become a main issue 
in American Company Law. Cf. Berle- Means, p.210 ; K.K.Luce, op.cit., p.32. 
4 Berle-Means, p. 208. 3. Levy, p. 152. 
4. New Jersey and Delaware were and still are referred to as classic examples of states 
with an extremely liberal attitude towards the formation of new companies and laxity 
in failing to provide important safeguards against all kind of abuses. 
Lit.: T.Conynton,Organization and Management of Corporations,with special reference 
to the laws of New York,New Jersey,Delaware and West Virginia,New York 1900; C.C.Kee- 
dY, Delaware Corporation Law and Equity Practice,New York 1931; R.C.Larcom, The De- 
laware Corporations,Baltimore 1937; J.H.Colmann and J.F.Finn, "Comparison of Business 
Corporation Law of Minnesota and Delaware ",in : "Minnesota Law Review ", vol.22 (1938), 
pp661-675 
; L.C.B.Gower, "Some Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law ", in : HLR, vol.69 (1956), p.1377 ; V.W.Westrup, "A comparative study of the Corporation Laws of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and New York ", in : "New York 
University Law Quarterly Review ", vol.11 (1934), pp. 348 ff. 
LCB.Gower, op.cit., pp. 1377 and 1389, 
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incorporation of companies 1, especially of holding companies 2, were, of 
course, accessory to the great collapse of September and October 1929. 
Partly as the result of this financial crisis, and in the framework of the 
New Deal company legislation of the thirties, state supervision was intro- 
duced concerning all larger companies 3, and a special Securities and Ex- 
change Commission, usually called S.E.C., was set up, invested with far - 
reaching powers This Commission could even require the presentation of 
balance sheets, of profit -an -loss accounts, the drawing up of various other 
"consolidated" accounts, and, also, the production of annual returns. 
Further, it could censor prospectuses, and even scripts of radio broad- 
cats undertaken in connection with an appeal to the public. Though this 
legislation did not apply to all American companies 5, it implicitly 
created a class of companies that had many traits in common with what we 
call "public companies ". Inter alia , this legislation provided for the 
registration of companies in one of the National Stock Exchnages, and in 
one of the National Securities Exchanges. Thus, transactions of business 
1. Levy, P. 188. 2. Cf. supra p. 149. 
30 Levy, pp. 190 ff. 
4. R.W.Ballantine, "Problems in drafting a Modern Corporation Law ", in:The American Bar 
Association Journal ", vol.17 (1931), pp.579 ff.; M.S.C4, "Creation of Government 
Corporations by the National Government ", in : "Michigan Law Review ", vol.33 (1935), 
pp. 473 ff.; E.II.Dodd, Jr., "The Modern Corporation Private Property and recent 
federal legislation ", in : HLR, vol.54 (1941), pp.917 -948 (cf. especially pp.931 f.); 
F.Kessler, "Die neueste Gesetzgebung und Rechtssprechung auf dem Gebiete des nord- 
amerikanischen Aktienrechts ", in : ZsAIP, vol.6 (1932), pp.926 -953 ; J.P.Loeb, 
"Revision of the Corporation Laws of California" , in : "American Bar Association 
Journal ", vo1.19 (1933). PP.679 ff.; F.E.Schmey, "Aktuelle Probleme des amerikanischen 
Aktienrechts" 
, in : ZHR, vol.96 (1931), pp.129 ff. 
5. E.g it did not apply to companies which operated or traded within one single 
state only. 
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in non -registered securities were treated somehow as "less important" and 
were sometimes even declared unlawful. It is curious to note that one of 
the main aims of this legislation was protection of shareholders as 
investors, and of the shareholders against the various possible underhand 
manipulations of the managers and directors. In doing so, stress was laid 
upon their position as investors, and not as members of the company 1. 
The practical value of the work of the S.E.C. was in respect of new 
issues, especially in the introduction of a scrutiny of projected increases 
of capital, of the par -value of the new shares 2, and of the issue of no- 
par -value shares. It is worth while noting that this S.E.C,was in principle 
against various manipulations which lead to a suppression or limitation 
of pre -emptive rights. 
Though the provisions regarding amendment of the charter vary from 
state to state, and the scope of the power is peculiar to each jurisdiction 3 
the present position of American Company Law 4 concerning alteration of 
1. Cf. supra pp. 21 ff. 2. Levy, Pp. 197 -198. 
3. K.K.Luce, "Legislative Amendment of Corporation Statutes - the Wisconsin problem ", 
in : "Marquette Law Review ", vol.30 (1946), p027. 
4. Lit.: C.C.Abbott, The rise of the business corporation, Ann Arbor 1936 ; F.M.Ander- 
son, American and Foreign Commercial Law, Washington 1939 ; H.W.Ballantine, On Cor- 
porations, Chicago 1946 ; C.F.Bostwick, Legislative Competition for Corporate Capi- 
tal, Albany 1899 ; N,S.Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate Enterprise, New York 
1940 ; J.Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism, New York 1924 ; W.W.Cook, The 
principles of Corporation Law, Ann Arbor 1925 ; A.S.Dewing, Financial policy of cor- 
porations, New York 1935 ; E.M.Dodd and R.J,Baker, Cases and Materials on Corporat- 
ions, Brooklyn 1951 ; A.A.Kuhn, A Comparative Study of the law of Corporations, New 
York 1935 ; A.W.Machen, A treatise on the modern Law of Corporations, Boston 1908 ; 
V.Morawetz, A treatise on the Law of Private Corporations, Boston 1886 ; P.O'Ieary, 
Corporate Enterprise in Modern Economic Life, New York 1933 ; R.B.Schlesinger, Com- 
parative Law Ca ses and Materials, Brooklyn 1950 ; H.O.Taylor, A treatise on the 
law of Private Corporations, Philadelphia 1884 ; S.D.Thompson, Commentaries on the 
law of Private Corporations, San Francisco 1895/1899 ; I.M.Wormser and J,A.Crane, 
Cases and other materials on Private Corporations, St.Louis 1948. 
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capital 1 can be summarized as follows. It is regarded as essential that 
in times of rapid industrial and economic change the corporate organizat- 
ions should have a flexibility which would enable them either to expand in 
order to incorporate new businesses, or to tighten the financial belt if 
the situation so required. Such financial and structural readjustment was 
usually very difficult under the old system, where the assent of all the 
shareholders was required almost every time 2. 
The rule about the unalterability of the charter and the capital fixed 
therein, generally based on the purely contractual structure of the 
relations between the state, the company and the shareholders 3, is now in 
practice inapplicable , since there is no longer any state left which does 
not have some sort of reservation or special authorization explicitly 
1. Lit. : H.W.B iia ntir_e, "Stockholders' liability in Minnesota ", in : "Minnesota Law 
Review ", vol.7 (1923), pp.79- 112 ; H.W.Ballantine, "Changes in California Corporation 
Laws ", in : " California Law Review ", vol.17 (1929), PP.529 ff.; A.C,Becht, "Changes 
in interests of classes of stockholders by corporate charter amendments reducing 
capital and altering redemption, liquidation and sinking fund provisions ", in : 
"Cornell Law Quarterly ", vol.36 (1950), pp.1 -50 ; A,C.Becht, "Corporate Charter 
Amendments, issues of prior stock and alteration of dividend rates ", in : CLR, vol. 
50 (1950), pp.900 -944 ; D.E.Bennett, "Remodeling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisia- 
na Corporations "; in : " Louisiana Law Review ", vol.3 (1941), pp.481 ff.; C.R.Car- 
penter, 'Reduction of capital stock - disposal of the resulting surplus ", in : 
"'texas Law and Legislation" (1947); E.O.Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the amend- 
ment of corporate charters ", in : " Michigan Law Review ", vol.32 (1934), PP743 ff.; 
E.C.Lasseigne, "Recapitalization and Reorganization of Corporations under Louisiana 
Corporation Law ", in : TLR, vol.24 (1949), Pp320 ff.; K.C.Mullen, "Stock dividends 
- eliminating accrued undeclared cumulative dividends by charter amendments ", in : 
"St. John's Law Review ", vol.19 (1945), pp.139 ff.; G.W.Wickersham , "The Capital of 
a Corporation ", in : NT,R, vol.22 (1909), pp.319 ff. 
2. D.E.Bennett, op.cit,, p. 481. 
3° A.C,Becht, "Corporate Charter Amendments, issues of prior stock and alteration 
of dividend rates ", in : CLR, vo1.50,01).902 ff. 
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given in its constitution or in the general laws 1. Many charters give the 
power of alteration to a majority of shareholders in order to secure in ad- 
vance the assent of the shareholders to possible alterations 2.When,however, 
the charter has definitely fixed the capital at a certain sum, the company 
has practically no authority to alter it at all 3,and can therefore neither 
increase nor reduce the number of its shares,nor alter their nominal value4, 
It was questionable for a very long time whether it was legal to amend the 
charter in order to give the majority of the shareholders the power to alter 
the capital 5, and it was decided that authorization to alter the charter, 
and the capital fixed therein , must be given explicitly by state legis- 
lation 6 , and must be affirmed by the articles 7 . This is the normal 
1. In former days when shareholders had to face the absence of such provisions, the 
courts in some states implied a "common- law " -majority power to amend the charter 
in good faith and +for purposes reasonably calculated to meet genuine business de- 
velopment heed ", although such a power was usually considered as inconsistent with 
partnership. Cf. E,U.Curran, op.cit., p.744 ; K.K.Luce, "Legislative Amendment of 
Corporation Statutes - a Nisconsin problem ", in : "Marquette Law Review ",vo1,30 
(1946), pP.24 -25. 
4 K.K.Luce, op.cit., p.27. 
3. V.Morawetz, A treatise on the Law of Private Corporations ,vol.I,p.408,vol.II,p.728. 
4 Berle - Means, pp.211 -212 ; Thompson, vol.II, p.1569. 
It was held in some of the states (e.g. in Montana, Nebraska, Utah) that an amend- 
ment could not affect those shares which were sold as fully paid, non -assessable, 
or subject to further assessments. 
5° E.O,Curran, op.cit., p. 765. 
60 Some of the state legislations in the nineteenth century possessed restrictive re- 
gulations concerning alteration of capital. Other states tried to avoid abnormal in- 
creases by providing for a maximum limit fixed. Cf.Thompson, vol.II, pp.1588 -1590. 
7. Unlike Scots and English Law, the American "articles" are the main instrument of the 
company constitution.While these American "articles" have retained for a much longer 
period the unalterability of a British "memorandum" (cf. supra_ p. 73 ), they do not 
correspond merel 
y 
to the "memorandum ", but have adopted to a great extent the 
functions of the British "articles ". The American "by -laws" are therefore a much 
less important instrument of the constitution. Cf. also Berle- Means, p.208. 
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case now. Usually it is declared in the corporation law of a particular 
state that a corporation may amend its articles in order : 
1. to increase or decrease the authorized number of its shares, of any 
class, issued or unissued, or the par -value thereof, 
2. to increase or decrease the number of shares of one particular 
series of shares, 
3. to change shares having par -value into the same or a different 
2 
number of shares without par -value , 
40 to increase or reduce the par -value of shares 1, 
5. to change shares without par -value 2 into the same or a different 
number of shares with or without any par -value, 
6. to create classes of par -value shares together with classes of 
shares without par -value 2, 
7. to create classes of shares of different par- value, 
8. to restrict, limit, create or enlarge the voting rights of certain 
classes of shares, 
9. to grant to any class or classes of shares pre -emptive rights to 
subscribe for shares, or 
10. to enlarge or restrict or revoke existing pre -emptive rights of any 
class or classes of shares 3. 
10 Pennsylvania was familiar with the provision of a legal maximum for one share of 
X 100 , and in a few states legal minimum figures were provided for. Cf. T.E.At- 
kinson, "Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika ", in : "Rechtsvergl.Handwörterbuch f.Zivil- 
und Handelsrecht" (ed.by F.Schlegelberger), vol.I, part 2, Berlin 1929, p.693. 
2. 
Cf. infra p. 228, note 2. See also : Berle- Means, p.213. 
3. Cf. e.g. California, s.3601, as amended by Statutes of 1949 (c.997). 
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This is a quite mormal catalogue of all the activities which may come 
under the heading of alteration of capital. In some states this right of 
the corporation to amend its articles at any time is linked with the 
obligation to comply strictly with certain special provisions of the law ; 
in other states it is declared that such amendments are valid so long as 
the articles as amended would have been authorized as original articles 
1 
by the vote of the holders of the majority of its shares entitled to vote, 
provided only that if any such amendment should change the rights, 
share 
privileges or preferences of the holders of any class 2, such an amendment 
must be approved by the vote of the holders of a majority of shares of each 
class of shares entitled to vote, and a majority of shares of each class 
whose rights, privileges or preferences are so changed 3. Such an author- 
ization may be limited. A limitation by sum may also be a two -sided one : 
for an increase, and for a reduction 4. Any increase beyond such an 
authorization would then, of course , be void 5. 
1. Cf. Indiana, s. 22. 
2, Cf. A.C.Becht, "Corporate Charter Amendments, issues of prior stock and alteration 
of dividend rates ", in : CLR, vol.50 (1950), pp.900 ; J.H.Rowell, "Rights of 
Preferred Shareholders in Excess of Preference ", in : " Minnesota Law Review ", 
vol.19 (1935), pp.406 -423. 
3. Cf. Michigan, s.43. 
4. "Corpus Juris Secundum" (ed.by W.Mack and D.J.Kisel),vol.18, Brooklyn 1939, p.740. 
5. Any creation of new shares in excess of the authorized amount was considered as pro- 
hibited by the rules of common law, and therefore illegal, 
Cf. E.O.Curran, "Minority stockholders and the amendment of corporate charters ", in: 
"Michigan Law ReviewQ, vol.32 (1934), p.766 ; Levy, p.788 ; V.Morawetz, A treatise 
on the Law of Private Corporations, vol.Il, Boston 1886, p.729. 
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State legislation generally provides for quorum and majority requisites 
in general meetings in order to reach valid decisions 1, and usually they 
are the same as are required for amendments of the charter 2. In a few 
states a rather peculiar rule exists replacing the requirement of a majority 
in general meeting simply by the written assent or consent of a certain 
number of shareholders 3 without meeting at all, and there is a provision 
in some of them that while a certain majority is sufficient in general 
meeting, a unanimous consent in writing is needed outside of it 4. Other 
states, however, are more formal concerning the general meetings for 
decision of these questions. Sometimes only either quorum or majority is 
required. A few states provide that the proposal of amendment should first 
come from the board of directors, where a resolution has to be adopted 
setting forth the proposed amendment and directing that it be submitted to 
a vote of the shareholders entitled to vote at a meeting (either an annual 
meeting or a special one).5 
1. These provisions are applicabb even if the charter provides explicitly that the 
capital may be "increased from time to time, at the pleasure of the corporation ", 
or any similar general formulae A majority of two thirds is provided for in some 
of the state statutes (e.g. Louisiana), and also in the Federal Act concerning 
the capital of national banks. 
Cf. A.C.Becht, op.cit., p.907 ; D.E.Bennett, "Remodeling, Merger and Dissolution 
of Louisiana, Corporations : a critical survey ", in : "Louisiana Law Review ", vol.3 
1941), p.493 ; E.C.Lasseigne, "Recapitalization and Reorganization of Corporations 
under Louisiana Corporation Law ", in : TLR, vol.24 (1949), p. 321 ; Levy, pp.788 ff; 
V.Morawetz, op.cit., vol.I, P.410 ; Thompson, vol.II, pe1589. 
2 R.S.Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private Corporations, St.Paul 1949, P.430. 
3. Cf. California, ss. 500, 3632 and 3638. 
4. E.C.Lasseigne, op.cit., p. 320. 
50 Cf. Indiana, s. 23. 
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In some other states the proposal of amendment may come either from the 
board, or by petition from the holders of not less than, say, ten percent 
of the shares entitled to vote 1, Only in a few states it is provided that 
this power may be delegated to the board without any restrictions 2, since 
the doctrine that the directors have no authority to amend or alter the 
charter, or, implicitly, to alter the capital, and that their power is 
merely to conduct ordinary business transactions has been prevalent almost 
everywhere 3. Sometimes special regulations are provided about the order of 
summoning general meetings and about the formal agenda of áuch meetings. 
The general usage is that upon the proposal and adoption of any amend- 
ment to the articles special "articles of amendment" shall be executed and 
filed 4, and on their presentation the secretary of state of that particular 
state may endorse his approval and issue a formal "certificate of amend- 
ment" 5. The provisions on the contents of the "articles of amendment" vary 
1. Cf. Pennsylvania, s.802. In either case, the board of directors shall direct that 
it be submitted to a vote at a general meeting, either annual or special. 
2. E.g. in California (s.1903) only a resolution of the board od directors is needed to 
direct that the capital should be increased by a transfer of a portion of the 
surplus to the stated capital account, 
3. The institution of "authorized capital ", so very much claimed as originating from 
the United States, was previously called by the Americans themselves : a right to 
"receive subscriptions to capital stock not filled up ". 
Cf. Thompson, vol.II, pp.1570 -1571 and p.1576. 
As a rule the directors are entitled in the framework of such an "authorized 
capital" to increase the capital only up to the sum mentioned as its limit, 
but even then the general usage is, however , to ask for the assent of the 
shareholders, although, legally, such an increase would be binding irrespective of 
whether or not assent had been given. The trend is now against the provision of such 
an additional assent, and there are only a few states left where such an assent is 
still required , as e.g. in Massachusets (c.156, § 16). Cf. Dodd -Baker, p.887. 
4. Cf. 
e8'.Indiana (s.26), Pennsylvania (8.806), Washington (s. 23.12.070), and 
Wisconsin (s.53)0 
50 Cf. e,g,California (s.3670), Indiana (s.27), New York (s.36), Wshington (s. 23.12.070). 
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from state to state 
lo 
Some states follow the principle that the previous capital should be 
fully, or almost fully, paid up prior to an increase, or,even, prior to the 
very contemplation of an increase. Usually an increase is effected by the 
issuing of new shares against cash, but an increase by increasing the nomi- 
nal value of the shares is also quite frequent. Besides, American Law is 
familiar with the institution of "n6- par -value" shares 2, and this makes 
1. Usually the articles of amendment set forth among other items the number of out- 
standing shares and a list of those entitled to vote on the amendment, and in the 
case of multiformity of shares, their division into classes etc.; also the number of 
votes for and against such an amendment (cf.e.g.Pennsylvania,s.806, Wisconsin,s.53); 
but some states provide for special statements about the shares already authorized 
and of the change to be made by the amendment (cf.e.g.Indiana, s.26, c -e). 
2. American literature on this question is vast, though, as may be seen from the list 
appended to this footnote,only a few are recent publications. They were mainly 
written in the middle twenties of this century, when these problems were new, the 
material very sparse indeed, and the experience of practice and theory not yet part 
of the normal American field of debate. Now, however, the trend has distinctly 
changed, being rather towards low par value, than no par value shares. Besides, the 
"education" of the investors is a factor that should not be overlooked when one 
ceases to speak about the risks of this no- par -value practice. 
Lit.: N.Powell and. J.R.Wildman, Capital stock without par value, New York 1928 ; 
C.W.Wickersham, A treatise on stock without par value, Albany 1927 ; H.W.Ballantine, 
"Non par stock - its use and abuse ", in : "American Law Review ", vol.57 (1923); 
A.A.Berle, "Problems of no par stock ", in : CLR, vol.25 (1925); J.C.Bonbright, "The 
dangers of shares without par value ", in : CLR, vol.24 (1924); H.E.Colton, "Par 
value versus no par value stock ", in : "American Bar Association Journal ", vol.? 
(1921); W.W.Cook, "Stock without par value ", in : "American Bar Association Journal, 
vol.7 (1921); F.Dwight, "The par value of stock ", in : YLJ, vol.16 (1907); J.E.Good- 
bar, "No par stock - its nature and use ", in : "Miami Law Quarterly ", vol.3 (1948); 
x.H.Hollen and R.S.Tuthill, "Uses of stock having no par value ", in : "American Bar 
Association Journal" a vol.? (1921); C.L,Israels, "Problems of par and no par shares: 
a reappraisal ", in : CLR, vo1.47 (1947); W.E.Masterson, "Consideration for corporate 
shares, with special reference to shares without par value ", in : "Idaho Law Journal ", 
vo1.2 (1932); W.D.Mitchell, "Capitalization of corporations issuing shares without 
par value ", in : "American Bar Association Journal ", vol.11 (1925) ;V.Morawetz, "Shares 
without nominal or par value ", in : HLR, vol.26 (1913); W.de V.Piersen, "Stock 
having no par value ", in : "Illinois Law Review ", vol.17 (1922); R.F.Rice and Harno, 
"Shares with no par value" in : "Minnesota Law Review ", vol.5 (1921); J.L.Weiner, 
"The amount available for dividends where no par shares have been issued ", in : 
CLR, vol.29 (1929). 
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the regulations on alteration even more complex 1. There are only two 
states left (Nebraska and Oklohama) where no -par -value shares are not 
permitted 
2. 
There are three different ways in which the "not- par -value" 
question is approached in American statutes : 
1. they require or permit the mention in a certificate of incorporation of 
either the minimum sale price per share, or the minimum dollar amount 
per share that should be included in the calculation of the capital 3, 
or they require : 
2. that the total consideration for no- par -value shares should be shown as 
capital 4, or 
3. that an unlimited authority should be given to the board to designate a 
part of the consideration as paid up surplus and to allocate to the 
capital only the remainder of the sum received for no- par -value shares 
Some statutes provide that no company shall increase its capital except in 
the manner provided by law, and that written notice of the purpose of the 
general meeting summoned to consider this question shall be given at least 
1. I think it is possible to assert that Belgian Law has in respect of "no- par -value" 
shares followed the American line (cf. supra p. 140). On the recent plan to intro- 
duce this institution into British company law see also : L.C.B.Gower, "Some Con- 
trasts between British and American Corporation Law ", in HLR @view, vol.69 (1956), 
P.1400. 
Cf, also supra p. 80, note 4, and infra p. 284. 
2DC.L,Israels, op.cit., p.1279 and note 2. 
3o Cf. e.g, Illinois, 19 ; Michigan, s.450.4 (e); 
see also Berle Means, p.255. 
4 Cf. e0g, California, s.1900 CO; Florida, § 612.21 ; Indiana, § 1 (h) ; New York 
§ 12 B ; Wisconsin, s.180.14 (2). 
So Cf, e.g. Delaware, § 14 ; Idaho, § 128 ; Louisiana, § 25 ; Maine , § 19 ; Maryland, 




: H,W.Ballantine, On Corporations, Chicago 1946, p.480 ; and 
CL.Israels, op.cit., p.1286 and note 40. 
South Dakota, § 11.0401 (3)(a); 
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sixty days before the date of the meeting. If such meeting be an annual 
meeting, such purpose may be included in the normal notice of such annual 
meeting. The resolution shall be adopted upon receiving the affirmative 
vote of the holders of at least a majority of the issued shares, unless 
any class of shares is entitled to vote thereon as a class , in which event 
the affirmative vote of the majority of the issued shares has to be counted 
in each class separately where a class is entitled to vote as a class, and, 
in addition, the affirmative vote of all holders is needed to make this 
decision valid 1. 
New shares cannot usually be issued at less than their market value,except 
in the case of an equal distribution of the shares among all the sharehold- 
ers. The exercise of rights belonging to the shareholders and emanating 
from the issue of new shares, e.g.voting rights, is very often linked with 
the requirement that the full amount of the shares has to be paid up. A 
great amount of learned opinion has been expressed concerning the question 
of an increase by issuing preference shares 2. 
1. Cf. e.g. Pennsylvania, s. 309. 
2. A.C.Becht, "Corporate Charter Amendments : issues of prior stock and alteration of 
dividend rates ",in : CLR,Tol.50 t195L),pp.913 ff.; Berle- Means,p.215 ; E.O.Curran, 
"Minority Stockholders and Amendment of Corporate Charters ",in : "Michigan Law 
Review ",vol.32 (1934),pp.768 ff.; H.Goldschmidt, "Die Kreditbeschaffung durch Vor- 
zugsaktien and Schuldverschreibungen nach englisch -amerikanischen Recht",in : G , 
vol.67 (1925),pp.522 ff.; C.M.Hicks, "The rights of non -cumulative preferred stock - 
a doubtful decision by the United States Supreme Court ",in : "Temple Law Quarterly ", 
vol.5 (1931), pp. 538 ff. 
It was held in an early leading case that the general power reserved to alter the 
charter does not authorize the issue of preference shares.Now it is very seldom that 
a court holds that an issue of preference shares is a fundamental change requiring 
the assent of all the shareholders. When such preference shares are issued a special 
"redemption clause" is frequently inserted, giving the option either to the corpor- 
ation or to the shareholders, or to both, to redeem, or to demand redemption of the shares. Cf. infra p. 237. 
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The practice of issuing new shares gratis out of a surplus 1, and 
their allocation to former shareholders is also widely followed. Itis a 
live question in American jurisprudence to consider to what extent the 
"dividende arrearages" can be removed 
2. 
An issue of gratis shares is 
considered as one of the best ways out of the impasse of the illegality of 
disposing of these accrued dividends. An issue of gratis shares could be 
made in addition to, or instead of a dividend paid in cash. The American 
term for it is "to pay stock dividends" 3. When a company declares "stock 
dividend" in wholly or partly paid up shares, the new shares are paid up in 
whole or in part out of the profits which belong to the existing sharehold- 
ers. The majority of states explicitly declare auch an action to be an in- 
crease of capital 4, but there are still some states where the stress is on 
the payment of dividends, and the question whether it is or is not an in- 
crease proper is usually somehow avoided 5. Another question is whether 
surpluses arising from various sources are equally transferable to the 
capital account. The trend is more and more to treat all kinds of surpluses 
1 Cf. e.g. California, s.1903. 
4 The board of a company may be interested in removing such arrearages in order to pre - 
vent the impairment of the capital, or to increase the credit of the company, or to 
renew or to increase dividend payments, or to improve the market conditions of the 
company's securities, or to simplify the capital structure. Cf. E.C.Lasseigne, 
"Recapitalization and Reorganization of Corporations under Louisiana Corporation 
Law ", in : TLR, vol.24 (1950), p.322. 
3. Rauch 
, vol.I 
s P p .52 ff. , and vol.Il, pp.85 ff. and pp.106 -107 ; H.Schneider, Die Ak- 
tie nach englischem, amerikanischem und französischem Recht, Marburg 1930 ; K.C.Mul- 
len, "Stock dividends - eliminating accrued but undeclared cumulative dividends by 
charter amendment ", in : " St.John's Law Review ", vol.19 (1945), PP.139 -144. 
4. Cf. e.g. California, s.1903 ; Indiana, s.12a. 
5.0 
f. e.g. Michigan, s.22 ; Washington, s. 23.24.050 ; Wisconsin, ss. 14 (4) and 
38 (2)(a)ß 
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on the same footing, whereas previously a considerable number of states 1 
provided differing restrictions on differing kinds of surpluses. Thus, in 
some of the states (e.g. in Delaware) the "preferred" dividend accruals 
were considered as a "vested right" , and it was for this reason that it 
was thought that they could not be wiped out by an amendment of the charter2. 
Sometimes special rules exist for the case where a shareholder holds less 
shares than the number which would suffice to give him one more new share 
3 
Qualified increase is usually provided for in American Law. The assent of 
some public authority is required for increase of capital in some public 
companies of a particular character, as e.g. railway, electricity, gas or 
waterwork companies 40 
American Law is familiar with the institution of pre -emptive rights, and 
the literature on this question also is vast 5, In the case where the 
1. E.g. Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maryland, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and Wisconsin. Cf. Rauch, vol.II, pp.85 -86, 
2, D,E.Bennett, "Remodeling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisiana Corporations ", in : 
"Louisiana. Law Review ", vol.3 (1941),p.495 ; E.C.Lasseigne, op.cit,, p.322. 
3. Cf. supra p. 177 and infra p.258. 
4. "Corpus Juris Secundum" (ed.by W,Mack and D.J.Kisel), vol.18, Brooklyn 1939, p.748. 
5. Lit. :A.,.0 j, A Comparative Study of the Law of Corporations, New York 1935 ; 
R.S,Stevens Handbook of the Law of Private Corporations, St,Paul 1949 ; H.S.Drinker 
"The pre -emptive rights of shareholders to subscribe to new shares ", in : HLR, vol. 
43 (1930); F.Dwight, "The right of stockholders to new stock ", in : YLJ , vol.18 
(1908); A.H.Frey, "Shareholders' pre -emptive rights ", in : YLJ, vol.38 (1929); 
G.S.Hills, "Pre -emptive rights of preferred stockholders to subscribe to i stock ", 
in 
: "New York University Law Quarterly Review ", vol.5 (1928), pp.207 ff.; E.C.Las- 
seigne, "Recapitalization and reorganization under Louisiana Corporation Law ", in : 
TLR, vol.24 (1949), pp0320 ff.; V.Morawetz, "The 
pre -emptive rights of shareholders; 
in : HLR, vol.42 (1928), pp.186 ff,; - I.Lott, Das deutsche , französische, engli- 
ache und amerikanische Aktienbezugsrecht, Stuttgart 1935 ; and A.P.Sereni, La 
societá per azioni negli Stati Uniti, Milan 1951. 
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shares are issued for cash 1, every shareholder has a right of "pre- 
2 
emption" of a fractional part of the new issue 3, in proportion to his 
share in the company's existing capital.To exercise these rights a reason- 
1. Unless otherwise provided in the articles, pre -emptive rights do not exist where 
shares are issued for property or considerations other than cash (i.e,in the case of 
a qualified increase), or where shares are issued in case of a merger, or to satisfy 
conversion rights, or where shares are issued in payment of debt. Cf. e.g.Michigan, 
s.31. According to some statutes (e.g. Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Ohio, Tennessee) 
pre -emptive rights do not apply to a further increase in an already existing class. 
Cf. Berle- Means, pp. 145 -146, and p. 207 ; Buchanan, p.80 ; Dodd- Baker, pp. 887 and 
908 ; and A.H.Frey, op.cit., pp. 563 -583. See also infra p. 235, note 2. 
2. The doctrine of "pre -emptive rights" was first promulgated in 1807 in the case of 
Gray v. Portland Bank (1807, 3 ma.ss.364), though its history in American Law may 
be much older, since the expression "pre -emption" itself had already been accepted 
in America prior to the War of Independence (thus being an early Georgian creation). 
opinion was expressed in American theory of law that the institution of 
pre -emptive rights was based on early partnership conceptions. Cf. also : L.C.B,Gower, 
"Some Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law ", 
in : HLR, vol.69 (1956), p.1380. 
It was originally meant to be only an "equitable" remedy, and not a positive legal 
right,and even at the beginning of this century this "right" was rather an agreement 
to enlarge the investments proportionally to the shares held by the shareholders, 
with a special clause that only upon a failure to take up one's allotment,could it 
be sold on the market. Cf. Berle - Means, p.144 and pp. 255 ff.; Buchanan, p. 78 and 
note 11 ; Dodd- Baker, p. 904 ; F.Dwight, op.cit., p. 111 ; G.S.Hills, "Model 
Corporation Act ", in : HLR, vol.48 (1935),p.1357, note 33 ; Levy, pp.701 ff., and 
Pp.795 -796 ; V.Morawetz, A treatise on the Law of Private Corporations,vol.I, p.427. 
3. It has been held that these pre -emptive rights do exist where the shares are created 
by an amendment to the charter, but do not exist in the case of an issue out of a 
previously authorized capital, since it is understood that the original subscribers 
took their stock on the implied presumption that the company could complete the sale 
of this stock (within the framework of the authorized capital)without any obligation 
to offer it to those who bought one of the previous lots out of the same authorizat- 
ion. An exception to this exception is still possible, however, namely, when the 
conditions have changed to such an extent that the issue of new shares,6, 
though 
technically out of the old authorization, has nothing in common 
with the old 
financial plan. Then, of course, pre -emptive rights exist just 
as they would 
exist in a newly authorized stock. Cf. Dodd -Baker, pp. 904 -908. 
able time to subscribe for the new shares has to be given, though usually 
it is comparatively short 1. Some of the statutes are, however, reversing 
the legal presumptions in this question am lines similar to those we have 
observed in Scots and English Law 2,where a compulsory; rule on this question 
has not been adopted 3. These states provide that, unless otherwise stated 
in its articles, a. company may issue shares, option rights or securities 
having option rights or conversion rights, without first offering them to 
shareholders of any class or classes 4, Other states, though they have 
retained this institution, declare that 
pro 
rticles of any co pany may 
ide that the shareholders shall have no pre -emptive rights, or may pro- 
ride such restrictions or limitations on these rights as may be desired 5. 
Again, still other states provide that a company is entitled to cancel its 
.embers' pre- emptive rights by a decision in ,general meeti  ng , and to dis- 
tribute the new shares otherwise, even by selling them in open market 7. 
1. Dodd-Baker, P. 908 ; Thompson, val.II, p.1585. 
2. Cf. supra pp. 77 ff. 
3. Cf. l.C.3,Gower, op.cit., p. 1380 , and L.C.B.Gower, "Corporate Control : the 
battle for Berkeley" in : HIR, vol.68, p. 1179, note 10. 
L.C.B.aower is of the otinion that the doctrine of pre -emptive rights has n e v e r 
been adopted as a compulsory leval rule in Britain. It is submitted, however, that 
it vas known here at the end cf the eighteenth centn,p to 1862 (cf.supra p.78 and 
notes 3 and 5), and is still 'known in the Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts cf 
1845 (cf. supra: p. 66, note 2, and p. 79). 
4. Cf. e.g. Indiana, s.6 (i) ; Pennsylvania, x.611. Cf. Buchanan, p.80. 
/. Cf. e.g. Colorado, :ï+ 2243 ; Illinois, 24, and § 47 (k) ; Michigan, s.31 ; 
1omtana, § 5905 ; pest Virginia, 6 (i). 
So', a of the. states provide that in order to delete from the charter any regulation 
Which gives to shareholders pre- e ptive rights, the affirmative vote of the holders 
of 80% of the shares of each class is required. Cf. Indiana, s.24 (e) and s.25 (b). 
lo 
If, however, shares once issued by a company should have come hack into its possession 
it is usually considered that there is no reason why they should not be sold on the 
.rket. Cf. V,1[nrawetz, ap.cít., vol.I, p. 427. 
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Pre -emptive rights are usually considered as being part of the common 
law. They belong to the shareholders, it has been said, as an "inherent 
right by virtue of their being stockholders" 
1. 
Only quite recently and in 
certain states were these common law principles replaced by statute law 
regulations, which, as mentioned, sometimes even provide a complete re- 
versal of the former principle, and where ever possible curtail the facili- 
ties to exercise these rights. Legal theory is still in favour of the old 
principle affirming pre- emptive rights as inherent right of the shareholders, 
and opposing their exclusion by a decision of a majority or by adopting a 
charter without them. The courts, on the other hand, are on the whole in 
2 
o 
favour of all general meeting decisions to curtail pre -emptive rights 
Unlike French, Belgian and Italian Law, the principle of complete 
subscription is unknown in American Law 3, and an increase is considered 
valid irrespective of the amount of subscription, i.e. whether the whole 
4. Usually the sharehold- or only a part of the new issue has been taken up 
ers who sign for new shares without qualification 
or cancel their subscriptions where an incomplete 
place. 
are not entitled to rescind 
subscription has taken 
Dodd_Baker, p. 892. 
Courts notabl y in Delaware New Jersey and New York, have assaulted the principle 
of "pre- emptive rights" from three different sides : 1) asserting that pre- emptive 
rights could be used only when the amendment of increasing the number of shares was 
authorized in the o r i g i n a l charter, 2) asserting that the shareholders 
might limit or waive their pre -emptive rights in advance, and 3) asserting that pre - 
emptive rights could not be used in the case of a qualified increase. This latter 
Point, notwithstanding of its lack of logic, has been widely recognized in almost 
all states. Cf. Berle - Means, pp.145-146 ;Ind Buchanan, PPo 79 ff. 
V orawetz, A treatise on the Law of Private Corporations, vol.I, p.144. 
4. Thompson, vo1.II, p. 1586. 
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Much smaller space in comparison is devoted to reduction of capital, 
though it can be asserted that a reduction may always have a more harmful 
effect upon the dividend and other rights of the shareholders than an in- 
crease 
1. 
There is no uniform system of treating this question in the 
various statutes of the various states. Only in a few states id "reduction" 
particularly mentioned in the chapter headings 2; sometimes there are only 
one or two sections in a chapter on "Shares of Stock" 3, or "Amendment of 
Articles of Incorporation" 4; but there are even cases where the word "re- 
duction" or its equivalent do not occur at all on the headings of individual 
sections5. The rule that a reduction of capital may be made only by the 
methods prescribed by the statutes is observed quite rigidly 6. Only a few 
statutes 7 include reacquisition of shares 8 as one of the approved methods 
and then only in exceptional circumstances 9, since it is ustally held that 
the company's assets have been reduced by the amount paid for the acquired 
shares, while tha proportionate interest of each of the other shareholders 
lo E.O.Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters ", in : 
'Michigan Law Review ", Y01.32 (1934),p,767 ; E,C.Lasseigne, "Recapitalization and 
Reorganization" of Corporations ... ", in : TLR, vol.24 (1949), PP. 324 ff. 
2. California (Chapter 5, ss.1900 ii.); Pennsylvania (Article VII, ss.7o1 ff.). 
3. Washington (Chapter 23.16 : "Shares of Stock ", ss.130 and partly 140), 
40 Indiana (Article 3 : "Amendment of Articles of Incorporation ", s,30 only ). 
5. Cf. e.g. Michigan. It was held in a few states that since the laws were silent as to 
reduction 
( 
e. formerly in Louisiana) the power of reducing the capital should 
be 
denied. Cf a note in : "Albany Law Journal ", vo1.32 (1885), pp.256 -257. 
6, This is contrary to the attitude in Scots and English Law. Cf. supra 
p.91 and note 4 
7. Cf. e.g. Louisiana, s.23; Ohio (1955), 5.1701,31. 
8. Cf sßá 108 ff 
9. Dodd -Raker, p. 1232 ; G.S.Hills, "Model Corporation 
Law ", in : HLR, vol.48 (1935), 
P.1340. 
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in the diminished assets has been increased by diminishing the number of 
outstanding shares, but that nevertheless such a transaction is not a re- 
duction in the technical legal sense 
1. 
The statutes usually provide that 
shares of a certain class or classes may be made subject to redemption 2. 
Some statutes also provide that upon such a redemption an amount not to ex- 
ceed the capital represented by these shares may be charged to capital or 
nominal capital 3. Some of the statutes call this process "cancellation of 
shares by redemption" 4 contrasted with various "cancellations other than 
through redemption" 5; other statutes are less pronounced and couple the 
"redemption" with the purchase and "retirement" of the shares without a too 
precise definition of the notions involved 
6 
Usually the power to redeem 
is delegated by the articles to the board, and the effect of such redemption 
1. Although shares thus acquired are, unless formally "retired" (cf. infra p.239) by 
some approved form of reduction, treated as "treasury shares" and carried on the 
company's books as an asset, it is obvious that although the selling shareholder 
has given up an asset, the company has not acquired one. Such shares are of no 
value to the company unless and until resold, 
2. Only a few statutes distinguish between redemption at the option of the issuing 
company, and the option of the holder of the share. Cf. e.g. California (1949), 
8,1101 ; Florida , s. 612.09 ; Ohio, SS 8623 -8624. 
Cf. also : A.C.Becht, "Changes in the Interests of Classes of Stockholders by Cor- 
poration Charter Amendments reducing Capital and altering Redemption, Liquidation 
and Sinking Fund Provisions ", in : "Cornell Law Quarterly ", vo1.36 (1950), pp. 1 ff; 
D.E.Bennett, "Remodeling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisiana Corporations : a cAti- 
cal survey ", in : "Louisiana Law R. ", vol.3 (1941), pp.500 --501; Dodd -Baker, p, 1263. 
3. Cf. e.g. California, s.1706 (c); Delaware, §§ 13 and 27 ; Illinois, §§ 6, 14 and 5$; 
Michigan,s.37 
; New Jersey,§ 14.8 -3 ; New York, § 28 ; Ohio, § 8623 ; Pennsylvania, 
s.705. 
4. Thus, e.g. in the very "up to date" Wisconsin Business Corp.Law of 1953 (ch.399). 
Cf. G.Young, "Some comments on the new Wisconsin Business Corporation Law ", 
in : "Wisconsin Law Review "(1952), PP. 5 ff. 
5. Cf. e.g. Wisconsin, 6.180.59. 
6, Cf. e.g. New York, § 28 ; on similar though not identical lines : Washington, 
s. 23.16.130. 
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is to reduce the actual value of the assets of the company by an amount 
that should not be greater than the capital represented by the redeemed 
shares 
1 
It is the obligation of the board to ensure that by such a 
redemption the actual value of the company is not reduced below a figure 
which represents the total amount of the company's debts and liabilities, 
plus the amount of its capital reduced by the amount of capital so applied2. 
Other statutes put this figure at "the lowest aggregate amount of liqui- 
dation prefernces of shares to remain outstanding having prior or equal 
claims to the assets" 3. Again, other statutes declare simply that no 
redemption may take place when the aggregate amount of the outstanding 
shares remaining after such a redemption would be thereby "impaired" 4e 
There are various rules about the financial pilan of a redemption. A company 
may redeem its shares out of capital, out of borrowed money, but the most 
usual fund is called the "reduction surplus" 5. 
1. Cf, e.g. New York, § 28 (1) ; Pennsylvania, s.705 (A); Wisconsin, s.180.58 (1). 
Such shares are usually restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares, 
The amount of stated capital attributable to such a share shall be determined by 
dividing the stated capital by the number of shares of the class or series out- 
standing immediately prior to the acquisition of the share by the company. 
Cf. also California, s.1710 and New York, § 28 (2). 
20 Cf, e.g. Louisiana, s.45 (2) ; New York, § 28 (2) ; Washington, s.23.16,130, 
30 Cf, e.g, California, s, 1708 (3). 
4. Cf. e.g, Indiana, s,30 ; Michigan, s. 450.37 (1). 
5. Cf. e.g. California, ss,1906 -1910 ( "reduction surplus account "); Michigan, ss.450.37 
and 450.43 (2) : mentioned indirectly only ; New York, §§ 28 (1)(3) and 36 (4)(c) ; 
Louisiaba, s. 45 45 (Iv). Cf, D.E.Bennett, op.cit., pp. 500 ff.; Callahan, "Statutory 
protection of creditors in Reduction of capital stock ", in : "Ohio State Law 
Journal ", vol.2 (1941), pp. 220 if 
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Some of the statutes provide for a formal "retiring" of uncalled shares, 
and for a reduction of the capital of the company by an amount equal to the 
capital represented by these retired shares 
le 
Some of the statutes delegate 
to the board the power to retire such shares 
29 
others treat it more on the 
lines of a normal statutory reduction implying either a formal vote of the 
shareholders, or their consent 3. 
All these were the shortened forms of reduction 4, which somehow became 
in American practice the main ones, and overshadow in importance the normal 
type, usually called the "statutory" reductions Compared with other systems 
of law, however, the latter is much easier and simpler, since the protection 
of the creditors' interests is much less emphasized 5, and the role of the 
courts and officials in checking the advisability of a reduction is 
comparatively small. 
Almost all statutes provide the possibility of reducing the capital either 
by diminishing the number of shares or by diminishing the par value of the 
shares. The initiative lies usually with the board, who in a resolution set 
forth the amount and the manner of the reduction. The approval by vote or 
consent of the holders of the majority of all issued shares, or a qualified 
majority, is quite essential 
6. 
The statutes usually allow a surplus 
le Dodd- Baker, p.1264. 2. New York, § 28 (1); Washington, s.23.16.130. 
3. California, ss.1904 (1), 1905 (b), 1906 (1). 
4. Cf. serra, pp.179 ff. 
So E.C.Lasseigne, "Recapitalization and Reorganization .. ", in : TLR, vo1.24, p.326. 
6, California, §§ 1904 -1908 ; Illinois, § 59 ; Indiana, s.24 (a), s,26 (d)(e); Louisia- 
na, 8.45 ( a majority of two thirds at a "duly for that purpose" called meeting); 
iassachusets, S 41 ; Michigan, 8.450.43 ; New York, § 35 (2)(C)(4), § 35 (4), 
and 
37 (1)(C)(1); Pennsylvania, s.706 (A); 
Washington, s. 23.16.120; Wisconsin, s.180e51 
( a majority of two thirds). 
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created through a reduction to be distributed among the shareholders 1. 
This case is in practice the only one where the interests of the present, 
and, in some cases, of future creditors also may be affected 2. In all 
other cases, however, the reduction of capital may be merely a means of 
eliminating or absorbing a present deficit created by operating losses, or 
a shrinkage in asset values 3, or of eliminating depreciation or fixed 
charges, or merely a financial plan to prevent a deficit 4; that is why, as 
a rule, the creditors are not directly affected 5. Usually the majority 
required for a statutory reduction is exactly the same as for a regular 
to Dodd -Baker, p.1279. 
2. Theoretically the creditors may also be interested in a reduction where shares have 
been only partly paid up, where the reduction applies exclusively to a diminishing 
of the liability of subscribing shareholders concerning uncalled shares. 
Cf.: Callahan, "Statutory protection of creditors .. ", in : "Ohio State Law Journal ", 
vol.2 (1941),pp.220 -225 ; G.R.Carpenter, "Reduction of capital stock - disposal of 
the resulting surplus ", in : "Texas Law and Legislation" (1947), pp.276 -285 ; E.H. 
Warren, "Safeguarding the creditors of corporations ", in : HLR, vol.36 (1923), pp. 
509- 538 ;9.W.Wickersham, "The capital of a corporation ", in : HLR, vol.22 (1909), 
pp.319 -338. 
3. E.C.Lasseigne, op.cit., p. 325. 
4. There may be various economic backgrounds to such a reduction : a deficit caused by 
the company's operations, discrepancy between the value of the assets on the company's 
books and the actual cost:., inadequacy of prior reserves for depreciation or deplet- 
ion, or an extraordinary loss not compensated by insurance. Cf.DE.Bennettt "Remodel- 
ing, Merger and Dissolution .. ", in : "Louisiana Law Review ", vol.3 (1941), p.498 ; 
Dodd -Baker, p. 1280. 
5. Nevertheless the creditors may be indirectly affected by the impact a reduction may 
have on the "freedom" of the company after such a reduction, either to pay dividends 
or to purchase out of the "reduction surplus fund" or the future earnings of the 
company shares in order to redeem them. These are the most widely spread causes of 
recent reductions in American companies. Notwithstanding such an impairing of 
the 
creditors` interests there is practically no legal way given 
to the creditors to 
interfere with such types of reduction. Cf.D.E.Bennett, op.cit., 
p.500 ; Dodd -Baker, 
P.1280 ; E.C.Lasseigne, op.cit., p. 326. 
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amendment of the charter.Only a few states now require a qualified majority 
for a decision on reduction 1, and even fewer provide for a quorum 2. In 
some statutes there is a provision in specific cases for a qualified majority 
of, say, two thirds of all issued shares of any class or series, often re- 
gardless of any limitations or restrictions imposed on the voting power, 
attaching to them, e.g.: 
a) if the dividend rate is to be reduced, 
b) if previously issued shares are to be made non -cumulative as to dividends, 
c) if the redemption price of the shares is to be reduced, 
d) if their financial preference in case of a winding -up is to be reduced,or 
e) if pre -emptive rights are to be reduced or altered 3. 
Some states provide for a minimum limit of reduction, forbidding the 
capital to be reduced to an amount "less than the aggregate preferential 
amounts payable upon all issued shares having a preferential right in the 
assets of the corporation in the event of involuntary liquidation,plus the 
aggregate par value of all issued shares having a par value but no prefer- 
ential right in the assets of the corporation in the event of involuntary 
liquidation" 4. Only a very few states provide for a legal minimum capital 
1. Cf. e.g. Wisconsin, 5.180.51. Cf. K.K.Luce, "Legislative amendment of corporation 
statutes - the Wisconsim problem ", in : "Marquette Law Review ", vo1.30 (1946). 
PP. 20 ff.; G.Young, "Some comments on the new WisconsinBusiness Corporation Law ", 
in : "Wisconsin Law Review ", (1952), pp. 5 ff. 
2. Cf. e.g. California, 3.2211. 
3, Cf. e.g. California s.3634. Cf.G.L.Stirling, "Amendments to Californian Corporation 
Laws 1937 Readjusting stock structure ", in: "California Law Review ",vo1.26 (1938), 
P.80. 
4. Wisconsin s.180.60 (2). On similar, though not quite identical lines : Illinois, 
Louisiana and some other states. Louisiana (s.45), New York (§ 37, 3a) and. Washing- 
ton (s. 23.16.120) applied here the same principle as in the case of redemption (cf. 
supra pp.237 -238). Cf. D.E.Bennett, op.cit., p.499 ; Dodd -Baker, p.1285. 
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below which no reduction may go 1. 
The latest development of American jurisprudence indicates a differ- 
' entiation within the notion "reduction ", which may be considered as a 
parallel to similar differentiations in Scots and English Law 2, and in 
German Law 3. While the old term continues to be used for any type of 
diminution of capital by the vote of the requisite majority in general 
meeting, at the same time - redemption, retirement and purchase, i.e. the 
types which are in the powwr of the board, are being split off in one 
direction, and recapitalization and reorganization 4 in the opposite 
direction. There are, of course, no strict limits yet fixed between the 
latter two types, and they are not yet accepted as new forms of alteration 
of capital in the etxts of American statutes, but it appears that recapital- 
ization covers alterations in the structure of capital without a strict 
reduction of the capital 5, though requiring a qualified majority to accept 
the amendment, whereas reorganization usually also involves a more radical 
change in the structure of the capital and the debts of the company, which 
could not be carried through without an alteration of the capital. These are 
still financial rather than legal notions, a recapitalization being usually 
considered as a prelude to a reorganization, or a means of avoiding it, or 
1 T.E.Atkinson, " Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika", in : "Rechtsvergl.Handwçrterbuch far 
Zivil_ und Handelsrecht", vol.I, part 2, Berlin 1929, p.693. 
Cf. also supra pp. 178, 185, 192 and 203. 
2. Cf saps p. 89, 3. Cf. supra p. 182, note 2. 
40 Dodd -Baker, pp. 1286 ff.; E.C.Lasseigne, "Recapitalization and Reorganization of 
Corporations under Louisiana Corporation Law ", in : TLR, vol.24 (1949), pp.320 -341; 
Rutledge, "Significant trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes ", in : "Washington 
University Law Quarterly ", vol.22 , pp.305 -337. 
5. Cf. su ra p. 60. 
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a milder form of reorganization 
1. 
Cases where a reduction was carried 
through without a change in the voting power, or a change in the dividend 
rate were therefore sometimes called "quasi -reorganization" 
2. 
Some other 
authors tried to classify as a new type of alteration those cases where the 
statutes provide for class- voting, calling them "readjustment of stock" 3. 
Curious and typical of American Company Law is the institution of 
appraisal Some of the statutes provide that a shareholder who is not 
assenting to a fundamental corporate change is entitled to demand the fair 
cash value of his shares 5. Sometimes this rule is only applied to cases of 
merger and consolidation 6, but ih other statutes it applies to all cases 
where preferences are altered. A series of qualifications considerably 
limiting the applicability of this institution is found. One of them is 
indirectly connected with those types of reduction where a qualified majorit 
is required, another requires that the company must be able to "meet its 
liabilities" at the moment of the alteration opposed by dissenting share- 
holders, and a third excludes the right of appraisal in cases where 80% or 
more of the voting power have voted in favour of the suggested alteration Î 
lo E.C.Lasseigne, op.cit., p.320. 
2. Dodd- Baker, p. 1286, note 1. 
3. G.L.Stirling, "Amendments to Californian Corporation Laws 1937 : Readjusting stock 
structure ", in : "California Law Review ", vol.26 (1938), p.79. 
4. This institution of appraisal may have slightly influenced s. 287 of the C.A. of 
1948 ( 11 and 12 Gee VI, c.38). 
Cf. also : A.C.Becht, "Corporate Charter Amendments : issues of prior stock and 
alteration of dividend rates ", in : CLR, vol.50 (1950), p.923. 
5. Louisiana., s.52 ; Massachusets, s.46 ; Pennsylvania, s.810 ; Washington, s.1600 
6, E. g. California and Indiana. 
DE.Bennett, "Remodeling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisiana Corporations : a criti- 
cal survey ", in : "Louisiana Law Review ", vol.3 (1941), pp.482 ff., and p.493. 
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The terms and formalities of a formal claim for appraisal are usually very 
strict, though there is a recent trend to abolish them or to make them more 
easy and less formal 1. Some attention has recently been given to the 
question of the acquisition of these shares, and whether, if at all, pre- 
emptive rights could be operated in these cases 2. It is worth while noting 
that this institution of appraisal has some traits in common with the 
Italian Law right of dissenting shareholders to ask for their proportionaly 
satisfaction 3 
1. Dodd -Baker, p. 1334. 
2. J.J.Kaplan, "Problems in the acquisition of shares of dissenting minorities ", in : 
"Boston University Law Review ", vol.34 (1954), pp. 291 ff. 
3. Cf. Aura p. 210. 
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9. L i e c h t e n s t e i n° 
The tiny Principality of Liechtenstein has earned some measure of fame 
in connection with its strikingly modern legislation le It had inevitably 
been doubted whether there was enough economic background for a highly 
developed legislation, since its ten thousand rural inhabitants grouped 
into wine growing and cattle keeping communities in a total area of less 
than 60 sq.m. 2 would scarecely suggest this. The opposite point of view 
was that its law, especially concerning holding companies and their 
taxation, is nothing else than a means of attracting foreign capital 
seeking cheaper countries for a formal domiciliation of their companies, 
and of "making the little principality of Liechtenstein the Delaware of 
Europe" 3. 
The impact of American Law was apparent on the Civil Code of 1926, which 
following the single codex principle of Swiss Law, covered also commercial 
and company law. The company law of this code contained all the latest 
features of a liberal company law of American origin : the principles of 
"authorized capital ", no-par-value shares, increase of capital before the 
previously issued shares were fully paid up, etc. A great many of these 
features of the law of Liechtenstein have since then become common property 
1. E.Beck, "Liechtenstein ", in : "Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch far Zivil - und 
Handelsrecht" (ed.by F.Schlegelberger;, vol,I, part 1, Berlin 1927, pp. 117 ff. 
2. Rauch, vol.I, pp. 93 -94 
3° A.R.Feller, "The movement for corporate reform : a world -wide phenomenon ", in : 
"American Bar Association Journal ", vol.20 (1934), p.348. 
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to almost all the legislations of Europe, and so the advantages of some of 
them have perkaps partly faded away. This study is not particularly con- 
cerned with the taxation side of holding companies which continue to re- 
gister in Liechtenstein in surprisingly great numbers and give the in- 
habitants an almost tax -free life by supplying the state a never -ceasing 
source of income. The provisions on alteration of capital may interest us 
only as a comparatively early reception of ideas of American Law. 
The style, though not so much the content, of the Civil Code of Liech- 
tenstein is very much like Swiss Law 1. Sections 261 -367 are devoted to 
limited companies 2. The principle of no-par-value shakes is provided for 
in one of the first declaratory sections 3. The institution of authorized 
capital 4 is treated as a sub -type of limited company 5. The Law of Liech- 
tenstein, following an American idea, provides that the capital in these 
companies may not only be raised up to a sum mentioned in the charter, but 
also diminished (without any formalities and decisions in general meeting) 
down to another minimum mentioned in the charter. The provision that in the 
case of such a diminution of the capital of such a "variable" company the 
sum of the liabilities and of the remaining capital must always be above 
the total of the assets 6 is suggestive og an American origin. 
1. ArminjonNolde- Wolff, vol.II, pp. 220 and 417. 
2. "Das Personen - und Gesellschaftsrecht ... vom 20.Jänner 1926 ", ( being part III 
of the "Liechtensteinisches Zivilgesetzbuch "), Vaduz (s.a.,after 1928),pp.142 -198. 
3. .Art. 262, 4. G. : " ... verä,nderliches Einlagekapital ". 
5. Art. 361 -367, 6. Art. 363 (1). 
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Like Swiss Law, the law of Liechtenstein deals with the "normal" type 
of increase of capital in the third, or "C ", sub- division of the chapter, 
bearing a very similar heading "The protection of the sharecapital and of 
the shareholders" It provides for an increase of capital by issuing new 
2 
shares with or without a simultaneous reduction Unless mentioned in the 
charter, no quorum or qualified majorities are required 3. The previously 
issued shares need not be fully paid up, but in the case where the previous 
shares were issued below par the difference has to be made up from surplus 
or reserves 
before a new issue of similar type can be effected. Qualified 
increase by issuing new shares is provided for 4, although the formalities 
surrounding the general meeting necessary thereto are strictly to be observed 
- a two thirds quorum, and a two thirds majority are both required, and 
further, shareholders participating in the invecta et illata are void of 
their voting rights and are considered as unpresent at this general meeting. 
An unusual provision of this sub -division is the rule enumerating the 
cases where an issue of new shares, or an exchange of share -documents may 
be effected without cash or any other consideration 5. This list contains 
the following cases 
1. 
Art. 292 -306. 2. Art. 295. 
3. A quorum of two thirds in a "first" meeting and of only one third in a "second" one 
is provided in Art. 294 for all general meetings deciding on an extension of busi- 
ness (G. : "EPWejterung des Geschgftsbereichs "), or narrowing down (G.: "Verengerung ") 
or amalgamation. It is nowhere, however, laid down whether that applies to an in- 
crease of capital also. I rather think it does not. A majority of three quarters of 
all present and of two thirds of all the shares of the capital is provided for in 
Art, 293 (3) for all amendments of the charter cancelling provisions containing 
restrictive requirements ccincerning general meeting decisionso 
4. Art. 296 (1). 5. Art. 297e 
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1. an increase in compensation of a debt, 
2. issue of new shares against debentures, 
3. increase of the amount of issued shares out of reserves or surplus 1, 
4. readjustment of the nominal value of the shares, especially in the case 
of : a) an inflation of the currency 2, or 
b) a transfer of "silent" reserves 3, 
5. reduction of the nominal amount of the shares 4, 
6. translation of the capital or a part of it 5 into an alien currency, 
7. translation of the nominal value of the shares into an alien currency, 
8. exchange of preference shares against common stock 
6. 
The same sub -division contains provisions for gratis shares 7, and pre- 
emptive rights 
8 
This last provision is curious in many respects. Firstly, 
a quite unusual feature is that the charter may impose on some shareholders9 
the o b l i g a t i o n to subscribe for new shares 10. Secondly, Swiss- 
American jurisprudence and theory have apparently influenced the text of 
this section to a remarkable amount, since pre -emptive rights were defined 
1. G. "Aufstempelungen oder Aufhöhungen ". 
20 It is submitted that this is the only known case where a possible inflation of the 
currency is anticipated in a statute. 
30 G. : "Aufwertung oder Aufnumerierung ". 
4. G. : "Abstempelung oder Abwertung ". 
5. This is, again, a unique case where the capital of a company may be expressed in, 
say, two or three different currencies. 
6, G. "Stammaktien". 7. Art. 302. 
8. Art, 303. 
9. Not to holders of share warrants, only to "Namensaktionäre ". 
10, G. : 
" Bezugspflicht ". Cf. the marginal notes to Art. 303, and Art.303 (4). 
Árt.303 (5) 
Bezugspflicht ist eine Last ...". Cf. Hallstein, p.189 
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as "awaiting rights in order to procure new shares" 1, and as "an in- 
gredient part and not (sic :) proceeds of the share" as an imaginary 
quota of the capital 
2. 
'Thirdly, it is provided that pre -emptive rights, 
though only if limited to a particular issue and with the permit given by 
a state authority, may be promised even prior to the general meeting 
deciding on the increase 3. 
The "normal" type of reduction is dealt with in another, the eighth or 
"H ", sub- division of the same chapter 4, bearing the marginal heading : 
"Repayment and other reductions of the share capital ". A repayment is 
permissible only if all the rules regarding a repayment of capital in the 
case of a winding -up are complied with, unless a sufficient amount of 
assets to cover all liabilities is left over, or a new "cushion" of 
reserves is created for this purpose 5, or the sanction of the creditors 
to the proposed reduction is to hand, 
Finally, the following miscellaneous points should also be noted. : 
As in Swiss Law an induciae of six months is provided for, but only for 
a reduction without repayment 6. An unusual feature of these provisions is 
the rule concerning a shortened form of reduction 7. A board of directors 
is according to this rule entitled to reduce capital (without a decision 
1. G. 
" 
2. Art. 303 
3. Art. 303 
anwartschaftlighes Recht auf dEn Bezug neuer Aktien ". 
(1)(5) : " ... Teil der Aktie, jedoch keine Frucht ..." 
(3), 4. Art. 355 -360. 
5. This idea is, again, of American provenience, 
6. G.: 
" .. blosse Herabsetzung ". 7. Art. 356. Cf. supra pp. 179, 239 and 242. 
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in general meeting and without complying with all the provisions concerning 
an amendment of charter and repayment), and to repay a fractionlif the 
share amount, provided only that this amount remains the liability of the 
shareholders 
2. 
A reduction -cum- cwnver_sion is permissible only with the 
consent of the shareholders 30 A reduction by redemption is provided for 4. 
The law of Liechtenstein provides also for a readjustment of the nominal 
amount of the shares without an alteration of capital, though it must 
comply with all the regulations on amendment of the charter 5. 
These regulations, though they may have seemed very up -to -date in the 
late twenties, are in some respect quite old fashioned when we compare them 
with the latest developments in American Law. 
1, The reduced amount of capital should in no circumstances 
be smaller than 20% of the 
previous amount in case of name shares (G.: "Namensaktien "), 
or 50% in case of 
share warrants. 
2' G. : " Vorbehalt der Wiedereinzahlung". Cf. supra p. 94, 
note 2. 
... 
3. Art. 3570 
4. Art. 358 -360. 
5o Art. 264-265. 
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10. S w e d e n. 
The general origins of Swedish Law are Germanic. There was, of course, 
some influence of Roman Law too 1, but it was never accepted as current law 
as it was e.g. in Germany up to 1900 2, and in Latvia up to 1938. Foreign 
law, however, , makes very little impact now, especially as regards Family 
Law, Law of Inheritance, and Law regarding Immovebles and Movebles,although 
there is an exception to this in the field of Commercial Law 3, Attempts to 
achieve unification of law within Scandinavian countries, starting in the 
eighties of the nineteenth century 4, were not always favorable for borrow- 
ing alien matter into Swedish Law. The impact of modern German jurisprudence 
and of the theoretical approach to legal problems was less apparent in 
Sweden than in Denmark and Norway 5' 
Special statutes regarding limited companies were published in 1848, on 
28th June 1895, on 12th August 1910 
6 
, and on 14th September 1944. Up to 
1. Cf. Ph.H(ult), "Storia del diritto Svedese ", in : " Enciclopedia Italian ", vo1.33, 
Rome 1937, pp.69 ff.; Toynbee, vol.VII, p. 286. 
2. H.Munch- Petersen, "Main features of Scandinavian Law ", in : LQR,vol.43 (1927) ,pp.366 ff. 
3. K.Olivecrona, "Schweden. ", in : "Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch far Zivil- und 
Handelsrecht" (ed.by F.Schlegelberger), vol.I, part 1, Berlin 1927, pp, 218 ff. 
4. Förhandlinger vid andra nordiska juristmötet i Stockholm, Stockholm 
1876 ; L.B.Or- 
field, The Growth of Scandinavian Law, Philadelphia 1953, pp.60 ff., pp.107 -112, 
Pp. 210 -212, pp. 302-306. 
4. H.Munch- Petersen, op.cit., p. 366. 
6. Almost simultaneously with a similar law in Norway. Cf. 
C.Haffner, Das norwegische 
Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften vom 19 Juli 1910, 
verglichen mit dem deutschen 
Recht, Erlangen 1913 ; K.Lehmann, "Norwegisches Gesetz aber Aktiengesellschaften und 
Komanditgesellschaften auf Aktien" , in : ZHR, vol.69 (1911), pp.502 ff.; and 
Rauch, vol.I, p.820 
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1895 the principle of "concessions" by the state was the leading factor, 
but some signs of relaxation of this principle became apparent already in 
1891, and after that as well. The law of 1910 was in some respects drafted 
on the lines of the German HGB : the general impression was that it was a 
simplified edition of the German system 1, though in some questions a more 
complex approach was adopted, partly perhaps to facilitate the supervision 
of the companies by the state. The Germans always tried to consider Swedish 
Company Law as a modification of German Company Law 2, but this is perhaps 
only true in part. 
Alteration of the charter required under the law of 1910 a qualified 
majority 3, but when a variation of the rights of the shareholders had to 
be considered, unanimity was necessary 4. Besides the usual increase by 
issuing new shares, an increase out of surpluses 5 was provided for then, 
and, though not explicitly 6, an increase by augmentation of the nominal 
amount of the shares also. An issue of new shares was possible only after 
1. It was asserted that the Scandinavian characteristic was a "precocious freshness and 
originality and a precocious clarity and rationalism" (Toynbee,vol.VII, p.446,note 3). 
One may agree that that applies also to a legal clarity of expression, at least in 
comparison with the German mode of expression. 
2. F.Crusius, Ein Vergleich zwischen dem deutschen und schwedischen Aktienrecht, Erlan- 
gen 1926 ; Hamburger, p.84 ; I.Strahl, in : "Annuario di diritto comparato", vol.VI, 
part 1,(1931), 
3 § 91. Cf. also : F.Guse, Die Grúndung einer Aktiengesellschaft, die Kapitalerhöhung 
und Kapitalherabsetzung in den skandinavischen Aktiengesetzen im Vergleich mit den 
Bestimmungen des deutschen Handelsgesetzbuchs, Freiburg i.Br.1923. 
4. Hamburger, p. 85. 
5. This was a novelty then, since the law of 1895 completely omitted such a possibility 
Cf. § 47 (5). 
6 
Cf. infra p. 255, note 4. 
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the rior ones were fully 
1 
P , paid. up A resolution in general meeting, or, 
at least, a sanction by the general meeting of a resolution made by the 
board of directors 2 was considered essential even in cases of an alteration 
within the framework of authorized capital 3, the only exception being that 
a qualified majority was not necessary when the total amount of capital was 
kept below the sum adopted as authorized capital . Pre -emptive rights were 
recognized in principle 4. The process of an increase had to be completed 
within one year 5. Formation of a company and an increase of capital were 
generally considered analogous, more or less on the lines of German Law, 
Reduction of capital 6 without consent by the court was possible only where 
redeemable shares were concerned. The pre -requisites of consent by the court 
were as follows : 
1. a valid resolution in general meeting in accordance with all the 
requirements concerning an alteration of the charter 7, 
2. formal publication of such a resolution, 
3. securing of payment of the full amount of the creditors' debts or claims, 
4. (in the case of multiformity of shares) a valid resolution in those 
class meetings which would be affected by the redemption of shares, or 
by the reduction of capital 
8. 
1. 
§ 35. Cf. Hallstein, p.183. 2. Hallstein, p. 184. 
3. s 35 ( iii ), and § 46. 4. §§ 39 -40, and § 47 (7). Cf. Hallstein, p.190 
5. § 44. Cf. Hallstien, p. 186, 
6. A special law concerning reduction of capital was issued on 28th March, 
1924. 
1. § 93 (1). Cf. Hallstein, p.194. 





The present Law on Limited Companies - came into force on 1st January, 
1948. This law, though in many respects following traditional lines, is 
evidently under the influence of recent American legislation, especially 
in the abundance of detail, surpassing in this respect the older Swedish 
statutes, and the German laws of 1900 and 1937. Whereas the law of Liech- 
tenstein shows an influence of some early ideas of American origin, this 
Swedish companies act indicates an impact of American statutes of the late 
thirties. 
Twenty two sections ( §' 48 -69) are entirely devoted to questions con- 
cerning alteration of capital 
2. 
These twenty two sections cover almost ten 
pages of the Swedish statute book 3, or almost eighteen pages of the Amer- 
ican translation of it 4. Unlike the stress put upon reduction by Scots 
and English Law, there are more regulations about increase than reduction 5 
Though the greater part of the subdivision on "increasing the capital 
stock" 6 is devoted to the standard type of increase, i.e. the increase by 
a new issue of shares 7, there are two sections 8, which regulate the 
1. Svensk Fórfattningssamling, No.705, 2nd Nov.,1944 A translation by American 
lawyers was published in 1949 by the Svenska Handelsbanken, Stockholm (s.a., 1949). 
2. There are besides other provisions scattered through the Companies Act. 
Cf. infra pp. 261 ff. 
3. Svensk Fórfattningssamling, 1944, No.705, pp.1492 -1501. 
40 The Swedish Stock Corporation Act, Stockholm (s.a., 1949). , pp.33 -51. 
5. Cf. s pp. 71, 87 and 236. 
6. The "Foreword" to the American edition of the Swedish Companies Act stresses that 
the translators have generally adopted the American legal phraseology although in 
many cases the Swedish original is textually nearer to the English usage.Thus, e.g. 
the Swedish "aktiekapital" is, of course, terminologically nearer to the English 
term "share capital" than to the American "capital stock ". 
7. 48 -62. 
8. §§ 63_64. 
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increase of capital by decision of the board l ( § 63), and increase by 
stock dividend 2. Since both these minor types of increase are nonetheless 
visualizing an issue of new shares 3, they seem to embody varieties in 
procedure rather than in structure 4. Unlike Scots and English Law 5, all 
details are elaborately set out in the Battute book, and the whole style of 
Swedish Companies Act is much more reminiscent of American statutes. 
A resolution in general meeting 
6 
and authorization by the articles 7 
1. The Swedish text throughout calls the Board of Directors, simply and in one word, 
"styrelse ", which is inconsistently translated sometimes as "board of directors ", 
and sometimes as board only 
2. Since the headings of the different sections are an invention of the American trans- 
lators, one should be careful in adopting this technical term "stock dividend ", 
although it is familiiar in America (cf. supra pp. 231 ff.), since the Swedish text 
does not have any particular name for this variety of increase. Cf. infra p. 260 . 
3. Cf. § 63 (5), and § 64 (1)(4) and (2)(3 -4). 
4. Rauch (vol.I, p.82) imagined that an increase of capital simply by augmentation of 
the nominal value of shares and without issuing shares was still possible. He thought 
however, that the actual text of the statute did not explicitly mention this 
possibility, being apparently not aware of the wording of S 133 (I and IV), where 
the possibility of an increase or reduction of the amount "for which ... may be 
issued" was provided for, 
5. Cf. supra p.p. 71 -72. 
6. Swedish : "bola, g sstámma ". The American translation of it "meeting of the sharehold- 
ers" (§ 48, part 1) is not quite correct since the word "shareholders" (Swedish : 
"aktieigare ") is not used at all in this place. A better rendering of the Swedish 
term for general meeting is given, e.g., in § 41 ( "meeting of the corporation "), or 
in § 114. The term "meeting of the corporation" is mush more adequate to the status 
of a limited company as a legal entity than the rather informal "meeting of the 
shareholders ". 
7. Swedish 
: "bolagsordningen ". American translation : "By laws ". They correspond more 
or less to the "articles of association" of Scots and English Law. The "articles of 
incorporation" S 6 , Swedish : "stiftelseurkunden ") correspond to the "memorandum 
of association ", but the "memorandum of incorporation" ( 11 , Swedish : "stiftelse - 
n órelsens i.e. advertisement of the formation) is rather a Swedish peculiarity, 
and means only a statement for publicity purposes. 
Cf. supra pp. 216 and 223, note 7. 
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are the main pre- requisites in Swedish Law. Unlike Scots and English Law 1 
a resolution uno flatu covering the amendment of the articles and the in- 
crease of capital itself is not admissible 2 There are special provisions 
about unanimity and majority requirements in the case of an amendment 3, 
The extremely detailed provisions regarding the official proposal 4 of the 
board concerning the increase ( a statement of opinion signed by all the 
members of the board is needed) and the publicity to be attached to it 5 
may well seem to us to be strange. The contents of the resolution 6 
regarding the projected increase are provided for in full detail 7. There 
have to be mentioned : 1. the amount of increase, 
2. the classing of the new shares, 
3. the preference rights 8, as provided in the Com- 
panies Act or in the charter, 
4. the period within which all preferential purchases 
of new shares can be made by the shareholders 9, 
1. Cf. supra p. 73, note 1. 2. § 48 (1). 
3. §§ 133 -134. 
4. Swedish : "F3rslap ". The American translation renders that not quite correctly as 
"draft resolution ", though s. 802 of Corporation Laws of Pennsylvania (( 1951) uses 
the more exact "proposal of amndment". "Motion" or "suggestion" would be also a 
much nearer equivalent. 
5° Filing of the whole set of balance sheets, of the profit and loss accounts, and of 
different statements for inspection at the office of the corporation. Cf. S 48 (2). 
6. Swedish 
: "beslutet ". Cf. supra p. 228, note 1. 
7° § 49. 
8. The Swedish "fóretrádesrátt" corresponds more to the usual "pre -emptive right" than 
the translation in the above mentioned edition, which speaks about "preferential 
rights ". The usual American term is still : "pre -emptive rights". 
9. Cf. also §§ 54 -55. 
and 
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5. the par value and the prise of the shares 1 , 
6. the method of allotment in case of an over -subscription, 
7. the moment when the dividend rights of the new shares 
will begin to operate. 2 
Contrary to the older Swedish law, the Companies Act of 1944 does not 
provide strictly that the whole previous capital has to be fully paid up, 
but only that the amount of shares registered as fully paid 3 has to be 
stated in the resolution_, The resolution may provide for a minimum amount 4 
in the case of an under- subscription that would have a binding effect on 
the act of subscription This same section also provides for the 
possibility of a reduction -cum -- increase 6. Special attention is given 
to qualified increase 7. 
As regards formalities, a resolution on increase has to be filed 
with the registrar 
8 
Since the only recognized procedure regarding 
increase is that by subscription 9, increase by simultaneous promotion 10 
being unknown, it is provided that the text of the subscription lists 
and the appropriate publication has to be approved by the registrar 
11, 
1. Cf, supra p,54; p. 80, note 1 ; and p. 228. 
2. Cf. supra p. 59. 3, § 49 (2). 
4. § 49 (3). 
5. Though this seems to be a non -obligatory requisite of the resolution on increase, 
it is a very important one : if such a minimum is mentioned in the resolution, 
shorter terms of payment are applicable, but if such minimum is not mentioned, 
the provisions about amendment of the charter (§ 7) come into operation with all 
their rigidity in almost all cases, 
6° 
§ 49 (4) and § 65. 7. § 7 and § 60(2). 
8, § 51. 9, §§ 52 and 57. 
10, ó 190 (2)(1). 11. § 53. 
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and his approval may not be granted before the resolution for an in- 
crease 1 has been registered 2. Further, it is necessary to announce 
in the offfcial gazette and in a local newspaper that the increase has 
been completed 3. 
Contrary to Scots and English Law 4, pre -emptive rights are still 
provided for in the Swedish Companies Act 5, though they are somewhat 
weakened in two directions - by the rttYier uncertain phrase "insofar as 
it is possible" 6, and by a cross -reference to the charter in case of a 
multiformity of shares 7. As in German law, special provision is made 
regarding fractional pre -emptive rights 8, i.e. regulating the case 
where pre -emptive rights "vested in one old share do not cover one or 
more new shares ". A special certificate for fractional subscription 
rights was introduced 9. If such certificates were issued, they must 
be surrendered at the time of the subscription for the new shares. 
Special formalities are provided for the procedure of subscription 
10. 
In the case of a qualified increase the subscription list may not be 
opened until at least two weeks have elapsed after the announcement 11 
1. § 51. 2. § 190 (2)(1). 
3. § 54. 4. Cf. supra pp. 77 ff. 
0 
5 § 55, 6. Swedish : " ... i den man det kan ske ... ". 
7. Concerning those companies with different classes of shares, the position of 
Swedish Law is similar to that in Britain in one respect : the provisions of 
the charter are decisive. Cf. supra pp. 57 and 77. 
8, § 56. 9. Swedish : " teckningsrittsbevis ". 
10. § 57. 
11. Swedish "kungórelsen" was translated as "memorandum of association" in §§ 11 and 17 
but as "announcement" in §§ 52 and 54, though the Swedish terms used in all these 
places are almost identical. 
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has been inserted in the newspapers 
1. 
Conditional subscription is 
invalid unless it is especially provided for in the charter and re- 
ferred to in the formal resolution on increase 2. Immediately after 
the closing of the subscription list follows the allotment of the new 
shares 3, which is usually left to the discretion of the board of di- 
rectors 4. Unlike Scots and English Law, there is a time limit in the 
Swedish Companies Act 5 within which the newly issued shares must be 
fully paid. This time limit is usually one year, but in the case where 
a subscription minimum is provide for 6 a special report has to be 
filed with the registrar within six months' time 7. Special provisions 
concerning a qualified increase "by compensation" are also made in this 
connection 8. Within six months after the expiry of the period fixed for 
making payments for the new shares another report has to be filed with 
the registrar, namely, about the shares fully paid -up 9, and minute 





is entitled to increase the capital subject to approval 
in general meeting, but the resolution 12 of the board has to be approved 
§ 58 (2). 1. § 17 N. 2. 
3. § 59. 4. § 49 (1)(6). 
5. § 6o. § 49 (3). 
7. § 61. 8. § 60 (2). 
9. § 62 (1)(1). 
lo, Especially particulars about considerations other than cash. 
11. Cf. supra p.255, note 1. 
12. Swedish : "beslut ". The American translation renders 
that as "decision," when 
speaking about the resolution of the board, but as "resolution" 
when speaking 
about the general meeting. The Swedish text, however, uses the same word in 
both cases. 
by the registrar 
1, 
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However, the new shares cannot be entered in the 
9 
register before the general meeting has approved the resolution of 
the board 3. 
Swedish Company law explicitly regulates the increase of capital by 
way of transfer of existing surpluses 4. If the company possesses 
undistributed profits which have not been set aside to a reserve fund, 
or to a debt -adjustment fund, a transfer of this profit to the capital 
account is permissible 5. Minute provisions follow concerning the 
proposal being made available for inspection 6, the right of the holders 
of "previous" shares 7 to have t h e s e new shares allocated to them 8, 
and the publication of the resolution 9, its filing and registration. 
Neither fractional scrip certificates ZO, nor certificates for new shares 
may be issued to shareholders before the registration of This resolution, 
or before the shareholders have presented the share -certificates on which 
this right is based 11. 
1. §63 (2). 2. Swedish : " godkánnanda ". 
3. § 63 (5)0 4. § 64. Cf. ,supra p.231 and p. 255, note 2. 
5. This was not a new idea in Swedish Law, since it was based more or less on the 
provisions of § 47 of the Companies Act of 1910, Rauch (vol.I, p.82 and p.132, 
note 1) had presumably not noticed the difference in naming the fund : while 
formerly it was the "rejuvenation" fund (Swedish : "f6rnyelsefond ") , it is 
now the "debt- adjustment" fund (Swedish : "skuldregleringsfond "). 
6. § 64 (1)(3), 7. Swedish : "f3rutvarande aktier ". 
8. Though there is a similarity between pre -emptive rights and these rights, 
the Act 
stresses the difference by adopting another terminology : here 
the right of the 
shareholder is called the acquisition right (Swedish: "erh.11a 
"), instead of the 
"pre- purchase right" (Swedish: "f6retridesrátt"). Cf. 
supra p. 256, note 8. 
Cf. § 55 (second sentence) and § 64 (1)(4)(second sentence). 
9. § 64 (2). 11. § 64 (2)(4). 
10. Swedish 
: "delbevis ", again different from "teckningsráttsbevis" 




As mentioned above 1, this chapter 2 is not the only place in the 
Swedish Companies Act where questions on increase of capital are dealt 
with. A chapter on amendments of the charter 3 contains minute regulat- 
ions about the cases where such amendments also involve an alteration 4 
of the rights attached to all 5 or certain shares. In some cases 
unanimity is required, in other cases a majority of at least nine 
tenths 6, but in cases where such an alteration of rights 4 is linked 
with increase of capital, a majority of two thirds in two successive 
meetings 7 is necessary, or in the case of a multiformity of shares, 
three quarters in two successive meetings in all classes concerned 8, 
Another group of special provisions concerning increase of capital 
can be found in the chapter on existing restrictions on acquiring shares 
in certain cases, and concerning certain groups of persons 9. If such 
restrictions exist, reference to them is needed in the resolution 10, in 
the certificate for subscription rights 11, in the report sent to the re- 
gistrar 12, and in the fractional scrip certificates 3. The registration 
office luis power to grant or to refuse approval in cases where the 
company intends to increase its capital 
14. 
1. Cf. supra p. 254, note 2. 
3. §§ 133 -137. 
2. §§ 48 - 64. 
4. It is curious to note that the American translation uses two different verbs : 
"to alter" (e.g. in the first sentence of § 133) and "to affect" (5 133, I 4), 
while the Swedish text uses only one term - "rubbas ". 
5. 
§ 133 (1)(first sentence). 6. § 133 (1)(2). 
7. § 133 (5). 8. § 1 3 (4). 
9. 177 -187. 10. § 182 (1). 
11, § 182 (2) 12. § 183 (1). 
13. § 184 (2). 14. § 190. 
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As mentioned above 1, much less space is devoted to the question of 
reduction of capital 2, and in this respect too there is a similarity 
with American Law Some of the types of reduction are mentioned in § 66 : 
redemption of shares, retirement 4 of shares without repayment to the 
shareholders, reduction of the par -value 5, and consolidation of shares 6 
All reductions may be divided into two groups : with 7 or without 8 
transfer of a corresponding sum to the reserve fund 9. A reduction by 
redemption within the framework of the authorized capital is permissible 
if and as authorized by the charter 
10, 
but if an amendment of the charter 
is required for this purpose, such a reduction must be of the nature of an 
increase- cum -reduction 117 Ar unusual item is the provision that no 
reduction by redemption 12 is possible if the balance sheet for the 
preceding fiscal year shows that after the reduction the reduced amount 
of capital and the corresponding amount of the reserve fund would not be 
adequately covered, or if the sum of the reduced capital, the reserve fund 
and the debt -adjustment fund would be less than the amount of the debts of 
1. Cf. supra p. 254. 2. §§ 65 - 69. 
3. Cf.. supra p. 236. 
4. Sw. : "indragning av aktier ". American influence is evident here again (cf.supra p.239). 
30 Sw.: ".. nominella belopp." 6. Sw. :" sammanlággning 
av aktier ". § 222. 
7. § 68. 8. § 67. 
9. The Swedish text speaks always about "reservfonden ", 
never using the 
descriptive epithet "legal ". 
10. § 65 (1) 11. § 65 (2). 
12. Though the text does not specify explicitly that 
this provision applies only to 
reduction by redemption w i t h i n the framework 
of authorized capital, this is 
evident from the p lace which this provision 
holds in this chapter on Reduction. 
Cf. also the initial sentence of § 66. 
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the company. For this purpose the balance sheet is a necessary part of 
the report that has to be filed with the registration authority. Such a 
reduction by redemption can be decided upon either in general meeting or, 
as may be provided for by the charter, by the board and the managing 
director 
1, 
All other types of reduction, including reduction by redemption outside 
the framework of the authorized capital, have to be decided upon in 
general meeting 2 This proposal has to be made available for inspection 3. 
The contents of the resolution in general meeting is, again, given in 
full detail 4. The whole process of such a reduction, including the 
filing with the registration authority, has to be completed in four 
months' time, or else the resolution on reduction is deemed to have 
lapsed 5. 
The difference between a reduction with or without a transfer of a 
corresponding sum to the reserve fund 6 lies in whether the sanction of the 
court is needed or not. When there is no sum transferred to the reserve fund 
the reduction is ineffective w i t hou t the sanction of the court 7, 
1. § 65 (4). 
3. § 66 (1)(2).Cf.supra p. 260. 
5. § 66 (1)(4 -5). Swedish : " ... nedsgttninggsbeslutet 
fairfallet .. ". 
It is interesting to note this laconic style of the Swedish original as 
compared 
with the American translationo 
6. Of su rá p. 262, note 9. 
2. § 66 (1)(i). 
4. § 66 (1)(3). 
7. Swedish 
: " ... rgttens tillstánd" 
(e.g. § 67) with "sanction of the 
court" , or "court's permission" ( 
one term for it. 
Cf, also the initial sentence of § 
. The American translation renders it sometimes 
court ", and sometimes with "permission of the 
e.g. § 68), though the original text uses only 
67. 
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but in the other case, i.e.when there is a transfer of an appropriate 
sum to the reserve fund, the sanction of the court is required only 
for the payment of dividends, except when the capital is increased by 
an amount corresponding to the reduction 
l 
in the case of a reduction -cum- 
increase 
2 
The Act thereafter 3 deals with the formalities involved in 
obtaining the sanction of the court. As is the case in German Company Law, 
an induciae of six months has to expire 4 before the decision of the 
court can be registered, or a repayment to the shareholders made 5. The 
acquisition of shares by the company itself is valid only in connection 
with a reduction of the amount of the acquired shares. The sanction of 
the court 6 is needed in this case too, unless it can be operated as a 
reduction by redemption within the framework of the authorized capital 7, 
In other cases all shares bought by the company have to be resold as soon 
as possible without loss to the company 
8. 
1. 68 (initial sentence). 
It should be noted that the words : " by an amount at least corresponding" 
would have lessened the formalities of this provision. 
2. Cf. suera p. 257. 
4. § 67 (1)(5). 
6. This is implied from the quotation of § 67 in the first sentence 
of § 69. 
7. § 65. Cf. supra p. 262. 8. § 69 (2). 
3. §§ 67 and 68. 
5. § 66 (2)(2) and § 67. 
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11. S p a i r. 
The origins of Spanish Law are, of course, Roman Law, though its 
influence is not apparent to the same extent in all questions. Spanish 
commercial law retained its on character up to 1829, when a new code 
was promulgated, mainly following the lines of French Law. Eowever, 
this French influence spread over civil law only in 1889, auch later 
than in almost all the Ibero-American states 1. There the commercial 
and company laws also developed more or less on the lines of the Code 
de Commerce of Napoleon. On the other id, a slight äiminis }irg of 
French influence was noticeable at the same time in Spain. Thus, the 
1. T.Ascarelli, Problemas das Sociedades Anonimas e direido comparado, S.Paulo 1945 ; 
J.Barra, Estudio Comparativo de la Legislación de las sociedades par acciones, 
Mexico 1909 ; L.Cornejo, Derecho Commercial, vol.I, Lisa. 1935 ; H.P.Crawford, "The 
Corporation Law of Cuba ", in : TLR, vol.10 (1936), Pp.568 -588 ; H.P.Crawford, "The 
Brazilian Business Corporation ", in TLR, vol.11 (1936), p.59 -80 ; H.P.Crawford, 
"The Corporation Law of Venezuela ", in : PLR, vol.12 (1938), pp.200 -225 ; H.P.Craw- 
ford, "The 1940 Corporation Law of Brazil ", in : TLS, vol.16 (1942), pp.228 -248 ; 
Baihigo, Sociedades de responsabilidad limitada, La Habana 1936 ; B.di Faria, 
Direito comercial, Rio de Janeiro 1947 -48 ; A.Féeasse, Les sociétés anonymes dans 
la Republique d'Argentine, Paris 1928; Fernandez, Código de Comercio Comentado, 
Buenos Aires 19113 Y.j.Ferreira, Compendia de sociedados mercantis, Rio de Janeiro 
1949 ; L.Mascheroni, Contabilidad de sociedades anónimas, Buenos Aires 1932 ; P. de 
Sola Canizares, Les societes comnerciales en Argentine, Paris 1949 ; P.de Sola Can- 
sares and H.Aztiria Tratado de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada en derecho 
Argentino y Comparado, vol.I, Buenos Aires 1950 ; R.C.Suarez, Aumento del capital 
social, Mexico 1941 ; T. de LValverde, Sociedades por aloes, Rio de Janeiro 1953 ; 
t.R.yoelkel, "A comparative study of the laws of Latin America governing foreign 
business corporations ", in : TLR, vo1.14 (1939), PP.49 -71. 
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new Commercial Code of 22nd August,1885, has shown more features of its 
own than the previous on of 1829 1. A remarkable feature of Spanish com- 
pany law of that time 2 was a lack of the conception of legal personality 
which, one would have thought, should have been apparent in view of Roman 
Law being the ultimate forebear of Spanish Law and jurisprudence. On the 
contrary, the stress on the contractual relations in company law was much 
heavier than in other legal systems which have their origin in Roman Law 3. 
It was only with its Companies Act of 1951 4 that Spain came into line 
with other legal systems possessing modern companies acts. The former law 
was completely silent on the questions of alteration of capital 5, and the 
methods adopted in practice 6 were to some extent similar to those of older 
English and German Law, since there also the contractual relations were 
considered as more important than those based on the conception of 
legal personality. 
1. Arminjon-Nolde-Wolff, vol.I, p.159. 6. Rauch, vol.', p.76 (1). 
2. Lit.: F.Ehrenfried, Das Aktienrecht Spaniens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 
Berlin 1936 ; Garrigues, Curso de Derecho Mercantil, vol.I, Madrid 1936 ; J.Moneva 
y Puyol and L.Perels, "Spanien ", in : " Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch f.Zivil- 
und Handelsrecht" (ed.by F.Schlegelberger), vol.', part 1, Berlin 1927, pp.245 -265 ; 
H.Prudhomme, Code de Commerce espagnol, Paris 1891 ; P.de Sola Canizares, Le droit 
espagnol des societes anonymes, Paris 1947. 
3. Cf. Ph.de Sola Canizares, Le droit espagnol des societes anonymes, Paris 1947, 
and a report on this book in : "Revue International de Droit Compare ", vol.I 
(1949), Pp.218 -219. 
4. Ley de 17 Julio de 1951 sobre Regimen Juridico de las Sociedades Anónimas. 
This study quotes from the text published by Camara Oficial de Comercio, 
Industria y Navigacábn de Bilbao, Bilbao 1951. 
Lit. : Gsrrigues and Uria, Comentario a la Ley de sociedades anónimas, Madrid 1953 ; 
Gay de Montella, Tratado Práctico de Sociedades Anbnimas, Barcelona 1952 ; R.Quinta- 
no, Diccionario de derecho comparado, Madrid 1951 ; F.de Sola Canizares, Tratado de 
sociedades anónimas en el derecho espagnol y en el derecho comparado, Barcelona 
1952, See also : P.J.E(der), "Spain_ : New Law of Stock Companies", in : "The 
American Journal of Comparative Law ", vol.1 (1952), pp.117 ff. 
5. G.Hubretch, "La nouvelle loi espagnole sur les societes anonymes ", in : "Revue In- 
ternational de Droit Combare ", vol.3 (1951), p.463. 
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The new Act is rather short, containing 171 sections. The fifth l 
chapter, containg merely 18 sections, is devoted to increase and reduction 
of capital, and amendments of the charter 2. The system and style of this 
Act is extremely simple and logical. An impact of certain ideas of Americla 
origin is nevertheless apparent, though expressed in an extremely dry form 
and without any details. This might be not so much the result of a drafts- 
man's triumph, as simply a sign of undeveloped capitalism 3, On the other 
hand, the omnipresence of state control in Spain may also be one of the 
reasons for the very short form in which these provisions are set 4, 
Besides, Swiss influence in drafting this law may also have been present. 
The placing of both the main types of alteration of capital - increase 
and reduction - side by side with amendments of the charter is, of course, 
an achievement from the point of view of legalistic system. We find this 
as well in Article 58, where the basic principles on qualified majority 
are provided for 5, as also in Chapter Five 1, although the material is 
better arranged in the contents of this chapter than in its heading. The 
1, Art. 84 -101. 
2, Spanish 
: " Aumento y reduction del capital. - Modificacibn de los Estatutos". 
3. It may be said that there is even yet no necessity for 
any "education" of the 
investors. Cf. supra p. 228, note 2. 
Cf. C.L.Israels, "Problems of par and no -par shares 
: a reappraisal ", in : CLR, 
701.47 (1947), p.1300. 
4. Cf. suers P. 44, note 3o 
5. Art. 84 (2) refers to this general rule on qualified 
majority. On the other hand 
the requirements of this Art.84 are referred 
to in Art. 87 dealing with any kind 
of increase of capital mentioned in the charter, in Art.93 dealing with the issue 
of new shares as preference shares, in Art.97 dealing with any kind of reduction 
of capital mentioned in the charter, and, finally, in Art.100 (2), which deals 
with amortization of shares. 
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qualified majority required for any type of increase, or reduction, or 
any other amendment of the charter is very complex. A more or less usual 
feature is the provision for different majorities in the "first" and in 
the "second" meeting 1, but the provision of different methods of de- 
termining the two thirds according to whether the shares are name - shares 2, 
or share -warrants 3, seems to be quite unique. In the first of these 
cases the result is not only counted by the number of shareholders 4 
but also "weighed" by the value of the paid up capital 5. For a valid 
resolution at the first meeting a two thirds majority is necessary by 
both methods, while in the case of share -warrants only a "weighing" takes 
place and a majority of at least two thirds is required. For the second 
meeting a simple majority counted only by "weighing" the votes and the 
representation of the half of the paid up capital will be sufficient, 
while in the case of share- warrants only the representation of this half 
of the paid up capital is required. 
There is a declaratory provision 6 that no new obligations can be 
imposed upon the shareholders without their consent, but if an amendment 
of the charter contains regulations affecting, directly or indirectly, 
the rights of one particular class of shareholders, the assent of the 
1. Spanish : "primera convocatoria" and "segunda convocatoria ". Cf.supra p.247,note 3. 
2. Spanish : "acciones nominativas ". 3. Spanish : "acciones al portador ". 
4. Spanish : " ... dos terceras partes del numero de socios ... ". 
5. Spanish : " ... del capital desembolsado ". 
6. Art. 85 (1). 
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appropriate class meeting is needed and the rules on qualified majority 
of Art.58 apply to such a class meeting as well 
1, 
As in American Law, rights of appraisal 
2 
are to be found, but their 
applicability is very restricted. they become operative on amendment of 
the charter but only if the amendment consists of an alteration of the 
objects of the company : they can then be enforced by those shareholders 
who have not voted in favour of these amendments 3. 
Ten sections are devoted to increase of capital 4, and only five to 
reduction 5. Article 88 covers all the possible types of increase : 
by issue of new shares, by increasing the nominal value of the shares 6, 
by new additions to the property 7 of the company, by transformation of 
the reserves or "super- values" 8 , or by conversion of debentures into 
shares. The provision that the previous issues must be fully paid up 
prior to the issue of a new series is typical of countries where 
capitalism is not highly developed, and caution in this respect is 
1. Art, 85 (2). 
2. Cf. supra p. 2430 See also : P.J.E(der), "Spain : New Law of Stock Companies ", 
in : "The American Journal of Comparative Law ", vol.1 (1952), p.118. 
3. Arto 85 (4). This right of appraisal ( "derecho de separarse") includes the right 
to receive a repayment of the value of the shares. 
4. Art. 87 -96. The expressions "aumento" and " elevacibn" are both used to express 
"increase ". 
50 Art- 97-101. The expressions "reduccibr_" and " disminución" are both used to 
denote "reduction ", though the first one is more commons 
6. Spanish : " .. aumento del valor nominal ". 
7. Spanish : " ., nuevas aportaciones al patrimonio social ". This corers an issue 
for cash, and for any other consideration as well. 
8. Spanish : " plusvalias ". 
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accordingly usually found 
1. 
The unpaid amount of the new issue should 
not exceed 75ó of the nominal value of each subscribed share 
2. 
There are 
provisions about a qualified increase 3. The usual form of issue of new 
shares is a public subscription, the required contents of a special pro- 
spectus 
4 
being given in all details. Pre -emptive rights 5 are provided for 
where the increase is effected by issuing new shares, thus accepting an 
American idea. 
For an increase out of reserves 6 two ways are provided : either by way 
of gratis shares 7s or by increase of the nominal amount of the old 
shares 8. For an increase by conversion of debentures 9 it is provided 
that such a conversion should either have been stated at creating that 
class of shares, or be made with the assent of the affected obligacionista. 
In this latter case, the value of the issuable shares may not be higher 
than the value of the convertible debentures , or the difference should be 
transferred from the reserves or the profits of the company 
10, 
A possibi- 
lity of a reduction- cum -increase is also provided for 
11. 
The regulations 
on authorized capital 12 are somewhat similar to those in Germany. An in- 
crease within the framework of the authorized capital has to be effected 
not later than five years from the date of the formation, or from the date 
1. Art. 89. 
3. Art. 90 and Art. 91 (8). 
2. Art. 90. 
4. Art. 91. 
5. Spanish : " derecho a subscribir en la nueva emisión ". 
6, Art. 88 and 94. 7. Sp.: " ..sin exigirles desembolso alguno." 
8. Spanish : " .. aumento del valor nominal ..." 
9. Art. 88 and 95. 
11, Art. 95 (3). 
10. Art. 95 (2)(2). 
12. Art. 96. 
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of the amendment of the charter. Such an increase can be made either in one 
or in a series of actions, but the amount of authorized capital can in no 
case be higher than the nominal capital at the time of such an authorization. 
The provisions on reduction of capital are of an even more accentuated 
brevity, and the more significant traits may be simply listed as follows : 
An induciae of three months is provided for, but this applies only to the 
case of reduction with repayment 
1 
As in Swiss Law 2 a three -fold publicat- 
ion in the official gazette 3 and in three local periodicals of a larger 
circulation is obligatory. The creditors are entitled to oppose such a re- 
duction within these three months, unless the company is able to give satis- 
faction or security 4. Such a security is not needed, however, where the 
whole reduction is effected for the sole reason of re- establishing an equi- 
librium between the assets of the company and its capital after sustaining 
losses5. A reduction is considered obligatory where more than two thirds of 
the capital has been lost 6. A re- grouping of the shares in connection with 
a reduction is provided for 7. The company is entitled to exact forfeiture 
of those shares which were not presented for re- stamping in due time 8. The 
usual practice of selling the new shares, issued instead of those forfeited 
on behalf of the interested person is provided for 9. The institution of a 
reduction by redemption is also familiar to Spanish Law 10 
is Spanish : " restitución de sus aportaciones a los accionistas ..," 
2Cf. supra p. 205. 3. "Boletin Oficial del Estado ". 
4. Spanish : "garantia ". 5. Art. 99 (1). 
6. Art. 99 (2). 7. Art.100 : "agrupacion de acciones ". 
4 Art.100 (2). 10. Art. 100 (3) and Art. 101. 
9. Spanish : " por cuenta y riesgo de los interesados ... ". 
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V C o m p a r a t i v e Survey. 
A remarkable change of attitude towards history became noticeable 
during the last three centuries ; the trend, which is still accelerat- 
ing, is towards a universalizing history 1, and the world, the subject 
of the historians, is becoming one world This shrinking of the world, 
brought about both by speed of travel and by the ever growing sense of 
the universal community of _mankind, has had its parallels in the de- 
velopment of all sciences and doctrines. Einstein's attempts to find 
a common denominator in the field of mathematics and physics are 
typical of our age ; and equally so is the awareness of the plurality 
of forms and the comparability of norms in law and economics. Further 
more, the days of the water -tight -compartment conception have irrevo- 
cably passed, and neither a country, nor a continent, nor any branch 
of life or of knowledge, nor any social science, can now be regarded 
within the strict precincts of their former precincts, 
1. J.B.Bossuet (1627 -1704) with his Discours sur l'histoire Universelle (1681) 
was considered as the first philosopher of history. Sir Winston Churchill's 
A History of the English Speaking Peoples ( 1956 ff.) may in one sense be 
looked on in the future as a turning point in our conception of history. 
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But it is still very difficult to say whether c o m p a r a t i v e 
1 a w 1 has made any significant development towards a more universal 
approach to legal phenomena since the days of the French scholar Edouard 
Lambert 2 and the address delivered by Lord Macmillan in 1932 3. There 
is one striking feature in common amongst modern philosophers of history 
and comparative jurists, namely a greater sensitivity to tendencies than 
to situations 4. And there are tendencies amongst the jurists themselves 
which should be noted as possibly facilitating a more fruitful comparative 
approach, namely, on the one hand, Anglo- American scholars are showing 
less of their abhorence of abstractions 5, notions, principles and theories, 
1. Lit. : P.Arminjon, Baron B.Nolde and M.Wolff, Traité de droit comparé, three vol., 
Paris 1950 - 1952 ; L.Bienaimé and P.Baudoin -Bugnet, Le code des sociétés anonymes 
en Europe, Brussels 1938 ; F. van Calker, "Gesetzgebungspolitik und Rechtsverglei- 
chung", in : "Festschrift Paul Laband gewidmet" (University of Strasbourg), Túbín- 
gen 1908, pp.97-118 ; F,David, La réforme de la legislation des sociétés par actions 
d'après les enseignements du droit comparé , Paris (s.a.,1942) ; J.Escarra, Cours de 
droit commercial complementaire, Paris 1948 - 1949 ; J.Escarra, Cours de legislation 
commerciale comparée, Paris 1949 ; H,C.Gutteridge, Comparative Law, Cambridge 1946 ; 
W,Hallstein, Die Aktiengesetze der Gegenwart, Berlin 1931 ; A.K.Kuhn, A comparative 
study of the Law of Corporations, 3rd ed., two vol., New York 1935 ; Roscoe Pound, 
"Comparative Law in Space and Time ", in : : "The American Journal of Comparative 
Law ", vol.4 (1955), pp.70 -84 ; R.Quintano, Diccionario de derecho comparado, Madrid 
1951 ; M.Rivarola, Sociedades anónimas : estudio juridico- economico de la legis- 
lación argentina y comparada, two vol., Buenos Aires 1924 ; R.B.Schlesinger, Compa- 
rative Law, Cases and Materials, Brooklyn 1950 ; A.F.Schnitzer, Vergleichende 
Rechtslehre, Basle 1945 
2. "Recueil d'etudes en l'honeur d'edouard Lambert ", three vol., Paris 1937 -1939, 
Cf. also : H.C.Gutteridge, op.cit., and. K.Zweigert, " Rechtsvergleichung als uni - 
versale Interpretationsmethode ", in : ZsAIP, vol.15 (1949), pp. 5 ff.; and "Neue 
Systeme und Lehrmittel der Rechtsvergleichung" , in : ZsAIP, vol.17 (1952),pp.397 ff 
30 Lord Macmillan, "Scots Law as a Subject of Comparative Study ", in : "Law and other 
Things" ( Selected essays by Lord Macmillan), Cambridge 1937, pp.102 ff, and in : 
"Mémoires de l'Academie Internationale de Droit Comparé ",vol.II,part 4, Paris 1935. 
4. Roger Caillois, "Illusions in Reverse ", in : " Encounter ", vol.IV (4) (1956), p.41. 
5. M.Gutzwiller, " Rechtvergleichung in kontinentaler Sicht", in : " Receuil des 
travaux suisses presentes au IV -iéme Congres International du droit comparé ", 
Geneva 1954, p6. 
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and are inclining towards even a sympathy for a "disregard for the 
utilitarian" 1, and, on the other hand, continental jurists are aban- 
doning their alegiance to the traditional juridical constructions 2, 
and thereby diminishing the gulf between these two opiPsite sides. 
Commercial and company law are, perhaps, especially suitable for 
comparative studies, not only owing to their place in the forefront 
of legal progress but also because of their pragmatic character and 
economic background, and because different systems have always shown 
substantial similarity in these matters to a much greater extent than 
different systems of civil and criminal law 3, where national elements 
are more preponderant. Any comparative study in this field, though one 
has to be aware of the inevitable imperfection, may be a help and guide4 
if the chance should arise for a recasting of company law in order to 
improve its style, adaptability and elasticity. It should be stressed, 
however, that this study has the much more modest aim of showing the 
trends of development, where that is possible, and of elucidating at least a 
part of the assembled material. 
1. F,Sewell Bray, "An Accounting Progression ", in : " Accounting Research ", vol.IV, 
part 2, Cambridge 1953, p. 145. 
2. The author, in a paper read at the Faculty of Law of the University of Graz in 
1944, ( "Rechtskritische and rechtsvergleichende Grundzage zum Problem Aber 
Kapitalerhöhung aus Gesellschaftsmitteln") noted (p.2) the remarkable amount 
of the then recently recorded departures from various doctrines, theories and 
traditional opinions in all branches of law. This amount has, it is submitted, 
been increasing ever since. 
3. This point of view is familiar in American theory of law as well. 
Cf. e.g. A.H.Feller, "The Movement for Corporate Reform : A world -wide 
phenomenon ", in : " American Bar Association Journal ", vol.20 (1ß34),p.347. 
4. Escarra-Rault, vol.I, p. 39 ; and Pic - Kreher, p.194. 
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Public companies are a relatively recent formation within the 
framework of company law, and this is, perhaps, the reason why it is 
not always possible to note trends and tendencies, or not possible to 
do so yet. However, it is perhaps possible to ascertain some changes 
of style, content and appearance during the last hundred years, and 
to an even greater extent, during the last fifty years. It was the 
intention of this study to denote these lines of development, espe- 
cially in A l t e r a t i o n of C a p i t a l, but this 
could not, of course, be done without paying attention to changes 
in the background, and without considering trends and tendencies 
observed in connection with o t h e r special questions of company 
law, like membership, allocation of shares, rights of shareholders, and, 
last but not least, the controversy about the contractual basis and the 
legal personality of these companies. 
The system of dealing with alteration of capital in statute law 
varies from country to country. In older statutes, as e.g. in Scots and 
English Law prior to 1867, and in some American states, e.g. in Louisiana, 
even the possibility of a reduction of capital was not contemplated. The 
importance attached to the question of the protection of the creditors' 
interests in the case of a reduction was initially somewhat exaggerated, 
and, partly owing to this, the provisions on reduction, when entering 
the statute book, sometimes received more emphasis in the system than 
the older form of alteration, namely, increase of capital 
1. 
The juxta- 
1. thus, there is quite often a separate division, or sub -division, entitled "Reduct- 
ion", in some of the systems of law, as e.g. in Scots and English Law (cf.supra 
pp. 71, 87 and 88), Switzerland, or Liechtenstein, w i t h o u t there being 
at the same time any adequate division or sub -division entitled "Increase ". 
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position of these% two types of alteration took place in only a few 
quite recent statutes, as e.g. in Germany, Sweden and Spain, and was 
mainly based on a logical analysis of the notion of alteration of 
capital. It is also wc%h while noting that there is a textual short- 
ening of the provisions in countries where either the supervision of 
the investment market is firmly in the hands of a governmental body, 
or semi -official bodies like stock -exchanges, or capital issues com- 
mittees 1, or securities' commissions 2, or, concerning reduction of 
capital, the powers of courts and registrars to investigate a case are 
not too rigidly circumscribed by provisions on form and procedure 3. 
The attempt to create a new legal conception, namely, "supply of 
capital" 4, and to consider increase as only one of its forms, was, 
to the writers knowledge, confined to Germany. A similar idea is found 
in a chapter entitled "Protection of shareholders and of the share - 
capital" in the laws of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and it is, in 
a way, reminiscent of the departure from the doctrine of the unalter- 
ability of capital. This doctrine was, as a matter of fact, much 
stronger in Swiss Law and jurisprudence than in Germany, the country 
of its origin. 
1. Cf. supra p. 71, note 7. It is submitted that the projected introduction of no -par- 
value shares (cf. supra p. 22 and p.80, note 4) and a possible abolition of the 
control exercised by the Capital Issues Committee (cf,L.C.B.Gower, "Some Contrasts 
between British and American Corporation Law ", in : HLR, vol.69, p.1383) may result 
in a lengthening of the provisions of the Companies Act. 
2, Cf. supra p. 220. 
3, It is submitted that a shortening of the provisions on reduction may also be 
visualized in Scots and English Law, since the court's freedom of action has 
recently grown (cf. supra p. 96) and a number of detailed provisions are merely 
reminiscences of regulations that were in force and had their meaning at an 
earlier date. 
4. G. : "Kapitalbeschaffung". 
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The interrelation between alteration of capital and authorized 
capital was a question familiar to almost all systems of law. In 
countries where there were less strict regulations concerning the 
speed of paying up the whole subscribed capital9 there was initially 
very little attention paid to the question of authorized capital, 
since nobody interpreted the notion "capital" as anything else than 
the permitted maximum limit of issuable capital 1. Only in comparison 
with continental countries, where the official figure of the statutory 
amount of capital had almost always to be reached within a relatively 
short period of time, and where it was considered as the "reliable" 
figure of the paid up capital, did the difference of attitude become 
apparent. The usual interpretation of authorized capital was to 
consider it as the maximum limit up to which a company was entitled 
to increase its capital without setting in motion the formal procedure 
of amendment of the charter or alteration of capital. Only in a few 
American states 2 and in Liechtenstein3are legal minimum figures 
provided for, thus creating a lower limit up to which a reduction 
was facilitated. The Law of Liechtenstein even created a sub -type 
of company based on these two -sided regulations on authorized 
capital, calling them the variable companies 4. 
This study has in general dealt o n l y with those alterations of 
capital which are beyond this framework of authorized capital, though 
1. Hallstein, p.181. 
2. Cf. supra p.224, note 1, and p. 225. 3. Cf. supra p. 246. 
4 G. : " Aktiengesellschaften mit veránderlichem Einlagekapital ". 
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it was unavoidable to mention those regarding which special provisions 
existed in particular legislatures. 
A quite distinct question is that where authority to alter capital 
should be expressed. Some legislatures deal with it in their companies 
acts, but there are to be found in many countries statutes which 
simply leave it to the companies to deal with it in their articles 
of association 1 or memorandum 2. In a few countries, however, such 
authorization must be expressed both in the statute law, and in the 
charter 3. 
A resolution in general meeting is the normal mode of expression 
of the company's wish to alter its capital. There are exceptions to 
this rule, however. In rare cases the approval of shareholders4 may 
be obtained individually without their being convened to a meetings. 
Another exception would be the provision that the power of author- 
ization of an alteration could generally (i.e. n o t only within 
the framework of the authorized capital) be delegated to the board 
of directors 
6e 
It is seldom nowadays that there are special provi- 
sions about the type of general meeting where such questions could 
appear on the agenda, but there are still a few states where alter- 
1. Cf. supra pp. 72 -73. 2. Cf. supra p. 223, note 7. 
3. E.g. in a few American states. 4. Cf. supra p. 226. 
5. This variety could, perhaps, be called " an off -meeting collection of 
shareholders' approvals ". 
6. E.g. in some cases in California. 
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ation of capital is within the power of an extraordinary general 
meeting 1. Sometimes two general meetings are required to deal with 
these questions 2. In a few states an additional permit or "concession" 
to alter the capital has to be obtained from a state authority 3, 
sometimes even prior to the resolution in general meeting. 
Special statutory provisions exist about the quorum and majority 
required in these general meetings to pass resolutions on alteration 
of capital, but there is a noticeable trend to abolish quorum requirements 
altogether 4, and to diminish the required majorities 5, though in only 
very few countries the majority requirement is exactly the same as for 
any other resolution in general meeting 
6 
The usual way of counting any 
majority of votes is by "weighing" them according to the value of the 
shares they represent, but a considera1le number of exceptions from 
this rule are found in various countries, either in their statutes, 
or in the charters. There are regulations which, firstly, limit the 
accumulation of votes, secondly, introduce a double counting 7, thirdly, 
1. Thus, e.g. in Belgium (cf. supra p. 139), and, concerning the "first" meeting, in 
France, 
2. E.g. in France, Luxembourg, Sweden and Spain. 
3. Cfo supra p. 71, note 7, and pp. 131 and 209. 
4. A relatively high quorum (coupled with a simple majority) is required in Italian 
Law ; a quorum is provided for in Swiss Law (cf. supra p. 200) ; and a quorum, 
coupled with a majority, in the law of Liechtenstein (cf. supra p. 247). 
5. Statutory requirements of unanimity or very large majority (e.g. of nine tenths) 
are extremely rare nowadays, though they are still on the statute books in 
Belgium and Sweden (cf. supra pp. 139 and 261). 
6. E.g. in the provisions of Scots and English Law relating to increase, and in the 
laws of a number of states in U.S.A. 
7. The law of Luxembourg provides for a presumption of absent voters voting partly 
in favour of the board's proposals (cf. supra p. 147). Spanish Law provides for 
an additional counting of shareholders' votes without any "weighing ". 
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give an equal vote to all shares irrespective of their value 1. In the 
case of a multiformity of shares, the passing of the resolution in all 
the class -meetings, or in all the class -meetings of affected classes 
only, is usually required in addition, and very often prior to the 
general meeting dealing with this question. 
Where are a few systems of law which link the first alteration of 
capital with some requirement of time, either facilitating an alter- 
ation in the early stages, or restricting it, or, even, forbidding it 
during the first years of the existante of a company 2. Another limit- 
ing factor in the alteration of capital may be the prescribing of 
minimum amounts for shares and capital in the case of reduction 3, and, 
much less frequently, maximum amounts in the case of increase 4. 
A very much discussed question is that of how alteration of capital 
is to be effected. While the issue of new shares is still the favourite 
method of increase, an alteration of the nominal amount of each share 
seems to be the basic method of reduction ; but both methods now extend 
almost evenly to both increase and reduction 5e Though there are still 
a number of states where increase of capital by increasing the nominal 
1. E.g. in Switzerland (cf, supra p. 201, note 3 ). 
2. The company law of Norway provided that no increase be undertaken prior to the 
registration of the company. 
3. Nominal minimum amounts for a share are provided for in a few states of America 
and partly in France (cf.supra p. 131). Nominal minimum amounts for the whole 
capital are provided for in Germany (cf. su-ora pp. 158 and 177), Switzerland 
(cf. supra p. 203 and note 2), Italy (cf. supra pn. 209 and 213 ), and in a 
very few of the states of America (cf. supra p. 241). 
4. E.g. in Pennsylvania (cf. supra p.224, note 1). 
5. The general impression to be drawn is that the provisions of the statutes 
relating to reduction (about the method that should be applied, i.e. diminution of 
the nominal amount, or cancellation , or otherwise), are much less detailed than 
tho 
relating to increase of capital (cf.dupra PP. 91, 173 and 203. 
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amount of the shares finds no place in the statute book 1, or where such 
increase is considered as admissible only by virtue of a very liberal in- 
terpretation 2, nevertheless those states which have enacted'company law 
in recent years are now on the whole familiar with this method 3. Parallel 
to this development goes the diminishing application of the analogy between 
formation of a company and increase of capital 4. Whereas increase by issuing 
new shares was very often considered in theory as a type of re- formation 5 
of a company, the other method, i.e. increase by increasing the nominal 
value of the shares, appeared less suitable for the construction of such an 
analogy 
6 
. The idea of considering any alteration, either increase or re- 
duction, as a form of amendment of the charter is still widely accepted, 
and cross -references to the general provisions on amendment of the charter 
are to be found in various companies acts 7. 
1. E.g.in Scots and English Law (cf. supra pp. 74 -75), but also in France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and, oddly enough, in Liechtenstein. 
2. E.g. in Germany (cf. supra pp. 153 and 160) and in Sweden (cf. supra pp.252 and 255). 
3. E.g. in Switzerland (cf. supra D. 195), Italy (cf. supra p. 210), America (cf, supra 
P. 224) and Spain (cf. supra pp. 269 -270). 
4. The construction of such an analogy was, of course, alien to Scots and English Law 
(cf. supra p. 80), but it is still a live idea in the jurisprudence of France and 
Switzerland, although lately criticized (cf. supra pp. 131 and 196). It is, besides, 
generally recognized in Belgium (cf. supra p. 139 ) an,a also, though only partly, in 
Germany (cf.supra p. 156). 
5. G. : " partielle heugrúndung ". This interpretation was, besides, very popular in 
France and in the pre- soviet law of Poland. 
6. It is not, perhaps, just a coincidence that in almost all countries (e.g. America, 
Italy and Spain) f u l l y recognizing the method of increase of capital by 
increasing the nominal value of the shares, the analogy between formation and 
increase has ceased to play any part. 
10 E.g. in Germany (cf. supra pp. 156 and 160) and in Switzerland (cf. supra pp. 
196 -197) 
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As for increase of capital, much attention has been paid in statute 
law to the question of whether and, if so, how far the previous amount of 
capital has to be paid up. In a number of countries this question is 
practically non -existent 1, but in others an increase may be declared 
invalid if the previous capital has not been fully 2, or almost fully 3, 
paid up. 
One of the central questions within the framework of this study is 
that of whether and, if so, in what form, p r e- e m p t i v e rights 
of shareholders and other persons 5 to subscribe for new shares are re- 
cognized by statute, In Anglo-American Law the trend is somewhat on the 
decline. There, the sedes materiae of the principle was to be found 
either in the common law, or in companies acts of older origin 6 
; and 
4 
1. E.g. in Scots and English Law (cf. supra pp. 76 -77), in Switzerland (cf.supra 
p. 197)(, and in Liechtenstein. and America. 
2. E.g. Finland, Spain and France (cf. supra p.133), Austria (prior to 1938), 
China (prior to 1949), Latvia (prior to 1940), Liechtenstein (prior to 1926), 
and in the pre- soviet laws of Bulgaria and Hungary. 
3. E.g. Germany under the former law ( "HGB "). Cf. supra p. 161. 
4, Cf. F. de Sola Canizares, "The rights of shareholders ", in : ICLQ, vol.2 (1953), 
part 4, pp. 572 ff. 
5. E.g. holders of convertible bonds (America, Liechtenstein, Switzerland). 
In a very few systems of law (e.g. in the pre- soviet law of Latvia) there was a 
provision that a 1 1 shareholders have a "second- hand" pre- emptive right to 
subscribe for those shares which had not been already taken when those share - 
holders,who were entitled to subscribe proportionally to their respective hold- 
ings, were asked to subscribe. 
6. E.g. in Scots and English Law up to 1862 (cf. supra p.78), and in almost all the 
American states. 
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later it was either relegated to the official "TableA" 1, or left 
entirely to explicit provisions in the individual charter 2. On the 
other hand, the continental systems of law, initially unfamiliar with 
this institution, have started to introduce it, and the trend there is 
still increasing 3. It is submitted 4 that the lessening of the stress 
on these rights, as observed in this country and in a few American states, 
is in line with the general lessening of emphasis on 'the shareholders' 
status as members. However, it is perhaps still too early to assert that 
this trend may affect the second group too, i.e. those countries which 
have only recently become familiar with the institution. If so, one 
could then perhaps say that it illustrates the process of movement of 
the whole body of public companies towards a detachment from their 
"human" base 5. There are various limitations of these pre -emptive 
rights provided for in different countries, e.g. exclusion altogether 
in the case of preference shares 6, or in the case of a qualified 
increase 7. 
1. Up to 1948 in Great Britain, and still in Northern Ireland (cf. supra p.77,note 4). 
2. In Scots and English Law since 1948, and in a few American states (e.g.in Indiana 
and Pennsylvania),. A similar attitude is observed in Belgium and Luxembourg (cf. 
supra p. 141). 
3. E.g. France (since 1935 only), Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Spain (since 1951 
only), Sweden and Switzerland, 
4. Cf. supra p. 57. 5. Cf. supra, p. 31. 
6. E.g. Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and Turkey. 
7. E.g. America and Italy. 
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Another institution has attained universal recognition during the last 
fifty years, namely, qualified increase of capital. The initially wide- 
spread opposition l to increase for considerations other than cash has 
given way, and not only is its admissibility recognized in principle, but 
in practice more or less detailed statutory provisions can be found in 
almost all systems of law. The issue of bonus or gratis shares 2 out of 
surplus, or, as the Americans say, the payment of "stock dividends" 3, 
is nowadays one of the most popular methods of a qualified increase 4. 
On the other hand, a still very controversial point is the question of 
no- par -value shares 5. Though the interest in this question has somewhat 
diminished in America 6, it is nevertheless a typical American invention 7. 
It was introduced into Belgium, Liechtenstein and Luxembourgh 8, and there 
is a very strong feeling that it may become part of Scots and English Law 
too 9, though there are still warning voices raised against its intro- 
duction into Britain. About ten years ago the opinion was ventured by 
1. The often quoted work by the late Professor K.Rauch ( Kapitalerhóhung aus Gesell - 
schaftsmitteln, two vol., Graz 1947/50) is, perhaps, the best, though sometimes 
one -sided contribution to this question. See also the critical notes on this work 
by E.J.Cohn (in : LQR, vol.62, pp.126 -127) and a Swiss jurist H.Reichwein ( in : 
ZsAIP, vol.17, pp.698 ff.). 
2. Cf. supra p. 83, note 1. 3. Cf. ,supra pp. 231 ff. 
4. E.g. in France (cf. supra p. 132), Belgium ( cf.supra p.142), Luxembourg, Germany, 
Switzerland (cf. supra p. 195), Italy (cf. supra p. 210), Liechtenstein (cf.supra 
pp.247 -248) and Sweden (cf. supra, p. 255). 
5. Levy, vol.I1, pp.596 -602. 6. Cf. ,supra p. 228, note 2. 
7. Arminjon Nolde- Wolff, vol.II, p.597. 
8. This institution was also familiar in Italy, though it never was a very popular one. 
9. Cf. supra p. 80, note 4. 
Professor LCB,Gower expressed recently ( "Some Contrasts between British and 
American Corporation Law ", in : HLR, vo1.69, p.1400) the hope "that this slur 
will be soon be removed" and no- par -value shares legalized. 
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American jurists 1 that this institution has lost its importance and its 
actuality. It was submitted by some authors that this institution tended 
to indicate a reluctance to push forward with the "de- humanisation" of 
the legal entity called "public company" 2, since it was considered as 
strengthening the "stock- ownership" relations between the members 3. It 
is submitted that the introduction of this rule regarding no- par -value 
shares may have some practical advantages in countries with an unstable 
currency, and in order to avoid the expense of re- dockettin# the share 
documents. 
There is no international uniformity either in the question of whether 
a full subscription 4 to the new shares is obligatory, or under what 
circumstances an incomplete subscription is considered as binding. The 
principle of full subscription, meaning that any incomplete subscription 
is invalid, originates, it is thought, from French Law 5, though in France 
and in Luxembourg a slight lessening of the rigidity of this principle was 
noticeable. In other countries, however, it is still quite strictly observe 
Anglo- American Law is unfamiliar with this rule,, and since the laws of 
Liechtenstein and Spain are also silent in this respect, and that of 
Sweden provides for the possibility of fixing a binding minimum 9, it is 
tempting to assert that this has been done owing to American impact. 
1. C.L,Isra.els, "Problems of par and no par shares : a' reappraisal ",in : CLR, vol.47, 
p.1300. 
2. Cf. supra p. 32. 3. Buchanan, p. 98. 
4.1 Fr. : "souscription integrale". 5. Cf. supra p. 132. 
7. E.g. Belgium (cf. supra p.140, note 4), Holand, Italy (cf.supra p.211), Norway. 
8. Cf. supra pp.80, 132 and 235. 
9. Cf. supra p. 257. 
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There are sometimes differences in the procedure for passing general 
meeting resolutions to reduce capital 
1 
though generally the rules are 
the same, i.e. the same majority and quorum, and the same attitude 
towards reduction as a form and variety of a charter amendment 
2 
There 
are still, however, some countries left, where there are practically no 
statutory provisions at all 3, and in Chile any reduction was strictly 
forbidden. 
Provisions on reduction were initially dominated by the idea of 
protection of the creditors' interests, which was considered the most 
essential obligation of the company and of the supervising state as well 4. 
The complexity of various statutory provisions 5 on this question is 
mainly due to this consideration. It was only more or less recently that 
the court's freedom of action in some countries was raised 6 up to a point 
where the court acquired the rights to decide whether to apply a special 
procedure provided for the protection of the creditors' interests. This 
rule is really an achievement of legal technique, and it is submitted 
that it may lead to a textual simplification of the statutory provisions 
1. E.g. a three -quarters majority is required under Scots and English Law (cf.supra 
p.90 and note 3) ; no extraordinary meeting is required under French Law (cf.supra 
p.134) ; the attendance of the representative of the Ministry of Finance was 
"made possible" in the pre -soviet law of Lithikania ; but the attendance of the 
representative of a neutral body of approved auditors is obligatory in Switzerland 
(cf. supra pp. 204 -205) ; in some countries, e.g. in Belgium, the method of 
reduction has to be specified in the notice calling a general meeting. 
2. E.g. ,in Belgium, Italy, Spain. 3. E.g. in Persia. 
4. The emphasis on the protection of the creditors' interests is comparatively much 
smaller in America (cf. supra p. 239). Other systems of law, as e.g. Italian Law, 
provide that the court may overrule the opposition of creditors (cf. supra p.213). 
Cf.also Hallstein, p.192. 
5. Cf. e.g. supra p. 174. 6. E.g. in Scots and. English Law (cf. supra 
pp. 96 ff.). 
-287- 
on reduction1. As a matter of fact, later legislations showed in many cases 
a shortened version of the statutory provisions on reduction 2. The con- 
sideration that complex provisions regulating this question are of no great 
avail, and that a flexible provision on the permissibility of demanding, 
and n o t the obligation of demanding security, or satisfaction, or 
guarantee for the benefit of the creditors may be much more advantageous 
7 
has), perhaps, influenced this trend. The practice of an agreement with the 
creditors 4 may also have helped to dethrone the old -fashioned complex 
rules on reduction. 
A wide spread institution within the procedure of reduction,though 
unknown in Britain and almost unknown in America, is that of an induciae, 
i.e. a space of time before the expiry of which no payments of dividends or 
repayments of capital to the shareholders are allowed, all creditors' claims 
should be filed and settled, and a final filing of the reduction with the 
registrar should not be made. This institution, which is apparently of 
German origin 5, is now accepted in the majority of legal systems 6. 
Reduction shows more structural changes than increase,though on the whole 
it is impossible yet to say that there are any universaltrends of develop- 
1. Cf. supra p. 97, note 3. The inapplicability of the "Order L III B" in Scotland 
(cf. supra p. 98, note 2, and infra p. A 19) means that Scots Law on reduction is 
considerably simpler than English Law, though, of course, the court's right not to 
apply the special procedure laid down in s.56 (2)of the Companies Act somewhat over- 
comes this difference between the two systems. 
2. This trend is noticeable in Switzerland cf.supra p.201), Italy ( cf.supra p.211), 
America (cf.supra p.236), Liechtenstein ( cf.supra p.249), Sweden ( cf.supra p.262) 
and Spain (cf. supra pp. 269 and 271). 
3. Cf. supra pp.99 --100, 174 -175, 206 -207, 213. 
4. Cf. supra pp. 143 and 207. 5. Cf. supra p.158. 
6, E.g. in Belgium ( cf.supra p.143), Germany (cf.supra p.175), Switzerland ( cf.supra 
p.206), Italy (cf. supra p.213), Liechtenstein ( cf.supra p.249), Sweden ( cf.supra 
p.264) and Spain (cf. supra p. 271). 
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ment. One thing is certain, perhaps, and that is that there are some 
types of shortened or simplified reduction 1 provided for in various 
legislations, and that this trend may influence future legislation and 
future practice too, and even replace the old "normal" procedure of reduct- 
ion. One of the types of reduction which has acquired some universal ap- 
plication and has, owing to its frequency, developed into an almost sepa- 
rate institution of modern company law, is reduction by redemption 2. Much 
attention has also been given to the relationship between reduction and 
liability. Readjustment as a type of alteration has acquired some importance 
in countries with a not too reliable currency system 3. It usually takes 
form of special legislation 4 in order to re- arrange capital figures after 
a heavy inflation has upset the whole system of corporate capitalization. 
There is only one case, however, where provision far in advance for such a 
possibility has been made 5, and it is to the effect that the situation, 
when it arose , could be dealt with without any further legislation. 
1. Cf. supra pp. 178 -181, and p. 239. 
It is submitted that in this country the freedom of the court to decide whether to 
apply the complex procedure laid down in s.56 (2) of the Companies Act of 1948 is in 
itself a simplified form of a reduction of capital. 
2. In Scots and English Law, it is known under the name of "reduction of the redemption 
reserve fund" (cf. supra pp. 87, 94 and 111 ff.), in America usually called "can- 
cellation of shares by redemption ( cf. supra pp. 237 ff.). This institution is, 
besides widely applied in Germany (cf. supra pp. 173 and 182), Sweden (cf.supra 
p. 262) and Spain()cf.supra p.271). 
3. France (cf. supra pp. 136 -137), Belgium ( cf.supra p.142), Germany ( cf.supra 
pp. 183 ff.). 
The American term "readjustment of stock" has a distinctly different meaning (cf. 
supra p. 61 , note 1, and p. 243). 
4. Cf. supra p. 183, note 2. 
5. Liechtenstein (cf. supra p. 248 and note 2). 
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']chile most persons would doubtless agree that in a capitalistic 
economy the aim of business corporations is to secure the maximum 
possible net return, this does not apply so fully to public companies 
where considerations of national economy are as important as those of 
private profit 
1, 
Neither is it generally recognized or 
appreciated that almost the only way of measuring the achievements 
of individual enterprises is by the use of methods of accounting 
2 
The interrelation between the subject of this study and the 
methodological approach of the accountant is very complex. Accounting 
methods and accounting concepts may be adapted to the individual purpose 
of practically any case. There is a rivalry between modern law which 
introduced accounting poncepts into the statutes, and modern accountancy, 
each trying to outwit the other for the benefit of their customers. 
Attempts, however, have been made, especially in Switzerland, to 
neutralize the accountant, and make impartiality and objectivity essential 
features of his opinion and choice of methods. 
As a by- product of these trends arguments on accounting matters have 
almost reached the stage of litis contestatio. It may be that finally it 
will be deplored that accounting has entered the legal and juridical 
precincts, but, on the other hand, it may be submitted that this was 
1. Cf. supra pp. 21 and 36. 
2. A.A.Berle, Jr., and F.S.Fischer, "Elements of the Law of Business Accounting ", 
in : CLR, vol.32 (1932), pp. 573 -600 ; N.S.Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate 
Enterprise, New York 1940 ; E.Folliet, Le bilan dans les sociètès anonymes au 
point de vue juridique et comptable, Lausanne 1920, pp. 98 ff.; W.G.Katz, 
"Accounting problems in corporate distributions ", in : "University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review ", vol.89 (1941), pp. 764 -788. 
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inevitable since it followed the general trend of formalism that has 
entered all branches of social life. 
The advent of public companies as instruments of high economic policy 
of a planning state may lead to the need for a public official entitled or 
obliged to look deeper into the business life of such companies, and to do 
that vigilantly not only from the point of view of controlling the legality 
of its transactions, but also with a view to checking the accounting 
methods applied to them. The battle of wits in concepts and motives will 
naturally enough become the leading factor in accounting Matters too, It 
is yet quite impossible to predict what methods and arguments will be 
brought forward on either side. However, one may assert already that 
planning states are usually more interested in prescribing detailed 
principles of accounting, although this might hardly be advantageous 
for private initiative.. 
Questions about limited companies and their capital, and, especially, 
about a l t e r a t i o n of their capital led to legalistic constructions 
inundating the science of accounting, and to balance sheet requirements 
being transferred to the statute book 1, The "capital of a company ", 
introduced for the first time in a balance sheet as an invariable number, 
had in every respect a quite different meaning some fifty years ago. The 
rather fluid and elastic principles of balance keeping became somewhat 
distorted under the influence of the rigidly and formally unalterable 
number called capital. Compated with other items on the same balance 
lo Rauch. vol.I, pp. 1 -2. 
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sheet, this new notion of capital was much less real, especially in 
countries with emphasis on the unalterability of capital and lacking 
the institution of authorized capital. 
This is not the only reason why it may be thought that the less 
accounting matters enter statute law, the better for the interests of 
accountancy. It is also an advantage, in the writer's opinion, that 
standards of uniformity are kept at a minimum in the Companies Act of 
1948 1, since an abundance of detail would inevitably lead to a rampant 
formalism and cause a spiral of arguments. Accounting may have become a 
healthy and important brake on the process of de- humanization 2 of the 
economic life of a competitive planning state. 
It is the duty of the legislature to find out the best possible 
synthesis of the requirements of the state and of those of private 
initiative, and this applies to the field of public companies as well. 
The practical value of accounting theory 
3 
and of theoretical 
maxims of jurisprudence, as applied to company law, becomes apparent 
in this connection. Sociological aspects become an essential element 
in the process of judging any situation, or any trend. Economists in 
the borderland between economics and accounting, jurists in the borderland 
1. F.Sewell Bray, Four Essays in Accounting Theory, London 1953, p.19. 
Professor Bray recommends in another place (ibid., p.31) that company legislation 
should not attempt to define an account. 
2. Cf.supra pp. 31 -32 and pp. 284 -285. 
3. Cf. the studies by F.Sewell Bray : The Accounting Mission, Melbourne 1951, 
and Four Essays in Accounting Theory, London 1953. 
-292- 
between law and applied economics, and accountants familiar with company 
law may become the ideal set of people to correlate tendencies within 
these doctrines. There is inevitably an interconnection between currency 
policy, the general balance of payments in a state, and the state's 
interest in controlling the investment activities of its citizens and 
legal entities. 
In all the cases of alteration of capital accounting methods and 
accounting concepts are of great importance, and there is fertile ground 
for argument on points of advisability of altering the capital, checking 
the accuracy of an alteration scheme, or checking a completed alteration, 
The interests of the shareholders, of classes and groups of shareholders, 
of directors and the management, of the company accountants and book-keeper s 
1, 
and, last but not least, of the planning, or simply controlling, state 
may be, and very often are, in conflict. 
The impact of accounting on statute law does not always affect public 
and private companies equally, and one may even visualize the existence of 
a special public company accountancy 2, It may even be asserted that the 
process of nationalization of enterprises, either in otherwise capitalistic 
countries, or in countries of socialistic or soviet character, always brings 
1. They are, of course, and quite naturally, primarily concerned with the interests 
of their employer - the public company. Cf. F.Sewell Bray, Four Essays in 
Accounting Theory, London 1953, pp. 31 -32. 
2. F.Sewell Bray, op.cit., pp. 16 - 17 ; and F.Sewell Bray, "The Formal Principles 
of Public Company Accounting ", in : "Accounting Research ", vol.IV (4), Cambridge 
1953 
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growing accountancy obligations with it 
1. 
It may be advantageous for 
the art, science and theory of accountancy 2 to keep accounting matters 
out of the statute book as much as possible, since the danger that it 
may easily enough become a "legal constraint" 3 is quite possible too. 
The emphasis on the impartiality of the public or social accountant 4, 
entitled or obliged to look into an internal matter of alteration of 
capital, as we observe it in Swiss Law; may be advantageous in order 
to keep the whole class of public companies on a "lower" level 
6 
of 
the companies' pyramid. 
Of the individual questions dealt with in this study, there should 
again be mentioned the institution of no -par -value shares as a means to 
bridge over the discrepancy between nominal and real values 7, and to 
ease an individual alteration of capital within the flux of general 
currency values. No -par -value shares may even become obligatory during 
1. It is submitted that it is not the "privilege of limited liability" ( an opinion 
expressed by Professor Bray, Four Essays in Accounting Theory, p. 17 ) that is 
decisive and responsible for the existing emphasis on accountancy, but simply 
the presence of the public interest. The public character of any public company 
is the point. The writer agrees otherwise with Professor F.Sewell Bray that some 
of the private companies may be very near to the higher level of public companies. 
2. F.Sewell Bray, The Accounting Mission, pp. 28 and 59. 
3. P.Sewell Bray, " The Formal Principles of Public Company Accounting ", p.10. 
4. F.Sewell Bray, The Accounting Mission, pp. 18 ff., and p. 60. 
5. Cf. supra pp. 204 -205, and p. 286, note 1. 
6. Cf. supra p.190. 
7. "Actual market valuation" ( a rather objective category) and "time delay" (as an 
internal policy of an individual company) are only two illustratmons of the 
futility of the "reality" of any values. Cf.F.Sewell Bray, The Accounting 
Mission, p.32. 
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periods when inflationary trends are a threat to the economy of a state, 
and accountancy should be aware of this possible trend, since the "Account - 
ing implications of changing money values" are and always have been a 
burning question 1. 
Another question which is dealt with in accounting theory is that of 
capital surplus adjustments 2 as a pre- condition of an increase out of 
surplus. Too strict and too formal statutory provisions on revaluation 
and depreciation 3, though designed to achieve accuracy and efficiency, 
may easily enough become a handicap and lead to new interpretative 
struggles of arguments. 
Summing up, it could, of course, be said that difficulties will 
inevitably arise in studies of this nature. If, other things being equal, 
two men are theoretically unable to see the same object with the same eye, 
then, when the other things are not equal, e.g. nationality, race, language, 
creed, background and philosophical approach , it is even less likely that 
similar results will be achieved when investigating comparative law. 
Any comparative study can be only an essay of comparison, and other 
writers may notice and select other peculiarities , stress different 
aspects and reach other conclusions. 
While individualistic elements were in the foreground in older 
companies acts, the general trend towards collectivism was bound to 
1. F.Sewell Bray, 
2, F.Sewell Bray, 
3. F.Sewell Bray, 
"The Accounting Progression ", in : "Accounting Research ", 
vo1.IV (4), Cambridge 1953, p. 141. 
The Accounting Mission, pp. 44 ff. 
Four Essays in Accounting Theory, pp. 30 ff. 
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affect modern company law. This has become apparent 1 every time a 
revision of company law has taken place lately, though the amount and 
style of its accentuation differed from country to country. The totalitarian 
countries experimented shortly before the Second World War with a complete 
divergence from individualism towards the protection of the interests of 
the whole economy. Other states continued to follow the classical lines 
of a democracy and tried to repair inadequacies by delicate measuring of 
needs and possibilities 2, by manoeuvring through the gulf between 
over -individuality and trans- personality, and by somewhat slowing 
down the amount of protection of the individual rights of 
shareholders and creditors. 
From the point of view of pure jurisprudence, it has to be borne in 
mind that countries with a Roman Law tradition were much more fortunate 
than others in finding available a good and short form of legal expression 
concerning even these so technically mercantile questions. On the other 
hand, the verbosity of the companies acts of German origin has not proved 
to be an asset, though these acts are doubtless pregnant with good logic 
and accuracy of thought, and though they are possibly the best represent- 
atives of subtle achievement in the transcendental world of juridical 
conceptionalism 3. In the long run these companies acts were not greatly 
favoured, and can hardly be considered as good specimens of legislative 
1. E.Bossard, Die Reserven der Aktiengesellschaft im neuen Obligationenrecht, 
Berne 1940, PP. 58 -59. 
2. Ibid., p. 74. 
3. M.Gutzwiller, " Rechtsvergleichung in kontinentaler Sicht ", in : "Recueil de 
travaux suisses presentès au Iv -i6me Congres International du Droit Comparè ", 
Geneva 1954, p. 8. 
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creations. Swiss Law has given an extraordinary good example of aloof 
criticism of German achievements in legal matters. It may have been very 
tempting for the Swiss to copy them more, especially in the psychological 
atmosphere of the late thirties. The tempered acceptance of American 
ideas in Liechtenstein and Spain could be counterbalanced by that in 
Sweden, where no Roman Law traditions have helped to filter the impact 
of the law of the most capitalistic country in the whole world. 
It is submitted that, concerning Scots Law, Roman Law traditions were 
again providential on at least two occasions in the past hundred years : 
firstly, in the return to legal traditions that were familiar in Scotland 
prior to 1856 - this happened in the sixties of the last century 1, and 
secondly, in the non -acceptance of the "Order L III B" in Scotland 2. 
1. Cf. supra p. 69. 
2. Cf. supra p. 98 and note 2, and p. 287, note 1. 
A N N E X E S . 
A 1 
ANNEX I 
Provisions relating to A l t e r a t i o n of C api t a l 
in the C o m p a n i e s A c t s 1862 - 1948 of the United 
Kingdom . 
The text is given here of those sections of Companies Acts which deal with 
the problem of alteration of capital. 
The numeration of sections and articles refers to the Companies Act of 1948, 
The numbers of identical or corresponding sections and articles of prior 
Companies Acts are given on the margin. 
The numbers of sections and articles which are no longer in force are bracketed9 
their text being given in footnotes if of some importance for this study. Single 
words and phrases omitted in later Acts are also bracketed. A footnote is 
appended. 
The uplifted sign ( indicates the beginning of a text dealt with or referred to 
in the next footnote. 
List of abbreviations used to denote the 













25 and 26 Vict., cap. 89, 
30 and 31 Vict., cap.131, 
40 and 41 Viet., cap. 26, 
42 and 43 Viet., cap. 76, 
43 Viet., cap.19, 
53 and 54 Viet., cap. 63, 
63 and 64 Viet., cap. 48, 
7 E VII,cap.50, 
8 E VII,cap.69, 
18 and 19 G V,cap.45, 
19 and 20 G V,cap.23, 
11 and 12 G VI, cap.38. 








Miscellaneous Provisions as to Share Capital 
1. 
3.59. 
A company, if so authorised by its articles 2 (as originally framed or as 
altered by special resolution) S , may do any or more of the following 
things, (namely) 4 
(a) make arrangements on the issue of shares for a difference between 
the shareholders in the amounts and times of payment of calls on 
their shares ; 
(b) accept from any member the whole or a part of the amount remaining 
unpaid on any shares held by him, although no part of that amount 
had been called up ; 
(c) pay dividend in proportion to the amount paid up on each share where 
a larger amount is paid up on some share than on others. 
S.6O. 
A limited company may by special resolution determine 6 that any portion of 
its share capital which has not been already called up shall not be capable 
of being called up except in the event and for the purposes of the company 
being wound up, and thereupon that portion of its share capital shall not be 
capable of being called up except and for the purposes aforesaid. 
1. The former head Xing was : " Power of company to arrange for different amounts being 
paid on shares ". Cf, C.A,19O8, S.39. 
2. The Companies Acts 1862, 1867 and 1877 used instead of "articles" the older ex- 
pression "Regulations ". Cf. e.g. C,A.1862, S.12, C,A.1867, Ss.9,21,24, and 
C.A,1877, S.5. 
C.A.19OO, S.29 used already the new word "articles ". 
3. Cf. e.g. C.A.1862, S.12, C.A.1867, S.24, C,Á.1877, S.5, C.A.19OO, 3.29. These 
words were omitted later. 
4. Cf. C.A.1867, S.24, C.A.19O8, S.39. This word was omitted later, 
5. Though this section had a different preamble its context corresponded to pts.a - c 
of later Companies Acts. 
6. C.A.1879, S.5 (4) used instead of "determine" the word "declare ". There was besides 
an unimportant difference in the last part of this section. 





''1929, S. 50. 
A 3 
S.61. 
(1) A company limited by shares or a company limited by guarantee and 
having a share capital 1, if so authorised by its articles 2 (as originally 
framed or as altered by special resolution) 3, may alter the conditions of 
its memorandum as follows, that is to say, it may - 
(e) 
47, s. 5. 
1908,5.41 (1)(e) 
1929,s,50 (1) ( e ) 
increase its share capital by new shares of such amount as it thinks 
expedient ; 
consolidate and divide all or any of its share capital into shares of 
larger amount than its existing shares ; 
convert all or any of its paid -up shares into stock, ( and reconvert 
that stock into paid -up shares of any denomination ; 
subdivide its shares, or any of them, into shares of smaller amount 
than is fixed by the memorandum, so, however, that in the subdivision 
the proportion between the amount paid and the amount, if any, unpaid 
on each ( reduced share shall be the same as it was in the case of the 
share from which the reduced share is derived 5 ; 
cancel shares which, at the date of the passing of the resolution in 
that behalf, have not been taken or agreed to be taken by any person, 
and diminish the amount of its share capital by the amount of the 
shares so cancelled, 
1. C.A.192f3, S.12 (a). This reference is not to be found in the text of C.A.1908, 
S.41 (1), and prior to that. 
2. Cf. supra p., A 2, footnote 2. 
Companies regulated by Table A are authorized by Art.44 (C.A.1949, Table A, cf. 
infra p. A 17 and footnotes) to increase their capital. 
3. Cf. supra p. A 2, footnote 3. 
4. 'The possibility of a reconversion of stock into shares was mentioned for the first 
time in the C.A,1900, 3,29. 
5. C,ó.1867, S.21, ended this way : " ... share of reduced amount shall be the same as 
it was in the case of the existing share or sharesw,hiich the share of reduced amount 
is derived ". 
A 4 
1,1867, S.21 (2) The powers conferred by this section must be exercised by ( the 
1,1908, S.41 (2) company in general meeting 1. 
1.1929, S.50 (2) 
01,1877, S.5 (3) A cancellation of shares in pursuance of this section shall not be 
,1,1908, S.41 (4) deemed to be a reduction of share capital within the meaning of this 
Act. 
S.62. 
(1) If a company having a share capital has - 
(a) consolidated and divided its share capital into shares of larger 
amount than its existing shares ; or 
(b) converted any shares into stock ; or 
),1908, S.42 (c) re-converted stock into shares ; or 
(d) subdivided its shares or any of them ; or 
(e) redeemed any redeemable preference shares ; or 
(f) cancelled any shares, otherwise than in connection with a reduction 
of share capital under section sixty -six of this Act ; 




registrar of companies specifying, as the case may be, the shares 
S.14 2 consolidated, divided, converted, sub -divided, redeemed or cancelled, 
S.51 (1) or the stock reconverted. 
(2) If default is made in complying with this section, the company and 
S.51 (2) 3. every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to 
a default fine. 
1. C.1í.1908, S.41, had the following text : " The powers conferred by this section 
with respect of subdivision of snares must be exercised by special resolution ". 
Similarly, C.A.1867, S.21, concerned only to the case mentioned in pt. "d" of the 
present S.61. 
2. This section did n o t mention pt. "d" of the present text( "Subdivided its shares 
or any of them "). This was put in for the first time by the C.A.1929, S.51 (1)(d). 
3. The penalty clause of the previous Acts was much more complicated. 
Cf. e.g. C.A.1928, S.14 (2). 
A 5 
S.63. 
(1) Where a company having a share capital, whether its shares have or 
have not been converted into stock, has increased its share capital beyond 
its registered capital,(and where a company not having a share capital has 
increased the number of its members beyond the registered number)1 it shall 
(within fifteen days after the passing of the resolution authorising the 
,41908, S.44 increase, give to the registrar of companies 2 notice of the increase (of 
.1929, S.52 (1) capital or members)3 and the registrar shall record the increase. 
(2) The notice to be given as aforesaid shall include such particulars as 
may be prescribed with respect to the classes of shares affected and the 
conditions subject to which the new shares have been or are to be issued, 
4,1928, á,15(b) and there shall be forwarded to the registrar of companies together with 
1,1929, S.52(2) the notice a printed copy of the resolution authorising the increase. 
41908, S.44 (2) 4 
,1929, 3.52 (3) 
d 
(3) If default is made in complying with this section, the company and 
every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a default 
fine 
1. Cf. C.Á,1908, S. 44 (1). See below footnote 2. 
2, The text of C.A.1908, S.44, was as follows : 
" give to the registrar of companies in the case of an increase of share 
capital, within fifteen days after the passing, or in the case of a special 
resolution the confirmation of the resolution authorising the increase, and 
in the case of an increase of members within fifteen days after the increase 
was resolved on or took place ... ". 
It was later much simplified through the omission of the phrase "increase of the 
number of members ", and the repalcement of a "special resolution" by the normal 
procedure in general meeting. Cf. C.Á.1929, 8.50, and W.Annan, An arrangement of 
the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, Edinburgh 1928, p.27. 
. Cf. C.Á,1908, 3.44. 
These words (similarly to the above mentioned : "and where a company not having .. ") 
were omitted later. 
4. This section mentioned a fine "not exceeding five pounds for every day during which 
the default continues ". This system of fines was simplified later. C.A,1929,8.52 (3) 





Reduction of Share Capital. 
s.66. 
(1) Subject to confirmation by court, a company limited by shares ( or a 
company limited by guarantee and having a share capital 2 may, if so author- 
ised by its articles 3 (as originally framed or as altered by special resol- 
ution) 4, by special resolution reduce its share 5 capital in any way,and in 
particular, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, may - 
(a) extinguish or reduce the liability on any of its shares in respect 
of share capital not paid up ; or 
(b) either with or without extinguishing or reducing liability on any of 
á908,S.46 (1)(b) its shares, cancel any paid -up share capital which is lost or unre- 
'1929,5.55 (1)(b) presented by available assets ; 
(c) either with or without extinguishing or reducing liability on any of 
,1908,5.46 (1)(c) its shares, pay off any paid -up share capital which is in excess of 
929,3.55 (1) (c) the wants of the company ; 
and may, if and so far as is necessary, alter its memorandum by reducing the 
amount of its share capital and of its shares accordingly. 
1. The head/in9 in the C.Á.1867 was as follows : "Reduction of Capital and Shares ". 
2. C.A.1929, 5.55 (1). This passage was unknown before. 
3. Cf. supra p. A 2, footnote 2. 
4. Cf. supra p. A 2, footnote 3. 
5. C.A.19O8, 5.51 (1). This word "share" was introduced only in the C.A.19OO, 5.4 (1)(6) 
and in the C.A.19O7, S.1 (3)(b). Simonson (2nd ed.,London 1924,p.17)considered it 
as a novelty of the C.A.1908. He apparently did not notice the appearance of the ex- 
pression "share capital" in the texts of 1900 and 1907. Cf. P.F.Simonson, The Compa- 
nies Acts 1900 and 1907 with Commentaries, London 1908, pp. 15 -16 and p.98. 
6. The text of C.A.1867, S.9, differs from that of C.A.19O8, 5.46, though the content 
is almost the same. 
7. The text of C.A.1877, 5.3, was as follows : " The word "capital" as used in the 
Companies Act,1867, shall include paid -up capital; and the power to reduce capital 
conferred by that Act shall include a power to cancel any lost capital, or any capi- 
tal unrepresented by available assets, or to pay off any capital which may be in 
excess of the wants of the company ; and paid -up capital may be reduced either with 
or without extinguishing or reducing the liability (if any) remaining on the shares 
of the company, and to the extent to which such liability is not extinguished or 
reduced, it shall be deemed to be preserved not withstanding anything contained in 
the Companies Act,1867 ". Cf. R.R.Formoy, The historical foundations of Modern Com- 
pany Law, London 1923, p.137. 
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1867, S. 9. (2) A special resolution under this section is in this Act referred to 
1 
;,1908, 646 as " a resolution for reducing share capital ". 
929, S.55. 
S.67. 
01867, S.11 2 (1) Where a company has passed a resolution for reducing share 3 capital, 
41908, S.47. it may apply to the court (by petition) 4 for an order confirming the 
.,1929, S.56 (1) reduction, 
(2) Where the proposed reduction of share 
3 
capital involves either 
diminuation of liability in respect of unpaid share capital or the payment 
to any shareholder of any paid -up share capital, and in any other case if 
the court so directs, ( the following provisions shall have effect, subject 
nevertheless to the next following subsections : - 
(a) 5 every creditor of the company who at the date fixed by the court is 
6 
,1877, S. 4 entitled to any debt or claim which, if that date were the commence - 
4 1908, S.49 (1) ment of the winding up of the company, would be admissible in proof 
1929, S.56 (2) against the company, shall be entitled to object to the reduction ; 
,1948, s.67 (2) 
1. The wording of this section differs slightly from the present one, 
2. The second part of this section became later 5.50 of C.A.1908. 
Cf. infra p. A 9. 
3. Cf. supra p. A 6, footnote 5. 
4. Cf. C.A. 1867, S011, C.A.1908, S.47, and C.A.1929, S.56 (1). These two words were 
omitted in the text of C.A.1948, S.67. 
5. Cf. C.A. 1929, 8.56 (2). This passage was unknown before, so was the subdivision of 
this subsection (2) into smaller units (a - c, i and ii). 
6. C.Á.1877, S.4 (first part) had the following text : " PYrovided that where the 
reduction of the capital of a company does not involve either the diminuation of 
any liability in respect of unpaid capital or the payment to any shareholder of 
any paid -up capital, 
(1) The creditors of the company shall not, unless the Court otherwise direct, be 
entitled to object or required to consent to the reduction, and 
(2) It shall not be necessary before the presentation of the petition for confirming 
the reduction to add, and the Court may, if it thinks it expedient so to do,dis- 
pense altogether with the addition of the words "and reduced" as mentioned in 
the Companies Act, 1867 ". 
(b) 
1908, S.49 ( 2) 
1929, S.56 (2)(b) 
(o) 
,1867, S.14. 
,1908, S.49 (3) 





the court shall settle a list of creditors so entitled to object, and 
for that purpose shall ascertain, as far as possible without requiring 
an application from any creditor, the names of those creditors and the 
nature and amount of their debts or claims, and may publish notices 
fixing a day or days whithin which creditors not entered on the list 
are to claim to be so entered or are to be excluded from the right of 
objecting to the reduction ; 
where a creditor entered on the list whose debt or claim is not 
discharged or ( has not 1 determined does not consent to the 
(proposed reduction, the court may, if it thinks fit, dispense with 
the consent ( of that creditor, on the company securing payment of 
his debt or claim by 3 appropriating, as the court may direct, the 
following amount (that is to say) 4 
(i) if the company admits the full amount of the debt or claim, or, 
though not admitting it, is willing to provide for it, then the 
full amount of the debt or claim ; 
(ii) if the company does not admit and is not willing to provide for 
the full amount of the debt or claim, or if the amount is 
contingent or not ascertained, then an amount fixed by the court 
after the like inquiry and adjudication as if the company were 
being wound up by the court. 
Where a proposed reduction of share capital involves either the 
diminuation of any liability in respect of unpaid share capital or the 
payment to any shareholder of any paid -up share capital, the court may, if, 
havánng regard to any special circumstances of the case, it thinks proper to 
to do, direct that subsection (2) of this section shall not apply as regards 
1929, 5.56 (3) any class or any classes of creditors. 
1. C.Á.1929, 5.56 (2)(c). These two words were inserted only then, 
2, C.A.1867, S.14. This word was omitted later. 
3. C.A.1908, S.49 (3). The older corresponding text was much more complex. 
4. C.A.1908, S.49 (3). Thse words were omitted later. 
s.68. 
(1) The court, if satisfied, with respect to every creditor of the company 
who under ( the last foregoing section 1 is entitled to object to the re- 
duction, that either his consent to the reduction has been obtained or his 
1867,5.11 (2)2 debt or claim has been discharged or has determined, or has been secured, 
,1908, 5.5O. may make an order confirming the reduction on such terms and conditions as 
,1929, S.57 (1) it thinks fit. 
1667, 5.10 3 (2) Where the court makes any such order, it may 4 - 
,1877, S.4 (1)5 (a) if for any special reason it thinks proper so to do, make an order 
,1908, S.48 6 directing that the company Shall, during such period, commencing on 
,1928, S.19. or at any date after the date of the order, add to its name as the 
,1929,5.57 (2)(a) last words thereof the words "and reduced ", and 
1. Cf. C.A. 1929, S.57 (1). The former text was simply :" ... this Act ".Cf. C.A.19O8, 
S.50. 
2. Cf. supra p. A 7, footnote 2. 
3. The text of this section is given below in footnote 4. 
4. Prior to 2)928 the text of this section differed owing to the then existing 
principle of the compulsory character of the addition of these words "and reduced ". 
The text of C.A.1867,S.1O, was as follows: " The company shall, after the date of 
the passing of any special resolution for reducing its capital, add to its name, 
until such date as the court may fix, the words "and reduced" as the last words in 
its name, and those words shall, until such date, be deemed to be part of the name 
of the company within the meaning of the Principal Act ". 
C,A.1877, 5,4, allowed the first exception to this rule. The text of this section 
is given above on p. A 7, footnote 6. 
C.A,19O8, 5.48, modified its text as follows : " On and from the confirmation by a 
company of a resolution for reducing share capital, or where the reduction does not 
involve either the diminution of any liability in respect of unpaid share capital or 
the payment to any shareholder of any paid -up share capital, then on and from pre- 
sentation of the petition for confirming the reduction, the company shall add to its 
name, until such date as the court may fix, the words "and reduced ", as the last 
words in its name, and those words shall, until that date be deemed to be part of 
the name of the company : Provided that, where the reduction does not involve 
either the diminution of any liability in respect of unpaid share capital or the 
payment to any shareholder of any paid -up share capital, the court may, if it thinks 
expedient, dispense altogether with the addition of the words "and reduced "." 
5. The text of this section is given above on p. A 7, footnote 6. It was partly later 
built in Otto the beginning of the second half of 5.48 of the C.À.19O8. 
6. The text of this section is given above in footnote 4. 
A 10 
(b) make an order requiring the company to publish as the court directs 
;,11.1877, S.4 (2) the reasons for reduction or such other information in regards thereto 
11,1908, S055 1 as the company may think expedient with a view to giving proper in- 
±11,1929, S.57 (2) 2 formation to the public, and if thinks fit, the causes which led to 
the reduction 2. 
(3) where a company is ordered to add to its name thewoybrds "and reduced ", 
11,1908, S.48(1)3 those words shall, until the expiration of the period specified in the 
,L,1929, So57 (3) order, be deemed to be part of the name of the company. 
s.69. 
(1) The registrar of (joint stock)4companies, on production to him of an 
order of the court confirming the reduction of the share5 capital of the 
company, and the delivery to him of a copy of the order and of a minute ap- 
proved by the court showing,with respect to the share capital of the company 
as altered by the order,the amount of the share.capital,the number of shares 
into which it is to be divided,and the amount of each share,(and the amount, 
if any, at the date of the registration deemed to be paid up on each share7, 
shall register the order and minute. 
(2) On the registration (of the order and minute 8,(and not before 9, the 
)special)10 resolution for reducing share capital as confirmed by the order 
so registered shall take effect. 
1. This section started as follows : " In any case of reduction of share capital, the 
court may require the company ..." . The remainder of this section was later built 
in to C.A. 1929, S.57 (2)(b). 
2. This part of the sub -section 57 (2)(b) was taken from S.55 of the C.Á,1908. 
3. The text of this section is given above on p. A 9, footnote 4 (last part). 
Altering the principle of the c o m p u l s o r y addition of the words "and re- 
duced", only the last part of the first paragraph of S.48 (C,A.1908) could be used 
for S.57 (3) of C.A.1929. 
Cf. W.Annan, An arrangement of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908, pp.31 -32. 
4. C.A.1867, S.15. The words "joint stock" were omitted already in the C.A.1877. 
5. Cf. supra p. A 6, footnote 5. 
7. Cf. C.A.1908, S.51. these words were introduced only then. 
8. Cf. C.11.1929, S.58 (2). 1.ese words were introduced only then. 
9. Cf. C.A.1908, S.51. These words were not previously included. 
10. Cf, C.Á.1867, S.15. This word was omitted later. 
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(3) Notice of the registration shall be published in such manner as the 
court may direct. 
(4) The registrar shall certify under his hand the registration of the 
order and minute, and his certificate shall be conclusive evidence that all 
1 
1867,Ss.9,15. the requirements of this Act with respect to reduction of share capital 
1908,5.51 (1 -4) have been complied with, and that the share capital of the company is such 
,1929,5.58 (1 -4) as is stated in the minute. 
(5) The minute when registered shall be deemed to be substituted for the 
1867,5.16. corresponding part of the memorandum and shall be valid and alterable as if 
1908,5.52 (1) 2 it had been originally contained therein. 
1929,5.58 (5) 
(6) The substitution of any such minute as aforesaid for part of the 
memorandum of the company shall be deemed to be an alteration of the 
memorandum within the meaning of section twenty -five of this Act. 
S.70ä 
(1) ( In the case of a reduction of share capital 3 a member of the 
company, past or present, shall not be liable in respect of any share to any 
1867,5.16 (2) 
i 
call or contribution exceeding in amount the difference, if any, between the 
908,5.53 (1) amount ( of the share as fixed by the minute and the amount 4 paid, or (as 
929,5.áy (1) the case may be) 5the reduced amount, if any, which is to be deemed to have 
been paid, on the share, ( as the case may be 5; 
1. Cf. supra p. A 6, footnote 5. 
2. This sub- section continued as follows : " ... and must be embodied in every copy 
of the memorandum issued after its registration ". 
3. C.A.1929, S.59 (1). This initial phrase was unknown before. 
4. C.A.1929, S.59 (1). These words were, though in a slightly different form, in the 
C.A.1867, 3.16 (last part). In the C.Á,1908, S.53, they were at the end of this 
sub -section. 
5. C,A.1908, S.53. These words were later transferred to the end of this paragraph.. 
Cf. Sch, III of the C.A.1907 (amendement to S,16 of C.Á.1867). 
'1867, S17. 
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Provided that, if any creditor, entitled in respect of any debt or claim to 
object to the reduction of share capital, is, by reason of his ignorance 
of the ,3_-^nr, _ 0.':n?ç rcr reduction, or of their nature and effect with respect 
to his claim, not entered on the list of creditors, and, after the reduction, 
the company is unable, within the meanings of the provisions of this Act with 
,1908,S053 (2) respect to winding up by the court, to pay the amount of his debt or claim, 
,1929,5.59 (1) then - 
(a) 2 every person who was a member of the company at the date of the 
registration of the order for reduction and minute, shall be liable to 
contribute for the payment of that debt or claim an amount not 
exceeding the amount which he would have been liable to contribute if 
the company had commenced to be wound up on the day before ( the said 
date 3; and 
(b) if the company is wound up, the court, on the application of any such 
creditor and proof of his ignorance as aforesaid, may, if it thinks 
fit, settle accordingly a list of persons so liable to contribute, and 
make and enforce calls and orders on the contributories settled on the 
list, as if they were ordinary contributories in a winding up. 







11929, So59 (2) 
1 
1. Cf. supra p. A 6, footnote 5. 
2. C.A.1908, 5.53, called these subdivisions "(1)" and "(2) ". They were unknown before. 
Cf. C.A,1867, S 17. 
30 A slightly different text is in the C.A.1908, S.53 (1). 
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S.71. 
If any officer of the company 1- 
(a) wilfully conceals the name of any creditors entitled to object to the 
reduction ; or 
(b) wilfully misrepresents the nature or amount of the debt or claim of any 
creditor ; or (if any director or manager of the company) 
2 
(c) aids, abets or is privy to any such concealment or misrepresentation as 
2 
,,x.1867, S.19 aforesaid, (every such director, manager or officer) he shall be guilty 
,1908, S.54 of a misdemeanour. 
,x,1929, 5.60 
Variation of Shareholders' Rights. 
S.72. 
(1) If, in the case of a company the share capital is divided into different 
classes of shares, provision is made by the memorandum or articles for authorising 
the variation of the rights attached to any class of shares in the company,subject 
to the consent of any specified proportion of the holders of the issued shares of 
that class or the sanction of a resolution passed at a separate meeting of the 
holders of those shares,and in pursuance of the said provision the rights attached 
to any such class of shares are at any time varied, the holders of not less in.the 
aggregate than fifteen per cent. of the issued shares of that class, being persons 
who did not consent to or vote in favour of the resolution for the variation, may 
apply to the court to have variation cancelled, and., where any such application is 
made,the variation shall not have effect unless and until it is confirmed by the 
court. 
(2) An application under this section must be made within twenty one days3after 
the date on which the consent was given or the resolution was passed, as the case 
may be, and may be made on behalf of the shareholders entitled to make the applic- 
ation by such one or more of their numbers as they may appoint in writing for the 
purpose, 
1. The preamble was different in C.A.1867 (s.19) and C.A.1908 (S.54): "If any director, 
manager, or officer of the company ". Later (C.A.1929, S.60) this formula was changed 
to :" secretary or other officer ", and has now shrunk to a mere "any officer ". 
2. These words were omitted after 1908. 
The subdivision of this section (a -c) was not made in C.A.1908, nor prior to that. 
3. Formerly : " within seven days ". Cf. C.A.1929, S. 61 (2). 
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(3) On any such application the court, after hearing the applicant and any 
other persons who apply to the court to be heard and appear to the court to 
be interested in the application, may, if it is satisfied, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case, that the variation would unfairly pre- 
judice the shareholders of the class represented by the applicant, disallow 
the variation and shall, if not so satisfied, confirm the variation. 
(4) The decision of the court on any such application shall be final. 
(5) The company shall within fifteen days after the making of the order by 
the court on any such application forward a copy of the order to the registrar 
of companies, and, if default is made in complying with this provision, the 
company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to 
a default fine. 
,1928, 5.17, (6) The expression "variation" in this section includes abrogation and the 
4929, S.61. expression "varied" shall be construed accordingly° 
Arrangements and Reconstructions 1. 
5.206. 
(1) where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and 
its creditors or any class of them or between the company and its members or 
n 
any class of them L, the court may on the application in a summary way of the 
company or of any creditor or member of the company, or, in the case of a 
company being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting of the creditors 
or class of creditors, or of the members of the company or class of members, 
as the case may be, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs° 
1. Formerly : " Power to compromise ". Cf. C.A.1908, 5.120. 
2. Cf. C.A.1900, s.24, and C.Á.1907, s.38. 
Cf. P.F.Simonson, The Companies Acts 1900 and 1907, London 1908, pp.76 -77 and pp. 
194 -196. 
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(2) If a majority in number representing three fourths in value of the 
creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members, as the case 
may be, present ( and voting l either in person or by proxy at the meeting, 
agree to any compromise or arrangement, the compromise or arrangement shall 
if sanctioned by the court, be binding on all the creditors or the class of 
creditors, or on the members or class of members, as the case may be, and 
,1908,5,120 
0.929,S.153 
(1 -2) 2 
(1 -2) 
(3) 
also on the company, or, in the course of being wound up, on the 
liquidator and contributories of the company, 
An odder made under subsection (2) of this section shall have no 
effect until an office copy of the order has been delivered to the registrar 
of companies for registration, and a copy of every such order shall be 
annexed to every copy of the memorandum of the company issued after the 
order has been made, or, in the case of a company not having a memorandum, 
of every copy so issued of the instrument constituting or defining the 
constitution of the company. 
(4) If a company makes default in complying with subsection (3) of this 
section, the company and every officer of the company who is in default 
ß,1928,S,53 (2) shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one pound for each copy in respect 
.111929,5.153 (3 -4) of which default is made. 
(5) An order under subsection (1) of this section pronounced in Scotland 
by the judge acting as vacation judge in pursuance of section four of the 
Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act, 1933, shall not be subject to 
review, reduction, suspension or stay of execution 3. 
1. Cf. C.A.1929, S.153 (2). These words "and voting" were unknown before, 
2. Cf. 33 and 34 vict. (1870), cap.104, S.2. 
3. Cf. 23 and 24 Geo V (1933), cap041 
A 16 
(6) In this ( and in the next following 1 section the expression "company" 
means any company liable to be wound up under this Act, ( and the ex- 
pression "arrangement" includes a reorganisation of the share capital of 
the company by the consolidation of shares of different classes or by the 
division of shares into shares of different classes or by both these 
methods 
2 
,1908, S.120 (3) 
.1928, B. 53 (1) 
1,1929, S.153 (5) 
1. These words were not inserted in the C.A.1929, and prior to that. 
2. Cf. C.A.1928, S.53 (1) and C.A.1929, 3.153 (5). 
This part of the section was transferred here in 1928. The corresponding text of 
the C.A.1908, S.45 (1), was as follows : " A company limited by shares may, by 
special resolution confirmed by an order of the court, modify the conditions 
contained in its memorandum so as to reorganise its share capital, whether by the 
consolidation of shares of different classes or by the division of its shares into 
shares of different classes : 
Provided that no preference or special privilege attached to or belonging to any 
class of shares shall be interfered with except by a resolution passed by a majority 
in number of shareholders of that class holding three -fourths of the share capital 
of that .class and confirmed at a meeting of shareholders of that class in the same 
manner as a special resolution of the company is required to be confirmed, and every 
resolution so passed shall bind all shareholders of the class." 
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T a b l e A (First Schedule). 
Alteration of Capital. 
Art.44. 
The ( company may from time to time by ordinary resolution 1 increase the 
snare capital by such sum to be divided into shares of such amount, as the 
resolution shall prescribe. 
111908, Table A, Art.41. 
11,1929, Table A, Art.34. 
,1929, Table A, Art.35) 
2 
1. Cf. C.A,1929, Table A, Art. 34. 
In the First Schedule of the C..ä,1862, and in the Table A of the C.A.1908 the text 
of this article began as follows : " The directors may, with the sanction of an 
extraordinary resolution of the company ,., ". An "extraordinary resolution" was 
meant to be passed by a majority of not less than three quarters of such members of 
the company for the time being entitled to vote as may be present in person or by 
proxy. 
Cf. C.A.1862, Ss.129 and 51, and First Sch., Art.26 ; and C.A.1908, Table A, Art.41. 
See also P.F.Simonson, The Revised Table A, London 1907, pp.37 ff. 
2. This article concerning the pre -emptive rights of shareholders was as follows : 
"Subject to any direction to the contrary that may be given by the company in 
general meeting, all new shares shall, before issue, be offered to such persons as 
at the date of the offer are entitled to receive notices from the company of general 
meetings in proportion, as nearly as the circumstances admit, to the amount of the 
existing shares to which they are entitled. The offer shall be made by notice 
specifying the number of shares offered, and limiting a time within which the offer, 
if not accepted, will be deemed to be declined, and after the expiration of that 
time, or on the receipt of an intimation from the person to whom the offer is made 
that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose of those 
shares in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company. The directors 
may likewise so dispose of any new shares which (by reason of the ratio which the 
new shares bear to shares held by persons entitled to an offer of new shares) cannot 
in the opinion of the directors, be conveniently offered under this article ". 
C.Á,1862, First Schedule, Art. 27, served as a prototype to the first two sentences 
of this article. The corresponding article of C.A.1908, Table A, began on a slightly 
different line : " Subject to any direction to the contrary that may be given by the 
resolution sanctioning the increase of share capital ..." . C.A.1862, First Schedule 
Art. 27, referred simply to the " ... members in proportion to the existing shares 
held by them ..." 
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LA.1929, Table A , Art.36) 
Art.45. 
he company may by ordinary 2 '' resolution - 
(a) consolidate and divide (all or any of 3 its share capital into 
shares of larger amount than its existing shares ; 
(b) sub- divide its existing shares, or any of them into shares of smaller 
amount than is fixed by the memorandum of association subject, 
nevertheless, to the provisions of section 61 (1)(d) of the Act 4; 
(c) cancel any shares which, at the date of the passing of the resolution, 
;4.1908, Table A, Art.44. have not been taken or agreed to be taken by any person. 
A.1929, Table A, Art.37. 
Art.46. 
The company may by special resolution reduce its share capital,(any capital 
redemption reserve funds or any share premium account 6in any manner and 
with,and subject to, any incident authorised,and consent required,by law. 
4.1908, Table A, Art44 (d) 
4.1929, Table A, Art.38. 
1. This article (identical with Art.43 of Table A of the C.A.1908) was as follows : 
"The new shares shall be subject to the same provisions with reference to the 
payment of calls, lien, transfer, transmission, forfeiture, and otherwise as the 
shares in the original share capital ". 
Both these articles ( 35 and 36 ) were omitted in the Table A of the C.A.1948. 
The Companies Act (Northern Ireland) 1932, 22 and 23 Geo V, cap.7, 1st Schedule, 
Table A, Art. 35 and 36, have analogous provisions in this respect. 
To the writer's knowledge, this has not been repealed since. 
2. C.A.1908, Table A, Art. 444 : " ... by special resolution ". 
3. These words were not previously included. They were put in for the first time by the 
C.A.1929. Cf. P.F.Simonson, The Revised Table A, London 1907, p.40. 
4. A slight difference with the text of C.A.1908, Table A, Art.44 (b). 
5. Cf. C.A.1929, Table A, Art.38. This phrase had not previously appeared. 
6. Cf. C.A.1948, Table A, Art.46. This part of the text had no mention of a 
share premium account prior to that. 
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ANNEX II. 
E x t r a c t s f r o m 
ORDER L III B, 
R.S.C. (Companies)(No.2),1948. 
P r o c e d u r e on A p p l i c a t i o n 
under t h e C o m p a n i e s Act, 1948. 
Rule 20 
Every petition (except a petition specified in Rule 5 (h))... 
to which this Order relates shall be brought to and issued out of the 
office of the Registrar Companies Court but every petition specified in 
Rule 5 (h) ... may at the option of the applicant or petitioner be brought 
to and issued out of either (a) such office or department as is specified 
in Order II, r.9, or (b) the office of the Registrar Companies Court ... 
Rule 5. 
The following applications shall be made by petition : 
(d) Applications to confirm a reduction of capital under section 67 
of the Act, 
(e) Applications to confirm the reduction of any share premium account 
or any capital redemption reserve fund under section 56 (1) or 
section 58 (1)(d) of the Act, 
(f) Applications to cancel any variation of the rights of holders of 
special classes of shares under section 72 of the Act, 
(g) Applications to sanction the issue of shares at a discount under 
section 57 of the Act, 
(h) Applications to sanction a compromise or arrangement under s.206 
(2) of the Act .... 
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Rule 8. 
The following applications shall be made by summons : - 
(g) Applications for meetings of creditors or members of a company 
under section 206 (1) of the Act, 
(h) Applications for facilitating reconstructions or amalgamations 
of companies under section 208 of the Act, where the matters to 
which such applications relate have not been dealt with, or fully 
dealt with, on the hearing of the petition to sanction the 
compromise or arrangement to which they relate, ... 
(m) Applications to extend the time for the issue of shares at a 
discount under section 57 (1)(d) of the Act, ... 
(o) Applications for the purpose of preventing or settling the terms 
of the acquisition of shares under section 209 of the Act, ... 
Rule 10. 
(1) alien the petition has been presented pursuant to paragraphs (a)(b)(c) 
(d)(e)(f) or (j) of Rule 5 of this Order, or where an order is sought under 
section 208 of the Act, an application shall in every case be made by 
summons in Chambers to the Judge for directions as to the proceedings to 
be taken. 
(2) Upon the hearing of the summons, or upon any adjourned hearing or 
hearings thereof or any subsequent application, the Judge may make such 
order or orders and give such directions as he may think fit to all the 
proceedings to be taken, and more particularly with respect to the 
following matters, that is to say - 
(a) the publication of notices, 
(b) in cases where the Court orders an inquiry as to the debts,claims 
or liabilities of or affecting a company or as to any such debts, 
claims or liabilities, the proceedings to be taken for settling 
the list of creditors entitled to object, including the dispensing 
with the observance of section 67 (2) of the Act as regards any 
class or classes of creditors ; fixing the date with reference to 
which the list of such creditors is to be made out, and generally 
fixing a time for and giving directions as to all other necessary 
or proper steps in the matter whether expressly mentioned in any 
of the Rules of this Order or not .... 
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Rule 11. 
In cases where the Court has ordered any such inquiry as aforesaid 
the following provisions shall apply : - 
(a) The company shall, within seven days after such order or such 
further or other time as the Judge may allow, file in the office 
of the Registrar, an affidavit made by some officer or officers of 
the company competent to make the same, verifying a list containing 
so far as possible the names and addresses of the creditors of the 
company to whom such inquiry extends. The said list shall also 
contain the amounts due to the creditors therein named respective 
in respect of debts, claims or liabilities to which the inquiry 
extends, or in the case of any such debt payable on a contingency 
or not ascertained or any such claim admissible to proof in a 
winding up of the company the value, so far as can be justly 
estimated, of such debt or claim. Every such list and an office 
copy of every such affidavit shall be left at the office of the 
Registrar not later than one day after the filing of the affidavit. 
(b) The person making any such affidavit shall state therein his 
belief that the list verified by such affidavit is correct, and 
that there was not at the date so fixed as aforesaid any debt, 
claim or liability which, if that date were the commencement of the 
winding up of the company, would be admissible in proof against 
the company, except the debts, claims and liabilities set forth in 
such list and any debts, claims and liabilities to which the 
inquiry does not extend, and shall state his means of knowledge of 
the matters deposed to in such affidavit ... 
(c) Copies of such list ... shall be kept at the registered office of 
the company and at the offices of the solicitors to the company 
and their London agents (if any) and any person desirous of 
inspecting the same may at any time during the ordinary hours of 
business inspect and take extracts from the same .., 
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(d) The company shall within seven days after the filing of such 
affidavit, or such further or other time as the Judge may allow, 
send to each creditor whose name is entered in the said list a 
notice stating the amount of the proposed reduction of capital, the 
effect of the order directing the inquiry and the amount or 
estimated value of the debt or the contingent debt or claim or both 
for which such creditor is entered in the said list, and the time 
(such time to be fixed by the Judge) within which, if he claims to 
be entitled to be entered on such list as a creditor for a larger 
amount, he must send in his name and address, and the particulars 
of his debt or claim, and the name and address of his solicitors 
(if any) to the solicitors of the company ... 
(e) Notice of the presentation of the petition, of the effect of the 
order directing the inquiry and of the list of creditors shall, 
after the filing of the affidavit mentioned in paragraph (a) of 
this Rule, be published at such times, and in such newspapers as 
the Judge shall direct. Every such notice shall state the amount 
of the proposed reduction of capital, and the places where the 
aforesaid list of creditors may be inspected, and the time within 
which creditors of the company who are not but are entitled to be 
entered on the said list, and are desirous of being entered 
therein, must send in their names and addresses, and the 
particulars of their debts or claims, and the names and addresses 
of their solicitors (if any) to the solicitor of the company ... 
(f) ... Such affidavit shall also state which of the persons who are 
entered in the list as creditors and which of the persons who have 
sent in particulars of their debts or claims in pursuance of such 
notices as aforesaid have been paid or have consented to the 
proposed reduction ... 
(g) If the company contends that a person is not entitled to be 
entered in the list of creditors in respect of any debt or claim 
whether admitted or not or if any debt or claim ... shall not be 
admitted by the company at its full amount, then and in every such 
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case, unless the company is willing to appropriate in such 
manner as the Judge shall direct the full amount of such debt or 
claim, the company shall, if the Judge think fit so to direct, 
send to the creditor a notice that he is required to come in and 
establish his title to be entered on the list .... 
(i) The result of the settlement of the list of creditors shall be 
stated in a certificate by the Registrar and such certificate 
shall state what debts or claims (if any) have been disallowed, 
and shall distinguish the debts or claims the full amount of which 
the company is willing to appropriate, and the debts or claims (if 
any) the amount of which has been fixed by inquiry and adjudication 
in manner provided by section 67 (2) of the Act, and this order, 
and the debts or claims (if any) the full amount of which the 
company does not admit or is not willing to appropriate or the 
amount of which has not been fixed by inquiry and adjudication as 
aforesaid; and shall show which of the creditors have consented to 
the proposed reduction, and the total amount of the debts due to 
them, and the total amount of the debts or claims the payment of 
which has been secured in manner provided by section 67 (2) of the 
Act and the persons to or by whom the same are due or claimed. The 
said certificate shall also state what creditors have under para- 
graph (g) of this Rule come in and sought to establish their title 
to be entered on the list and whether such claims have been 
allowed or not, but it shall not be necessary to make in such 
certificate any further or other reference to any creditors who 
are not entitled to be entered in the list or to any debts or 
claims to which the inquiry does not extend or to show therein the 
several amounts of the debts or claims of any person who have 
consented to the proposed reduction or the payment of whose debts 
or claims has been secured as aforesaid 
(1) Before the hearing of the petition, notices stating the day on 
which the same is appointed to be heard shall be published at such 
times and in such newspapers as the Judge shall direct .,, 
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ANNEX III. 
L i s t of A m e r i c a n 
c o r p o r a t i o n s t a t u t e s . 
Alabama Code 1907 (s.3447), Code 1940, 
Arizona Code 1939, 
Arkansas General Corporation Act 1904 (s.855), 1931 (s.255), 
California Code Civil 1907, amended 1931, 1947, 1951, 1953, 
Colorado Revised Statutes 1908, 1921, 1935, 1943, 
Connecticut Public Acts 1903 (c.194), 1907 (c.155), General Corporation Statutes 
1930 , 
Delaware General Corporation Acts 1901, Code 1915, amended 1929 (c.135), 
1931 (c.129), revised 1935, Code 1953, 
Florida Act 1927, General Statute Law 1953 (s.2653), 
Georgia Code 1910 (s.2822), Code 1933, 
Idaho Code 1932 (t.29), 
Illinois Business Corporation Act 1933, 
Indiana General Corporation Act 1929 (c.215), amended 1949, 1950, 1953, 
Iowa Code 1931, Code 1950, 
Kansas General Statutes 1909 (s.1746), 1923 (c.17), 1939, 
Kentucky Statutes 1909 (s.2161), Act 1942, revised 1948, 
Louisiana Act 1928 (c.258), Revised Statutes 1950, 
Maine Revised Statutes 1907 (c.47), 1930 (c.56), 1951, 
Maryland Revised Corporation Act 1908, amended 1924, 1953, 
Massachusets Business Corporation Law 1903, amended 1937, 
Michigan Corporation Acts 1900, 1903 (c.2), 1907, 1931 (c.327), 1933 (c.186), 












Revised Law 1905 (s.2849), Business Corporation Act 1933 (8.300), 
Code 1930, 
Revised Statutes 1939, Law 1943, 
Code 1909 (s.3349), revised 1931 (cc.33, 35), 
Statutes 1929 (c.24), 
Law 1937, 
Code 1907 (c.129), revised 1925 (c.227), 
General Corporation Acts 1896, 1906, 1910, 1911, 1930 (t.47),1953, 
Statutes 1929 (c.32), 
General Corporation Acts 1910, 1911, 1912, 
Stock Corporation Laws 1944, 1952, 
North Carolina Code 1943, 













New Ohio Corporation Act 1927, Code 1953, General Corporation 
Act 1955, 
Business Corporation Act 1947, 
Business Corporation Act 1951, 
Acts 1933 (c.106), 1937 (P.L.2828), amended 1939, 1941, 1949, 1951, 
Acts 1909, 1923 (c.248), 1932 (c.1941), 1938, 1948, 
Civil Code 1902, amended 1932, 
Act 1929, 
Code 1903 (s.2335), 
Act 1925, 
Code 1907 (s.335), amended 1933, 
Public Statutes 1906, 1910, 1934, 
Code 1930, 
Washington Code 1933 (c.185), revised 1937, 1939, 1941, 1947, 1949, 1952, 
West Virginia Code 1932 (c.31), Code 1943, 
Wisconsin Statutes 1905, 1911, 1933, 1949 (c.182), 1951 (c.731), 1953, 
Wyoming Code 1931 (c.28). 
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A N N E X I V. 
B i b l i o g r a p h y. 
This bibliography is, of course, unable to include all the works 
connected with this subject. 
The first part of this bibliography contains all bookst and articles 
actually consulted and quoted in the course of this study, the second part 
lists further literature from which I have not drawn material, and the 
third part gives the titles of periodicals containg articles quoted here. 
Works repeatedly quoted in this study are usually referred to only by 
the author's name. A list of such works is given on pp. 2 - 5. A mention 
of these abbreviations is given in this bibliography as well fin brackets 
at the end of the title). The titles of all o t h e r works are usually 
fully quoted, except when repeated on the same or the following page, 
Anonymous articles, and articles only bearing initials in periodicals 
and collective works and other minor contributions are not mentioned in 
this bibliography although they may be mentioned in footnotes. 
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The titles of articles in periodicals and collective works are 
denoted with inverted commas, and so also are the unabridged titles 
of periodicals and collective works. The list of abbreviations for 
periodicals is given on p. 6, and is also appended here at the end 
of this bibliography (p. A 67 ). Collections in honour of a person 
appear under that person's name, and other collective works under 
the name of their editor. Their names are bracketed. 
If there is more than one publishing place mentioned on the title 
page of the work, only the first is mentioned here. The place and year 
of publication of a work may be omitted if it is consecutively quoted 
on the pages of the same chapter. If there is no year of publication 
apparent on the title page, the abbreviation "s.a." is appended in 
brackets, and an approximate year of publication is sometimes supplied. 
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Part III . 
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1. Cf. supra p. A 53. 
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